McClellan General with biggest ego?

[Joseph A. Rose]

Likewise, you cannot prove factually that Buell did.

I agree with you. And I'm not arguing that Buell did or did not save Grant's army.

It does seem that you are arguing likewise that we cannot prove factually that Buell did not save Grant's army.

This issue is in the same league as the one where people claim that Grant's last line could have held no matter what.

 

[General JJ]

I agree with you. And I'm not arguing that Buell did or did not save Grant's army.

It does seem that you are arguing likewise that we cannot prove factually that Buell did not save Grant's army.

This issue is in the same league as the one where people claim that Grant's last line could have held no matter what.

Yes, ultimately it falls into the what if/alternate history discussion thread. Personally I do strongly believe that Grant and his army, by the time they were positoned in the last line, were safe. Don't think Beauregard could possibly have organized a succesful attack against such a strong position, even if the Army of the Ohio hadn't arrived. But ultimately we'll never know.

 

[Belfoured]

When someone argued that Buell saved Grant's army, you (and Dr. Smith) obviously disagreed. So, please show me factually that Buell didn't do so. You can't. Neither argument can be "substantiated."

As Dr. Smith notes the positive morale effect on Grant's army, then how does he know that this didn't save Grant's army by keeping his men on the line? He doesn't know. You don't know. I don't know.

As to Smith's opinion that there was no tactical surprise of Grant's army, a vast amount of evidence contradicts him.

Are you really arguing that Wallace's division was more important to the outcome of April 7th than Buell's three divisions?

Are you really arguing that Wallace's division was more important to the outcome of April 7th than Buell's three divisions?

Have you even read the book? If you have, you are aware of Smith's assessment of how Buell's three divisions were faring in the counterattack and why (p. 345). If you read on, you would have seen his detailed analysis of Wallace's maneuvers and their effect. Kindly tell us where he got the facts wrong.

As to Smith's opinion that there was no tactical surprise of Grant's army, a vast amount of evidence contradicts him

Have you even read the book? If so, re-read p. 236 about "surprise".

Neither argument can be "substantiated."

So much for the post claiming that Buell did "save" Grant. Thanks for refuting it.

 

[Belfoured]

I agree with you. And I'm not arguing that Buell did or did not save Grant's army.

It does seem that you are arguing likewise that we cannot prove factually that Buell did not save Grant's army.

This issue is in the same league as the one where people claim that Grant's last line could have held no matter what.

And I'm not arguing that Buell did or did not save Grant's army.

Thanks for clarifying that Post # 92 is wrong.

 

[Belfoured]

Yes, ultimately it falls into the what if/alternate history discussion thread. Personally I do strongly believe that Grant and his army, by the time they were positoned in the last line, were safe. Don't think Beauregard could possibly have organized a succesful attack against such a strong position, even if the Army of the Ohio hadn't arrived. But ultimately we'll never know.

I think you're right - that we can never know for certain. The one thing we do know is that the line held when it was attacked at the end of the fighting on April 6 and that was due overwhelmingly to the massive accumulation of Federal artillery and the significant topographical challenges for an attacker at Dill Branch Ravine. There's also a tendency to forget that the Confederate army had suffered significant losses itself (including its CO) and was also disorganized. I put much less weight on Buell's arrival making a difference as to Grant holding the PL line than I do on its unquestionable impact for the April 7 counterattack. Again, all of this took off from the claim that Buell "saved" Grant.

 

[General JJ]

In the battle of April 7th, I do believe Lew Wallace's division was the single most important unit on the field. While the AotO was bogged down in a slugfest, Wallace was flanking the rebel line and forcing them to retreat.

However, it is unlikely that Grant would have counterattacked in the first place had Buell's army not arrived. So I would argue that Lew Wallace and Buell were equally pivotal in the outcome of the day's fighting. Buell's army gave the Federals the opportunity to counterattack, and Lew Wallace was instrumental in successfully winning it.

 

[Belfoured]

In the battle of April 7th, I do believe Lew Wallace's division was the single most important unit on the field. While the AotO was bogged down in a slugfest, Wallace was flanking the rebel line and forcing them to retreat.

However, it is unlikely that Grant would have counterattacked in the first place had Buell's army not arrived. So I would argue that Lew Wallace and Buell were equally pivotal in the outcome of the day's fighting. Buell's army gave the Federals the opportunity to counterattack, and Lew Wallace was instrumental in successfully winning it.

As I think is clear, I agree on whether there would have been a counterattack on the 7th without Buell - in other words, "not hardly". (A distinct issue is whether I think Buell would have ordered the counterattack had it been up to him and not Grant. Same answer).

By "pivotal" I was referring to the separate issue of the counterattack's tactical success. Based on the careful analysis in Tim Smith's book, I give that one to Wallace, who executed two solid turning movements. And, obviously, Wallace could not have done what he did if the Confederates were not also occupied with Nelson, Crittenden, and McCook - and with Sherman and McClernand, as well.

