Lee actually made a number of attacks during the Overland campaigns - Po River, Harris Farm, Jericho Mills, Bethesda Church, that doesn't even count the the actions at Petersburg like Globe Tavern, Ream's Station, Peeble's Farm, ect. Not all of these were perfect or achieved what Lee had hoped, so my using them is to not act as if Lee was some mastermind, but does show that Lee continued een after the Wilderness to find opportunities to strike at Grant, and sometimes to great effect.
100% agree that we shouldn't just assume things.
@Luke Freet I apologize, I'm not sure how to quote your post into here, but I wanted to give you credit for most of this!!!
Johnston had the advantage of terrain features at multiple points throughout the campaign, with three rivers running generally east to west along the path of Sherman's advance. He began the campaign in a strong defensive position around Rocky Face Ridge. He had months to scout the terrain in his rear in the case of a retreat or fallback line needing to be established.
Yet, except for June 27th, Johnston was outsmarted time and again by Sherman on the strategic board. Johnston was turned out of the Dalton position because he left only marginal forces to screen his left flank. He failed to scout the ground south of the Oostanaula at any point since taking command and the start of his campaign, which affected his decision making on the 16th of May. That day, Sherman had divided his army group to cross at different point. Given the marching order and delays with the crossings, the Union forces were divided and unsupported, leaving multiple isolated columns to strike, most notably Howard's Corps advancing from Resaca to Calhoun, and Dodge's Corps advancing from Lay's Ferry, neither of whom were in condition to support the other. An enterprising commander would have crushed these isolated wings in detail, improving the Confederate situation dramatically.
Instead, Johnston called a retreat; if he had waited a day, he could have destroyed Dodge or Howard; indeed, Hardee's Corps, left behind as a rearguard, nearly pulled off just that at Rome's Crossroads, when Tom Sweeny's isolated division was nearly crushed by converging attacks by Walker's and Cleburne's Divisions which was called back due to false reports of Howard's capture of Calhoun (Howard had halted some distance north of the town upon hearing fighting on Sweeny's front).
Once south of the Etowah, Johnston (whose army by now numbered some 70,000 men, far more than Lee would have at ANY POINT for the entire year going into 1865) missed a chance to pull off a Wilderness-esque fight in the brushes north of New Hope Church and Dallas; given the terrain and the local advantage, Johnston could have neutralized Sherman's artillery advantage (if Sherman couldn't outmaneuver Johnston, he'd drive him back with well coordinated artillery barrages, another showcase of Sherman's ability as a commander), and delivered a blow to Sherman's isolated left wing. Instead, Johnston played defensive instead, resulting in inconsequential defensive victories (which I'd argue were more Union defeats than Confederate victories) on May 25th and 27th.
Far more egregious are his actions at the Chattahoochee. There, in one of the few examples of pre-planning defensive positions during the campaign, his chief of artillery Shoup devised a defensive line which could have allowed Johnston to hold a line against Sherman's army with about a division's worth of infantry and artillery, while freeing up the rest of the army to pull south of the river and strike at any of Sherman's crossing points. Instead, Johnston left his entire army north of the CHattahoochee, and when Sherman did cross near Roswell with a fraction of his army group, Johnston simply abandoned the line, and fell back to the outer works of Atlanta, not even considering striking at the isolated Union troops on the south bank of the river.
LUKE doees a great job of mapping out where Johnston failed to even give himself a chance to damage Sherman's army. Perhaps if he had, which would of damaged his own, but I'd argue the constant retreating was driving up desertion rates as is, so I think it would be better to try and hold out longer at his river crossing and meet Sherman when he crossed as opposed to falling back on the next river. I think with all that said above I'm within the ball park of being able to lob some criticism Johnston's way in his handling of the campaign. Reality is I don't believe Johnston ever won a single battle during the civil war.
I just think that the evidence points to major failings on Johnston's part during the campaign. I don't have a personal vendetta against him. From all I can tell he was civil and courteous to his fellow generals.
Bringing the