Most Underrated General

[Nytram01]

Good points - he might be better remembered if he hadn't fallen down on the job at Bryce's Crossroads - really weak sauce on his part.

But he made amends at Tupelo.

 

[BillO]

I don't think so. It made perfect sense not to fight until Seven Pines. It would have been foolish to fight McClellan further down the Peninsula, since the Union army could easily use its naval power to outflank any Southern line by moving up the rivers. Moreover, if Johnston fought and defeated McClellan farther down the Peninsula, the Union army would have had a relatively easy time evacuating. By withdrawing towards Richmond and not launching a counter attack until Seven Pines, Johnston was able to engage McClellan at a place where the firepower of Union gunboats and the mobility provided by Union river transports could not be employed and where a Union defeat would leave the Army of the Potomac in an extremely precarious position (as it later was during the Seven Days Battles).

It's true that the battle plan was poorly executed (everybody was still learning how to manage a large army at this point), but that doesn't change the fact that Johnston's overall strategy was a sound one.

It made perfect sense to Johnston to retreat all the way up the peninsula to the outskirts of Richmond. It was a surprise to Davis and Lee. I'd also point out to you that the AoP was receiving supplies daily at White House landing and the Federal navy controlled both rivers beyond that landing, or at least they did after Johnston pulled out of Norfolk for no real reason, and beyond Harrison's Landing on the James. This means that the Aops' flanks were still protected by the navy when Johnston decided to attack at Seven Pines. If the AoP had been defeated, which was a very slim possibility, They still would have been easily evacuated from almost anywhere on the James.

 

[BillO]

In April, Johnston met with Davis, Lee, Randolph, Longstreet and G.W. Smith in Richmond to discuss what would become the Peninsula Campaign.


Lee wanted the Confederates to defend as far up the Peninsula as possible. He argued that it might be possible to attack from Yorktown, he argued about defending at Yorktown or Williamsburg, and conducting a withdrawal in stages. Any of these option, he claimed, would allow the Confederacy to train more troops to free up the veteran unit in Georgia and the Carolina's which could then be brought to Richmond as reinforcements for the AotP(C) - as it was then prior to being named the ANV - manufacture or purchase more weapons for the army and relocate the ships and guns from Norfolk to better positions.

Johnston, as the only man present who had actually been to Yorktown, said he couldn't attack because Magruder had flooded the area to his front and Yorktown was unsuitable for a sustained defend because its poor earthwork and the Federal dominance of the rivers. He couldn't argue against defending at Williamsburg because he hadn't there, nor could he oppose Lee on Norfolk for the same reason. Nevertheless he advocate an immediate withdrawal from Yorktown to the Richmond area where he would attempt a counter-attack to defeat the Federals.

Randolph merely commented on the preferability or evacuating anything of military value from Norfolk, Smith supporter Johnston for an hour before pleading illness to go lie down in the next room, while Longstreet didn't contribute at all after he was rudely interrupted by Davis at his first attempt and came to assume that only asked to be present out of courtesy, while Davis didn't take side during the debate but would make the final decision.

It was thus Lee vs Johnston over what strategy was eployed. At attack from Yorktown was ruled out, and Davis decided that the best course was Lee's stage-by-stage withdrawal. But the final decision was still clear - the decisive battle would not occur on the Peninsula but would only happened when the armies were closer to Richmond and the threat from the Federal navy negated.

From what was required of him Johnston commanded the Peninsula Campaign adequately.

In your first paragraph have you ever wondered why Longstreet was present and Magruder wasn't? I'll tell you because Magruder didn't agree with Johnston and didn't see the immediate need to skedaddle. Longstreet was there because he was Johnstons buddy and GW Smith was Johnstons second in command and was quite frankly an empty suit. The final decision was made by Johnston and not Davis by the expedient of simply not saying anything until the army arrived in Richmond. When Johnston was in Harpers Ferry he couldn't wait to get back, when he was in Manassas he couldn't stand it and when he was at Williamsburg in a very nice place he couldn't wait for Norfolk he just had to go. IMO calling Johnston adequate is a bit of a stretch.

