Stonewall Why did Longstreet outrank Jackson by 1 day?

Mr. King

Sergeant Major
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Jan 15, 2014
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Carolina Coast
What was the purpose in this? Longstreet as 2nd in command? Who ordered this so? Kirby Smith also outranked him. I've never understood why Smith was anything more than a colonel anyway.

Does anyone know why this happened?
 
The grade of lieutenant general was created in October of 1862, after the Army of Northern Virginia had been organized into Longstreet and Jackson's corps, which, in turn, were organized after the Seven Days battles... during which, Jackson's performance was wildly inadequate. As such, Lee made Longstreeet's corps about 60% larger than Jackson's; it only makes sense to have the more qualified general with a larger command as the senior.

Frankly, Jackson's talents could be best described as inconsistent. With a compact, fast-moving, smaller command that had freedom to maneuver, he could work tactical wonders, but his aggression was rarely tempered with pragmatism, and there were points (like, for example, just before the Seven Days) when he became lackadaisical, almost to the point of insubordination. Longstreet, by contrast, was the superior strategic and logistical thinker of the pair.
 
These are my opinions, take them as you will.
  1. With the exception of Seven Pines Longstreet had performed well in all his command assignments. Jackson's performances during the Seven Days and at Cedar Mountain were less than stellar. 2nd Manassas and Sharpsburg held promise for the future, but there was still a question mark.
  2. The rank precedence determined who would succeed Lee if Lee were incapacitated. Jackson was known to be irascible and had difficulties with a number of subordinate officers. Probably not the best quality for an army commander.
  3. Longstreet had rank precedence as a Major General.
As far as I can see Kirby Smith had performed very well in his commands to this point in the war, including a stint as a department commander while he recovered from wounds received at 1st Manassas.
 
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These are my opinions, take them as you will.
  1. With the exception of Seven Pines Longstreet had performed well in all his command assignments. Jackson's performances during the Seven Days and at Cedar Mountain were less than stellar. 2nd Manassas and Sharpsburg held promise for the future, but there was still a question mark.
  2. The rank precedence determined who would succeed Lee if Lee were
    incapacitated. Jackson was known to be irascible and had difficulties with a number of subordinate officers. Probably not the best quality for an army commander.
  3. Longstreet had rank precedence as a Major General.
As far as I can see Kirby Smith had performed very well in his commands to this point in the war, including a stint as a department commander while he recovered from wounds received at 1st Manassas.

I guess hindsight is 20/20.
IMO, Longstreet had a tendency to blame others and throw his subordinates under the bus. I'm not a huge fan if his. I agree that up to the time of their promotions to Lt. Gen, Longstreet had performed very well. But I have seen it pointed out that up until Suffolk, Lee had kept close tabs on him. Jackson always had semi-independance, whereas Longstreet was always close to the ANV HQ. Jackson had the Valley Campaign. He was cut loose with an additional division for the Northern VA Campaign. He was given the assignment of taking out Harper's Ferry. Jackson was out in the Valley at the start of the Fredericksburg Campaign.
Jackson had his faults. I blame his botched performance in the Peninsula Campaign on exhaustion after the Valley. His constant use of handcuffs on his div. commanders is almost comical at times. Garnett was a victim of Jackson's wrath, that's for sure. But after Suffolk, Longstreet began a string of foul ups that rivaled anything Jackson may have been guilty of. One thing is for certain.... Longstreet never had career highlights such as 1st Winchester or Chancellorsville.
 
I guess hindsight is 20/20.
IMO, Longstreet had a tendency to blame others and throw his subordinates under the bus.
Sounds like Jackson.


One thing is for certain.... Longstreet never had career highlights such as 1st Winchester or Chancellorsville.
Longstreet had the attack on August 30 at Second Bull Run; the attack on the Second Corps in the Wilderness; the attack at Chickamauga.
 
