Longstreet's Countermarch Examined & Walked

After a trip to the battlefield in 2011, I decided to study up on the Countermarch (for simplicity, I concentrated on General McLaw's Division route) and walk as much of it as I could. I had a map of the most probable route from Reference 1. I figured it would be about a seven mile walk and trained for it over four months. In 2012, I walked about 80% of the route specified in Reference 1's map. The northwest "Loop" from Herrs Ridge Road to the Black Horse Tavern Road via the old Adam Butt and Mark Forney farm lanes are on private property so I couldn't walk it.

When I got home, I continued my research because I had the inkling that the route I walked mirrored today's roads too much. Eventually I purchased Reference 2, which also contained a map of its version of the Countermarch. I think this one presented a truer depiction of the route that may have been taken in 1863. But both maps had their strengths and weaknesses, so which one do I use? I needed a tie breaker. Fortunately I had one, a remarkable set of four maps, Reference 3. These show troop dispositions over the three days, but more importantly, the roads/lanes and farms that existed at the time of the battle.

So based on the above 3 references and supplemented by Reference 4 and Reference 5, my best educated guess as to the route taken by General McLaw's Division is shown in my two attachments (I had to break it up into a "Northern" and "Southern" section to get it all in).

Real World Considerations

1. I guess it may be possible to walk the "Loop" due to the small number of resident's permissions required. However, walking McLaw's overland route to the Willoughby Run Road ("River Road") would be impossible given the half million homes populating that section today.

2. The River Road portion is particularly interesting because you can walk the actual path, or very close to it, the Confederate soldiers did. For about 0.5 miles south of its intersection with the Fairfield Road, its path is essentially the same as it was. Then the old road would have veered toward the riverbank. The low ground at this point would have been the most obvious place for this change in direction. As you walk toward the river, notice a low water crossing that continues east out of the river valley. That farm lane existed during the battle and lead to the Emanual Pitzer Farm. Reference 3 shows General Pickett's Division using this lane on July 3, 1863 on the way to their eventual jump off point. Continuing your walk south on the river's west bank, you will see the "driveway" to the John Plank Farm on your right. One thousand feet beyond the "driveway", the old road made a low water crossing over to the river's east bank. I saw a couple of duck blinds here, so I would avoid doing this during duck hunting season. Fifteen hundred feet beyond the crossing, the old River Road would have intersected the Black Horse Tavern Road at the old William Felix Farm (not extant). A quarter mile later, the Black Horse Tavern Road intersects with the Millerstown Road @ the Pitzer Schoolhouse (not extant). The troops would have turned east here and followed essentially the same route as today's roads to Warfield Ridge. Have fun.


References:

1. Gettysburg – The Second Day, Pfanz, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1987.

2. The Second Day at Gettysburg: The Attack and Defense of Cemetery Ridge, July 2, 1863, Shultz and Mingus, Savas Beatie LLC, El Dorado Hills, CA, 2015.

3. The Battlefield at Gettysburg, (four map set), Desjardin, The Gettysburg Foundation, 2011.

4. www.historicalaerials.com, (old USGS maps and aerial photos).

5. Google Maps, (current day maps and satellite photos).

Pretty cool. Did you try to see Little Round Top from the crest of the hill at the turning point?

infomanpa said:

Pretty cool. Did you try to see Little Round Top from the crest of the hill at the turning point?

Click to expand...

I tried, but could not see it; too much tree growth.

heb said:

I tried, but could not see it; too much tree growth.

Click to expand...

I actually knew the answer to that one. I've tried with binoculars and could not see LRT. Like you said, it's the distant trees, but also the height of them.

heb said:

Longstreet's Countermarch Examined & Walked​

After a trip to the battlefield in 2011, I decided to study up on the Countermarch (for simplicity, I concentrated on General McLaw's Division route) and walk as much of it as I could. I had a map of the most probable route from Reference 1. I figured it would be about a seven mile walk and trained for it over four months. In 2012, I walked about 80% of the route specified in Reference 1's map. The northwest "Loop" from Herrs Ridge Road to the Black Horse Tavern Road via the old Adam Butt and Mark Forney farm lanes are on private property so I couldn't walk it.

When I got home, I continued my research because I had the inkling that the route I walked mirrored today's roads too much. Eventually I purchased Reference 2, which also contained a map of its version of the Countermarch. I think this one presented a truer depiction of the route that may have been taken in 1863. But both maps had their strengths and weaknesses, so which one do I use? I needed a tie breaker. Fortunately I had one, a remarkable set of four maps, Reference 3. These show troop dispositions over the three days, but more importantly, the roads/lanes and farms that existed at the time of the battle.