 

[Nytram01]

It made perfect sense to Johnston to retreat all the way up the peninsula to the outskirts of Richmond. It was a surprise to Davis and Lee. I'd also point out to you that the AoP was receiving supplies daily at White House landing and the Federal navy controlled both rivers beyond that landing, or at least they did after Johnston pulled out of Norfolk for no real reason,

Johnston's orders to Huger was constantly being overridden by Richmond. Without even informing Johnston the Richmond Authorities had delayed Huger's withdrawal from Norfolk, had transfered a brigade from Huger's command to central Virginia and order Huger to fall back to Petersburg instead of Richmond. It was not until Johnston took up position near the Chickahominey and offically requested Huger's command be transfered from him because it was only nominal and he no control over it that the Richmond Authorities stopped issuing their own orders to Huger behind Johnston's back.

As for why Huger was pulled out of Norfolk, to say there was "no real reason" isn't accurate. Huger had no protection for a Federal landing to the south after the Mosquito Fleet had been defeated at the Battle of Elizabeth City. This also isolated Norfolk from the rest of the Confederacy and made it indefensible, especially so when the Federals gained dominance of the James River. To have left Huger in such an extended position, vulnerable to attack from the practically all side would have been suicidal to that command.

 

[BillO]

Johnston's orders to Huger was constantly being overridden by Richmond. Without even informing Johnston the Richmond Authorities had delayed Huger's withdrawal from Norfolk, had transfered a brigade from Huger's command to central Virginia and order Huger to fall back to Petersburg instead of Richmond. It was not until Johnston took up position near the Chickahominey and offically requested Huger's command be transfered from him because it was only nominal and he no control over it that the Richmond Authorities stopped issuing their own orders to Huger behind Johnston's back.

As for why Huger was pulled out of Norfolk, to say there was "no real reason" isn't accurate. Huger had no protection for a Federal landing to the south after the Mosquito Fleet had been defeated at the Battle of Elizabeth City. This also isolated Norfolk from the rest of the Confederacy and made it indefensible, especially so when the Federals gained dominance of the James River. To have left Huger in such an extended position, vulnerable to attack from the practically all side would have been suicidal to that command.

What you're calling the authorities in Richmond was in fact Lee. Huger had sent several messages asking what he was supposed to be doing and was getting no responses from Johnston who was actually in charge of all the confederate forces in Va. at that time. Jackson was having the same problems with Johnston not answering his mail. Lee stepped in to try to make some sense of what was going on.

 

[BillO]

As long as the CSS Virginia was on station the federal navy wasn't going anywhere and as long as the navy refused to move McCellen certainly wasn't going to either. Norfolk was in no real danger.

 

[Elennsar]

It's true that the battle plan was poorly executed (everybody was still learning how to manage a large army at this point), but that doesn't change the fact that Johnston's overall strategy was a sound one.

I think the main problem was that Johnston seems to have had an excessive (as it turns out) fear of what threat the naval firepower actually posed - the Union navy did not shower itself in glory here.

Otherwise, the main issue as far as the peninsula goes is whether taking longer would be better when it came to the concentration of reinforcements and interfering with Union plans. Whether it needed to be quite as far as where "at Seven Pines" I would need a map to answer, and falling back as Johnston doesn't seem to have done Norfolk any good, but otherwise I agree more than I disagree with you and Nytram on this.

 

[KeyserSoze]

Early won a great tactical victory at Monocacy, forcing Lew Wallace to flee.

Early defeated a force he outnumbered by about 3 to 1. And if you honestly believe that Early had a ghost of a chance of capturing Washington, it was a strategic defeat by delaying his advance on Washington for over a day.

He attacked Fort Stevens and inflicted just under 500 casualties to the Union defenders, suffering just over 300 himself.

Your imaginative casualty figures aside, Early never came close to capturing Stevens and withdrew from Washington.

