The War that Never Was: Britain, the U.S. and the Trent Affair

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Oh Lord Lord Lord...I didn't follow 67th tigers to AH website to organise attacks against him simply because usually as soon as I find out he's on a website I choose the "ignore" feature on any forum pertaining to him furthermore I wasn't part of a "Mob" on tank-net nor was he attacked ad hominem by those posters he posted at times nonsense and got called out for it . It might not be known to you but there are quite a few authors that inhabit that website along with British participants that took him to task for some of his assertions. I along with others have found him distorting what sources he quotes quite often so it's not just me. However this discussion isn't about him or me.


Now that aside I don't what you or 67th Tigers use for sources but I do tend to use the OR,ORN or various books in what I think is a very extensive private library of my own. I also don't just rely on one book source plus follow footnotes very closely. I just posted OR sources along with Series #, Voluime # and page number . Now just what are the sources saying no large armies in the North East? I also don't get where you think the Erie Canal,Oswego Branch, and Champlain Canal can't but help support an army in this area since the Union will almost surredy control Lake Ontario since the Beauharnois canal runs along the southern side of the St Lawrence therefore easily disrupted.

I ask what are the sources that a large amy can't be supported in the Northeast?

To all other participants and moderators ,I will leave my disagreements with 67th Tigers & myself off right here with this post....I promise..
 
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By the way the Ohio & Erie canal wasn't neccessarily "closed" to freight by 1861 just that it couldn't compete with railroads but that doesn't mean it couldn't be used if neccessary as a supplement to railroads...


doesn't look as if Maine/New Hampshire or Vermont are exactly railroad poor...

https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3701p.rr000430/
 
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By the way the Ohio & Erie canal wasn't neccessarily "closed" to freight by 1861 just that it couldn't compete with railroads but that doesn't mean it couldn't be used if neccessary as a supplement to railroads...


doesn't look as if Maine/New Hampshire or Vermont are exactly railroad poor...

https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3701p.rr000430/

Good point that those canals could probably be crash reopened (not sure you could do it until spring/summer though, from my experience with canals you've got to drain them in the winter so as not to incur frost damage).

I think (from the arguments being made) that the gist is that the Union can't hope to mount a winter campaign in winter 1861-62 using the existing railroads because they aren't capable of sustaining the operations of forces as large as those being sustained out West or on the Potomac (which were ice free most of the year meaning you could still run supplies by ship or barge) by rail stock alone. The shipping which would be needed to sustain a force larger than a division is ice bound until spring.

In turn, the British can't mount a winter campaign against the Union because their major waterway is frozen and the Grand Trunk can't sustain a force larger than a division either. That and the poor weather off the North Atlantic coast would make a sea campaign a miserable affair for landing troops and maneuvering in.

In short I suppose the contention is that any serious campaigning (as opposed to raids and skirmishes) is by fact of weather and the need to prepare, relegated to the spring months of May 1862.
 
and just who says the railroads in their current configuration can't ship /support a large army up North along the BNA border?

The numbers.

One also has the Erie Canal,

Opened 1st May in 1862

Ohio-Erie canal,and

Not a major artery.

Illinois-Michigan Canal

Opened 24th March in 1862.

to support this and as has been pointed out before one has large population centers up North. I referenced earlier the Gettysburg campaign,which yes was in 1863 but,,,,,however it quite clearly states that Haupt had the Western Maryland and the Gettysburg railroad BY JULY 4 upgraded the former carrying 5 times as much as it did before while the latter was well enough off to support the logistical operation of carrying 16,000 wounded ot of ther battlefield.

Meaningless without context. In fact the Western Maryland went nowhere - they hadn't reached the planned destination (Hagerstown), and didn't until 1872. The railroad simply had nothing to carry beforehand.

In context, running 50 cars with 5 locomotives from White River Junction to by Ft Montgomery delivers a train every 4 days - one day to load, one day to move, one day to offload and one day back.

