Hood's Plan -- Hood's Failure

[trice]

Tim,

I just want to make sure we're on the same page. You say the Mobile & Ohio was not running "in this area..." Are you referring to north of Corinth? When Hood was at Tuscumbia, the Mobile & Ohio tracks were in use to the south of Corinth. As I'm sure you know supplies were then sent via the Memphis & Charleston to Cherokee Station. From there they were hauled overland to Tuscumbia.

Eric

A bit more:

October 30, 1864: "I am here, and need at once twenty days' supply of breadstuffs and salt, with some forage for the supply-train animals, which will have to go to Cherokee for these supplies. Please give me all the assistance you can in obtaining them. I am very much obliged for the aid you have hitherto extended to this army. Can't the cars on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad run directly to Cherokee so as to avoid reshipment at Corinth?" Hood to Taylor from Tuscumbia

October 31, 1864: "I must have twenty days' supply of rations for this army at Cherokee with the least possible delay. Please give me all the assistance you can in transporting them to that point, and allow the trains from your road to run direct to Cherokee Station, which will avoid transshipment at Corinth; time is of the utmost importance." Hood to Superintendant of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad from Tuscumbia.

October 31, 1864: "Give me all the aid you can in transporting twenty days' supply of rations for this army to Cherokee Station at once. Time is all important. I have asked of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to allow their trains to run direct to Cherokee to avoid reshipment at Corinth." Hood to Major Whitfield, Quartermaster at *******n, MS from Tuscumbia

November 3, 1864: "The country round about Florence has been again and again devastated during the past three years, and Beauregard must be dependent on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, which also has been broken and patched up in its whole extent." Sherman to Halleck from Kingston, GA.

November 8, 1864: "I inclose two communications from Major Whitfield. The train I turned back at this place for transportation of negroes and pontoons was unable to pull the entire load. I shipped on same morning by passenger train one car of tools, which I presume are those referred to in his letter and which escaped his attention because of their being on different train. I have adopted the precaution of telegraphing to ascertain positively whether or not they were the tools desired. Transportation is now working well on both roads. Colonel Tare went up on yesterday, and if you can have about 200 of General Smith's negroes turned over to Major Whitfield I think he will have cars running to Tuscumbia in a very short time." Tayor to Hood from *******n.

November 8, 1864: "I respectfully request that the work of repairing the railroad to Cherokee Station be now discontinued, and that the labor thus employed be put to work in repairing the road from Corinth to Purdy, which is in the direction of Jackson, Tenn., also discontinue the work from Cherokee to Tuscumbia. Purdy would, I think, be the most convenient point from which to draw our supplies during the movement contemplated." Hood to Beauregard from Tuscumbia.

November 15, 1864: "Third. To giving still greater protection to Corinth and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to that point.
I was aware that those points had already been discussed between us, but my anxiety for the safety of the troops under your command made it incumbent on me to call again your attention to those important matters. I wish also to inform you that the third point mentioned may require greater time than was at first supposed necessary. All orders for completing the defenses of Corinth, repairing and prosecuting vigorously the work on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to this place, and for repairing the Mobile and Ohio Railroad from Okolona to Bethel, have been given and are being carried out as rapidly as the limited means of the engineer and quartermaster departments will permit. It is at present reported that the railroads referred to will be completed in from fifteen to twenty days, but it is reasonable to suppose that the prevailing unfavorable weather will delay the work one or two weeks longer. General Taylor and myself will always be anxious to aid you in your present campaign with all the means at our control, but these being limited, ample previous notice of what may be required should be given, to enable us to make all necessary preparations. It will also give me pleasure to confer on you such powers as you may deem necessary to secure your communications, repair roads, and hasten supplies to your army whilst operating in the department of General Taylor." Beauregard to Hood from Tuscumbia.

The roads in the area were simply not in good shape, even where they were running. When they received instructions, Taylor and his command did all that they could to get them in running order. But those instructions came far to late for Hood to expect the RR to be running when he got there.