It looks like you and I are on the same "book and page."

 

[Joseph A. Rose]

Have you even read the book? If you have, you are aware of Smith's assessment of how Buell's three divisions were faring in the counterattack and why (p. 345). If you read on, you would have seen his detailed analysis of Wallace's maneuvers and their effect. Kindly tell us where he got the facts wrong.


Have you even read the book? If so, re-read p. 236 about "surprise".


So much for the post claiming that Buell did "save" Grant. Thanks for refuting it.

I've read the book, but don't own a copy. My notes from it detail how Smith repeatedly took Grant's side. Maybe I just don't like your use of the word "pivotal," but you seem to be indicating that Buell's three divisions were less important than Wallace's one division.

Who you should really be criticizing are Grant, for stating that Wallace was a coward and that Sherman had also told him so. Sherman wrote that Wallace had little hard fighting at any time, but made a good deal of noise, firing his guns into the woods where there was no enemy. No enemy regt was w/i 3 miles of the front and Wallace was in woods to my right rear on Owl Creek near where McDowell was when fight started. He didn't have to move as he was already in a safe place. Sherman and Grant were liars.

As to the "surprise" on page 236, Smith elsewhere admitted that Grant was strategically surprised, but not tactically. So page 236 either refers to a strategic surprise or Smith contradicted himself.

I don't have to "refute" the post claiming that Buell did "save" Grant. That's an unknowable opinion, similar to opinions that Buell did "not" save Grant, that Grant's last line was impregnable, and that Grant would have won the battle without Buell's help. You should take grave issue with that last one, given the military situation.

 

[Library Lady]

Based on reading what this thread has become (as opposed to the OP's original question), would it be out of place to suggest that perhaps an XL-sized ego is not the province solely of dead generals?

Back on the mainline, both McClellan and Sheridan are prime examples of the grain of truth at the bottom of the stereotype that short guys have big egos.

 

[OpnCoronet]

My vote is for William S. Rosecrans as being with the most 'out of control' ego.

Not only was he convinced in his own mind that he knew better than his Commander In Chief, and also his immediate superiors, he was bound and determined to act on that conviction, no matter what they thought or said.


P.S. I used to think McClellan's problem was an inflated ego, but now I am not so sure. Perhaps a man with a crippling lack of confidence in himself as McClellan, precludes the idea of his having an ego at all.

 

[Belfoured]

I've read the book, but don't own a copy. My notes from it detail how Smith repeatedly took Grant's side. Maybe I just don't like your use of the word "pivotal," but you seem to be indicating that Buell's three divisions were less important than Wallace's one division.

Who you should really be criticizing are Grant, for stating that Wallace was a coward and that Sherman had also told him so. Sherman wrote that Wallace had little hard fighting at any time, but made a good deal of noise, firing his guns into the woods where there was no enemy. No enemy regt was w/i 3 miles of the front and Wallace was in woods to my right rear on Owl Creek near where McDowell was when fight started. He didn't have to move as he was already in a safe place. Sherman and Grant were liars.

As to the "surprise" on page 236, Smith elsewhere admitted that Grant was strategically surprised, but not tactically. So page 236 either refers to a strategic surprise or Smith contradicted himself.

I don't have to "refute" the post claiming that Buell did "save" Grant. That's an unknowable opinion, similar to opinions that Buell did "not" save Grant, that Grant's last line was impregnable, and that Grant would have won the battle without Buell's help. You should take grave issue with that last one, given the military situation.

You repeatedly represent that Smith has stated that there was no tactical "surprise" by the April 6 attack. Despite your word-parsing between strategic and tactical surprise, that assertion is untrue.

Page 236 of the book isn't the first time he addressed this issue.

For example, in his entry on Shiloh for the Essential Civil War Curriculum series that he wrote in 2011, he stated:

"The first indications were that, despite Beauregard's nervousness, the Confederates had caught the enemy by surprise. Although there had been some skirmishing in the days prior to April 6, most Federals had no idea they were about to be attacked in force. In fact, Grant was not even with the army, but kept his headquarters at Savannah, awaiting Buell's arrival. Only the nervousness of a brigade commander in Grant's army, Colonel Everett Peabody, mitigated a disastrous total surprise. Not convinced that it was only small roving Confederate units who were in his front, he sent a patrol of some two hundred men to scout the area in front of him. It was this patrol that the Confederate front line intercepted and attacked at dawn, thus beginning the Battle of Shiloh."

What is inaccurate about this? Anybody who has studied the battle knows that Peabody's initiative - despite the orders of his division commander - did indeed "mitigate" a "total surprise" from a tactical standpoint. As a result of Peabody stumbling into the attack, for example, troops from Prentiss's division did move forward from their camps to meet the attack, rather than rolling out of their tents to find the Confederate army in their midst. And how on earth does this let Grant off the hook?