= 25,000 troops supported.
 
In turn, the British can't mount a winter campaign against the Union because their major waterway is frozen and the Grand Trunk can't sustain a force larger than a division either. That and the poor weather off the North Atlantic coast would make a sea campaign a miserable affair for landing troops and maneuvering in.

Indeed. The British also didn't like leaving too many troops in Halifax over the winter. The plan was to concentrate at the much warmer Bermuda. The minimum required would be placed in Canada and the Maritimes, and the rest (with shipping) concentrated at Bermuda to go down the St Lawrence in April, or elsewhere.
 
it seems this is where 67th Tiger gets his info on what union railroads could & couldn't do however sources like Webber & Turner seem to show that railroads were pushed pretty hard to keep up with demand,and basically did, during the war plus they were upgraded pretty fast too...


https://books.google.nl/books?id=X7...PAhVqBsAKHYcIBm0Q6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

Dear ickysdad,

I am not clear of your reasoning. The linked report shows some data to which anyone, you, I, 67th Tigers, TFSmith121 can apply some analysis in order to determine what a given railway line might achieve. Why then are you relying on a secondary source which is addressing railways other than those which are important to the movement of troops to the border?
 
Dear ickysdad,

I am not clear of your reasoning. The linked report shows some data to which anyone, you, I, 67th Tigers, TFSmith121 can apply some analysis in order to determine what a given railway line might achieve. Why then are you relying on a secondary source which is addressing railways other than those which are important to the movement of troops to the border?
My reasoning is improper? It's a secondary source that used primary sources itself primary info that showed railroads being pushed beyond what their capacity was. The source used by 67th Tigers was through September,1861 which was before either the Union or CSA got to the point of having to push capacity. If the Union was able to push things on other railroads and upgrade them quickly why not the railroads up North? All you and 67th tigers are trying to analyse is basically saying that because the railroad only carried so much before the war really started in earnest it couldn't have possibly carried more....You know sometimes railroads won't show themselves to be carrying much traffic simply because there is no traffic to carry,i.e. lack of business. Now that brings up my main assertion just because an annual report shows a railroad only carrying so much traffic doesn't mean it can't carry much more...
 
I also have Elmer Sulzer's books on abandoned railroads for Tennessee,Kentucky and Indiana. I will say there are several railroads that have been abandoned in my area they all had capacity to carry a heck of a lot more then what some of their annual reports might have shown but there was no business along the lines certainly not enough to carry on operations. The old Monon which used to go through Bloomington onto Beford then Mitchell then Orleans onto Salem through New Albany to Louisville used to carry probably 10-12 Trains a day. However powers that be figured out it was better to abandon and place out of use certain sections because it was more efficent to use a different route. Now are you saying in a case like this means that all of a sudden it's capacity went down?

I have also went backed and it seems there are several North-South routes(4) From Maine,Massachusets, and New York reaching up into Vermont,Maine,New Hampshire and Eastern New York /Eastern Lake Ontario not including maybe able to use Lake Champlain as an additional supply artery. I always understood that driving up the Hudson through Lake Champlain -Richilieu river was always one of the main/favored routes to drive into Canada? Not saying it'll be a cake walk or it's hard to defend but....
 
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My reasoning is improper? It's a secondary source that used primary sources itself primary info that showed railroads being pushed beyond what their capacity was. The source used by 67th Tigers was through September,1861 which was before either the Union or CSA got to the point of having to push capacity. If the Union was able to push things on other railroads and upgrade them quickly why not the railroads up North? All you and 67th tigers are trying to analyse is basically saying that because the railroad only carried so much before the war really started in earnest it couldn't have possibly carried more....You know sometimes railroads won't show themselves to be carrying much traffic simply because there is no traffic to carry,i.e. lack of business. Now that brings up my main assertion just because an annual report shows a railroad only carrying so much traffic doesn't mean it can't carry much more...

