General James B McPherson

[SSVilla]

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Thought that's an interesting comment by Sherman that was highlighted.

How often, and to what extent, are perceptions and assessments of CW generals during wartime influenced/shaped (positively or negatively) by a knowledge of their postwar life experiences?. James Longstreet is one example, that readily comes to mind.

I think honestly of the many memoirs I have read, Sherman is probably the one who took it very seriously to stick to how he felt and saw things at the time. He used letters and memoranda and stuck a lot of his original letters and dispatches to tell the story.

All one has to keep in mind is that it's still his subjective opinion at the time. One cannot take that as the truth of things… but it does reveal what he thought.

————

Imagine the complications of adding in revisionist writing, that is all these generals who make up stuff besides, like if only so and so had listened to me… or I was the one who came up with X idea or Y. General James H. Wilson is one who makes me very suspicious.

 

[tony_gunter]

I don't know what specifically so triggered Bearss about McPherson, but if you really want to see a hit piece, you should read Misfire in Mississippi. Bearss basically expends a novella calling McPherson a coward for his decision in the Canton Expedition 1863, retreating with 8,000 troops back to his base while 12,000 troops converged on him.

Canton Expedition, 1863 | Siege of Vicksburg

I was pondering Ed Bearss propensity for pooping all over McPherson for reasons I can't discern. In pondering his disdain for McPherson, I was reading back over the Canton Expedition of 1863. Background for the expedition: Grant besieges Vicksburg with XIII, XV, and XVII Corps. Portions of...

civilwartalk.com

 

[tony_gunter]

I'm not surprised that Ed Bearss expressed the opinion that McPherson may have been one of the most over-rated corps commanders. McPherson was, undoubtedly, one of the bright engineering graduates of WP, with a winning personality that easily led to his becoming a protege of Grant and Sherman. But his elevation to corps, and finally army command, may have been too hasty to give him sufficient time to hone his leadership and tactical abilities to a level that is commensurate with the high acclaim he has been accorded in history. Grant and or Sherman may have treated McPherson with kid gloves for his moves at Raymond and Snake Creek Gap. Although McPherson's best decision was probably deducing the threat to the AoT's flank near Decatur and safeguarding that position in the nick of time from Hardee's flank attack. That, and his untimely death in battle, are what cemented his reputation and ends up being most remembered.

I'm not sure where Bearss came to any of those conclusions. McPherson was more or less directing troop dispositions beginning at Fort Henry (much to McClernand's chagrin), Donelson, Shiloh, commanded a brigade at Second Corinth, and an ad hoc army corps beginning in October 1862.

Grant's plan in the Vicksburg Campaign was to move up along the Big Black River and pin Pemberton in place while his right wing broke the railroad and possibly reduced Jackson, forcing Pemberton out of his fortifications. IOW, McClernand was the anvil, McPherson was the hammer, and Sherman was the reserve between the two.

Grant wasn't "protecting" McPherson or handling him with kid gloves. McPherson had already proven his ability to make rapid marches while living off the land in December 1862 so McPherson was the logical choice for the right wing.

 

[jackt62]

Grant wasn't "protecting" McPherson or handling him with kid gloves. McPherson had already proven his ability to make rapid marches while living off the land in December 1862 so McPherson was the logical choice for the right wing.

As I understand it, according to Tim Smith, Grant didn't expect a significant enemy response on the right, which is why he assigned McPherson to that flank. Despite his other misgivings with McClernand, Grant apparently valued him to hold the more exposed left wing along the Big Black River. Getting back to McPherson, it made absolute sense for Grant to place the more inexperienced McPherson where he did.

 

[tony_gunter]

As I understand it, according to Tim Smith, Grant didn't expect a significant enemy response on the right, which is why he assigned McPherson to that flank. Despite his other misgivings with McClernand, Grant apparently valued him to hold the more exposed left wing along the Big Black River. Getting back to McPherson, it made absolute sense for Grant to place the more inexperienced McPherson where he did.

McClernand had the easy lift. March north with his flank protected by the Big Black, his front protected by Fourteen Mile Creek, and the supply line running directly to his rear. McPherson had the difficult lift: sprint north to the railroad with no supply line, break the railroad, possibly reduce Jackson before reinforcements could arrive, and be ready to sprint back to the main body and attack if, as Grant hoped, Pemberton moved out of his fortifications. Sherman occupied the middle, ready to reinforce either corps as the situation required, but on May 12th, McClernand and Sherman were basically side by side, while McPherson was 7 miles away from Sherman with a cavalry brigade blocking the direct road between, which left two direct roads open by which Pemberton could have reinforced Raymond (and in fact did reinforce Raymond with the cavalry brigade mentioned previously).

Grant protecting McPherson is a silly fabrication that originated with Bearss.

