Longstreet Remembering James Longstreet

[War Horse]

If I remember right Lee was going to do one of his great flanking moves at Mine Run but Meade had withdrawn from the field... Lucky Meade like to avoid fights...

Wisely withdrew and who drove the conderates off of their winter quarters and used it themselves? I'm sure Lee just invited the Union forces to winter there out of the kindness of his heart.

 

[novushomus]

Okay so Longstreet did send is men into a few small fights nothing on the scale of a true battle... No great victories bit a couple failures...



Okay, Meade broke the line but it fizzled... no great fights with Lee... His lack of aggression is why Grant came east...

An assault that resulted in the capture of one of Lee's elite brigades, but sure, it "fizzled." Grant came east not to replace Meade but as commander-in-chief of all Union armies. When given the option replace Meade with Baldy Smith, he didn't.

Again, the two men are interchangeable...

That's a gross oversimplification.

 

[War Horse]

An assault that resulted in the capture of one of Lee's elite brigades, but sure, it "fizzled." Grant came east not to replace Meade but as commander-in-chief of all Union armies. When given the option replace Meade with Baldy Smith, he didn't.



That's a gross oversimplification.

As a matter of fact. Grant after meeting Meade for the first time liked Meade and made the decision to keep him in his role. Something Meade himself did not expect.

 

[rpkennedy]

As a matter of fact. Grant after meeting Meade for the first time liked Meade and made the decision to keep him in his role. Something Meade himself did not expect.

Meade offered to step down in favor of Grant's choice but Grant told him that that would not be necessary.

Ryan

 

[Rebforever]

After Lee was behind Mine Run. Warren had approx 28k men with the addition of Frences brigades. Warren claimed that during the night Lee reinforced his line on the right making it no longer practical to attack. Meade waited the attack and grew frustrated as time passed. He rode to Warren who then explained his reasoning.

Is it before or after or during Battle of Payne's Farm?
First off, I am just trying to pinpoint what fighting you are posting about.
Payne's Farm is where the actual fighting was.
If it is after the fighting when Lee moved his his army behind Mine run, there was one big reason for not attacking. A storm dropped 6 inches of ice on everything and they couldn't move cannon or anything thing else.

Warren and Meade both went together to look at the line and Meade new it would be a futile effort to attempt an attack.

IMO, observing the fortress behind the Mine Run, they would not have been successful even if the sun was shining. The defensive terrain is fascinating to say the least.

 

[5fish]

He never wanted to retreat.

I disagree with ... he wanted to retreat...

There were more than just cavalry and rearguard scraps. They certainly did not avoid each other. Each planned and plotted to destroy they other. It was in some ways a brilliant game of chess between two very capable soldiers.

Yes, there maybe a shade of truth, there is a book about I found an on this topic. I do not know if brilliant the word to use... Now, Stuard's actions during Lee retreat was brilliant... My point he could of push Lee into engagements but did not he chose caution over risk...

You are right about Meade. Everyone forgets what happened after Gettysburg and Lee's retreat fight all the way back to
Mine Run!

I do not think one would call it a retreat back to Mine's Run.

Warren claimed that during the night Lee reinforced his line on the right making it no longer practical to attack. Meade waited the attack and grew frustrated as time passed. He rode to Warren who then explained his reasoning.

Many Historians think Warren was right not to attack. I going with the attack...

That's a gross oversimplification.

Yes, a great generalization they were interchangeable but true... Longstreet and Meade could move and manage a large group of troops but they could not use them as an effective fighting force. They both seem to choose caution over risk. I will add. If you look at Ft. Sanders poorly plan attack while and Campbell Station and Bean no punch...

Meade defeats Lee but does not chase him down but lets him get across the river... He cracks the line later again no follow-up... French crosses the river and gets stopped the Payton's Farm ( no Punch) ... Mine's Run he withdraws... I will admit Meade seems plan attacks better...

Clearly, my vision of these two generals goes against the norm but is true... They were both ineffective in independent command situation in similar ways... both were great lieutenants to the commander general...