Note also that on November 8 (nine days after he arrived at Tuscumbia, and 13 days before he actually moves out), Hood wants to change his base of supplies AGAIN, this time to Purdy. That LOC would be more vulnerable to Union raids from Memphis and would require construction of another river crossing somewhere near Savannah (where Forrest had been unable to cross of the 6th). It will be vulnerable to interdiction by Federal gunboats any time there is water enough in the river. Supplies from there will have to move East over some pretty poor roads to Waynesborough to get back on the Pike north to Columbia-Franklin-Nashville (assuming that is still what Hood is planning to do).

Note also that on November 8, as Hood wants to change his base of supply, Hood is ALSO ordering his Corps to move across the river at Tuscumbia. Very strange. If he had seriously been planning such a change of base to go along with his forward movement, he needed to start working on it well before this, and would never have been trying to get the RR rebuilt to Tuscumbia. Hood gives every appearance of someone who is pursuing whatever idea came through his head most recently.

Whatever his undoubted skills as an energetic and aggressive battlefield tactical commander, Hood shows every sign of being incompetent on matters of supply and logistics and advance planning. You simply cannot make these types of constant changes without the underpinnings of solid staff work and organization on top of abundant transportation and supply resources. Not if you expect your plan to be workable, anyway.

Tim

 

[trice]

I think you just put it all together quite well. Nothing Hood does is going to change the outcome of the war. But does he, or Lee, or Davis, or many in the ranks either feel the war is truly lost or even more importantly....are they ready to give up? We see it so clearly today, but did they? Apparently not, because they all couldn't be brain dead zombies.

See it clearly? Lee did. He had known from the beginning that if the Union ever reduced the war in the East to a siege of Richmond-Petersburg, their advantage in resources would make the fall of the city a matter of time. Once that happens, the defense of the entire Eastern seaboard of the Confederacy is unhinged; the fall of Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah becomes virtually certain. That is why Lee always sought to move the fighting away from that area in 1862-64.

Davis and Hood are the sort of men who resist ideas that are contrary to their desire. I do not think either one was willing to see the fall of the Confederacy clearly. Not at any time.

Other people probably fall in between. Joe Johnston clearly stated that he understood the situation when he came back to command in early 1865. Beauregard less so, but he was a bit of a poser and might have admitted it to himself earlier than he admitted it publicly. I think he had seen the doom by late November of 1864.

The men in the ranks? We are speaking of well over 100,000 men, maybe over 200,000 in the late Fall of 1864. Some did, some didn't. Resignation to the end was probably gradual, increasing steadily from September on as event after event went against the Confederacy.

That's what makes Franklin so compelling to me. Indomitable spirit on both sides. The war just wasn't over yet and perhaps its greatest tragedy, and other wars as well, is the losing side doesn't quit or know to quit until they have nearly been ground to bits.

That we can easily agree on. If you check, you'll see a discussion in the Campfire Chat - General Discussions section on "Japanese Surrender WWII" that focuses on just what was the tipping point in their decision. Men often fight on when there is little hope, and Japan perhaps did it longer than most.

The same spirit, I think, which kept 33,000 Confederates fighting in Tennessee in late 1864 with no pay, lousy food, crummy clothing, bad weather, death, disease, Lincoln's reelection, etc etc is something of the same spirit which drove Hood. MAYBE MAYBE MAYBE we can win. But we may also die trying.

I'd agree that there is much of that. However, Hood is an Army commander. He is responsible for deciding how much is enough for his men in many situations. The man in the ranks doesn't get to do that under military law (or, rather, he gets charged with disobeying orders and/or desertion if he doesn't attack when ordered.)

Hood is responsible to his government through the chain of command. He is responsible through his duty and obligations to his men for their fate. It is an extremely difficult position to be in, particularly at the end of a war like this one.

Tim

 

[trice]

If you are correct, the question bcomes (in regards to the weather suddenly/unexpectedly turning bad) is what he did in response, based on the resources that could be tapped.

Or to put it another way.

Hood was not forced by destiny to continue on, even with the weather turned far worse than he was (through no fault of his own, the aspects that he should have done better with have been discussed in other posts) able to deal with the resources and supplies at his disposal.

He had the option of turning back, in other words. Would it have been good for morale? No. Would it have accomplished anything? No.

But Hood, somewhere between entering Tennessee and facing Schofield at Franklin, should have taken the time to weigh "Is any potential benefit I can gain from continuing worth the losses, and would turning back now be a greater disaster than continuing onward?"