 

[RedRover]

I think honestly of the many memoirs I have read, Sherman is probably the one who took it very seriously to stick to how he felt and saw things at the time. He used letters and memoranda and stuck a lot of his original letters and dispatches to tell the story.

All one has to keep in mind is that it's still his subjective opinion at the time. One cannot take that as the truth of things… but it does reveal what he thought.

————

Imagine the complications of adding in revisionist writing, that is all these generals who make up stuff besides, like if only so and so had listened to me… or I was the one who came up with X idea or Y. General James H. Wilson is one who makes me very suspicious.

It wasn't just memoirs. Gen. Lee's staff officer Charles Marshall, who compiled the official reports, noted it was very difficult to keep the wartime official reports submitted to HQ from wandering into who did'nt do X or Y, rather than just sticking to what they did, and and why. He had to interview many officers to determine where their report might have gone off the rails, and determine for General Lee's own reports what was what.

General Sherman, in his own official reports during the war, relative to what happened at Resaca on May 9, offered no specific criticism of Gen. McPherson, because Gen. M. did not disobey any orders, and no disaster resulted. From his report;

....

So Sherman's "disappointment" is part of the official record. Ten years later, in his memoir, Gen. Sherman states that his "somewhat disappointment" manifested due to a personal conclusion that McPherson's failure to throw the dice in an all out assault on Resaca, or failing that, digging in on the railroad to await a counterattack on May 9, was seemingly timid, considering SHERMAN, did not believe the Confederates would have fought for that point in any force. In other words, he believed Gen. McPherson might have made some "bolder" attack" either at Resaca or on the railroad at any point than he did, before his command fell back to Snake Creek Gap, as ordered. Sherman's memoir, vol. 2:

Sherman is not speaking of McPherson personally, but his generalship. He says HE was certain McPherson's movement was a surprise to the Confederates, and threw them into some disorder:

Was McPherson's advance, under Dodge, practically unopposed on May 9? Turning to Confederate sources, it appears there were ca. 4,000 CSA troops in the fortifications there by the time of McPherson's withdrawal of that part of his army facing them:

And more Confederates were on the way according to General Johnston, the Confederate Commander. He states that McPherson's advance engaged the CS cavalry pickets at Snake Creek, all the way to Resaca where they took position in the trenches with artillery, and Hood's corps WAS prepared to move from about Dalton to Resaca for its defense should McPherson have chosen to contended for it... and that was besides the infantry of Polk's corps from Mississippi moving by rail to Resaca en route to join Johnston at Dalton.
But this Night of the 9th, per Johnston:

So though only perhaps 4,000 troops were in the lines at Resaca when McPherson probed them, Hood's corps was backing them up; And Polk's infantry on the way there, as even Hood admitted in his memoir. It is evidently the case that when McPherson withdrew from Resaca without attacking in force on the evening of the 9th, Gen. Johnston recalled Hood's corps to Dalton:

Night of the 10th and during the 11th, General Johnston again prepared to reinforce the lines at Resaca as the federals again moved from Snake Creek Gap toward that point, but by then Gen. Polk was at Resaca with Loring's infantry division entire, besides the cavalry still skirmishing with McPherson about Snake Creek Gap...

General Schofield, who commanded the Army of the Ohio at the time, explains the McPherson's situation on May 9, and why he did no wrong in declining a general assault upon Resaca or digging in against Johnston's army in that vicinity on that day, because he could not conclude, as Sherman had in May, '64, that the Confederates would not have fought McPherson for Resaca on the 9th:

So Schofield believes McPherson's assault upon Resaca's defenses on the 9th would have required at least 12,000 troops, if not more to then hold it against counter-attack. He was personally convinced that far from having a chance at crippling Johnston's army by cutting off Resaca, had McPherson's army of the Tennessee engaged in a general battle to take and hold that point, Johnston was not only ready for it, but determined to prevent it and punish them for the attempt, and so, like Sherman, Johnston would have preferred a bolder attempt by McPherson:

So the argument seems to come down to General Sherman versus General Johnston's personal speculations. Sherman says, if McPherson had been bolder, less timid (as he put it) on May 9, one of the most significant victories of the war MIGHT have been carried out, and Johnston thrown into irrevocable disorder by McPherson fighting a general battle for Resaca or a point on the road. General Johnston, for his part, says that had McPherson chosen to fight to the death for Resaca or a point on the road on May 9, he would have obliged and MIGHT have crushed him before Sherman's other forces could render aid.