 

[Bee]

I disagree with ... he wanted to retreat...

Are we supposed to rely on your opinion, only, or do you have a source that supports this claim?

Clearly, my vision of these two generals goes against the norm but is true

"it is true" -- according to whom or what source?

 

[lelliott19]

Longstreet was attached to Bragg in Tennessee.

Welcome @dinnie58 Happy to have you aboard here at CivilWarTalk.
Just wanted to clarify that Longstreet's independent command in Tennessee referenced in this discussion is the Department of East Tennessee - after Longstreet left Bragg at Chattanooga.

From November 4, 1863 until March 31, 1864 (when they arrived in Bristol) Longstreet commanded the Department of East Tennessee which consisted of McLaws' and Hood's Divisions of Infantry, Alexander's Battalion of Artillery, and Wm T Martin's corps of cavalry (temporarily assigned to support various parts of the campaign.) The engagements included a minor action at Huff's Ferry (Loudon, TN); Battle of Lenoir's Station (Lenoir, TN); Battle of Campbell's Station; the failed Assault on Fort Sanders at Knoxville, TN; Battle of Bean's Station; and various minor actions that went unnamed.

And just so you know.......discussions on the forums don't always get as heated as this one.

 

[novushomus]

Yes, a great generalization they were interchangeable but true... Longstreet and Meade could move and manage a large group of troops but they could not use them as an effective fighting force. They both seem to choose caution over risk. I will add. If you look at Ft. Sanders poorly plan attack while and Campbell Station and Bean no punch...

That seemingly contradicts your premise. As a corps commander, Longstreet's main responsibility (as well as one of his strengths as a general) was handling and moving large amounts of troops effectively in combat (what Earl J. Hess calls primary tactics), with his staff officer T.J. Goree remarking that Longstreet could maneuver a division of 10,000 men as easily as a company. At Second Manassas he coordinated 30,000 men in an assault that broke Pope's army (one of the largest infantry assaults of the war). At Gettysburg he wielded 14,000 that smashed Sickles and damaged the troops to sent to support Third Corps. At Chickamauga, he gave the Confederacy its only major victory in the Western Theater when he massed 18,000 that broke through Rosecrans's right wing. And with only 10,000, he saved Lee's right wing at the Wilderness and turned back Hancock (a peer in martial ability) before being seriously wounded.

I agree that Fort Sanders was badly planned, but in was a strategic context where he had little freedom of action. He was under pressure by Bragg to attack quickly and return to Chattanooga before Grant could attack. Once Burnside withdrew from Campbell's Station when Law bungled his flanking maneuver, the chance for the campaign ending rapidly or with a Confederate success vanished. So Longstreet picked what was presumed to be the weakest point in the Federal line under advice from the very engineer who had built Fort Sanders and picked his two freshest brigades which had not seen combat at Chickamauga to spearhead the assault. While it is true that he failed to understand the deep trench in front of Sanders (fooled by a Union soldier standing on a plank into believing the trench was much shallower) and failed to provide scaling ladders, it is also true that none of his officers realized this until Alexander did and Alexander was unable to deliver his message to Longstreet in time for the assault.

Clearly, my vision of these two generals goes against the norm but is true... They were both ineffective in independent command situation in similar ways... both were great lieutenants to the commander general...

This is why your generalization fails. Longstreet and Meade did not have similar careers. Longstreet spent most of his career in the Confederate service as a corps commander. He had two brief but unillustrious stints in independent command, but his greatest value to the Confederacy was as a corps commander. He was commanding a corps at Second Manassas while Meade still commanded a brigade in the Pennsylvania Reserves. Meade commanded the Pennsylvania Reserves to excellent effect at South Mountain and briefly commanding the First Corps at Antietam when Hooker was wounded. Meade was responsible as a division commander for the only Union success at Fredericksburg when he broke through A.P. Hill's divisional line. His stint as a corps commander basically saw him engaged briefly at the first day of Chancellorsville but unengaged for the rest of the battle. This why many historians have difficulty judging him as a corps commander since he was one for only short periods of time. However, Meade was a successful army commander and was successful in independent command. Longstreet never commanded an army in combat and was only partially successful in independent command (Suffolk).