This all started with a post that asserted a fact - Buell "saved" Grant. You have stated more than once that this is unknowable. If that's accurate, a post claiming the fact cannot be accurate.

 

[Belfoured]

My vote is for William S. Rosecrans as being with the most 'out of control' ego.

Not only was he convinced in his own mind that he knew better than his Commander In Chief, and also his immediate superiors, he was bound and determined to act on that conviction, no matter what they thought or said.


P.S. I used to think McClellan's problem was an inflated ego, but now I am not so sure. Perhaps a man with a crippling lack of confidence in himself as McClellan, precludes the idea of his having an ego at all.

P.S. I used to think McClellan's problem was an inflated ego, but now I am not so sure. Perhaps a man with a crippling lack of confidence in himself as McClellan, precludes the idea of his having an ego at all.

That's an interesting point. I think its unquestionable that McClellan had an inflated opinion of himself and his intellectual superiority to others but that, like many narcissists, he also needed constant reassurance of this (shown in examples like his letter to Ellen claiming that those whose judgment he relied on told him that his performance at Antietam was brilliant). At the same time I think he lacked the boldness of others - such as Grant - to take action without everything in place to "guarantee" success. I don't think the two are mutually exclusive. Maybe another way to put it is that his inflated ego wasn't of the type that's required for military success.

 

[Cavalier]

I didn't see him mentioned above, although I am definitely a fan boy, I think Phil Kearny could be described as having a pretty hefty ego.

John

 

[rbasin]

Thought that's a good nomination for a big ego too.

But don't think that Mclernand's ego was of quite the same magnitude as McClellands.

It was close.

 

[rbasin]

I'll throw a name out there: Sherman.

 

[tony_gunter]

When I think of "biggest ego" my first inclination is to turn this into a ratio: ego/abilities.

If we rate them based on the ratio, I don't think anyone ranks above Fremont. Wholly incompetent, but felt himself so entitled to high command that Lincoln had to sneak agents into his department with orders relieving him of command so that he wouldn't deny them entry into his department.

My second would be McClernand, a capable enough commander if someone was explicitly telling him what to do but wholly incapable of formulating tactical or strategic movements that involved more than a division of troops. Felt entitled to independent department / army command.

 

[Library Lady]

When I think of "biggest ego" my first inclination is to turn this into a ratio: ego/abilities.

If we rate them based on the ratio, I don't think anyone ranks above Fremont. Wholly incompetent, but felt himself so entitled to high command that Lincoln had to sneak agents into his department with orders relieving him of command so that he wouldn't deny them entry into his department.

My second would be McClernand, a capable enough commander if someone was explicitly telling him what to do but wholly incapable of formulating tactical or strategic movements that involved more than a division of troops. Felt entitled to independent department / army command.

I can endorse this. Still, I wonder where that leaves McClellan? He had definite organizational talent and definitely whipped the Army of the Potomac into a capable fighting force, but when it came to actually using that fighting force, he seems to be sorely lacking. Lee said something along the lines of to be successful as an army commander, you had to love the army, but not to the point that you are unwilling to risk its destruction. McClellan seems not to have had that drive. I'm not saying that he didn't get people killed, but that perhaps he got more killed for little effect by being slow/timid than if he had moved more boldly. Plus, anything untoward was always somebody else's fault. Despite this, he thought he was God's gift.

 

[tony_gunter]

I can endorse this. Still, I wonder where that leaves McClellan? He had definite organizational talent and definitely whipped the Army of the Potomac into a capable fighting force, but when it came to actually using that fighting force, he seems to be sorely lacking. Lee said something along the lines of to be successful as an army commander, you had to love the army, but not to the point that you are unwilling to risk its destruction. McClellan seems not to have had that drive. I'm not saying that he didn't get people killed, but that perhaps he got more killed for little effect by being slow/timid than if he had moved more boldly. Plus, anything untoward was always somebody else's fault. Despite this, he thought he was God's gift.

Oh yeah, McClellan is definitely up there. Biggest ego by far, but at least he was nominally skilled.

 

[Belfoured]

Oh yeah, McClellan is definitely up there. Biggest ego by far, but at least he was nominally skilled.

And I'll add that - as compared to Fremont - he at least didn't enlist his wife to run interference.

 

[OpnCoronet]

When I think of "biggest ego" my first inclination is to turn this into a ratio: ego/abilities.

If we rate them based on the ratio, I don't think anyone ranks above Fremont. Wholly incompetent, but felt himself so entitled to high command that Lincoln had to sneak agents into his department with orders relieving him of command so that he wouldn't deny them entry into his department.

My second would be McClernand, a capable enough commander if someone was explicitly telling him what to do but wholly incapable of formulating tactical or strategic movements that involved more than a division of troops. Felt entitled to independent department / army command.

I had forgotten all about about Fremont. Good choice.