But neither of these circumstances occurred, to the various disappointments of Sherman and Johnston, because of McPherson. To Sherman because of a somewhat "timidity" in his movements and to Johnston because of McPherson's circumspection would not allow for his being baited into disaster.
McPherson simply fell back from what he thought was a bad position, per his orders, back to Snake Creek Gap, per his orders, and advanced with the balance of the army to take on Resaca a few days later, after Johnston had already fallen back from Dalton to that point, without a general battle. So while McPherson might not have "snapped the whip" as hard as Sherman preferred on May 9, he did it loud enough to cause Johnston to hear it, and eventually to fall back on that point, but without a chance to crush McPherson in doing so.

So we turn to General McPherson himself. His official communications to General Sherman comprise our lone evidences of his doings and reasonings, as he died shortly after, and so could not respond to the personal speculations of Sherman or Johnston relative to their various hopes on the 9th of May as later written about. Here's what McPherson reported to Sherman on the night of the 9th:

So it was General Dodge of the 16th Corps, the front end of a tenuous and constricted route of march, who probed and skirmished with the Confederate defenses at Resaca on the 9th. He reported that Gen. McPherson personally came up to observe the Confederate fortifications after his troops assaulted and captured the bald hill west of the Confederate lines. As they deployed to face the Confederate fortifications, the skirmishing was continuous at all points, and they were subjected to artillery fire from the fortifications sweeping all open ground, and in some places, bold movements by the Confederates to threaten the flanks of Dodge's 2nd Division, attempting to deploy in the woods, etc. When McPherson decided against a general assault, and then the withdrawal, it was done with difficulty, and without massing, by regiments, and under fire, as the Confederate artillery swept the open ground through which they had advanced, and next withdrew back to Snake Creed Gap, as Sherman's standing orders provided for.

McPherson on the 10th reported to Sherman that all his units had been in, and remained, in constant contact with Confederate skirmishers, a continuous skirmish line, in fact, several miles long, while advancing and withdrawing about Resaca on the 9th, and this certainly signifies that Johnston knew exactly what force was approaching Resaca, which contingency Johnston says he planned for the previous day, the 8th, when McPherson first moved into Snake Creek Gap. McPherson to Sherman on the afternoon of the 10th:

So there we have it. Besides Shermans' personal opinion that He missed a chance at great victory by McPherson's not attacking Resaca or contending for the railroad on the 9th; and Besides Johnson's that HE missed a chance at a great victory by McPherson's not attacking and contending for Resaca or the railroad on the 9th; Gen. McPherson was satisfied that had Gen. Sherman personally witnessed the positions and situation, he would have approved his course of at least threatening Resaca and the railroad on the 9th, and digging in at Snake Creek inviting a counterattack by Johnston, who declined to attack Snake Creek Gap, but did in fact choose to withdraw his whole force from about Dalton to Resaca in the following days.

General Sherman as McPherson's commanding officer, accepted McPherson's reports on their face. He didn't have to, he might have attempted to insert his opinion of McPherson's movements into the official record, but he knew better.

 

[tony_gunter]

As I understand it, according to Tim Smith, Grant didn't expect a significant enemy response on the right, which is why he assigned McPherson to that flank. Despite his other misgivings with McClernand, Grant apparently valued him to hold the more exposed left wing along the Big Black River. Getting back to McPherson, it made absolute sense for Grant to place the more inexperienced McPherson where he did.

I guess silly is a bit mean.

Strange? Counter-intuitive?

McClernand had the largest force with four divisions. Logically, his corps would cover the largest space: Big Black River to Mt Moriah Road (5 miles of frontage at Fourteen Mile Creek). McClernand was the door frame.

McPherson with two divisions had the most experience making rapid marches without a supply line. Logically, he would be the door that swung shut on Pemberton.

Sherman with two divisions would sit between the two and serve as the hinge.

Grant was well aware that Port Hudson was not yet invested, and that as long as the railroad was intact McPherson could be met with thousands of reinforcements from Port Hudson (~15,000) and the east (unknown). McPherson's raid on Crystal Springs returned on May 11th with intel that thousands of troops had passed through the town to Jackson from Port Hudson and Beauregard (actually Johnston) was on his way with an army.

If Grant were protecting McPherson, it stands to reason he would have had him in Sherman's spot safely between the two wings, not on the extreme right where he could be surprised from either the east or the west.

Bearss has a provable and inexplicable bias against McPherson. Again, the best proof of that is to read Misfire in Mississippi where Bearss labels McPherson a coward for withdrawing to his base instead of pushing on to Canton, when a superior force was converging on him, he was 30 miles deep into enemy territory living off the land, and his cavalry was woefully outmatched (1500 to 3400).

 

[Nathan Towne]

It wasn't just memoirs. Gen. Lee's staff officer Charles Marshall, who compiled the official reports, noted it was very difficult to keep the wartime official reports submitted to HQ from wandering into who did'nt do X or Y, rather than just sticking to what they did, and and why. He had to interview many officers to determine where their report might have gone off the rails, and determine for General Lee's own reports what was what.