Meade had two successful campaigns (Gettysburg and Bristoe Station) and two successful battles (Gettysburg and Rapphannock Station) (so clearly "ineffective" /s) against the most capable Confederate general under his belt before Grant came east. That is why essentially you are comparing apples and oranges.

 

[5fish]

Are we supposed to rely on your opinion, only, or do you have a source that supports this claim?

You always make me work... here is a link.. like all civil war controversies there are two sides... Meade wanted to run... or not...

https://npsgnmp.wordpress.com/2015/...eneral-meade-and-the-july-2nd-council-of-war/

another link... http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=4253

"it is true" -- according to whom or what source?

Well... me and my take on history...

 

[Bee]

You always make me work... here is a link.. like all civil war controversies there are two sides... Meade wanted to run... or not...

https://npsgnmp.wordpress.com/2015/...eneral-meade-and-the-july-2nd-council-of-war/

another link... http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=4253



Well... me and my take on history...

Thank you. I will take a look at these tonight.

 

[5fish]

The engagements included a minor action at Huff's Ferry (Loudon, TN); Battle of Lenoir's Station (Lenoir, TN); Battle of Campbell's Station; the failed Assault on Fort Sanders at Knoxville, TN; Battle of Bean's Station; and various minor actions that went unnamed.

Many minor actions but he failed to stop Burnside from reaching Knoxville...

That is why essentially you are comparing apples and oranges.

Comparing Meade and Longstreet is like comparing apples and oranges... maybe...

And just so you know.......discussions on the forums don't always get as heated as this one.

You should have been around back in the early days... of this forum

 

[5fish]

Meade had two successful campaigns (Gettysburg and Bristoe Station) and two successful battles (Gettysburg and Rapphannock Station) (so clearly "ineffective" /s) against the most capable Confederate general under his belt before Grant came east. That is why essentially you are comparing apples and oranges.

Maybe the Question should be what would one gain or lose by interchanging the two? Who would have gotten the better deal Grant or Lee? I argue neither...

 

[Irishtom29]

While it is true that he failed to understand the deep trench in front of Sanders (fooled by a Union soldier standing on a plank into believing the trench was much shallower) and failed to provide scaling ladders, it is also true that none of his officers realized this until Alexander did and Alexander was unable to deliver his message to Longstreet in time for the assault.

But it should've been assumed there was a ditch in front of the rampart, that was standard practice, indeed it was the spoil from the ditch with which ramparts were built. And Dennis Hart Mahan, who taught engineering at West Point from the 1820s until 1871, taught that ditches should be at least 6 feet deep. And an engineering officer could've been sent to the lip of the ditch at night to get a view, this was a common practice. Very dangerous of course but that's what engineering officers were paid to do.

 

[Rebforever]

You always make me work... here is a link.. like all civil war controversies there are two sides... Meade wanted to run... or not...

https://npsgnmp.wordpress.com/2015/...eneral-meade-and-the-july-2nd-council-of-war/

another link... http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=4253



Well... me and my take on history...

Fish, I suggest you read this again. Meade did not want to quit Gettysburg.

 

[5fish]

Fish, I suggest you read this again. Meade did not want to quit Gettysburg.

He claims he did want to withdraw... but more officers say he wanted to pull back...

 

[Rebforever]

He claims he did want to withdraw... but more officers say he wanted to pull back...

That is not what this article says.

"I shall remain in my present position to-morrow," he offered, "but am not prepared to say, until better advised of the condition of the army, whether my operations will be of an offensive or defensive character."[3] Meade called for his subordinates to gather at his headquarters, convening the campaign's first Council of War.

