Charles Dana's Chickamauga-Chattanooga Telegrams

Rhea Cole

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Charles A. Dana Library of Congress

CHARLES DANA'S CHICKAMAUGA-CHATTANOOGA TELEGRAMS
1863, September 10 - 1863, November 12

"I am here as a 'special commissioner' of the Ward Department, sort of official specter & company to the movements of this part of the campaign, charged particularly with overseeing & regulating the paymasters & generally making myself useful." Charles Dana

Dana's reports from Grant's HQ during the Vicksburg Campaign became essential reading for President Lincoln. The fact that his messages were not copied into the standard log, but recorded in a logbook of their own is an indication of just how highly valued they were. Dana was an educated man & had been a news paper editor. As a result his vocabulary was a bit of a challenge for the operators who deciphered his messages.

"Dana's reports by telegraph were generally full, & the cipher-operators during that period had occasion to consult the dictionary many times for the meaning of words like "truculent" "hibernating" had to be dug out of telegraphic chaos. While Dana's long despatches, ruthlessly critiquing or commending our generals, were being deciphered. Lincoln waited eagerly for the completed translations which he would usually read aloud with running comments, harsh criticisms being softened in the reading." David Homer Bates, Lincoln in the Telegraph Office, pp. 204-205.

Wouldn't you like to read the messages from Dana that Lincoln found so compelling? What was it that Dana was saying that was an essential element in Grant's rise to command of the Union Army? If you could read the telegrams that were often only hours apart, you could make up your own mind on Grant & Rosecrans' generalship. For the last 125 years, that was impossible because the Dana logs had been destroyed along with all the others in 1868.

In 2017 Dana's logs were put on the market along with the entire cache of 16,000 pages of ciphers & messages that Thomas T. Eckert, the head of the Military Telegraph office in Washington, had not destroyed. The Huntington Library purchased & digitized them. The entire hoard is available online.

Dana's messages from right behind the lines in the days before the opening shots of the Battle of Chickamauga on page 33 state that Rosecrans' knew Longstreet was coming up from Atlanta, but not exactly when. On page 43 the breakthrough & retreat to Chattanooga are documented by someone who was there in the midst of it. Tellingly, the last line of the dispatch states that the lack pursuit had left time for the Army of the Cumberland to settle into Chattanooga. The dramatic first lines of that message are all I have ever read before. That was the message that Stanton & Lincoln read when they ordered two corps of the AofP & Grant to Chattanooga.

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"Some gentlemen of Rosecrans' staff say Chickamauga is not very much worse than was Murfreesboro. I can testify to the conspicuous & steady gallantry of Rosecrans on the field. He made all possible effort to rally the broken columns nor do I see that there was any fault in the disposition of his forces.." Dana Log page 54

What really got my attention is a long message on pages 48-52. Dana's report does not criticize Rosecrans in the way it is usually depicted. In these pages he reports that the officers of the AofC's morale was anything but down trodden. In fact, with the exception of the mishap that precipitated the retreat, they considered it to be not all that different from Stones River. It was that positive attitude that turned Chickamauga into nothing but a tactical setback. When you compare Dana's reports with the near despair that permeates the letters of Bragg's soldiers in the AofT the difference could not be starker.

I encourage you to read Dana's messages aloud just like Lincoln did. This is what the men around him heard before making decisions that had profound effects on the war. In a more scholarly view, you can also read the log of other messages sent to Washington from Chattanooga & compare the content. The Dana logs in the Eckert papers are the raw intel that guided Lincoln's decision making at that critical time. It is not much of a stretch of the imagination to consider what you would have said if Lincoln had looked over the page & said, "What do you think?"

<hdl.huntiington.org> Thomas T. Eckert Papers​
 
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Danas reports on Grant had to encouraging, if not actually glowing, and those on Rosecrans generally damning .

The Grant reports in general, only confirmed Lincolns own growing admiration of a general who did not argue with his superiors and seemed content to accept what his govt could or would provide him and quietly got on with his job.

Lincoln was basically fair minded and tried to see the good rather than the bad in situation, and, although his experiences with Rosecrans had become prickly over trying to support Grants Vicksburg siege.

Although discomfited and disoriented by his sudden defeat at Chickamauga Rosecrans seems to have quickly regained his composure and confidence and after the first panicky reports there was no more talk of retreat.