General Sherman, in his own official reports during the war, relative to what happened at Resaca on May 9, offered no specific criticism of Gen. McPherson, because Gen. M. did not disobey any orders, and no disaster resulted. From his report;

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So Sherman's "disappointment" is part of the official record. Ten years later, in his memoir, Gen. Sherman states that his "somewhat disappointment" manifested due to a personal conclusion that McPherson's failure to throw the dice in an all out assault on Resaca, or failing that, digging in on the railroad to await a counterattack on May 9, was seemingly timid, considering SHERMAN, did not believe the Confederates would have fought for that point in any force. In other words, he believed Gen. McPherson might have made some "bolder" attack" either at Resaca or on the railroad at any point than he did, before his command fell back to Snake Creek Gap, as ordered. Sherman's memoir, vol. 2:


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Sherman is not speaking of McPherson personally, but his generalship. He says HE was certain McPherson's movement was a surprise to the Confederates, and threw them into some disorder:

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Was McPherson's advance, under Dodge, practically unopposed on May 9? Turning to Confederate sources, it appears there were ca. 4,000 CSA troops in the fortifications there by the time of McPherson's withdrawal of that part of his army facing them:

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And more Confederates were on the way according to General Johnston, the Confederate Commander. He states that McPherson's advance engaged the CS cavalry pickets at Snake Creek, all the way to Resaca where they took position in the trenches with artillery, and Hood's corps WAS prepared to move from about Dalton to Resaca for its defense should McPherson have chosen to contended for it... and that was besides the infantry of Polk's corps from Mississippi moving by rail to Resaca en route to join Johnston at Dalton.
But this Night of the 9th, per Johnston:

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So though only perhaps 4,000 troops were in the lines at Resaca when McPherson probed them, Hood's corps was backing them up; And Polk's infantry on the way there, as even Hood admitted in his memoir. It is evidently the case that when McPherson withdrew from Resaca without attacking in force on the evening of the 9th, Gen. Johnston recalled Hood's corps to Dalton:

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Night of the 10th and during the 11th, General Johnston again prepared to reinforce the lines at Resaca as the federals again moved from Snake Creek Gap toward that point, but by then Gen. Polk was at Resaca with Loring's infantry division entire, besides the cavalry still skirmishing with McPherson about Snake Creek Gap...

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General Schofield, who commanded the Army of the Ohio at the time, explains the McPherson's situation on May 9, and why he did no wrong in declining a general assault upon Resaca or digging in against Johnston's army in that vicinity on that day, because he could not conclude, as Sherman had in May, '64, that the Confederates would not have fought McPherson for Resaca on the 9th:

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So Schofield believes McPherson's assault upon Resaca's defenses on the 9th would have required at least 12,000 troops, if not more to then hold it against counter-attack. He was personally convinced that far from having a chance at crippling Johnston's army by cutting off Resaca, had McPherson's army of the Tennessee engaged in a general battle to take and hold that point, Johnston was not only ready for it, but determined to prevent it and punish them for the attempt, and so, like Sherman, Johnston would have preferred a bolder attempt by McPherson:

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So the argument seems to come down to General Sherman versus General Johnston's personal speculations. Sherman says, if McPherson had been bolder, less timid (as he put it) on May 9, one of the most significant victories of the war MIGHT have been carried out, and Johnston thrown into irrevocable disorder by McPherson fighting a general battle for Resaca or a point on the road. General Johnston, for his part, says that had McPherson chosen to fight to the death for Resaca or a point on the road on May 9, he would have obliged and MIGHT have crushed him before Sherman's other forces could render aid.

But neither of these circumstances occurred, to the various disappointments of Sherman and Johnston, because of McPherson. To Sherman because of a somewhat "timidity" in his movements and to Johnston because of McPherson's circumspection would not allow for his being baited into disaster.
McPherson simply fell back from what he thought was a bad position, per his orders, back to Snake Creek Gap, per his orders, and advanced with the balance of the army to take on Resaca a few days later, after Johnston had already fallen back from Dalton to that point, without a general battle. So while McPherson might not have "snapped the whip" as hard as Sherman preferred on May 9, he did it loud enough to cause Johnston to hear it, and eventually to fall back on that point, but without a chance to crush McPherson in doing so.