So based on the above 3 references and supplemented by Reference 4 and Reference 5, my best educated guess as to the route taken by General McLaw's Division is shown in my two attachments (I had to break it up into a "Northern" and "Southern" section to get it all in).

Real World Considerations

1. I guess it may be possible to walk the "Loop" due to the small number of resident's permissions required. However, walking McLaw's overland route to the Willoughby Run Road ("River Road") would be impossible given the half million homes populating that section today.

2. The River Road portion is particularly interesting because you can walk the actual path, or very close to it, the Confederate soldiers did. For about 0.5 miles south of its intersection with the Fairfield Road, its path is essentially the same as it was. Then the old road would have veered toward the riverbank. The low ground at this point would have been the most obvious place for this change in direction. As you walk toward the river, notice a low water crossing that continues east out of the river valley. That farm lane existed during the battle and lead to the Emanual Pitzer Farm. Reference 3 shows General Pickett's Division using this lane on July 3, 1863 on the way to their eventual jump off point. Continuing your walk south on the river's west bank, you will see the "driveway" to the John Plank Farm on your right. One thousand feet beyond the "driveway", the old road made a low water crossing over to the river's east bank. I saw a couple of duck blinds here, so I would avoid doing this during duck hunting season. Fifteen hundred feet beyond the crossing, the old River Road would have intersected the Black Horse Tavern Road at the old William Felix Farm (not extant). A quarter mile later, the Black Horse Tavern Road intersects with the Millerstown Road @ the Pitzer Schoolhouse (not extant). The troops would have turned east here and followed essentially the same route as today's roads to Warfield Ridge. Have fun.

View attachment 409472View attachment 409473
References:

1. Gettysburg – The Second Day, Pfanz, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1987.

2. The Second Day at Gettysburg: The Attack and Defense of Cemetery Ridge, July 2, 1863, Shultz and Mingus, Savas Beatie LLC, El Dorado Hills, CA, 2015.

3. The Battlefield at Gettysburg, (four map set), Desjardin, The Gettysburg Foundation, 2011.

4. www.historicalaerials.com, (old USGS maps and aerial photos).

5. Google Maps, (current day maps and satellite photos).

Click to expand...

Correct me, the reason for his movement was that he had been seen by the Union forces on Little Round Top ? If this is not so then what was his reason for doing so and in effect by doing so may have caused confusing in his troops? Could he had continued to march to the flank of the Union forces on the hill? If he had accomplished this would he had drawn forces towards just him just as a distraction for Union command or even move fast enough to have actually move against the flank and into the rear of Meade's army thereby avoiding the latter attack up the hill and coasting hundreds of losses . Correct me as I admit I like flank movements .I do not like up the center esp. when the other team has a strong defensive line.

The original reason for the march was just like you said, flank the Union line and roll it up toward the town. A stipulation was to do so out of sight of the Union signal station. The reason for the countermarch was because the Confederates could clearly see the Union signal station on top of Little Round Top, and of course, the Union them, when they arrived at the "turn around point" (today's overwhelming tree growth was not there in 1863) . You are also correct in that it did cause confusion and downright consternation among the troops.

When the Southern troops eventually got to their ordered jump off point, Union troop disposition was not as planned so the roll up could not be accomplished (think Battle of Atlanta). General Hood wanted to take his division around to the right and strike the Union line on their flank/rear, but his request was denied and the rest is history.

John S. Carter said:

Correct me, the reason for his movement was that he had been seen by the Union forces on Little Round Top ? If this is not so then what was his reason for doing so and in effect by doing so may have caused confusing in his troops? Could he had continued to march to the flank of the Union forces on the hill? If he had accomplished this would he had drawn forces towards just him just as a distraction for Union command or even move fast enough to have actually move against the flank and into the rear of Meade's army thereby avoiding the latter attack up the hill and coasting hundreds of losses . Correct me as I admit I like flank movements .I do not like up the center esp. when the other team has a strong defensive line.

Click to expand...

The original reason for the march was just like you said, flank the Union line and roll it up toward the town. A stipulation was to do so out of sight of the Union signal station. The reason for the countermarch was because the Confederates could clearly see the Union signal station on top of Little Round Top, and of course, the Union them, when they arrived at the "turn around point" (today's overwhelming tree growth was not there in 1863) . You are also correct in that it did cause confusion and downright consternation among the troops.

When the Southern troops eventually got to their ordered jump off point, Union troop disposition was not as planned so the roll up could not be accomplished (think Battle of Atlanta). General Hood wanted to take his division around to the right and strike the Union line on their flank/rear, but his request was denied and the rest is history.

This, for me , is one of the bigger rabbit holes of the Second Day.