Dear ickysdad,

Thank you for your response to my last post. I do not believe you have really explained to me why you would want to refer to a secondary source as opposed to analyse a primary source on your own behalf but it really isn't that important to the debate so I shall move on to something that is. Please see the first line I have emboldened in the quote from your post. Would you please be so kind as to explain what changes occurred between Sept. '61 and 27th Dec. '61-10th Jan. '62 which would enable the Union to significantly increase the capacity 0f the north eastern rail-roads primarily in upper New York state such that they could deliver a large Union force to the border with BNA and supply it. I myself have no idea what this change might be?

The argument you present in the second emboldened line is a fair one. However, for many of the lines described in the previously linked report sufficient information is provided to determine if the use of the line is significantly under capacity. To be clear you seem to think I have analysed the data in this report but I have only just started up until now I have accepted the capacity calculations of 67th Tigers on face value but I shall now spend a few weeks seeing what I come up with.
 
Thank you for your response to my last post. I do not believe you have really explained to me why you would want to refer to a secondary source as opposed to analyse a primary source on your own behalf but it really isn't that important to the debate so I shall move on to something that is. Please see the first line I have emboldened in the quote from your post. Would you please be so kind as to explain what changes occurred between Sept. '61 and 27th Dec. '61-10th Jan. '62 which would enable the Union to significantly increase the capacity 0f the north eastern rail-roads primarily in upper New York state such that they could deliver a large Union force to the border with BNA and supply it. I myself have no idea what this change might be?

The 1861 and 1862 reports on the Railroads of the State of Vermont show no major changes. They inspected the Missisquoi Bay and Rouses Point bridges finding they were unsafe and major work was carried out in 1862, but the reconstruction was so major it wasn't complete until the 1863 season. Of course all construction work has to stop for the winter.

The consequences of one of those bridges collapsing is obvious, and much worse if a large US military force is deployed to Rouses Point or Plattsburgh and the bridge is knocked out either by collapse or by a small force of Canadian militia with axes.
 
Now that aside I don't what you or 67th Tigers use for sources but I do tend to use the OR,ORN or various books in what I think is a very extensive private library of my own. I also don't just rely on one book source plus follow footnotes very closely. I just posted OR sources along with Series #, Voluime # and page number . Now just what are the sources saying no large armies in the North East? I also don't get where you think the Erie Canal,Oswego Branch, and Champlain Canal can't but help support an army in this area since the Union will almost surredy control Lake Ontario since the Beauharnois canal runs along the southern side of the St Lawrence therefore easily disrupted.

Erie canal - frozen until 1st May. Then supports the Niagara front (which has plenty of rail transport as noted above). Too shallow for gunboats.

Oswego railhead - supports a force at Oswego (on Lake Erie). Oswego opens to navigation 2nd April.

Both these support forces around Lake Erie, which doesn't get you much. It's Lake Ontario that really matters,

The Champlain canal is frozen in the winter, and the Hudson to Lake Champlain route opens in early May.

Your faith that the US will rapidly disrupt the Beauharnois Canal is likely misplaced, and doesn't really matter, as an alternate route via Ottawa and Kingston exists, albeit of less depth (but enough to admit gunboats). British and Canadian domination of Lake Ontario is a given, especially given the vast superiority of Canadian tonnage on that lake. Lake Erie is balanced (about 50/50) and is the one in question.
 
Dear ickysdad,

Thank you for your response to my last post. I do not believe you have really explained to me why you would want to refer to a secondary source as opposed to analyse a primary source on your own behalf but it really isn't that important to the debate so I shall move on to something that is. Please see the first line I have emboldened in the quote from your post. Would you please be so kind as to explain what changes occurred between Sept. '61 and 27th Dec. '61-10th Jan. '62 which would enable the Union to significantly increase the capacity 0f the north eastern rail-roads primarily in upper New York state such that they could deliver a large Union force to the border with BNA and supply it. I myself have no idea what this change might be?