So we turn to General McPherson himself. His official communications to General Sherman comprise our lone evidences of his doings and reasonings, as he died shortly after, and so could not respond to the personal speculations of Sherman or Johnston relative to their various hopes on the 9th of May as later written about. Here's what McPherson reported to Sherman on the night of the 9th:

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So it was General Dodge of the 16th Corps, the front end of a tenuous and constricted route of march, who probed and skirmished with the Confederate defenses at Resaca on the 9th. He reported that Gen. McPherson personally came up to observe the Confederate fortifications after his troops assaulted and captured the bald hill west of the Confederate lines. As they deployed to face the Confederate fortifications, the skirmishing was continuous at all points, and they were subjected to artillery fire from the fortifications sweeping all open ground, and in some places, bold movements by the Confederates to threaten the flanks of Dodge's 2nd Division, attempting to deploy in the woods, etc. When McPherson decided against a general assault, and then the withdrawal, it was done with difficulty, and without massing, by regiments, and under fire, as the Confederate artillery swept the open ground through which they had advanced, and next withdrew back to Snake Creed Gap, as Sherman's standing orders provided for.

McPherson on the 10th reported to Sherman that all his units had been in, and remained, in constant contact with Confederate skirmishers, a continuous skirmish line, in fact, several miles long, while advancing and withdrawing about Resaca on the 9th, and this certainly signifies that Johnston knew exactly what force was approaching Resaca, which contingency Johnston says he planned for the previous day, the 8th, when McPherson first moved into Snake Creek Gap. McPherson to Sherman on the afternoon of the 10th:

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So there we have it. Besides Shermans' personal opinion that He missed a chance at great victory by McPherson's not attacking Resaca or contending for the railroad on the 9th; and Besides Johnson's that HE missed a chance at a great victory by McPherson's not attacking and contending for Resaca or the railroad on the 9th; Gen. McPherson was satisfied that had Gen. Sherman personally witnessed the positions and situation, he would have approved his course of at least threatening Resaca and the railroad on the 9th, and digging in at Snake Creek inviting a counterattack by Johnston, who declined to attack Snake Creek Gap, but did in fact choose to withdraw his whole force from about Dalton to Resaca in the following days.

General Sherman as McPherson's commanding officer, accepted McPherson's reports on their face. He didn't have to, he might have attempted to insert his opinion of McPherson's movements into the official record, but he knew better.

Put up some good stuff on the topic here:

What was the Union's worst blunder in the west? | South & Western Theaters

Right, and the Federal Road bypasses Resaca entirely. Which is only relevant insofar as you can maintain the Oostenaula line because it does so by moving well off to the east by southeast well north of Resaca and north of the bend in the Connasauga River. Your line of communication and supply...

civilwartalk.com

Definitely not poorly handled on McPherson's part, at all.

 

[tony_gunter]

I finally started listening to the original round table audio. The fact that he hand-waves over the Battle of Port Gibson "Grant wins the battle as well he should" gives you a hint why he's so wrong about McPherson and McClernand.

McClernand in direct command on the field of three divisions and one brigade of Logan's division got fought to a standstill and ordered his men to retire a distance and prepare for a day 2. That could have been a critical error had Pemberton been rushing reinforcements from Vicksburg.

On the other side of the battlefield, Osterhaus had been struggling on his own against two brigades for several hours and clamoring for reinforcements. Grant sent McPherson with the other brigade of Logan. Osterhaus asked for a flank attack on the Confederate position, McPherson agreed and ordered John Smith to execute it. But the approach was canalized and enfiladed and the men went to ground immediately.

McPherson rode to the front to survey the situstion in person and quickly devised an assault not ON the Confederate flank, but INTO THEIR REAR. The flank having been encircled, those Confederates that didn't surrender fled and a general retreat was ordered across Bayou Pierre.

Osterhaus played almost no role in the attack, but if you read McPherson's report not only does he not mention the single-handed nature of the affair, he credits Osterhaus as taking part in breaking the Confederate position.

McPherson simply downplayed his badassery in the OR. He didn't need recognition, he knew what a badass he was.

Later in the presentation Bearss mocks McPherson for saying he saw two brigades and 5,000 men at Raymond. When you look at the Confederates on the field that day, you have:

Gregg's brigade: 2750 effectives.
Wirt Adams' brigade: 800 men
3rd KY Mounted Infantry: 250(?) men

The whole of which withdrew in the direction of Jackson and were joined by elements of

WHT Walker's brigade: 1100 men

That's actually three brigades and 4,900 men.

And of course his claim that McPherson had "22 guns and 12,000 men." Gregg chose the ground to negate the artillery advantage, and McPherson fought the battle with Logan's Division which had ~4680 infantry. I think all told after reinforcements from Crocker's Division came up McPherson had 6900 infantry total, a little over 8000 if you count the three regiments guarding the wagons.

 

[tony_gunter]

Another point about the original audio:

I never understood why Bearss insisted on lumping Streight's Raid into the Vicksburg Campaign. That was purely Rosecrans' affair that happened to coincide with Hurlbut and Dodge's plan to generate chaos in North Mississippi to cover the move by Grierson.

I can't think of any scenario where Forrest would have been ordered to pursue Grierson, and it didn't prevent Jackson's Cavalry Division from being ordered to reinforce Pemberton in mid-May.