The Friends/Foundation maps don't show elevation, so I would recommend getting yourself a good copy of the Warren map.

Try to get past the secondary source interpretations and get to the primary sources themselves. McLaws and Kershaw are two good ones but there are more. Look at things like the OR message traffic to assist in understanding the timeline. Some of Kershaw's input on this is in the Bachelder Papers.

And while you're doing all that, remember the words of Moxley Sorrel...."The attempt was made to move the troops to the right into position without discovery by the enemy, but it was abortive. We were seen from the start and signaled constantly."

heb said:

The original reason for the march was just like you said, flank the Union line and roll it up toward the town. A stipulation was to do so out of sight of the Union signal station. The reason for the countermarch was because the Confederates could clearly see the Union signal station on top of Little Round Top, and of course, the Union them, when they arrived at the "turn around point" (today's overwhelming tree growth was not there in 1863) . You are also correct in that it did cause confusion and downright consternation among the troops.

When the Southern troops eventually got to their ordered jump off point, Union troop disposition was not as planned so the roll up could not be accomplished (think Battle of Atlanta). General Hood wanted to take his division around to the right and strike the Union line on their flank/rear, but his request was denied and the rest is history.

Click to expand...

Thank you for this infomation. I thought that prehabs their movement may have been seen by a observation balloon on LRT.

With respect, I have read the messages from the Signal Corps and I disagree with the idea the Confederates were seen on Bream's Hill. Yes, they COULD have been seen had they gone over the hill and continued toward Seminary Ridge. But the message traffic does not indicate to me that Longstreet's men were seen, due to the time notations. The signals that indicate a large number of Confederates in motion were much too late in the day to have been referencing Longstreet's force that countermarched. Therefore, I don't think that force was seen. They were correct not to go over that hill because they COULD have and probably WOULD have been seen.

LBG's Ralph Siegel and Mike Vallone have a book, "Peach Orchard: A Gettysburg Battlefield Guided Tour." It includes a driving tour with the "Countermarch", highly recommend it. I also did a "Countermarch" tour with LBG, Jim Hessler. Well worth it! Highly recommend both the book and the tour!

SF_Byers said:

LBG's Ralph Siegel and Mike Vallone have a book, "Peach Orchard: A Gettysburg Battlefield Guided Tour." It includes a driving tour with the "Countermarch", highly recommend it. I also did a "Countermarch" tour with LBG, Jim Hessler. Well worth it! Highly recommend both the book and the tour!

Click to expand...

I sure wish I was on that tour with Mr. Hessler. Did you actually get to walk the Adam Butt "Loop"? That would have been the ultimate Gettysburg experience. Thanks for the book advice.

heb said:

I sure wish I was on that tour with Mr. Hessler. Did you actually get to walk the Adam Butt "Loop"? That would have been the ultimate Gettysburg experience. Thanks for the book advice.

Click to expand...

We did not get to walk the actual loop. However, we did have permission from one of the property owners at the approximate turnaround spot off Black Horse Tavern Road. It was a good tour.

heb said:

Longstreet's Countermarch Examined & Walked​

After a trip to the battlefield in 2011, I decided to study up on the Countermarch (for simplicity, I concentrated on General McLaw's Division route) and walk as much of it as I could. I had a map of the most probable route from Reference 1. I figured it would be about a seven mile walk and trained for it over four months. In 2012, I walked about 80% of the route specified in Reference 1's map. The northwest "Loop" from Herrs Ridge Road to the Black Horse Tavern Road via the old Adam Butt and Mark Forney farm lanes are on private property so I couldn't walk it.

When I got home, I continued my research because I had the inkling that the route I walked mirrored today's roads too much. Eventually I purchased Reference 2, which also contained a map of its version of the Countermarch. I think this one presented a truer depiction of the route that may have been taken in 1863. But both maps had their strengths and weaknesses, so which one do I use? I needed a tie breaker. Fortunately I had one, a remarkable set of four maps, Reference 3. These show troop dispositions over the three days, but more importantly, the roads/lanes and farms that existed at the time of the battle.

So based on the above 3 references and supplemented by Reference 4 and Reference 5, my best educated guess as to the route taken by General McLaw's Division is shown in my two attachments (I had to break it up into a "Northern" and "Southern" section to get it all in).

Real World Considerations

1. I guess it may be possible to walk the "Loop" due to the small number of resident's permissions required. However, walking McLaw's overland route to the Willoughby Run Road ("River Road") would be impossible given the half million homes populating that section today.