Chambersburg was burned by John McCausland, not Early himself.

McCausland was under Early's command.

Sheridan's victories were results of his numerical superiority. Everything Early wanted to hold the Valley was men. It is easy to say you won a triumph when your opponent is nothing but a tub against your whale. Don't forget that, while Sheridan's loss was just over 23000, Early lost just under 10000, making great use of the troops he had.

I have no idea what source your casualty figures come from but I'm sure it's colorful and imaginative.

Finally, I referred to the EAST, not the whole outlook. The observers operated in the East and were aware of the operations there, where the Confederacy was gaining victories and glory.
Civil War Scholar.

Then maybe they should have also been paying attention to where the Confederacy was getting it's behind kicked before they decided that the South was going to win.

 

[Nytram01]

In your first paragraph have you ever wondered why Longstreet was present and Magruder wasn't? I'll tell you because Magruder didn't agree with Johnston and didn't see the immediate need to skedaddle.

No. Longstreet was present because he was in Richmond and Johnston requested that he be allowed to bring Longstreet and G.W. Smith along for the conferance. He wanted to bring W.H.C. Whiting who had accompanied him to Yorktown but Davis wasn't particularly happy with Whiting at the time so it wasn't a good idea.

Magruder wasn't present because he was commanding at Yorktown and the meeting was thrown together in an afternoon after Johnston rushed back from a tour of Yorktown in which he was appauled at the poor state of the defence.

Magruder had never intended his Yorktown line to be anything other than a last-resort line of defence. It wasn't well planned out, the earth-works weren't well dug, and in places the line was flooded and exposed to both the elements and the enemy. In March he had suggested that if he had been immediately reinforced he could drive the Federals from the Peninsula but when he met Johnston at Yorktown in April his most recent communications with Richmond had been to suggest the evacuation of Norfolk and the entire James Peninsula leaving only a token force behind so he and Huger could link up with Johnston and attack across the Potomac. Magruer certainly did not favour sticking it out on the Peninsula.

. The final decision was made by Johnston and not Davis by the expedient of simply not saying anything until the army arrived in Richmond.

On April 29th Johnston sent a communication to Lee in Richmond. In this he said "should the attack upon Yorktown be made earnestly, we cannot prevent its fall, nor can it hold out more than a few hours." He went on to warn against the posibility of the shallow-bottomed Federal Ironclad getting up river and that would necessitate an immedate withdrawal, therefore it would be better to anticipate this than wait for it to happen before doing anything.

The very next day the Federal guns opened fire.

During the withdrawal from Yorktown, Johnston did not conduct regular correspondence with Richmond, but he was never stopped contacting them altogether. To quote directly from Steven Newton's book on this campaign:

"The published correspondence in the Official Records does portray Johnston as silent between May 1 and May 7, but this is misleading. Numerous notes and endorsements signed by Johnston concerning routine administrative matters appears in the records of the adjutant and inspector general. Especially significant are the endorsement by Johnston concerning letters by Longstreet to Samuel Cooper, dated May 7 and May 9, which indicate that he filed a preliminart report on the battle of Williamsburg. Though this document has not been found, its existance is further suggested by Johnston's immediate reports of the the much smaller engagement at Eltham's Landing. Contextual evidence in Lee's letterbook also indicates that Johnston wrote him on May 6, referring to provisions for the army. The longest period during which Johnston remained incommunicado definetly did not exceed four days (May 2-5) and may well have been shorter"​

By May 10th he had resumed regular communications with Richmond and at that time his Army was at Baltimore Crossroad and had yet to move south of the Chickahominy.

When Johnston was in Harpers Ferry he couldn't wait to get back, when he was in Manassas he couldn't stand it and when he was at Williamsburg in a very nice place he couldn't wait for Norfolk he just had to go. IMO calling Johnston adequate is a bit of a stretch.