 

[breckod]

Regarding McPherson at Resaca, in his new book on Atlanta, Dave Powell pretty thoroughly dismisses the argument that McPherson could have taken Resaca (which Sherman had not actually ordered or even come close to ordering him to do, in any case). McPherson does catch some light criticism for not making a more serious effort to disrupt the railroad.

 

[Sid J.]

Another point about the original audio:

I never understood why Bearss insisted on lumping Streight's Raid into the Vicksburg Campaign. That was purely Rosecrans' affair that happened to coincide with Hurlbut and Dodge's plan to generate chaos in North Mississippi to cover the move by Grierson.

I can't think of any scenario where Forrest would have been ordered to pursue Grierson, and it didn't prevent Jackson's Cavalry Division from being ordered to reinforce Pemberton in mid-May.

Hey Tony, as you know, looking at the correspondence between Hurlbut and Dodge leading up to Griersons raid they explicitly support Streight as a means of clearing the way for the Newton Station — Baton Rouge operation. I would doubt Streight was essential, Grierson would go off with or without him. But drawing off substantial CS cavalry over to the GA AL state line had to be helpful.

Whether or not that puts Streight into the Vicksburg Campaign is certainly debatable, especially since I don't think either he or Rosecrans were aware at the the time that the support they got from Dodge (and it was substantial) was employed to help Grierson.

 

[tony_gunter]

Hey Tony, as you know, looking at the correspondence between Hurlbut and Dodge leading up to Griersons raid they explicitly support Streight as a means of clearing the way for the Newton Station — Baton Rouge operation. I would doubt Streight was essential, Grierson would go off with or without him. But drawing off substantial CS cavalry over to the GA AL state line had to be helpful.

Whether or not that puts Streight into the Vicksburg Campaign is certainly debatable, especially since I don't think either he or Rosecrans were aware at the the time that the support they got from Dodge (and it was substantial) was employed to help Grierson.

Oh, certainly. I just don't see Forrest being ordered by Johnston to report to Pemberton for Grierson-chasing duties, and it didn't prevent Johnston from begrudgingly bringing a cavalry division with him to Mississippi.

When was it that the Confederates were even aware that the purpose of the chaos was to insert a brigade behind their lines, maybe Starkville or Macon? By that point, Grierson has a 100 mile head start on Forrest.

 

[121st PA Vols]

About McPherson. It seems typical to embellish about generals and other high-ranking men who fell in battle having attained enough status to be well regarded, perhaps favorites of others, particularly higher ranked offices.
Some egs could be Phillip Kearny at Chantilly, Albert Sidney Johnston at Shiloh, John F. Reynolds at Gettysburg and, controversially, Stonewall at Chancellorsville. Fearless and inspirational in battle doesn't correlate to tactical soundness or superiority in that area. But it seems we do that on occasion out of respect for a fallen and brave man.

About Bearss. I've seen him twice in person and of course he's on the net to see he often presents in an aggressive, cantankerous way. And anyone who calls any of these men cowards is....to be kind....a fool.

 

[tony_gunter]

About McPherson. It seems typical to embellish about generals and other high-ranking men who fell in battle having attained enough status to be well regarded, perhaps favorites of others, particularly higher ranked offices.
Some egs could be Phillip Kearny at Chantilly, Albert Sidney Johnston at Shiloh, John F. Reynolds at Gettysburg and, controversially, Stonewall at Chancellorsville. Fearless and inspirational in battle doesn't correlate to tactical soundness or superiority in that area. But it seems we do that on occasion out of respect for a fallen and brave man.

About Bearss. I've seen him twice in person and of course he's on the net to see he often presents in an aggressive, cantankerous way. And anyone who calls any of these men cowards is....to be kind....a fool.

Yeah, I really wish Bearss would have dug into McPherson a bit, I think he would have liked him. Personally, he was brave to the point of foolishness. But he wasn't out to make a name for himself at the expense of his men.

IIRC, the only demerits he received at West Point was ordering his men to take a cab back to campus after a day of arduous training. He then walked back so that the men could claim they were only following orders.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Regarding McPherson at Resaca, in his new book on Atlanta, Dave Powell pretty thoroughly dismisses the argument that McPherson could have taken Resaca (which Sherman had not actually ordered or even come close to ordering him to do, in any case). McPherson does catch some light criticism for not making a more serious effort to disrupt the railroad.