2. The River Road portion is particularly interesting because you can walk the actual path, or very close to it, the Confederate soldiers did. For about 0.5 miles south of its intersection with the Fairfield Road, its path is essentially the same as it was. Then the old road would have veered toward the riverbank. The low ground at this point would have been the most obvious place for this change in direction. As you walk toward the river, notice a low water crossing that continues east out of the river valley. That farm lane existed during the battle and lead to the Emanual Pitzer Farm. Reference 3 shows General Pickett's Division using this lane on July 3, 1863 on the way to their eventual jump off point. Continuing your walk south on the river's west bank, you will see the "driveway" to the John Plank Farm on your right. One thousand feet beyond the "driveway", the old road made a low water crossing over to the river's east bank. I saw a couple of duck blinds here, so I would avoid doing this during duck hunting season. Fifteen hundred feet beyond the crossing, the old River Road would have intersected the Black Horse Tavern Road at the old William Felix Farm (not extant). A quarter mile later, the Black Horse Tavern Road intersects with the Millerstown Road @ the Pitzer Schoolhouse (not extant). The troops would have turned east here and followed essentially the same route as today's roads to Warfield Ridge. Have fun.

View attachment 409472View attachment 409473
References:

1. Gettysburg – The Second Day, Pfanz, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1987.

2. The Second Day at Gettysburg: The Attack and Defense of Cemetery Ridge, July 2, 1863, Shultz and Mingus, Savas Beatie LLC, El Dorado Hills, CA, 2015.

3. The Battlefield at Gettysburg, (four map set), Desjardin, The Gettysburg Foundation, 2011.

4. www.historicalaerials.com, (old USGS maps and aerial photos).

5. Google Maps, (current day maps and satellite photos).

Click to expand...

Can I ask how long it took to walk it?

JerryD said:

Can I ask how long it took to walk it?

Click to expand...

It took me about 3.5 hours. I figured I walked a little over 6 miles. I was in no hurry to complete.

If they hadn't of turned around but instead followed E. Porter Alexander's artillery path, which was also out of sight, how much sooner would they have gotten to their positions?

Wizard of Cozz said:

If they hadn't of turned around but instead followed E. Porter Alexander's artillery path, which was also out of sight, how much sooner would they have gotten to their positions?

Click to expand...

About 45 minutes sooner. Here is my rationale: Starting at the approximate turn around point, Porter's route to Warfield Ridge was about 2.5 miles, McLaws' 4.4 miles. I used a "common time" marching speed of 2.5 miles/hour and divided it into each of the distances to get 1 hour & 1 hour, 46 minutes respectively. I rounded down the extra minute to get a convenient three quarters of an hour time. I think these times are optimistic but they serve to get a decent relative difference.

Good question, thanks. I think an even better one would be, what if General McLaws would have said, "The heck with all this hiding from view and counter marching stuff" and from his initial starting point gave the order to the head of his column to make a 120 degree left turn and march overland via the river road to Warfield Ridge. How much sooner would the troops been in position?

The mathematics for that is best left for another day.

I only ask, because part of the breakdown of the echelon attack the Longstreet and Lee decide upon happens because daylight begins running out. An extra 45 minutes to an hour would possibly of allowed the Confederates a better chance of victory on that day. Now it wasn't the only reason it broke down. Obviously, Anderson and Mahone play a major factor in it breaking down. Pender's mortal wounding is another factor.

speedylee said:

With respect, I have read the messages from the Signal Corps and I disagree with the idea the Confederates were seen on Bream's Hill. Yes, they COULD have been seen had they gone over the hill and continued toward Seminary Ridge. But the message traffic does not indicate to me that Longstreet's men were seen, due to the time notations. The signals that indicate a large number of Confederates in motion were much too late in the day to have been referencing Longstreet's force that countermarched. Therefore, I don't think that force was seen. They were correct not to go over that hill because they COULD have and probably WOULD have been seen.

Click to expand...

As far as I recall they were never seen. When they finally made contact with the troops in the Peach Orchard, these were taken by surprise. It was only after a few shots into the Union front that Hood's men were seen flanking further south toward the Emmitsburg Pike.
Lubliner.

Lubliner said:

As far as I recall they were never seen. When they finally made contact with the troops in the Peach Orchard, these were taken by surprise. It was only after a few shots into the Union front that Hood's men were seen flanking further south toward the Emmitsburg Pike.
Lubliner.

Click to expand...

This surprises me. Having been to Gettysburg more times than I could count and seeing the lay of the land, I always assumed that Longstreet was seen during the time when they realized the reconnaissance was faulty and they had to determine how to proceed. It was my understanding that from the time McLaws went into position, to the time Hood started the attack, that about 30 minutes or so elapsed, and that the Union troops in the Peach Orchard and along Emmitsburg Road had to know they were there in force.