Shelby Foote Quote on Lee and Gettysburg

I've always taken it to mean that the defeat at Gettysburg and disastrous casualties suffered was the price paid for having such an audacious and aggressive commander who sometimes (like Gettysburg) bordered on recklessness. One can only draw an inside straight so many times playing rashly before the cards don't come out your way and you end up giving it all back to the house. While you have the hot hand it's great but the cards ALWAYS cool off at some point and when they do you better not be all in.
 
Thought Foote's quoted statement is a little unfair to Lee, when it's considered in isolation.

Interpreted it to be meant as a criticism of Lee's mindset and command style demonstrated at Gettysburg, which culminated in the disastrous consequences of 'Pickett's Charge'. Thought the statement was a somewhat subtle attempt to assign the blame in the wake of the magnitude of Southern losses suffered there. (Interestingly, suspect this quote would not have even been conceived if Lee had won at Gettysburg, regardless of the casualties).

If one considers this quote in the context of Lee's leadership performance throughout the entire war, then personally believe it lessens the impact of any negative inferences that could be read into it.
 
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Shelby Foote famously said that "Gettysburg was the price the South paid for having Robert E. Lee as commander."

If the above statement is accepted at face value, then thought Gettysburg was a small price for the South to pay for Lee's effective and unifying field leadership over the entire course of the war.

Applying any cost/benefit analysis to Lee's overall field command performances in the wartime period, thought the benefits would far outweigh the costs.

If Gettysburg was the price the South paid for having Lee in command, then it was a price the Confederacy was willing to pay.
 
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If the above statement is accepted at face value, then thought Gettysburg was a small price for the South to pay for Lee's effective and unifying field leadership over the entire course of the war.

Applying any cost/benefit analysis to Lee's overall field command performances in the wartime period, thought the benefits would far outweigh the costs.
Except Lee didn't "effectively" unify the Armies of the South. He barely unified the Army of Northern Virginia at times.
 
Except Lee didn't "effectively" unify the Armies of the South. He barely unified the Army of Northern Virginia at times.
Lee's performance record of successful Army leadership on the battlefields in Virginia is indisputable - he was effective as a field commander. Was also separately referring to his ability to unify (hold together) throughout most of the war period such a diverse group of senior commanders (some of whom might be regarded as eccentric), within the A of NV. In my view, there was no other individual who could have managed this outcome. (He wasn't made General-in-chief of all Confederate Armies in the field until 1865).
 
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Lee had to be aggressive to the point of near recklessness. The Union had the far better war machine. Larger population, far superior manufacturing capacity, more money. The longer the war went the more it favored the superior war machine. The Confederates had to achieve some monumental victories to convince the Union the juice wasn't worth the squeeze and to negotiate a peace that honored the existence of an independent Confederacy. So yeah, Lee was in a situation where he had to be borderline recklessly aggressive.
 
Shelby Foote famously said that "Gettysburg was the price the South paid for having Robert E. Lee as commander."

What does that even mean?
Lee believed he won on the first day. He believed he nearly won the second and would have had their attacks been "better coordinated" He truly believed his Army would do whatever he ordered them to do on day three.
 
I take it to mean that Lee was aggressive and a gambler and, while generally successful, these tactics also led to heavy casualties which the CSA simply could not afford for long. At Gettysburg, the gambler rolled snake-eyes but still suffered the losses for little appreciable gain (except for supplies which would keep the army fed into the winter).

Ryan
 
If the above statement is accepted at face value, then thought Gettysburg was a small price for the South to pay for Lee's effective and unifying field leadership over the entire course of the war.

Applying any cost/benefit analysis to Lee's overall field command performances in the wartime period, thought the benefits would far outweigh the costs.

If Gettysburg was the price the South paid for having Lee in command, then it was a price the Confederacy was willing to pay.
Well said. There's always a 'price to pay' whatever you do. But I wonder what critics feel the man was supposed to do? Sit idly by in Virginia while the Union army swelled to 200,000....300,000?
Given the peace movements, overall political/military situation, combined with the northern command structure run by the greatest collection of incompetent commanders Lee could ever hope for (McClellan, Burnside, Hooker) to know he or any number of commanders would likely be audacious confronted by realities that promised such great rewards if well exploited.
 
Lee's performance record of successful Army leadership on the battlefields in Virginia is indisputable - he was effective as a field commander. Was also separately referring to his ability to unify (hold together) throughout most of the war period such a diverse group of senior commanders (some of whom might be regarded as eccentric), within the A of NV. In my view, there was no other individual who could have managed this outcome. (He wasn't made General-in-chief of all Confederate Armies in the field until 1865).
Lee wasn't the "indispensable" man history has made him out to be. He had shortcomings as a leader, among them the difficulty he had effectively managing logistics (admittedly exacerbated by an incompetent Confederate government) on a large scale. I think if he had shown the same audacity in managing his quartermasters and the bureaucrats early on his men would have fared better at times. His victories are, as you say, "indisputable", but so are the losses and missed opportunities.
 

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