I guess hindsight is 20/20.
IMO, Longstreet had a tendency to blame others and throw his subordinates under the bus. I'm not a huge fan if his. I agree that up to the time of their promotions to Lt. Gen, Longstreet had performed very well. But I have seen it pointed out that up until Suffolk, Lee had kept close tabs on him. Jackson always had semi-independance, whereas Longstreet was always close to the ANV HQ. Jackson had the Valley Campaign. He was cut loose with an additional division for the Northern VA Campaign. He was given the assignment of taking out Harper's Ferry. Jackson was out in the Valley at the start of the Fredericksburg Campaign.
Jackson had his faults. I blame his botched performance in the Peninsula Campaign on exhaustion after the Valley. His constant use of handcuffs on his div. commanders is almost comical at times. Garnett was a victim of Jackson's wrath, that's for sure. But after Suffolk, Longstreet began a string of foul ups that rivaled anything Jackson may have been guilty of. One thing is for certain.... Longstreet never had career highlights such as 1st Winchester or Chancellorsville.
It's worth noting that Lee wasn't in command of the Army of Northern Virginia when Jackson was in the valley; Joe Johnston was. Nor for that matter do I see much evidence of Longstreet "[throwing] his subordinates under the bus"; Ned is correct when he says that trait seems more indicative of Jackson - who was notoriously temperamental and capricious - that it does of Longstreet, whose only real argument with a subordinate that I can think of was with A.P. Hill - which, incidentally, Hill started rather than Longstreet. Could you be more specific about this "long string of foul ups"? Considering that you ignored every single one of his successes in that period, I have to wonder if you're not basing most of your opinions of Longstreet on the writings of Jubal Early...
 
It's worth noting that Lee wasn't in command of the Army of Northern Virginia when Jackson was in the valley; Joe Johnston was. Nor for that matter do I see much evidence of Longstreet "[throwing] his subordinates under the bus"; Ned is correct when he says that trait seems more indicative of Jackson - who was notoriously temperamental and capricious - that it does of Longstreet, whose only real argument with a subordinate that I can think of was with A.P. Hill - which, incidentally, Hill started rather than Longstreet. Could you be more specific about this "long string of foul ups"? Considering that you ignored every single one of his successes in that period, I have to wonder if you're not basing most of your opinions of Longstreet on the writings of Jubal Early...

I believe that he is referring to the Longstreet-McLaws kerfuffle.

R
 
Sounds like Jackson.



Longstreet had the attack on August 30 at Second Bull Run; the attack on the Second Corps in the Wilderness; the attack at Chickamauga.

Longstreet was a great general. I am not discounting that. It's just that Jackson's exploits were greater.

Longstreet was solid as a rock in the Appomattox Campaign. If Lee had been without him God knows they wouldn't have made it past Saylor's Creek. He was the only experienced corps commander left.
 
It's worth noting that Lee wasn't in command of the Army of Northern Virginia when Jackson was in the valley; Joe Johnston was. Nor for that matter do I see much evidence of Longstreet "[throwing] his subordinates under the bus"; Ned is correct when he says that trait seems more indicative of Jackson - who was notoriously temperamental and capricious - that it does of Longstreet, whose only real argument with a subordinate that I can think of was with A.P. Hill - which, incidentally, Hill started rather than Longstreet. Could you be more specific about this "long string of foul ups"? Considering that you ignored every single one of his successes in that period, I have to wonder if you're not basing most of your opinions of Longstreet on the writings of Jubal Early...

jackson and Hill had a pretty big run in but I don't recall the Hill Longstreet one.
 
It's worth noting that Lee wasn't in command of the Army of Northern Virginia when Jackson was in the valley; Joe Johnston was. Nor for that matter do I see much evidence of Longstreet "[throwing] his subordinates under the bus"; Ned is correct when he says that trait seems more indicative of Jackson - who was notoriously temperamental and capricious - that it does of Longstreet, whose only real argument with a subordinate that I can think of was with A.P. Hill - which, incidentally, Hill started rather than Longstreet. Could you be more specific about this "long string of foul ups"? Considering that you ignored every single one of his successes in that period, I have to wonder if you're not basing most of your opinions of Longstreet on the writings of Jubal Early...

I do not consider myself a lost causer.

Longstreet got sideways with McLaws for little to no reason and canned him. He blamed Huger for his late arrival at Seven Pines.

While Joe Johnston was the commander of the army, Lee was Davis' military advisor, and was issuing orders to Jackson.

The Siege of Suffolk was fruitless, tactically speaking. He outnumbered his opponent, which was a rare advantage.

Victory also evaded him at Siege of Knoxville.

I do believe there was also a lot of foot dragging on day 2 @ Gettysburg.
 
Longstreet was a great general. I am not discounting that. It's just that Jackson's exploits were greater.

Longstreet was solid as a rock in the Appomattox Campaign. If Lee had been without him God knows they wouldn't have made it past Saylor's Creek. He was the only experienced corps commander left.

I'm of the opinion that Jackson was good but not great. Tactically, he could be brilliant or dreadful. His Valley Campaign was impressive but it was against very subpar opponents. A lot of his legend stems from the fact that he was killed right when things started to go south for the AoNV. It became natural for people to look back and say "if only Jackson were there."

