jackson and Hill had a pretty big run in but I don't recall the Hill Longstreet one.
The whole reason Hill was in Jackson's corps to begin with is that after the Seven Days, he actually challenged Longstreet to a duel...
Yes, didn't he have AP Hill or one of his subordinates arrested for halting a column to rest or something without his express permission?
That was indeed Hill. There was also his arrest of Garnett for not sacrificing his entire command for no reason, his summary relief of a few colonels in the midst of battle (causing confusion among his own troops) for a variety of real or imagined infractions, and the fact that he was generally a bit nuts... which, admittedly, also worked in his favor quite often.
I do not consider myself a lost causer.
Longstreet got sideways with McLaws for little to no reason and canned him. He blamed Huger for his late arrival at Seven Pines.
While Joe Johnston was the commander of the army, Lee was Davis' military advisor, and was issuing orders to Jackson.
The Siege of Suffolk was fruitless, tactically speaking. He outnumbered his opponent, which was a rare advantage.
Victory also evaded him at Siege of Knoxville.
I do believe there was also a lot of foot dragging on day 2 @ Gettysburg.
I'm pretty sure no one here called you a lost causer, but alright. As for the rest:
-I had indeed forgotten the McLaws mess; as for his blame of Huger, Huger
was partially to blame. He was less to blame than Longstreet himself (who was supposed to be on an entirely different road), but that doesn't change the fact that Huger slowed Longstreet's advance as well.
-Absent specific orders from Davis (which didn't exist), Jackson couldn't have been detached to the Valley without Johnston's express approval; Lee had no direct authority over Johnston.
-You completely missed the point to Suffolk; the siege was never meant to be a tactical success. It was, however, a strategic success, in that it accomplished its primary goal of pinning down the Union troops long enough for Longstreet to complete his large-scale foraging operations. It wasn't actually meant to take the town.
-Victory evaded him at Knoxville because victory was impossible at Knoxville with the resources he was given; Bragg should have never sent him there.
-As for Gettysburg, he was indeed slow, and it was likely in part because he didn't feel that the attack should have been made (which, as it turned out, he was correct, though that doesn't excuse lethargy). However, it's worth noting that his orders were to remain unobserved in his approach, and most of the time was spent on a counter-march to achieve that goal, since Lee sent him out with a guide who hadn't actually scouted the approaches, having not actually been told to do so.
Longstreet was a great general. I am not discounting that. It's just that Jackson's exploits were greater.
Longstreet was solid as a rock in the Appomattox Campaign. If Lee had been without him God knows they wouldn't have made it past Saylor's Creek. He was the only experienced corps commander left.
I still disagree that Jackson's exploits were "greater"; they merely made better headlines, while his errors were generally overlooked entirely. Jackson was, at his core, inconsistent. He was either supremely brilliant or spectacularly incompetent; there was no middle ground. As for Appomattox, Longstreet may have been the last remaining
experienced corps commander, but I think you're overlooking John Gordon's raw talent.