Its not a stretch because he did what was expected of him. He held the Yorktown line until the Federals opened fire with their seige guns, he conducted a stage-by-stage withdrawal, and he bought time for more men to be trained and more weapons to be manufactored or purchased and brought to the army and when he had moved beyond the point where the Federals could use their naval superiority to outflank him he attempt to counter-attack. His conduct was well within the bounds of what was expected of him during that campaign.

 

[Elennsar]

Magruder had never intended his Yorktown line to be anything other than a last-resort line of defence. It wasn't well planned out, the earth-works weren't well dug, and in places the line was flooded and exposed to both the elements and the enemy. In March he had suggested that if he had been immediately reinforced he could drive the Federals from the Peninsula but when he met Johnston at Yorktown in April his most recent communications with Richmond had been to suggest the evacuation of Norfolk and the entire James Peninsula leaving only a token force behind so he and Huger could link up with Johnston and attack across the Potomac. Magruer certainly did not favour sticking it out on the Peninsula.

In the interests of information sharing, where is this from? I can look up his messages in the OR, but I am not familiar with the underlined bit (and if the others are more readily available outside the OR, that would be good to know).

 

[Nytram01]

In the interests of information sharing, where is this from? I can look up his messages in the OR, but I am not familiar with the underlined bit (and if the others are more readily available outside the OR, that would be good to know).

Mostly Steven Newton's book I admit.

For the flooding of some sections of the line Newton list his sources as: OR II (Part 1): 316, 317, and Part 3L 441-42. He also claims Edward Porter Alexander as a source. For exposed to the enemy Newton gives the same sources.

The exposed to the elements bit comes from the lack of tent as explained to Johnston by D.H. Hill. I cant see specific source for that bit but I'd it would be in OR 11 (Part 3) if it's anywhere.

As for Magruder's opinion on the positon, Newton gives his sourceas Ibid,. (Part 3) 422, 436

 

[M E Wolf]

Just a personal observation concerning Generals Johnston, Huger, Magruder and Longstreet ....

I've seen, as has several others, the personality conflicts from General Johnston and President Davis. Johnston from the beginning, had his nose out of joint for not being put in a senior generalship position upon the formation of the Confederacy aka C.S.A.; in its Provisional and in Regular state.

I call upon human nature's difficulties to constantly hear praises of the 'favored' such as Bragg, Lee, etc. when in the "Old Army" he was their senior. Even Colonel Sam. Cooper, though Adjutant-General of the U. S. Army, et.al.; had a lower rank then Brigadier-General Johnston in the Old Army. One gets extremely weary of hearing how others are better and this and that.

General Johnston, who wasn't a dummy, had to have seen this as a 'good old boy network' (putting it in modern terms) and had to have known the performances of each of these individuals from West Point aka United States Military Academy aka USMA; that perhaps made him nervous as they were unproven as Mexican War was the last major 'war' engaged by the U.S. Regulars.

Remembering also, that each military arm was specialized but, not always working in harmony as their arms were often disengaged with one another. Up into 1862, Cavalry was used more for escort, message carriers, and lucky to have been used by Infantry Commanders to improve their situation.

As one has a "President" who rather had been Secretary of War, frequently inserted himself into the affairs more deeply --perhaps too deep as to second guess the generals on the field witnessing the evolving scenes before them.

It must be remembered that General Johnston had under his 'supervision' the Army in Northern Virginia which was extremely successful at the First Battle of Bull Run/Manassas. Beauregard wasn't 'that' great and wasn't 'that' good. What is frequently coming to my mind is a reference to the movie Patton where General Bradley comments to General Geo. Patton, after Patton comments his pride in Bradley's success --...to the effect/affect that Patton had trained the army Bradley now commanded. Johnston 'trained' Lee's future army--to include their commanders. Only when Johnston was wounded was he removed from it and since Lee took over, Lee inherited the good foundation of which Johnston made. Johnston also saw the qualities of Longstreet and "Stonewall" Jackson. Longstreet recognizing J.E.B. Stuart's qualities -- recommended Stuart's promotion to General.