The argument you present in the second emboldened line is a fair one. However, for many of the lines described in the previously linked report sufficient information is provided to determine if the use of the line is significantly under capacity. To be clear you seem to think I have analysed the data in this report but I have only just started up until now I have accepted the capacity calculations of 67th Tigers on face value but I shall now spend a few weeks seeing what I come up with.

Well of course you would accept 67th Tigers analaysis just as you rejected all the well informed souls on other websites like tank-net...However there is this from an email to someone else

I also just thought about one thing the Union had 4 main trunk lines that ran east to west,the B & O had problems right away since it ran through Harper's Ferry & met the Ohio at Wheeling,WV but the other 3 managed to take up the slack and then some. I also read that the Michigan Central was carrying 3 times as many passengers in 1864 when it had just 85 passenger cars then in 1861 when it had 100 passenger cars. the main thing I found out is that the mount of local freight in the NorthEast went way down being replaced by through freight bound for New York or Washington ,one can surmise at looking at that traffic going the other direction. Railroad traffic problems were also the result of increasing European demand for say wheat but if US is needing to conduct operations up North I imagine it would take precedence. The city of Washington needed 80 cars per day before the war but after the Union Army being stationed there in the summer of 1861 it required over 400 cars per day basically the railroad managed it without much of a hitch.

67th Tigers used a report ending in 9/1861 now there was a report peertaining to the New Central a year later showing the tonnage it carried up from 1,167,000 tons in 9/1861 to 1,413,000 in 9/1862. I'll try to post a link later tonite but have to get to work...
 
I'll post a link later tonite proving my point about the New York central I realiaze it's not like the end of 12/1861 or 1/1862 but IMHO does prove Union RR's could carry more then what you two are giving them credit for but it is only for other posters not neccessarily to prove anything to you two.

You do know someone railroads may show more traffic then others simply because there maybe more business along one line then the other right? You know a railroad between New York & Philadelphia will show more tonnage in a year then one between say my town of Tell City,Indiana(pop..10,000) and Jasper,Indiana(pop 12,000???) right?????
 
67th Tigers used a report ending in 9/1861 now there was a report peertaining to the New Central a year later showing the tonnage it carried up from 1,167,000 tons in 9/1861 to 1,413,000 in 9/1862. I'll try to post a link later tonite but have to get to work...

The New York Central isn't the Vermont Central, which supplies the decisive Canadian front but whatever.

In 1861 the NYC carried 199.2 million ton-miles

In 1862 the NYC carried 237.4 million ton-miles

In 1863 the NYC carried 297.0 million ton-miles

So why is this? Because the NYC was in the process of being double tracked, and as the double track portion grew track loadings increased massively in those areas.

Double tracking the Vermont Central and Vermont and Canada is the job of three years at the rate the NYC is being double tracked (about 60 miles/year). I will agree that with massive investment the VC and V&C could maybe be double tracked by some time in 1865-6. This doesn't help supplying an army in 1862. The whole line needs double tracking before the terminal to terminal rate is increased (or there is a bottleneck).
 
Well of course you would accept 67th Tigers analaysis just as you rejected all the well informed souls on other websites like tank-net...

Dear ickysdad,

I thought you were going to leave all the unpleasantness from tank-net behind? As I recall the numerous debates on this subject on that side. 67th Tigers would present some information (and it has to be said occasionally come to a questionable conclusion) and the mob would attack it, occasionally from a reasonable perspective, more usually from an absurd one - the whole point being to demonstrate that the British Empire was incapable of winning a war against the Union even when historically the Union would have had huge difficulties defeating the Union without all of the materiel supplied from Britain. Quite often this would degenerate into ad hominem attacks.

Anyhoo, I am unaware of any information posted on the capacities of railways that the Union could used to send troops to the BNA border and supply them be they published by 'well informed souls' or otherwise. I am aware of quite a lot of smoke and mirrors being published based on railway maps alone. So if you know where this material can be found please link to it or point me in its direction.