"Near 9 o'clock on the evening of July 2nd, eleven generals joined Meade at his headquarters, the Lydia Leister farmhouse. The small room, totaling no more than "ten or twelve feet square," held a bed, table, and two chairs. Present at the meeting included Meade's Chief of Staff, Major General Daniel Butterfield and the army's engineer, Major General Gouverneur K. Warren. Major Generals Winfield Scott Hancock and Henry Slocum represented the army's "wing commanders." Additionally, each corps had a representative at the council. Major General John Newton represented the 1st Corps; Brigadier General John Gibbon the 2nd Corps and Major General David Birney the 3rdCorps. The army's 5th, 6th, 11th, and 12th Corps were represented by Major General George Sykes, Major General John Sedgwick, Major General Oliver Otis Howard, and Brigadier General Alpheus Williams respectively.[5]"

"Butterfield's first question considered the feasibility of the Army of the Potomac remaining in Gettysburg. "Under existing circumstances," he queried, "is it advisable for this army to remain in its present position, or to retire to another, nearer its base of supplies?" The second question posed, "It being determined to remain in present position, shall the army attack or await the attack of the enemy?" And, finally, if retaining the defensive, the generals debated how long they could hold their current position.[8] Meade then exhibited deferential leadership, allowing the generals to vote on each of the questions. The council proceeded with the most junior officer, Gibbon, voting first. Gibbon favored retaining the army's existing position, with a slight modification, believing the army was "in no condition to attack." Other generals echoed this sentiment. Slocum, commanding the 12th Corps, declared, "stay and fight it out." When the results of the council unanimously favored staying and fighting, Meade succinctly declared, "Such then is the decision."[9]

The hilited above came first from Butterfields mouth, not Meades.

https://npsgnmp.wordpress.com/2015/...eneral-meade-and-the-july-2nd-council-of-war/

 

[5fish]

The hilited above came first from Butterfields mouth, not Meades.

Did you read further and the truth dribbles out...

In the weeks and months following the campaign, Meade's leadership at Gettysburg became a topic of frequent and vociferous criticism. In the spring of 1864, the Joint Committee on the Conduct of War (JCCW) investigated the Gettysburg Campaign and specifically Meade's leadership. Meade testified before the Congressional committee on two occasions, March 5th and the 11th. Congress leveled several accusations against the commanding general, including the allegation that he did not want to fight at Gettysburg. Meade's critics used the July 2nd Council of War as evidence that the commanding general did not want to fight at Gettysburg, but infact wanted to retreat. To be sure, minimal evidence suggests that Meade favored withdrawing from Gettysburg. Such allegations stem from several of Meade's critics. Appearing before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, Butterfield and Birney both testified that Meade wished to retreat. A March 12, 1864 article published in the New York Herald, leveled damning allegations against Meade's leadership and his supposed reluctance to fighting at Gettysburg. Signed "Historicus," it is popularly believed that Daniel Sickles, Meade's most noted and vocal critic, wrote this article.[12]

 

[Rebforever]

Did you read further and the truth dribbles out...

In the weeks and months following the campaign, Meade's leadership at Gettysburg became a topic of frequent and vociferous criticism. In the spring of 1864, the Joint Committee on the Conduct of War (JCCW) investigated the Gettysburg Campaign and specifically Meade's leadership. Meade testified before the Congressional committee on two occasions, March 5th and the 11th. Congress leveled several accusations against the commanding general, including the allegation that he did not want to fight at Gettysburg. Meade's critics used the July 2nd Council of War as evidence that the commanding general did not want to fight at Gettysburg, but infact wanted to retreat. To be sure, minimal evidence suggests that Meade favored withdrawing from Gettysburg. Such allegations stem from several of Meade's critics. Appearing before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, Butterfield and Birney both testified that Meade wished to retreat. A March 12, 1864 article published in the New York Herald, leveled ****ing allegations against Meade's leadership and his supposed reluctance to fighting at Gettysburg. Signed "Historicus," it is popularly believed that Daniel Sickles, Meade's most noted and vocal critic, wrote this article.[12]

Yes, I read the whole thing. Butterfield was a thorn in Meades side and you can't believe him. He was the one that that said retreat.

 

[5fish]

. http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=4253

If you go to this link talks more about the senate hearing.... Meade got a pass...