Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

CC

Looking interesting. Going to be some battles ahead and hopefully Wolsely is being too negative about Napier's deployment but it does sound rather worrying.

Steve
 
CC

Looking interesting. Going to be some battles ahead and hopefully Wolsely is being too negative about Napier's deployment but it does sound rather worrying.

Steve

Time will tell!

I would have included the battles in this one but it was getting overly long as it was, and so I decided to cut them to get a longer editing process in.
 
I have to ask the obvious question. Detroit to London is 130 miles. How is the US force under Palmer being supported? About 30-40 miles inland any wagon train is basically only hauling it's own subsistence, leaving nothing for the troops.

Since you specify 17th May, the Royal Navy will have passed their Lake Erie Squadron down the Welland already. The Canal opened six weeks earlier, but direct communication from Lake Ontario to the sea only opened 1st May. The RN have over two weeks to move vessels down from the St. Lawrence.

Navigation at Kingston opened 14th April, and the Welland fully opened 15th (wrecking tugs having been going through for 11 days). The RN's and Provincial Gunboat Service auxiliary gunboats would have been on Lake Erie for a month. The St. Lawrence from the sea opens to Quebec on 16th April, to Montreal on 29th and the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario 1st May.

Hence by 17th May we should have a dozen or two dozen RN gunboats, plus other steamers armed at Kingston.
 
I have to ask the obvious question. Detroit to London is 130 miles. How is the US force under Palmer being supported? About 30-40 miles inland any wagon train is basically only hauling it's own subsistence, leaving nothing for the troops.

Without getting too much into the minutia: Two columns moving from Sarnia and Detroit. The column moving from Detroit (under Palmer) is moving using both baggage trains, and limited rail stock along the Great Western Railway, further supplies are facilitated from confiscated barges along the Thames which move along the line of march.

The second column (the second brigade under Fitch) is moving on the shorter route from Sarnia, and is also using the Great Western as a supply hub.

Needless to say both forces are also making use of supplies "requisitioned" from the locals.

The whole force will have their supply problem considerably eased if they can take London since they would then be able to be supplied by the Port Stanley London railroad. That might have been a target for the opening invasion if the USN were not busy with another matter...

Since you specify 17th May, the Royal Navy will have passed their Lake Erie Squadron down the Welland already. The Canal opened six weeks earlier, but direct communication from Lake Ontario to the sea only opened 1st May. The RN have over two weeks to move vessels down from the St. Lawrence.

Navigation at Kingston opened 14th April, and the Welland fully opened 15th (wrecking tugs having been going through for 11 days). The RN's and Provincial Gunboat Service auxiliary gunboats would have been on Lake Erie for a month. The St. Lawrence from the sea opens to Quebec on 16th April, to Montreal on 29th and the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario 1st May.

Hence by 17th May we should have a dozen or two dozen RN gunboats, plus other steamers armed at Kingston.

Well a dozen is unlikely I think. Like OTL Somerset is pushing as much of the cost and responsibility for the Lakes onto the Canadians as he possibly can. The Union also starts off with the only true purpose build warship, the USS Michigan, on Lake Erie which serves as the flagship of the Union's "Lake Erie Squadron" which will feature in the next chapter.

On Lake Ontario, well you'll have to bear with me on this one. The full OOB is not yet 100% complete, but in broad strokes the Canadians are putting together an extemporized squadron for service, and the RN is sending what help it can. However, the St. Lawrence is their main concern inside Canada at the moment, and the assignment of gunboats to the blockade has put Lake Ontario at the very bottom of the allocation list, and Lake Erie isn't even a blip on the radar.

The Union, is putting together a squadron on Lake Ontario, which is going to consist of a mix of extemporized gunboats and a few purpose built warships as well. The deciding factor might very well come down to skill in this contest.
 
Without getting too much into the minutia: Two columns moving from Sarnia and Detroit. The column moving from Detroit (under Palmer) is moving using both baggage trains, and limited rail stock along the Great Western Railway, further supplies are facilitated from confiscated barges along the Thames which move along the line of march.

