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- Apr 4, 2017
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And the Economics of the American Civil War David G. Surdam, University of South Carolina Press 2001.
This is a fact heavy book. The econometrics included for consumption by students and other economists are postponed to the appendixes, but the bulk of the book is a study of the pre war economy of the potential Confederacy. The effects of the blockade on cotton shipments is also emphasized. Special attention is paid to the facts that the southern states were partially dependent on the pork production of Arkansas, Tennessee and Kentucky and the beef production of Texas. Getting the meat to where the cities were located, and to the armies that were fighting was going to be difficult for the Confederacy even without a blockade.
The most interesting question for me was Surdam's mention that it was not clear cut that the American cotton economy would be most rapidly restored by forced mediation and an armistice as contrasted to outright US victory. Both points of view had arguments to propose. There was no clear cut answer especially after the US controlled both New Orleans and the Mississippi River all the way down to Memphis and beyond.
Surdam did not discuss another question that might would have been related to the possibility of British intervention. How divided would an armistice and division weaken the US when by September and October of 1862 the US controlled the major rivers, all the most populous cities, all of the far west, all of primary industrial areas and was exporting a grain surplus to the world market? I don't think people in England considered that a US faced with a Confederate competitor could be permanently militarized and produce its own American Napoleon.
Surdam does mention US wheat as a factor working against British intervention. The fact that the wheat was being shipped on US railroads owned in part by Englishmen, and was available as cargo for English ships that were taking over the US to Liverpool route, and that they wheat was arriving in Liverpool where it could be resold all over Europe, and this was all happening while the US was mobilizing to contest a Civil War, might have caused some people to advise restraint and patience.
This is a fact heavy book. The econometrics included for consumption by students and other economists are postponed to the appendixes, but the bulk of the book is a study of the pre war economy of the potential Confederacy. The effects of the blockade on cotton shipments is also emphasized. Special attention is paid to the facts that the southern states were partially dependent on the pork production of Arkansas, Tennessee and Kentucky and the beef production of Texas. Getting the meat to where the cities were located, and to the armies that were fighting was going to be difficult for the Confederacy even without a blockade.
The most interesting question for me was Surdam's mention that it was not clear cut that the American cotton economy would be most rapidly restored by forced mediation and an armistice as contrasted to outright US victory. Both points of view had arguments to propose. There was no clear cut answer especially after the US controlled both New Orleans and the Mississippi River all the way down to Memphis and beyond.
Surdam did not discuss another question that might would have been related to the possibility of British intervention. How divided would an armistice and division weaken the US when by September and October of 1862 the US controlled the major rivers, all the most populous cities, all of the far west, all of primary industrial areas and was exporting a grain surplus to the world market? I don't think people in England considered that a US faced with a Confederate competitor could be permanently militarized and produce its own American Napoleon.
Surdam does mention US wheat as a factor working against British intervention. The fact that the wheat was being shipped on US railroads owned in part by Englishmen, and was available as cargo for English ships that were taking over the US to Liverpool route, and that they wheat was arriving in Liverpool where it could be resold all over Europe, and this was all happening while the US was mobilizing to contest a Civil War, might have caused some people to advise restraint and patience.
Bringing the