Most importantly you seem to have missed the point that now I have the source material I can do my own analysis and decide if I agree with 67th Tigers or not.
 
Dear 67th Tigers,

Keep meaning to mention it I am off to Mexico City and Cuba on my holidays next week. I shall post a few photos from the Museum of the Interventions in Mexico City or the Tripartite and French interventions here and perhaps more interestingly photos of the Morro in the Havana and of the Paredon Grande light on the Naval War forum.
 
Thanks for the kind words.

There's a difference between producing enough long arms in the US, however, and simply having enough to equip the existing forces as of December, 1861, and any additional forces raised.

The only truly exhaustive and comprehensive lists for the Army would be in the Ordnance Department's records, which are available on microfilm at NARA; they are not on-line, which leads to various individuals using various other sources, including Congressional reports, communications between the Ordnance Department's investigators and various contract manufacturers, etc. That, in itself, is fairly spotty; add in the reality that the Navy and Treasury departments also had wartime procurement responsibilities, much less that in a federal system, every state and even territorial government had an executive branch and military department with the authority to raise and equip troops, entirely separately from the federal government and its departments, and a comprehensive survey of the issue becomes even more problematic. Then add the reality that the civilian arms stockpile and trade in the US was, as always, significant, and the potential sources of supply becomes even more diffuse.

One can come up with various lists, most of which are reasonably sourced in terms of the US Government arsenal production of (for example) the M1855 and M1861 rifle musket; but after that, there is the wartime production by civilian contractors of the M1861, the "Special" Colt 1861 design (which had features both of the M1861 and the British P53 that had been made under license by Robbins & Lawrence for the British Army during the Crimean War because of shortcomings in the British supply chain), the Remington contract design (which had a lot in common with the M1841 rifle, which was a modern percussion weapon that remained in production until well into the 1850s);, and then the changeover to the M1863.... these lines were being set up in 1861-62, began producing in 1862-63, and hit their stride in 1863, but the issues of supply chain for components gets pretty convoluted before deliveries began...

The prewar production numbers for the USG are pretty well known, but how many of those remained in loyal hands in the US vs. those that the rebels took control of in 1861 are another delta; there are estimates that I've read that less than 12,000 M1855 rifle muskets and 15,000 M1841 rifles produced on federal account actually ended up in what became rebel states in 1861 - if so, then the entire remaining stock of these modern weapons - at least 12o,ooo, if not more (150,000 or more is possible) - were in loyal states. Then, in terms of US-made rifles and rifle muskets in the standard calibers (.54 and .58) in US hands by the winter of 1862, when any conflict along these lines might break out, are the M1861s produced at Springfield (~40,000 or more by January, 1862), the R&L made P53s that were not exported to the UK (possibly as many as 10,000 to 15,000, in .577 or .58), the 4,000 or so M1859 Sharps breechloading rifles manufactured before the wartime orders for Berdan et al, etc. There are 200,000 or more weapons, at least, in these categories.

Then consider the reality the US had begun to mobilize in April, 1861, a full 9-10 months before any Anglo-American conflict would or could break out in the winter of 1862, and consider the flood of British and Belgian made Enfields/P53s (in .577 or .58); Austrian-made M1854s and variants (in .54 or .58), the M1851 "Saxon" rifle in .58, etc. These were all modern rifle muskets, designed for percussion caps and in calibers that were standardized; given that 330,000 P53s and 220,000 M1854s and 25,000 M1851s were imported in 1861-63, the numbers that came into the US and were accepted by Army Ordnance alone in 1861-62 numbered well between 200,000 and 300,000 of those weapons, as well.