It does not seem that Hood did that. He was going for Nashville by God and He would enable Hood to overcome the heath...Yankees. (No insult intended in making a half joking comparison of the invasion to a crusade.)

That, to me, is one of the signs that Hood was operating in the land of the highly optimistic. Let's say Hood inflicted 90% losses on Schofield, and suffering casualties equal to about a quarter of his army doing so (presumably, no disproportion losses amongst his generals, for the sake of this speculation.)

Would that be worth it? Would the gain to the Confederacy from destroying Schofield's forces be worth using up a quarter of the Army of Tennessee? Would the Army of Tennessee, after accomplishing such a victory, be in any condition for further operations (here or elsewhere)? Would Schofield's loss be a devastating blow to the Federals, locally or overall?

Unless one can answer "Yes." to most of these, Hood is throwing dice at long odds.

I agree with your post to a very large extent. However, there is one point I would like to note that favors Hood's choice somewhat.

If we are talking about the single point of about 3:30 PM on November 30, with Hood standing on the field and deciding the question "Attack or not?", your description of the upside is not quite strong enough.

Hood's orders, whatever the danger, make one thing clear: Hood's tactical eye saw what his only chance was: overrun and break the 2 Union brigades left outside the defenses and race them for the lines of Franklin, pursuing with the bayonet. He is essentially gambling that confusion and a Union reluctance to fire on their own fleeing men will allow his troops to close enough to swarm over the Yankee line. This is a pure gamble, like a man who suddenly plunges his bet to the limit at a roulette table.

As we note, there was a point where this almost worked. That's pretty remarkable all by itself, and indicates the sharp tactical eye of Hood. For some very short period, it looked like the Rebels might burst through to the bridges. If they had, the Confederacy might very quickly and at comparatively little cost, have killed or captured almost every Union soldier on the Franklin side of the Harpeth River, along with all their equipment.

You might figure that as something like 1,500 Confederate casualties; 10-12,000 Union ones. (I'm not sure how many men were actually in Franklin.) That is devastating to Schofield's command and very damaging to Thomas' command.

But by December 2, Thomas will still have 20-25,000 or more troops in Nashville. Schofield's remnants will arrive, and Smith is already there (10,000) and Steadman and the RR garrisons are arriving (5,000) to reinforce the existing garrison. The city is highly fortified. George Thomas is in command. They won't be coming out anytime soon, but they won't be surrendering, either.

Note that this is after a hypothetical situation that would be the single greatest tactical victory of the Civil War. Embarassing as can be to the Union, creating a political uproar -- but just how serious is it in terms of the overall war situation? Grant still has Lee in a vise. Sherman is still outside Savannah getting ready to take the town. Sheridan is already devastating the Shenandoah, and Farragut has already won at Mobile Bay.

You might see reinforcements from VA sent to TN. Maybe you'd even see Sheridan and the VI Corps coming out. But what does Hood do now, sitting outside Nashville, that is of any real importance?

As I say, that's after an amazingly good stroke of luck for Hood. I think it is possible, but I also think the chance of it is somewhere near 1% when Hood decides to go for it. Does that make it worthwhile?

The downside is what we know happened: some 7,000 estimated Confederate casualties, 15 Confederate generals dead wounded or captured, 53 of 100 regimental commanders as casualties in return for about 1500 Union casualties. As Eric and I agree, if Schofield decides to remain for December 1, this only gets worse for Hood. The likelihood of something very much like this happening when Hood made his decision is very, very high -- I would guess it is somewhere above 75%. Unsupported assaults on men behind any kind of fortification tended to result in disaster by that point in the war.

So that is the problem. In this situation, was Hood making a reasonable decision? Or not?

Tim

 

[Elennsar]

I would say no. The chance of a "decisive" victory (in quotes as even total destruction of Schofield's forces would be minor in terms of the war on the whole) is too small and the chance of losses ensuring that the Army of Tennessee is spent is too high.

The question of "Is this worth it?" really applies to the campaign on the whole, rather than just Franklin.

 

[trice]

I would say no. The chance of a "decisive" victory (in quotes as even total destruction of Schofield's forces would be minor in terms of the war on the whole) is too small and the chance of losses ensuring that the Army of Tennessee is spent is too high.