Lincoln was puzzled by Danas reports and Rosecrans seeming confidence and decided to let Grant decide whether to replace Rosecrans or not.
 
Danas reports on Grant had to encouraging, if not actually glowing, and those on Rosecrans generally ****ing .

The Grant reports in general, only confirmed Lincolns own growing admiration of a general who did not argue with his superiors and seemed content to accept what his govt could or would provide him and quietly got on with his job.

Lincoln was basically fair minded and tried to see the good rather than the bad in situation, and, although his experiences with Rosecrans had become prickly over trying to support Grants Vicksburg siege.

Although discomfited and disoriented by his sudden defeat at Chickamauga Rosecrans seems to have quickly regained his composure and confidence and after the first panicky reports there was no more talk of retreat.

Lincoln was puzzled by Danas reports and Rosecrans seeming confidence and decided to let Grant decide whether to replace Rosecrans or not.
I am having to reevaluate Dana's take on Rosecrans. So far, my Finding is that Dana has been cherry picked. His report announcing the retreat on page 43 has been quoted thousands of times. His long report begins with him saying that in the heat of the moment he had overstated the disaster. It is that kind of honesty that must have raised Lincoln's confidence in Dana's reports. I am beginning to appreciate just how much of what is said about Dana's reports is an accurate reflection of writer's preconceived ideas.
 
First Impressions are hard to reverse.

Grant and Rosecrans had a dispute about events at Iuka. Grant blamed him for his failed attack. Heard that Before.

Lincoln replaced Buell with Rosecrans. Part of the reason was to appease the Radicals. Rosecrans was a Democrat And a Catholic. However he was a Abolitionist. Rosecrans received a lot of Political appeal after Stones River. So, Rosecrans was a Political threat to Grant.
 
First Impressions are hard to reverse.

Grant and Rosecrans had a dispute about events at Iuka. Grant blamed him for his failed attack. Heard that Before.

Lincoln replaced Buell with Rosecrans. Part of the reason was to appease the Radicals. Rosecrans was a Democrat And a Catholic. However he was a Abolitionist. Rosecrans received a lot of Political appeal after Stones River. So, Rosecrans was a Political threat to Grant.
No, what Grant blamed Rosecrans for at Iuka was not covering both escape roads as according to the plan (which was Rosecrans' plan). But Grant did not completely lose patience with Rosecrans until after the Battle of Corinth.

I doubt if "political threat" ever entered into the reasons for their falling out.
 
No, what Grant blamed Rosecrans for at Iuka was not covering both escape roads as according to the plan (which was Rosecrans' plan). But Grant did not completely lose patience with Rosecrans until after the Battle of Corinth.

I doubt if "political threat" ever entered into the reasons for their falling out.
Wiley Sword calls Rosecrans Grants Rival. Here is the story of Iuka.

 
Wiley Sword calls Rosecrans Grants Rival. Here is the story of Iuka.

Thanks, yes I'm familiar with the particulars. The anti-Grant journalist Bickham, who is mentioned in your source, actually served on Rosecrans staff in his headquarters.

There's nothing from this period to suggest a "political threat."
 
I got the impression that Dana was sympathetic to Rosecrans immediately after Chickamauga, and then grew increasingly critical. Part of that change of heart came from discussions with subordinate officers who were critical of Rosecrans.






I think that is about right. Although Dana is trying to be fair, I think he really thought Rosecrans should be replaced.

As I have noted, Lincoln was fair minded and usually resisted being pushed into rash actions. But the issue had to be resolved and since it concerned military protocol, he decided to let a military man he had grown to have confidence in, make a military decision.
 
I am having to reevaluate Dana's take on Rosecrans. So far, my Finding is that Dana has been cherry picked. His report announcing the retreat on page 43 has been quoted thousands of times. His long report begins with him saying that in the heat of the moment he had overstated the disaster. It is that kind of honesty that must have raised Lincoln's confidence in Dana's reports. I am beginning to appreciate just how much of what is said about Dana's reports is an accurate reflection of writer's preconceived ideas.\


The main thought I draw from the events concerning Danas reports is its evidence of Lincolns coolness and level headedness in his decision making even in the face of imminent disaster.