This is a subject which has been extensively covered. I have read that section of Powell's book twice now and I don't think that he states that taking Resaca would have been impossible, had the situation been different for McPherson's Army, which necessitated withdrawal, but he certainly notes the difficulty of the situation and doing such would have been exceedingly challenging, to be sure. Had more U.S. forces been following through the gap (which was wholly workable) and the supply situation not been as it was, the situation could have been quite precarious for the Confederate Army. However, a larger move may also have resulted in a faster response if seen moving via Rocky Face Rodge. Confederate forces were rapidly converging on Resaca over the course of the 10th, as well, so such would have been quite difficult to maintain with the force which was actually available historically. The railroad certainly could have been cut north of Resaca, but the situation which was being confronted by McPherson was one which necessitated that they pull back, regardless.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Sidebar: I am sitting in the post war home of the captain who was captured with McPherson's personal effects. That was good fortune. Can't imagine him surviving the Nashville Campaign. His granddaughter married Douglas McArthur.

My wife's twice removed uncle was Gen Sprague who defeated Wheeler at Decatur. He was awarded the Metal of Honor.

I knew Ed Bearss personally for 20 years or so. What is not generally recognized is that Ed & his wife Margie Riddle were partners for 48 years. She was an excellent historian in her own right.

A well known historian said that with Ed every word was backed by a sentence, every sentence a paragraph & every paragraph a chapter. Margie was the source of a considerable amount of that research.

In public individuals treated Ed's hyper natural recall like a freak show act. He had a gracious way of dealing with that. With plenty of time rocking on the screen porch or one on one in the car Ed's 45 minute in depth answer could be profoundly thought provoking. His "You are wasting everyone's time answers not so much."

 

[SSVilla]

@RedRover, this part below had me thinking about Johnston specifically. I appreciate your effort in going through the controversy. Sherman's assessment there, considering how well we know Johnston's tendency to retreat gives it credibility, if we knew nothing else. Your lengthy post explores the confederacy POV and efforts they could and would have probably made to reinforce the place had McPherson attacked. Therefore Sherman could very well be underestimating the kind of resistance Johnston could (and would) put up; but Johnston's tendency to retreat was on Sherman's mind… and it was on mine as well when I read it.

Sherman is not speaking of McPherson personally, but his generalship. He says HE was certain McPherson's movement was a surprise to the Confederates, and threw them into some disorder:

View attachment 522865

I also keep in mind that nothing can really be gained in war without risk taking.

This is something difficult to understand for armchair generals like ourselves specially when we judge with hindsight and knowing everything, even the confederate's actions that Union commanders would not have known. Specially because the Union was in the offensive, this wasn't going to be a bloodless affair or easy.

General Grant would say of his risk taking in attacking Donelson with barely enough forces to take an entrenched enemy.

"Of course there was a risk in attacking Donelson as I did, but," said the General, smiling, "I knew the men who commanded it. I knew some of them in Mexico. Knowledge of that kind goes far toward determining a movement like this.""

— Conversations with General Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, John Russell Young

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Of his risk taking during the Vicksburg campaign:

"You see there was no general in our army who had won that public confidence which came to many of them afterward. We were all of us, more or less, on probation. Sherman contended that the risk of disaster in the proposed movement was so great that even for my own fame I should not undertake it; that if I failed no credit would be given me for my intentions; that the administration, about which I was worrying so much, would root me up and throw me away as a useless weed; that the politicians in Washington should take care of their affairs and we would take care of ours. I thought that war anyhow was a risk; that it made little difference to the country what was done with me. I might be killed or die from fever. The more I thought of it the more I felt that my duty was plain."

— Conversations with General Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, John Russell Young

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Explaining away Meade's decision not to counterattack Lee at Gettysburg, Grant was generous to Meade with his comment, but still spoke in terms of the risk involved.

"But if Meade made any mistake, if he did not satisfy the wishes of the country, who hoped for Lee's destruction, he made a mistake which anyone would have made under the circumstances. He was new to the chief command. He did not know how the army felt toward him, and, having rolled back the tide of invasion, he felt that any further movement would be a risk."

— Conversations with General Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, John Russell Young

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This topic of the evaluation of risk, sometimes involves guesses concerning the enemy's intentions as well as keeping in mind what the goal is.

Sherman himself said that no one was better at that than General Grant. He was daring, and said Sherman "I'll tell you where he beats me and where he beats the world, he doesn't care about what the enemy is doing out of his sight but it scares me like hell." Implicit in that opinion is that Grant was better at assessing risk, knowing when to go all in — that is what made him the best. Sometimes doing nothing itself carried risk. That is something hardly any other general but Grant understood. Time was also valuable. Even though Sherman stated he knew more about everything else than Grant did, theory of war, etc. Grant's judgment was much better about risk taking.

Grant described how Sheridan and himself thought the pursuit of Lee was worth risking all, leaving their rear, supplies and everything else to sort out themselves, while Meade was focused on securing what had been won and the safety of their communications. We take that capture for granted but Grant said he'd nearly reached the point where he would have had to stop to regroup because he had outrun his supplies and he could not maintain a speedy pursuit for much longer.