The question of "Is this worth it?" really applies to the campaign on the whole, rather than just Franklin.

Yes. When I look at the charge at Franklin in 1864, I am reminded of the comment French Marshal Pierre François Joseph Bosquet made on the Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava in 1854 : "It's magnificent, but is it war?"

Tim

 

[EricJacobson]

You might figure that as something like 1,500 Confederate casualties; 10-12,000 Union ones. (I'm not sure how many men were actually in Franklin.) That is devastating to Schofield's command and very damaging to Thomas' command.

But by December 2, Thomas will still have 20-25,000 or more troops in Nashville. Schofield's remnants will arrive, and Smith is already there (10,000) and Steadman and the RR garrisons are arriving (5,000) to reinforce the existing garrison. The city is highly fortified. George Thomas is in command. They won't be coming out anytime soon, but they won't be surrendering, either.

Note that this is after a hypothetical situation that would be the single greatest tactical victory of the Civil War. Embarassing as can be to the Union, creating a political uproar -- but just how serious is it in terms of the overall war situation? Grant still has Lee in a vise. Sherman is still outside Savannah getting ready to take the town. Sheridan is already devastating the Shenandoah, and Farragut has already won at Mobile Bay.

You might see reinforcements from VA sent to TN. Maybe you'd even see Sheridan and the VI Corps coming out. But what does Hood do now, sitting outside Nashville, that is of any real importance?

As I say, that's after an amazingly good stroke of luck for Hood. I think it is possible, but I also think the chance of it is somewhere near 1% when Hood decides to go for it. Does that make it worthwhile?

The downside is what we know happened: some 7,000 estimated Confederate casualties, 15 Confederate generals dead wounded or captured, 53 of 100 regimental commanders as casualties in return for about 1500 Union casualties. As Eric and I agree, if Schofield decides to remain for December 1, this only gets worse for Hood. The likelihood of something very much like this happening when Hood made his decision is very, very high -- I would guess it is somewhere above 75%. Unsupported assaults on men behind any kind of fortification tended to result in disaster by that point in the war.

So that is the problem. In this situation, was Hood making a reasonable decision? Or not?

Tim

Tim,

I think this post says a great deal very well and highlights how you and I look at Franklin fundamentally different. We agree that victory at Franklin for Hood does not change the outcome of the war. But I think even Hood knows the whole campaign is a long shot and he feels that Franklin is his last chance to have any redeeming value to the campaign. On the other hand, he knows Franklin could be a bloody failure. One man later called it "defeat in a blaze of glory."

The hypothetical about what happens if Hood eliminates much of Schofield's army is interesting. However, I know this word downside keeps coming up. I understand your point, but perhaps it is the crux of our disagreement. Certain commanders and soldiers in the CSA clearly didn't look at downside like you or I might. They saw the attitude of fighting to the last man if necessary and dying on the field of battle as a very likely possibility. I have firmly come to believe that unless you try to investigate that mindsight Franklin will never make sense.

By the way Tim, have you ever read my book? I think you will find that I am a bit harder on Hood than I come across from time to time on the boards.

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

The Mobile & Ohio was in terrible shape and had been for a long time. It was struck repeatedly by Federal raids throughout 1864. It suffered from a lack of maintenance and repair. It was short on rolling stock, and the Confederates were resorting to putting sections back in operation by ripping up the track from other sections.

May 1, 1864: "The Mobile and Ohio road is now in running order to Baldwyn, and will shortly be completed to Corinth. The Southern road to Jackson will be ready for travel in about two weeks, and the Central and New Orleans roads are being rapidly repaired." Report of Col. Brent to General Bragg.

June 25, 1864: " From the information I have, am clearly of the opinion that the force now moving from Memphis meditate the destruction of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad as far down as possible and then turn across to the Central railroad, destroy it and return to Memphis." Forrest to Major Elliot from Tupelo.

July 11, 1864: "I am anxious about the Montgomery railroad, which is much exposed to raids from Pensacola. I drew Maury's regiment to this side to be in place to re-enforce you, and then to guard the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and to operate against the enemy in case of his landing at Pascagoula." Dabney Maury to S. D. Lee from Mobile.