Though Union Generals had the same problems of uniting many State troops as to fight as one, to which McClellan did a good job of doing, it does not always make a 'all around' general. Its putting the right people in the right position. Unlike the Union's State Troops, there didn't seem to be a quota of promotions to command by State like the Confederate Army.

Further, Johnston when he recovered from his wounds, was transferred to the Western Theater did not 'train' that army but inherited it. This does not include the "clique" Johnston had to contend with, e.g Bragg and friends. Davis' attention, as it should have been, was on the Capitol of the Confederacy and being on the Eastern Theater, the Western Theater was deprived of the same quality supplies in a swift manner. With a smaller pool of States to draw from, without the density of fighting men -- all losses were instrumental in kicking out the timbers of support under the Confederacy.

Just some personal thoughts, comments and observations.

M. E. Wolf

 

[Elennsar]

Mostly Steven Newton's book I admit.

For the flooding of some sections of the line Newton list his sources as: OR II (Part 1): 316, 317, and Part 3L 441-42. He also claims Edward Porter Alexander as a source. For exposed to the enemy Newton gives the same sources.

Alexander's Military Memoirs of a Confederate, I presume?

Porter Alexander seems to have had a very keen eye when looking at decisions and consequences, so if he's vouching for something, in the absence of stronger contrary evidence I'd consider it a very good argument.

The exposed to the elements bit comes from the lack of tent as explained to Johnston by D.H. Hill. I cant see specific source for that bit but I'd it would be in OR 11 (Part 3) if it's anywhere.

As for Magruder's opinion on the positon, Newton gives his sourceas Ibid,. (Part 3) 422, 436

Greatly appreciated on all accounts, thank you.

 

[BillO]

OK back to the meeting that was brought up earlier basically between Randolph, Lee, Davis and Johnston. At the end of the meeting, according to C. Dowdy, Davis flatly told Johnston that Yorktown must be defended. After the war Johnston wrote" The belief that the events on the Peninsula would soon compel the Confederate Government to the necessity of adopting my method of opposing the Federal army, reconciled me somewhat to obeying the Presidents order." On May the 1st. Johnston sent a telegram to Davis informing him that Yorktown was being evacuated. Davis wired back asking if the safety of his army would permit them time to remove the public property from the Norfolk Navy yard. Johnston ignored the telegram and didn't respond. Johnston evacuated Yorktown on the night of May the 4th without saying anything to Richmond. Davis sent Mallory and Randolph to Norfolk to find out what was going on. They arrived about the same time that a staff officer from Johnston showed up at the Navy yard to order the immediate evacuation. Randolph and Mallory couldn't see any reason for it and countermanded the order. The AoP gave them about another week to move supplies out. Johnston sent a message to Richmond on May 7th. stating that the army was now at Barhamsville in New Kent co. near the White House landing. On may 8th Johnston sent an angry letter to Lee complaining that Lee and Randolph were dispatching troops that were under his command. On May 11th the CSS Virginia was scuttled and the next day the Federal navy started up the James river. That same day Johnston wrote Lee asking what plans had been made for supplying his army in the event Richmond was evacuated. IMO it is pretty easy to see why Davis and Lee lost faith in Johnston.

 

[diane]

Good points - he might be better remembered if he hadn't fallen down on the job at Bryce's Crossroads - really weak sauce on his part.

I don't think Grierson did a bad job at Brice's Crossroads - he was outgeneralled is all! He ran into Lyons at Porter's Field and was struck unexpectedly on both flanks and the rear. Pretty well catched. He couldn't do much more than hold his own then, and was no help to Sturgis. It might have been a different fight if Grierson had had full command of it - he trusted the black soldiers when they were under his command, and Sturgis did not. Made a great difference.

Back a ways there was some comment on A P Hill and Ewell at Gettsyburg. I don't think it mattered what either of them commanded because they weren't themselves. Hill was very sick with failing kidneys - hard to ride and that's probably why he didn't do the checking he should have done - and Ewell just wasn't the same after losing his leg. He was very cautious, which he hadn't been in his heyday with Jackson in the Valley. Lee had no way of knowing Ewell was not himself - he was banking on what he'd known of Ewell before his injury - and Hill, too, was a general he didn't realize was off his game big time. Lee had all reason to think both of them could handle what needed to be handled but, as things came out, it was clear he was mistaken.