Then consider older military rifles, whether US Government procurement (~25,000 M1819 breechloaders and ~60,000 M1803 to M1817 muzzle loaders, all in standard .52 or .54 calibers) or older European weapons (usually in the larger "Minie" calibers in the .69 to .71 range, so heavy, but still useful) all of which had been manufactured as or could be converted to percussion cap, or US civilian manufactured rifles. Then consider the vast stocks of US Government procured muskets, both made as percussion (275,000 M1842) or converted (675,000 M1816/M1822) which in a regiment with mixed weapons, add to the volume of fire and are as deadly in broken country as any rifle, and which, in fact, could be converted to rifled muskets. Then consider carbines (USG production or contract), civilian muskets, and shotguns, all of which could accomplish the goal of sending lead down range in vast quantities.

By the first quarter of 1862, that's a SWAG/ROM of a half million modern percussion rifles and rifle muskets, of US and European manufacture; presumably 100,000 or so older or 2nd-line rifles; and the same or more (~500,000) in US-made percussion muskets, designed as such or converted; etc. That's more than enough to equip an army of a million infantry; certainly more than enough to equip the 527,800 regulars and USVs on active duty in December, 1861 plus as many more of the 506,000 as mobilized historically to the call late in 1862 for additional USVs, plus as many state troops, militia, or auxiliary federal troops as one could wish for...

All of the above is basically just back of the envelope, of course; the only really reliable numbers are in NARA, and until their collections are digitized, they will remain there.

Best,

at another website I saw assertions that the US cannot build weapons without imported British steel, which I can't disprove without sources

Can you?
 
While we are playing war games here, remember Lincoln can sign a peace treaty with the rebels or simply assume defensive lines. The assumption of the Confederate war is not an assurance.

a diplomatic solution is far more likely with British all the way up to and including after the first clashes of armies and warships. After all the British and Union quarrel threatens neither of their existence if the Confederacy is not included in discussions and eases any threat to Canada as well

Lincoln cannot grant the Confederacy the implied recognition of a peace treaty. He can however stall for time by remaining on the strategic defensive in the East, and ensuring that Kentucky, Missouri and the Southwest remains secure as well a sending any reinforcements that might be necessary to the West Coast.
 
Dear ickysdad,

I thought you were going to leave all the unpleasantness from tank-net behind? As I recall the numerous debates on this subject on that side. 67th Tigers would present some information (and it has to be said occasionally come to a questionable conclusion) and the mob would attack it, occasionally from a reasonable perspective, more usually from an absurd one - the whole point being to demonstrate that the British Empire was incapable of winning a war against the Union even when historically the Union would have had huge difficulties defeating the Union without all of the materiel supplied from Britain. Quite often this would degenerate into ad hominem attacks.

Anyhoo, I am unaware of any information posted on the capacities of railways that the Union could used to send troops to the BNA border and supply them be they published by 'well informed souls' or otherwise. I am aware of quite a lot of smoke and mirrors being published based on railway maps alone. So if you know where this material can be found please link to it or point me in its direction.

Most importantly you seem to have missed the point that now I have the source material I can do my own analysis and decide if I agree with 67th Tigers or not.

tank.net is not the only place 67 Tigers has run into trouble with his theories

this is a good starting point regarding railroads in the Civil War (US Military Railroad specifically)

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Journals/JAMHF/2/2/Military_Railroads*.html

here is another to give a good feel for capacity of transportation lines in New York State

this particular book looks very thorough based on its table of contents, but the footnote alone provides a lot of good information

https://books.google.com/books?id=w0w0gJQ-B_EC&pg=PA253&lpg=PA253&dq=railroad+tonnage+in+1862&source=bl&ots=hwjff8PHLm&sig=hTK3FeHpOfGatoUksjq0f_FRXSQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjM8__J6N3PAhVIKiYKHYThDtcQ6AEIOzAF#v=onepage&q=railroad tonnage in 1862&f=false

this is a good read

https://www.amazon.com/dp/080713015X/?tag=civilwartalkc-20

 
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