July 17, 1864: "The manifest indisposition of the management of the Mobile and Ohio road to do anything unless aided by the army, renders it very certain that if the road is desired we shall have to furnish the labor necessary to repair it, otherwise if the troops are not drawn back to the forage our teams will necessarily be run down in hauling it to the commands, and the negroes also be required to handle it along the railroad and place it on cars to be sent forward as far as the road can carry it. As soon as the road is repaired, General Roddey, with his command, can occupy Corinth again, if it is desirable to do so." Forrest to S. D. Lee from Okolona.

October 12, 1864: "The great predominating, absorbing desire is to cut Sherman's line of communication. I did something toward accomplishing this result during my recent expedition, and I am anxious to renew the effort at some future day, but nothing can be done without a pontoon across the Tennessee River. I suggest that the railroad be repaired from Cherokee to Tus-cumbia and Florence, and that a bridge be thrown across the river. This can be accomplished without much difficulty, as the columns or piles of the old bridge will furnish ample support for ropes. I presume it is the only place on the river that a bridge can be built. The distance from Cherokee to Tuscumbia is fifteen miles. The road for several miles has been destroyed, but the iron necessary for repairs can be procured on the west end of the road between this place and in the direction of Grand Junction. If this bridge was built I could strike the Tennessee and Alabama road or the Nashville and Chattanooga road at pleasure, and return when hard pressed in safety." Forrest to Taylor from Corinth.

October 23, 1864: "First. The railroad from Jacksonville to Selma will be abandoned as a means of supplying the Army of Tennessee, the base having been transferred from Jacksonville to Tuscumbia. Henceforth the lines of communication for army supplies to that point will be the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston Railroads. These roads will be put forthwith in complete running order and be well supplied with rolling-stock." Beauregard's adjutant, Col. Brent, to Taylor from somewhere "In the field".

October 23, 1864: "General Hood moved on the 21st instant toward Guntersville, on the Tennessee River, and has probably by this time crossed that stream with his army. Thin movement, makes it necessary to supply the Army of Tennessee, via Corinth and Cherokee, to Tuscumbia, and, owing to the bad condition of both the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston Railroads, involves the necessity of promptly repairing those roads, establishing water stations on road from Corinth to Cherokee, &c. I have sent all the negroes and tools I can control for the moment to work the road from Okolona to Corinth, and have directed Brigadier-General Roddey to at once impress or hire negroes and tools to repair road from Corinth to Cherokee, and, if possible, to Tuscumbia." Taylor to Forrest from Selma after receiving the order from Beauregard.

October 23, 1864: "The lieutenant-general commanding therefore directs that you immediately proceed to impress hands and tools to repair the railroad from Corinth to Cherokee, and from Cherokee to Tuscumbia. If you are unable to at once impress or hire negroes for this purpose you will put your troops to work on the railroad, beginning by clearing the track between Corinth and Cherokee of weeds and grass, putting in new cross-ties where necessary, and establishing abundance of water stations along the route. The lieutenant-general commanding has ordered all the negroes at his disposal to be sent to Okolona to work the road from there to Corinth. If you can possibly get out negroes enough to spare any for that work, the lieutenant-general commanding wishes you to turn them over to the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. These repairs are now matters of the first importance, and the lieutenant-general commanding expects you to lend all your energies and influence to their speedy completion." Taylor to Roddey in Tuscumbia.

(As noted earlier, you and I agree on Dick Taylor. This indicates one reason why: Taylor is notified he has to do something, detailed orders start flying immediately and things get done.)