"Meade had given [Sheridan] orders to move on the right flank and cover Richmond. This Sheridan thought would be to open the door for Lee to escape toward Johnson. Meade's fear was that by uncovering Richmond, Lee would get into our rear and trouble our communications. Sheridan's idea was to move on the left flank, swing between Lee and the road to Johnson, leave Richmond and our rear to take care of themselves, and press Lee and attack him wherever he could be found. Meade's view was that of an engineer, and no doubt there were reasons of high military expediency in favor of his plan. His theory secured the safety of our army, the safety of Richmond, and all the triumphs of the campaign; but at the same time it left the door open to Lee. My judgment coincided with Sheridan's. I felt we ought to find Lee, wherever he was, and strike him. The question was not the occupation of Richmond, but the destruction of the army."

— Conversations with General Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, John Russell Young

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It's an interesting topic because it shows that sometimes things seem brilliant or reckless only in hindsight. The general is operating with the fog of war and trusting to his own instincts and information. Of course Grant nearly met defeat when he underestimated risks while encamped at Pittsburg Landing (as did Sherman, on whose opinions he relied) and apparently C.F. Smith, though this latter was so sick he had to rely on Sherman's assessments. McPherson was much junior at the time and somewhat in the background. I know much less about McPherson than I do Sherman. McPherson wouldn't write about conversations he had with Grant under a famous tree for example.

My understanding is also that there's not much McPherson correspondence that survived him. I think part of the reason he's not as well known in his personal character is precisely the lack of letters surviving him, no memoirs, no postwar existence unfortunately.

This chat has been very interesting. I truly don't know as much about his generalship or the Resaca controversy as @RedRover, @tony_gunter or @Eric Calistri do, and I have kind of started to get to know him a little bit. I have always thought very well of him, and nothing here, has dimmed that opinion.

 

[RedRover]

This topic of the evaluation of risk, sometimes involves guesses concerning the enemy's intentions as well as keeping in mind what the goal is.

Sherman himself said that no one was better at that than General Grant. He was daring, and said Sherman "I'll tell you where he beats me and where he beats the world, he doesn't care about what the enemy is doing out of his sight but it scares me like hell." Implicit in that opinion is that Grant was better at assessing risk, knowing when to go all in — that is what made him the best. Sometimes doing nothing itself carried risk. That is something hardly any other general but Grant understood. Time was also valuable. Even though Sherman stated he knew more about everything else than Grant did, theory of war, etc. Grant's judgment was much better about risk taking.

Grant described how Sheridan and himself thought the pursuit of Lee was worth risking all, leaving their rear, supplies and everything else to sort out themselves, while Meade was focused on securing what had been won and the safety of their communications. We take that capture for granted but Grant said he'd nearly reached the point where he would have had to stop to regroup because he had outrun his supplies and he could not maintain a speedy pursuit for much longer.

— Conversations with General Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, John Russell Young

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Purely speculating, of course, but I've wondered if McPherson, who had been a principal under Grant previous to the May, 1864 incidents which somewhat disappointed Sherman, shared Grant's concerns of facing off against Johnston. Grant is quoted...

Perhaps, Gen. McPherson at the outset of the Atlanta campaign considered Johnston in this vein, and was not inclined to give him a chance to fall upon a fragment of Sherman's army. Sherman was less convinced in Johnston's determination (or capability given Missionary Ridge, etc.) in giving general battle, and was disappointed as he thought McPherson had a chance, risks and all, to potentially force a general battle upon Johnston at the outset, which Sherman was convinced would have proven disastrous to Johnston:

But whatever the case, I conclude that what Sherman personally criticized as "a little timid" about McPherson's execution of his orders on that occasion, has been perhaps over-magnified for lack of other description of McPherson. Also given the imagined impacts of a decisive victory, which was so elusive.

But interestingly, General Sherman was evidently himself convinced in time that his memoir comment was unfair to McPherson personally in using the term "a little timid" relative to the May 9-11 period. In later editions of his memoir, he excised the term "timid" and refers to McPherson as "a little CAUTIOUS..." (from the 4th Edition, "revised and complete," 1891, vol. 2):

vs. 1875 edition:

Evidently Gen. Sherman was finally convinced that whatever lack of boldness was displayed was not for timidity, but caution. And both Grant and Sherman came to agree that caution was necessary facing Johnston.

Yet many modern historians prefer Sherman's first edition comment only, regarding McPherson's presumed "timidity"... rather than reasoned caution...

In any case, Sherman came to rely upon McPherson's military circumspection (demonstrated with great result on the day of his death at the Battle of Atlanta). He wrote just after McPherson's death:

...

Grant, Vol. 2, was satisfied with Gen. Johnston's methods of the defensive as the right one given his circumstances, viz., the most challenging to his armies...