Lincoln made own decisions according to his own mind(and agenda) and few others. Dana was a close friend and Lincoln trusted him, but, he was not dependent on him. Defeat or disaster was not necessarily evidence enough to replace a defeated General, other consideration, military, Political, even personal , etc., had to be in consideration, in his position of both President of the United States and Commander In Chief of the countrys military.

I note in the story of Rosecrans replacement, Lincoln continued his policy of keeping the promotion of senior commanders securely in his own hands. He seldom left it to other hands. In this case I believe even when he gave Grant authority to replace Rosecrans he did not leave it to Grant to name his own replacemet for the defeated General, i.e., Grant could replace Rosecrans if he chose, but, it would be with Thomas, according to Lincoln.
 
I think that the Grant-Rosecrans disconnect was about tempo. Unlike a host of CW officers, Grant had a profound understanding of the OODA curve. He understood that when you are exhausted, your opponent was probably in worse shape. That is when Grant wanted to hit them again before they recovered. Rosecrans, an engineer to the core, was a genius but he did not understand tempo as Grant did.
 
What would have changed Dana's mind? If Rosecrans was physically spent, his decision making would have been impaired. If the Confederate Wheeler got to the north and west side of the Tennessee River that would hurt US logistics and as a consequence morale in the Cumberland army. It seem that Smith was critical of Rosecrans, and Woods and Sheridan were embarrassed by their role in the Chickamauga defeat.
It would be interesting to know what Dana was receiving in terms of telegrams. He may have been reading the tea leaves that a bigger command was being created to get Hooker, Sherman and the Cumberland Army to work together and Grant was going to get the command. If so he may have been creating a rationalization for the decision.
This thread suggests that Rosecrans fate was sealed in June 1863, when it took him so long to get started. Events at Chickamauga may not have been seen as so disastrous, because he did not have give back Chattanooga.
 
Sherman was going to get highly favorable treatment for a variety of reasons. Two high ranking generals from Ohio was not going to happen.
 
Actually reading Dana's messages will give you a more informed opinion.

Throughout the first half of October, Dana's daily dispatches continually undermined Rosecrans, criticizing the Union commander at every opportunity. Dana analyzed the defeat of the 20th at length, passing on every bit of discontented gossip that caught his ear and in doing so, painted an increasingly bleak picture of the army's circumstances. On October 12, for example, he described Rosecrans as being "sometimes as obstinate and inaccessible to reason as at others he is irresolute, vacillating and inconclusive. . .He has inventive fertility and knowledge, but he has no strength of will and no concentration of purpose. His mind scatters. . He is a feeble commander."

Dana played on Stanton's worst fears by stressing the theme of retreat. At midday on October 16, reported Dana, "nothing can prevent the retreat of the army from this place within a fortnight. . .except the opening of the river." That same day, in a wire sent at 4:00 pm, Dana summarized a "full conversation" with the army commander, which sounded ever more alarming. The river must be reopened, claimed Rosecrans, but only Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker (with the reinforcements from the Potomac army) could do that, and Hooker had to wait for his trans to get up. Worse, "as soon as the weather would allow the enemy will cross. . .in force. . .and then it will be necessary to fight a battle.. . .or retreat from here." Given the parlous state of the army's logistics, fighting a battle seemed unlikely, leaving withdrawal as the only option. Worst of all, Dana charged that Rosecrans seemed oblivious to the peril, "insensible to the impending danger and dawdling with trifles."

Dana was sending pure, if vitriolic, nonsense. Rosecrans was neither inactive nor feeble. pp155 Barren Victory by David Powell

Dana was sent to Chattanooga to spy for Stanton. Stanton had conflicts with Rosecrans during the Tullahoma Campaign and the Campaign to Chattanooga. Maybe your analysis is incorrect. Rosecrans had no Retreat in Him. Using this narrative was destructive to Rosecrans. Gave Stanton and Grant the info they needed to cashier him.
 
Dana was sent to Chattanooga to spy for Stanton. Stanton had conflicts with Rosecrans during the Tullahoma Campaign and the Campaign to Chattanooga. Maybe your analysis is incorrect. Rosecrans had no Retreat in Him. Using this narrative was destructive to Rosecrans. Gave Stanton and Grant the info they needed to cashier him.
Dana didn't have anything to do with Grant's choice of Thomas over Rosecrans.

And if Rosey had "no Retreat in him," how would you explain his ride back to Chattanooga on Sept 20th?
 

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