October 27, 1864: "Major Whitfield, assistant quartermaster, in charge of railroad transportation, was sent several days ago, with all the negro hands which could be withdrawn from Mobile and Demopolis, for the purpose of putting in order the Mobile and Ohio Railroad and Memphis and Charleston road in accordance with the wishes and instructions of the general commanding. Major-General Gardner has been directed to have a suitable block-house erected at Corinth and other important points on the line of railroad communication within his district. At the railroad crossing of Bear Creek General Roddey had better make the necessary defenses, and he being accessible to General Hood the proper orders may be given him directly by General H. One of my staff officers has been sent to North Mississippi and Alabama for the purpose of urging forward the work on the roads. In the construction of field-works, &c., we must rely almost entirely upon the labor of captured negroes, as the section of country in which the work is to be done will afford very few hands, it being almost stripped of slaves. ... Tuscumbia until recently has been the headquarters of General Roddey. It is distant about fourteen miles from Cherokee, the railroad between those places having been entirely destroyed. ... Colonel Meriwether has been instructed to complete the railroad to Jacksonville. I had hoped, however; that the general commanding would have suspended the work of this extension. To effect the completion of the road to Jacksonville involves the necessity of taking up the iron from the branch road to Marion, which is in daily use and of considerable military as well as local importance in transportation of supplies. ... The road between Memphis and Corinth has been very effectually destroyed to within a short distance of the former place. All the bridges and the trestle-work have been burned and instructions have been given to render the destruction as complete as possible." Taylor to Brent from Selma.

Tim

Tim,

I'm assuming you are pointing all of this for the benefit of others on the board. But back to my original question. The Mobile and Ohio ran, albeit poorly, south of Corinth correct?

Eric

 

[trice]

Tim,

I'm assuming you are pointing all of this for the benefit of others on the board. But back to my original question. The Mobile and Ohio ran, albeit poorly, south of Corinth correct?

Eric, as that post points out, sometimes it did and sometimes it did not. Which particular point in time do you wish an answer for?

Tim

 

[trice]

By the way Tim, have you ever read my book? I think you will find that I am a bit harder on Hood than I come across from time to time on the boards.

I have seen and glanced at it, but have never had the opportunity to read it. Seemed like it might be a good one.

Tim

 

[EricJacobson]

The entire premise of Hood's invasion is that Sherman must follow him if he goes there. This is proven wrong the day Sherman starts marching for Savannah, when Hood is still sitting at Tuscumbia. Hood's actions to this point have already shown that he should not be holding this command. Hood then compounds his original error by invading TN anyway.

Bacvk in September and October, Hood had promised he would follow Sherman if Sherman moved away. Now Hood has placed himself where he cannot follow Sherman. Doesn't Hood bear responsibility for this?

Tim

Tim,

I do not believe that after a certain time frame Sherman was ever the goal. Going into Tennessee, Sherman following or not, was always the backdrop. Hood, of course, knows this and Davis does too, although he almost immediately tried to distance himself. It is true both of them, and others perhaps, thought Sherman would follow into Tennessee, but ultimately this was an effort to retake Nashville. Sherman is largely incidental.

Again, I think we agree Hood should NEVER have been in command of the army. But Tim, he was. Repeating over and over again that he shouldn't have been doesn't change that he was. And invading Tennessee, Sherman or not, was always the inferred goal, in my opinion.

Hood was fully responsible for the campaign ending in failure.

Eric

 

[trice]

Tim,

I think this post says a great deal very well and highlights how you and I look at Franklin fundamentally different. We agree that victory at Franklin for Hood does not change the outcome of the war. But I think even Hood knows the whole campaign is a long shot and he feels that Franklin is his last chance to have any redeeming value to the campaign. On the other hand, he knows Franklin could be a bloody failure. One man later called it "defeat in a blaze of glory."

The hypothetical about what happens if Hood eliminates much of Schofield's army is interesting. However, I know this word downside keeps coming up. I understand your point, but perhaps it is the crux of our disagreement. Certain commanders and soldiers in the CSA clearly didn't look at downside like you or I might. They saw the attitude of fighting to the last man if necessary and dying on the field of battle as a very likely possibility. I have firmly come to believe that unless you try to investigate that mindsight Franklin will never make sense.

That may well be. I have noted before that I understand the mindset. My Dad fought on Leyte and Okinawa as a combat infantryman, and certainly the Japanese had the die-on-the-battlefield part going for them. I simply don't think that it is necessarily proper for Hood to enforce it upon his army. The average man in the ranks having it is one thing; the Army commander deciding it for everyone else is another.

Tim

 

[EricJacobson]

Eric, as that post points out, sometimes it did and sometimes it did not. Which particular point in time do you wish an answer for?