R
 
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:: shrug :: We can second-guess them all day long, but it won't change Robert E. Lee's opinion... in which both Jackson and Longstreet stood quite high. I'm not aware of anything that Lee said or wrote comparing the two, however.
 
:: shrug :: We can second-guess them all day long, but it won't change Robert E. Lee's opinion... in which both Jackson and Longstreet stood quite high. I'm not aware of anything that Lee said or wrote comparing the two, however.
Well, if the movies "Gods and Generals" and "Gettysburg" quoted Lee accurately, he called Longstreet his "old war horse" in an endearing, confident tone and when told of Jackson's loss of his arm said "He has lost his left arm and I have lost my right."

Perhaps he held both in relatively equal esteem but realized they each had a different skillset he valued?
 
Well someone had to have precedence and I think that much of Jackson's reputation is based on the fact that he was killed at the height of his powers and therefore his bad days are glossed over whereas Longstreet was subject to villification after the war for going Republican and to some became a traitor to the lost cause.

Longstreet every time as commander of the ANV in place of an incapacitated or dead Lee.
 
jackson and Hill had a pretty big run in but I don't recall the Hill Longstreet one.
The run-in was the result of a newspaper article written after the Seven Days extolling the heroics of Hill. Longstreet felt he was improperly slighted (to an extent he was) and things degenerated from there. The following link from the And Then A. P. Hill Came Up website spells it out in great detail. http://www.aphillcsa.goellnitz.org/n91.html
 
jackson and Hill had a pretty big run in but I don't recall the Hill Longstreet one.
The whole reason Hill was in Jackson's corps to begin with is that after the Seven Days, he actually challenged Longstreet to a duel...
Yes, didn't he have AP Hill or one of his subordinates arrested for halting a column to rest or something without his express permission?
That was indeed Hill. There was also his arrest of Garnett for not sacrificing his entire command for no reason, his summary relief of a few colonels in the midst of battle (causing confusion among his own troops) for a variety of real or imagined infractions, and the fact that he was generally a bit nuts... which, admittedly, also worked in his favor quite often.
I do not consider myself a lost causer.

Longstreet got sideways with McLaws for little to no reason and canned him. He blamed Huger for his late arrival at Seven Pines.

While Joe Johnston was the commander of the army, Lee was Davis' military advisor, and was issuing orders to Jackson.

The Siege of Suffolk was fruitless, tactically speaking. He outnumbered his opponent, which was a rare advantage.

Victory also evaded him at Siege of Knoxville.

I do believe there was also a lot of foot dragging on day 2 @ Gettysburg.
I'm pretty sure no one here called you a lost causer, but alright. As for the rest:
-I had indeed forgotten the McLaws mess; as for his blame of Huger, Huger was partially to blame. He was less to blame than Longstreet himself (who was supposed to be on an entirely different road), but that doesn't change the fact that Huger slowed Longstreet's advance as well.
-Absent specific orders from Davis (which didn't exist), Jackson couldn't have been detached to the Valley without Johnston's express approval; Lee had no direct authority over Johnston.
-You completely missed the point to Suffolk; the siege was never meant to be a tactical success. It was, however, a strategic success, in that it accomplished its primary goal of pinning down the Union troops long enough for Longstreet to complete his large-scale foraging operations. It wasn't actually meant to take the town.
-Victory evaded him at Knoxville because victory was impossible at Knoxville with the resources he was given; Bragg should have never sent him there.
-As for Gettysburg, he was indeed slow, and it was likely in part because he didn't feel that the attack should have been made (which, as it turned out, he was correct, though that doesn't excuse lethargy). However, it's worth noting that his orders were to remain unobserved in his approach, and most of the time was spent on a counter-march to achieve that goal, since Lee sent him out with a guide who hadn't actually scouted the approaches, having not actually been told to do so.
Longstreet was a great general. I am not discounting that. It's just that Jackson's exploits were greater.

Longstreet was solid as a rock in the Appomattox Campaign. If Lee had been without him God knows they wouldn't have made it past Saylor's Creek. He was the only experienced corps commander left.
I still disagree that Jackson's exploits were "greater"; they merely made better headlines, while his errors were generally overlooked entirely. Jackson was, at his core, inconsistent. He was either supremely brilliant or spectacularly incompetent; there was no middle ground. As for Appomattox, Longstreet may have been the last remaining experienced corps commander, but I think you're overlooking John Gordon's raw talent.
 

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