This has probably been posted somewhere. I don't think I've read it before. It's a report about the conditions in Charleston Harbor gathered by BG James Simon, after Anderson moved to Fort Sumter. His warnings seem to have been heeded by Governor Pickens as shown by the quick military buidup in Charleston Harbor.
http://myathenaeum.com/simpson/page190.html
The Record of Fort Sumter From It's Occupation by Major Anderson To Its Reduction by South Carolina Troops During the Administration of Governor Pickens Compiled by W. A. Harris, Columbia, S.C.: 1862. Page 14-17
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH BRIGADE, S. C. M.,
CHARLESTON, January 1, 1861.
GOVERNOR : I have carefully considered the orders extended to me by the Major General, which emanated from your Headquarters yesterday, and the plan of military operations and line of defence therein set forth. I cannot sacrifice to matter of etiquette, questions and issues of such momentous importance as now surround us. I feel it to be my duty to report to you my opinion of the military movements which have been initiated.
First.—-The line of operations embraces four points:
1. Fort Moultrie.
2. Castle Pinckney.
3. Fort Johnson.
4. Morris' Island.
By the map which accompanies these papers, it will appear that your lines of communication with these, as at present established, are directly within the range and effective power of Fort Sumter—the citadel of the harbor—controlling every point. At the first return fire from Fort Sumter, your lines of communication are utterly cut off with every single post, except, perhaps, Castle Pinckney. Let me simply observe, that you are indebted to the forbearance of the enemy for the liberty of transporting the reinforcements and supplies, which you ordered at midnight, and which are to be sent this day, at two o'clock, to your battery, now in course of erection on Morris' Island. A single gun from Fort Sumter would sink your transport, and destroy your troops and supplies. These lines of communication are the prime consideration of a General. It is vain to say others will be adopted. It is enough that they do not exist now; and, when the present resources fail, your troops will be wholly isolated, and cut off from each other and the main.
Second.—Fort Moultrie.
This post is wholly untenable. Lieutenant Colonel DeSaussure, a brave officer, gave you prompt notice of this fact on the morning after his occupation. His report, this morning, shows you the irrefragable proof of his first report, after nearly a week's occupation of the post. Moreover, he asks for supplies, which he applied to you for on the 30th ultimo. He urges me to* supply these wants at the earliest practicable moment. Suppose he has them, however, there is probably not a single man out of the whole force which he carried down, who ever loaded a siege gun, or, perhaps, ever handled a single gun of heavy calibre, munition or implement, mentioned in the report. I know, and state as a fact, that there is no ordnance force in his whole command. His post must, even under the most favorable circumstances, fall to the enemy, after a very short and bloody contest.
Suppose they evacuate the post, where will they entrench themselves ? Shall they resort to the sandhills ? If the enemy be reinforced by two hundred and fifty United States artillery, as is reported, he can land two hundred men under the guns of Fort Moultrie, and attack Lieutenant Colonel DeSaussure's command—an unequal contest between disciplined veteran troops, commanded by educated and experienced officers, and raw militia, who never saw battle.
In the event of discomfiture to these brave young men, how can they make good their retreat from these sandhills ? Will it be said, there will be a causeway to the mainland, or other communication ? The answer is : The communication does not exist now, and the issue will be upon us in less than thirty hours.
Third.—Fort Johnson.
This post is garrisoned by Light Infantry, or rifles, who never handled a heavy gun, if there be such a gun or any munitions in the dilapidated post they now occupy. At any rate, a few shells from the enemy at Fort Sumter will compel them to retire from their position.
Fourth.—Morris' Island Battery.
Suppose it completed, which it is not, nor will be in thirty hours. The armament is three twenty-four pounders. The force is the corps of Cadets from the Citadel, and a corps of rifles; and these, to be reinforced by two more corps of rifles, not one man of whom, probably, ever saw a twenty-four pounder manipulated or fired.
When the Harriet Lane approaches, bows on, the Battery may fire a shot or two—never having been tried, the powder, the gun or the range—it is not even problematical whether they will strike the enemy. She will steam by, at fourteen knots per hour, and in fifteen minutes the reinforcements will be landed under the cannon of Fort Sumter.
Why, then, all this preparation and expense, if the work cannot but terminate in disastrous failure ?
Suppose, however, the enemy be reinforced, an'd not fire a gun in reply to the Morris' Island Battery ? He can demolish our other posts when he pleases, from one of the most impregnable fortresses in the world, and so our posts live at his will, and remain in our possession at his sufferance.
Suppose, however, we succeed in preventing reinforcements from entering our harbor? This will not prevent the United States Government from enforcing their revenue, for this can' be done outside the Bar by a war steamer, as well as inside by the Harriet Lane.
Suppose, however, all your plans succeed, and Fort Sumter were in our possession, how would we raise the blockade of the war steamers outside ?
If the Harriet Lane is not fired into, the preparations are unnecessary; and if she is fired into, we have commenced open war.
I ask your perusal of the report of Colonel Gwynn, to me, this morning. I have no transport at hand to send him, and have so notified him.
I feel it to be my duty, under all the circumstances above mentioned, to express my conviction of the inexpediency of commencing actual hostilities on our side, in our present wholly unprepared state, with raw, undisciplined troops, without equipments, munitions or proper arms required to work armaments that need the highest skill and training—nothing but bloody discomfiture must attend the opening campaign.
You will now require me, after this review, to offer a better plan. Deferentially, and with great diffidence, I recommend that a skilled and educated military man be selected for Major General in Chief, to command all the troops, and that he should establish a plan of operations. Meanwhile, I would recommend that amplification of the Ordnance and Engineer Departments be ordered, and a more effective organization of the Commissariat and Quartermaster's Departments.
With great respect, I pray your Excellency, at this moment of great peril, to take into consideration what has been herein submitted, and to lay the matter speedily before a Council of War, in accordance with the custom of armies engaged in active operations.
I am, with great respect,
Your Excellency's obedient servant,
JAMES SIMONS,
Brigadier General 4th Brigade of Infantry, S. C. M.
To His EXCELLENCY GOVERNOR PICKENS,
Commander-in-Chief.
Bringing the