Tim

When Hood is at Tuscumbia, of course. Because your answer of sometimes further ****s Hood, when the evidence I found from November 1864 is that the tracks, although far from perfect, were in working order. Not sometimes, but every day.

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

See it clearly? Lee did. He had known from the beginning that if the Union ever reduced the war in the East to a siege of Richmond-Petersburg, their advantage in resources would make the fall of the city a matter of time. Once that happens, the defense of the entire Eastern seaboard of the Confederacy is unhinged; the fall of Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah becomes virtually certain. That is why Lee always sought to move the fighting away from that area in 1862-64.

Davis and Hood are the sort of men who resist ideas that are contrary to their desire. I do not think either one was willing to see the fall of the Confederacy clearly. Not at any time.

If didn't stop Lee from fighting though did it? In fact, it didn't stop him from launching bloody attacks to get away from Petersburg. It also didn't stop him from dragging his limping army across Virginia, sort of like Hood's limping army heading south across Middle Tennessee. Only when completely surrounded, tracked down like a wounded dog, and on the verge of annihilation, did Lee accept defeat.

Eric

 

[trice]

I do not believe that after a certain time frame Sherman was ever the goal. Going into Tennessee, Sherman following or not, was always the backdrop. Hood, of course, knows this and Davis does too, although he almost immediately tried to distance himself. It is true both of them, and others perhaps, thought Sherman would follow into Tennessee, but ultimately this was an effort to retake Nashville. Sherman is largely incidental.

Not to Davis and not to Beauregard. Both of them see the purpose of a move to TN as drawing Sherman back there. If Hood was thinking this way, then that is a massive criticism of Hood.

What you are saying is that moving to TN is more important to the Confederacy than anything else. That is not the case, and such strategic thinking can only result in the destruction of the Confederacy.

Again, I think we agree Hood should NEVER have been in command of the army. But Tim, he was. Repeating over and over again that he shouldn't have been doesn't change that he was. And invading Tennessee, Sherman or not, was always the inferred goal, in my opinion.

I do not think I have been saying that about Hood, although I believe he was promoted too far. I have been saying that his own ideas and actions are what doomed his efforts. He was not forced to invade TN -- he chose to do so, and in fact acted improperly in many ways in making sure it happened.

Tim

 

[trice]

When Hood is at Tuscumbia, of course. Because your answer of sometimes further ****s Hood, when the evidence I found from November 1864 is that the tracks, although far from perfect, were in working order. Not sometimes, but every day.

It isn't when Taylor gets the word on October 23. It isn't when Hood arrives at Tuscumbia on October 31. It is still not running on November 8 when Hood asks Beauregard to suspend repairs to Cherokee Station. On November 15, Beauregard is again telling Hood that it will take some time to get this running reliably. So at what point in there do you think it is running day after day in a manner that will support Hood's army?

Tim

 

[trice]

If didn't stop Lee from fighting though did it? In fact, it didn't stop him from launching bloody attacks to get away from Petersburg. It also didn't stop him from dragging his limping army across Virginia, sort of like Hood's limping army heading south across Middle Tennessee. Only when completely surrounded, tracked down like a wounded dog, and on the verge of annihilation, did Lee accept defeat.

I have said before that Lee's situation is vastly different: he is in the immediate presence of his commander-in-chief and must defer to Davis on many matters while that is the case. With the exception of Gordon's attack (impeccably planned, initially successful, a total failure), what is it you are objecting to? Do you think Lee should have resigned? Do you think he should have surrendered as soon as he got the news of Five Forks? What, exactly, is it your opinion he should have done differently and how does it compare to Hood's decisions?

Tim

 

[EricJacobson]

Not to Davis and not to Beauregard. Both of them see the purpose of a move to TN as drawing Sherman back there. If Hood was thinking this way, then that is a massive criticism of Hood.

What you are saying is that moving to TN is more important to the Confederacy than anything else. That is not the case, and such strategic thinking can only result in the destruction of the Confederacy.

We'll disagree about Davis. By this stage of the war, moving into Tennessee was going to accomplish about as much as trying to stop Sherman. Not much, but capturing Nashville would have had a much bigger ripple effect, in my opinion.

