"One hand behind its back"

My citation of the number of soldiers in the AoP and AoJ in 1864 was to show that Union manpower was not the inexhaustable supply that Foote and others seem to think it was. If as late as 1864, with the victories in Atlanta, the Union was unable to muster more troops, where was this "other hand" of which Foote speaks going to come from?

The Union was not completely behind the war effort and I do not believe further Confederate victories would have changed this for the better.

No, it's a tricky issue, the number of men in the Federal Army. I have known people that insist there was a million man army out there somewhere. While the muster rolls did have slightly over a million names on them by wars end, the total strength of every department of the US shows somewhere between 200 and 300,000 during this period, with a major low after the 1864 Presidential election when the soldiers from states Lincoln was in danger of losing were furloughed to vote for him, and then half of them didn't come back.

However, Foote is talking about unrestricted conscription, and he kind of has a point, but even Prussia could have raised the numbers bandied about (with about the same population, new territories included, as the Federal States they but about 800,000 men in arms in 1870). However, the situation in 1864 is so bad that 7 out of 8 new enlistees are deserting soon after enlistment....
 
The U.S. had economic superiority

"It was an article of faith in the Confederacy that Northern industry would collapse when cut off from its Southern markets and its supply of cotton. Northern industry, on the contrary, grew fat and saucy during the war. Union sea power, despite Confederate raiders, protected freight and passenger service to foreign markets. War's demand stimulated production: in Philadelphia alone 180 new factories were built during the years 1862-64. A government generous in contracts and lavish in expenditures helped to create a new aristocracy of profiteers, who became masters of capital after the war. 1


1. The foundations of fortunes laid during the war were: Armour (meat packing), Havemeyer (sugar), Weyerhaeuser (lumber), Huntington (merchandise and railroads), Remington (guns), Rockefeller (oil), Carnegie (iron and steel), Borden (milk), Marshall Field (merchandise), and Stillman (contraband cotton). There were even a few such in the South -the King Ranch of Texas, for instance.

Source:
p668 The Oxford History of The American People. Samuel Eliot Morison. Oxford University Press. 1965.
 
The problem of assessing "One hand behind its back"

There are tens of thousand of "battle books" read and studied by those interested in the Civil War.

How many ever read a book on Jay Cooke? Not a lot of demand there.

R.E. Lee knew about Jay Cooke. In a letter to his son in early 1863 he wrote, ..."you see the Federal Congress has put the whole power of their country into the hands of their President. Nine hundred millions of dollars & three millions of men. Nothing now can arrest during the present administration the most desolating war that was ever practiced, except a revolution among their people...."

The U.S. was waging a war that even an old army officer could not comprehend, due to the vast amount of money spent on the war. A great deal of that money was raised by a man, few who study the Civil war, ever heard.

One great problem the Confederate founding fathers never considered resolveable, when seceding, was how the U.S. was going to raise the money to send troops into the Southern states. It had never been done, or could be done, prior to Lincoln's time. The Confederate founding fathers had never heard of one Jay Cooke.

Cooke, Jay, 1821–1905, American financier, b. Sandusky, Ohio. He founded Jay Cooke & Company, which marketed the huge Civil War loans of the federal government.
 
By phrasing the comment in that Shelby Foote avoids questions of secessionist legitimacy and national will.
By looking at the disparity of population, especially male military age population in the western states, of Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa and Minnesota, and by considering the limits on the strength of the secessionist movement, the outcome is weighted towards the United States from the beginning.
When one considers that the most dangerous weapons of the war were steam frigates and gunboats, and logistics were going to be supported by railroads, the conclusion is even more weighted in favor of the United States.
But considering the United States brought out that second hand, beginning in August 1864, and sent large, well equipped cavalry troops fighting and raiding all over the Confederacy, and the Confederates ended up with no answer, the late Mr. Foote's statement illustrates the essential tragic character of the Civil War.
Foote's comment is the same as General Grant's book.
The United States was going to win, only the how and when had to be decided.
 
I wonder if the statement simply relates to the Union's inherent advantages of better overall leadership--Lincoln vs Davis, better generalship--Grant and Sherman and the ability to keep the Union forces well fed and well armed. It took two full years for all those advantages to merge before the strong right hand did the deed.
Didn't anyone ever question Foote about his claim?
 
I think Foote's conclusion is correct, but in 1864 that second hand was used, and in a quick series of jabs and power punches, Sherman made it to Atlanta, Mobile Bay was closed, and Grant had Lee locked down at Petersburg. When Grant ended the Banks expedition and took control of the Army of the James, and created a unified command in the Shenandoah Valley, the war ended rapidly and completely.
 
The second hand was coming out, but it wasn't larger land armies. The other part of the war mobilization was the much improved telegraph network, a railroad industry that adapted to moving unprecedented volumes of freight, a domestic firearms industry that was constantly experimenting with new weapons and new ammunition, and much more powerful naval vessels.
The second hand was deployed in the combined arms operation at Mobile Bay, the water based logistics of the Petersberg siege supplemented by a military railroad, and the final operation against Fort Fisher at Wilmington, NC. At Fort Fisher, the navy could just stand off the coast and move the bombardment from point to point as the soldiers and marines advanced. And that was not the limit of what was possible.
The late Mr. Foote's statement is a summary statement based on his extensive reading of material published about the paid labor states during the war.
 
"One hand behind it's back"

When Lincoln was sworn in as President, there was no gov't less prepared for war tha the United States.
A miniscule, widely dispersed, army, a superanuated senior officer corps (many of whom were dough faces) and a War Dept. so tied in bureaucratic red tape that it was barely able to shuffle its paperwork from one bin to another.. A treasury with, almost literally, no money etc.
The directing and control of a nationwide war, was a work in progress all through the war. The point is that Lincon and his administration were activists, they met the challenges as they occurred, head on and found solutions to problems, rather than reason's something could not be done or reject programs, because 'it had never been done that way before'.
By mid 1863 and beyond, the war was won militarily, it was a matter of the war for the hearts and minds of the Unionist's something that Lincoln and his party knew a great deal about.
Lincoln was perfectly capable of leading the Union's war effort, and as others have noted, where Lincoln led, the people and Congress eventually followed.
It is true that of necessity, the North Had to fight with severe, political, social and industrial handicaps, but as the war progressed and the country learned the art of war making (almost from the ground up) the restraints of those handicaps lessened and as the war continued the other hand (of steel) was surely being loosened, until it was fully freed, had the south managed to survive the hand of iron..
Indeed. What I think people underestimate is not just the North's industrial capacity, but that capacity combined with Lincoln's resolve. He had a giant aura of influence and persuasion. And once he brought Grant east, he had the general with the exact personality and mindset needed to carry it through.

I believe that if the 1864 Virginia campaign had gone much worse, and I mean much worse (Cold Harbor along with the other horrific losses in May and June was bad enough), Grant with Lincoln's blessing would have simply doubled down and tripled down with more logistical pressure.

He would have gone into whatever level of debt was necessary to accelerate the capacity. They could have begun producing breechloaders almost immediately. New and existing regiments could have been brought onto line armed with Henry repeaters, early Winchesters, Sharps, Spencers all in much greater quantities. But even with rifled muskets, the North could keep bringing new regiments to the front.
 
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