 

[Elennsar]

[A]nd Ewell just wasn't the same after losing his leg. He was very cautious, which he hadn't been in his heyday with Jackson in the Valley. Lee had no way of knowing Ewell was not himself - he was banking on what he'd known of Ewell before his injury - and Hill, too, was a general he didn't realize was off his game big time. Lee had all reason to think both of them could handle what needed to be handled but, as things came out, it was clear he was mistaken.

I'm not altogether sure I would describe the general who smashed Milroy at Winchester as well as any battle in the VAlley by Jackson had smashed a Federal force and who committed his two available divisions at Gettysburg on day 1 vigorously on and on his own initiative as too cautious and "not himself".

He certainly made mistakes - but they don't start showing until the issue of what to do with his corps for the next day's fighting comes up, rather than the issue of being expected to take the high ground south of town with only two of his brigades immediately available (Avery and Hays, I think) and concerns on his flank.

 

[diane]

I'm not altogether sure I would describe the general who smashed Milroy at Winchester as well as any battle in the VAlley by Jackson had smashed a Federal force and who committed his two available divisions at Gettysburg on day 1 vigorously on and on his own initiative as too cautious and "not himself".

He certainly made mistakes - but they don't start showing until the issue of what to do with his corps for the next day's fighting comes up, rather than the issue of being expected to take the high ground south of town with only two of his brigades immediately available (Avery and Hays, I think) and concerns on his flank.

That's true. Ewell did redeem himself. I guess his mistakes go into the one oh s! wipes out all your atta-boys! Still, I don't think one can say he was the same aggressive general he had been. That happened to Sedgwick, too. He became much more cautious after being seriously wounded, but one couldn't say he was a bad general. Neither Hill or Ewell could be replaced anyway - Lee had a pretty short list of acceptable candidates.

 

[Elennsar]

That's true. Ewell did redeem himself. I guess his mistakes go into the one oh s! wipes out all your atta-boys! Still, I don't think one can say he was the same aggressive general he had been. That happened to Sedgwick, too. He became much more cautious after being seriously wounded, but one couldn't say he was a bad general. Neither Hill or Ewell could be replaced anyway - Lee had a pretty short list of acceptable candidates.

"Ewell acted aggressively in one set of circumstances and didn't act so aggressively in another set of circumstances." - what I understand you to be saying.

But were those circumstances equivalent? I'm not saying Post Injury Ewell did all things right, but the situation in the Valley in 1862 is not the situation in the Overland Campaign in 1864 in terrain, in opportunities, in resources, or in the opposition (except in the sense "still fighting Yankees").

Picking those two as the campaign that showed his qualities and the campaign that saw him transferred away from field command, which is about as stark a contrast as I can think of.

 

[Civil War Scholar]

Early defeated a force he outnumbered by about 3 to 1. And if you honestly believe that Early had a ghost of a chance of capturing Washington, it was a strategic defeat by delaying his advance on Washington for over a day.


Your imaginative casualty figures aside, Early never came close to capturing Stevens and withdrew from Washington.



McCausland was under Early's command.



I have no idea what source your casualty figures come from but I'm sure it's colorful and imaginative.



Then maybe they should have also been paying attention to where the Confederacy was getting it's behind kicked before they decided that the South was going to win.

Keyser Soze,
Early's victory was a victory. When a Union general has 3 to 1 superiority, it's a victory. When the same applies to a Confederate one, not talk for victory.
I didn't say Early captured Ft. Stephens. Yet, his reaching of the DC was enough to earn him admiration and glory.
Figures come from Long, Foote and Wikipedia.
Civil War Scholar.

 

[Elennsar]

When will we see figures from sources that show their sources?