 

[EricJacobson]

I have said before that Lee's situation is vastly different: he is in the immediate presence of his commander-in-chief and must defer to Davis on many matters while that is the case. With the exception of Gordon's attack (impeccably planned, initially successful, a total failure), what is it you are objecting to? Do you think Lee should have resigned? Do you think he should have surrendered as soon as he got the news of Five Forks? What, exactly, is it your opinion he should have done differently and how does it compare to Hood's decisions?

Tim

I don't think Lee should have resigned. He did what he thought best....period. I won't even get into comparing Lee and Hood because there is no comparison. Different men, different situations. But both are driven to fight to the very last. What I'm sick of is the constant attack of Hood, but when the conversation is compared or shifted to Lee's less than stellar moments, well, that doesn't apply.

In the end, I will never convince you and you will never convince me. Rather than have this endless running argument, we can be gentlemen and agree to disagree.

Eric

 

[Elennsar]

In regards to the blaze of glory mindset.

Understandable? Somewhat.

Acceptable? No, particularly as Hood did it.

If Hood said to his men something to the effect of "If we are to die, let us die like men" (which, if memory serves, Cleburne did say.) and had gone in with them, in the style of some grandly quixotic charge of old, that might have something resembling merit. It would be foolish but at least it would be able to claim that it was done honorably.

Sending his men, with all signs indicating he expects success (or that he conveyed the impression that he thought the AoT could succeed here) in an all but suicidal charge at Schofield's lines, and then sitting outside Nashville for Thomas to come out and destroy what's left of the Army of Tennessee is not something I can give him an ounce of respect for on this score.

Hood owed his men one of two things.

1) A fair chance to fight and win in whatever battles he ordered them into, subject to the limitations of the situation at hand.

2) A full explaination of why a glorious death would be better than accepting that they've lost and surrendering.

Not "You don't want to live under the Yankee tyrants, do you?" but an explaination for how their heroism would mean something.

Death before dishonor is a wonderful concept. When "dishonor" is pronounced like "defeat", it becomes either suicidal or murderous, depending on if the individual with it is making that choice for himself or imposing that choice on his subordinates.

I'll give Hood the benefit of the doubt. He wasn't intentionally trying to destroy his army out of some pyschotic obsession with casuality figures.

It just looks that way because there are very few more charitable explainations.

Elennsar

Edit: I'm perfectly willing to say the same about Lee in any situation in which he did something equally appaling. I'm biased against fools, not Hood.

 

[trice]

I don't think Lee should have resigned. He did what he thought best....period. I won't even get into comparing Lee and Hood because there is no comparison. Different men, different situations. But both are driven to fight to the very last. What I'm sick of is the constant attack of Hood, but when the conversation is compared or shifted to Lee's less than stellar moments, well, that doesn't apply.

In the end, I will never convince you and you will never convince me. Rather than have this endless running argument, we can be gentlemen and agree to disagree.

Lee certainly has less than stellar moments. Gettysburg July 1-3 comes to mind immediately; definitely not his best, and I have great trouble seeing how he could have believed the attack of Pickett would succeed although I am convinced that somehow he did believe it.

But Lee's task in 1864 and 1865 was accomplished very well. There is no moment before the breakthrough at Five Forks at which it is reasonable to expect Lee to surrender -- that is a decision for Davis and the Confederate government. Generally speaking, Lee husbanded his strength incredibly well over that period of time, knowing all the while that the shoe was going to drop in the Spring when Grant moved.

Once Grant smashes through in April, it is Grant's responsibility to do what he can as long as he can. This ends up being nine days or less where you can criticize him for not ending it. While he is still in contact with Davis and allowing the Confederate government time to escape, there is some reason for saying that he should continue to resist. After Sailor's Creek, the sand is just about gone from the hourglass. At Appomattox, it would have been approaching insanity to fight any more.

Late on April 7th, Lee received a message from Grant asking his surrender. Longstreet describes it thus: "I was sitting at his side when the note was delivered. He read it and handed it to me without referring to its contents. After reading it I gave it back, saying, 'Not yet.'"

That is how military men think of such things; Grant, Lee and Longstreet all understood the situation, which is why Grant had written. The last resort was close, and Lee could have given it up then. Thirty-six hours later he did. That is essentially the margin we are talking about with Lee.

Tim