The second column (the second brigade under Fitch) is moving on the shorter route from Sarnia, and is also using the Great Western as a supply hub.

Needless to say both forces are also making use of supplies "requisitioned" from the locals.

The whole force will have their supply problem considerably eased if they can take London since they would then be able to be supplied by the Port Stanley London railroad. That might have been a target for the opening invasion if the USN were not busy with another matter...

I'm not convinced that would be terribly successful. If there is rolling stock (of 5 ft 6 gauge) on the GWR that would help, but surely it would be withdrawn to the interior or destroyed. The US railroads at Detroit are 4 ft 8.5 gauge, so that isn't helpful. The US would likely have to build new engines and rolling stock east of the Detroit river.

Also Sarnia is still 60 miles from London, which is pretty far in military terms. In summer with good roads the wagon train can support an army 40-50 miles from depot. In mid-May, with the roads flooded etc. one suspects the US army would struggle to move much beyond the beachhead until things dried a bit.

Well a dozen is unlikely I think. Like OTL Somerset is pushing as much of the cost and responsibility for the Lakes onto the Canadians as he possibly can. The Union also starts off with the only true purpose build warship, the USS Michigan, on Lake Erie which serves as the flagship of the Union's "Lake Erie Squadron" which will feature in the next chapter.

On Lake Ontario, well you'll have to bear with me on this one. The full OOB is not yet 100% complete, but in broad strokes the Canadians are putting together an extemporized squadron for service, and the RN is sending what help it can. However, the St. Lawrence is their main concern inside Canada at the moment, and the assignment of gunboats to the blockade has put Lake Ontario at the very bottom of the allocation list, and Lake Erie isn't even a blip on the radar.

The Union, is putting together a squadron on Lake Ontario, which is going to consist of a mix of extemporized gunboats and a few purpose built warships as well. The deciding factor might very well come down to skill in this contest.

You'd be surprised how many gunboats the RN has. At home in reserve are 36 ready to go and another 70 requiring some work. Given four months the RN would actually be receiving new build gunboats from March onwards. The recommended complement for Lake Erie was 20 gunboats and 3 newly built ironclad batteries. There are 53 gunboats recommended for the St. Lawrence, Richelieu, Lake Ontario and Lake Erie and they're drawing on a reserve stock of 106 vessels plus those in Commission (with 23 slated for the blockade, and some to take up UK harbour defences). It doesn't seem unlikely the RN would have fielded a significant number on the Lake some 16 days after navigation from Montreal to Lake Ontario opened.

Michigan, with her 1863 armament of 1x 30 pdr Parrott on a pivot, 5x 20 pdr Parrotts (1 aft pivot and 2 each side) and 6x 24 pdr howitzers (3 each side) (the boats had a 12 pdr each) presents a 7 gun broadside and is fairly powerful, sure. However, RN gunboats of the time were smaller and only carried two guns. However they were a 110 pdr and a 40 pdr Armstrong. I'm not sure I'd fancy my chances, as the 110 pdr shell would be devastating to the thin iron hull of Michigan.
 
I'm not convinced that would be terribly successful. If there is rolling stock (of 5 ft 6 gauge) on the GWR that would help, but surely it would be withdrawn to the interior or destroyed. The US railroads at Detroit are 4 ft 8.5 gauge, so that isn't helpful. The US would likely have to build new engines and rolling stock east of the Detroit river.

Depends on if the militia and regulars can seize them all, or even remember to destroy them. Then it's not impossible to have rail stock on hand for the Union, especially from the Grand Trunk.

Also Sarnia is still 60 miles from London, which is pretty far in military terms. In summer with good roads the wagon train can support an army 40-50 miles from depot. In mid-May, with the roads flooded etc. one suspects the US army would struggle to move much beyond the beachhead until things dried a bit.

The worst flooding is gone in south Ontario by mid May most years, probably at the start of June at the worst. Also, I think you're underestimating draft amimals. They don't need to carry fodder with them in rich country like this, and they are in a rich country full of forage and grass.

You'd be surprised how many gunboats the RN has. At home in reserve are 36 ready to go and another 70 requiring some work. Given four months the RN would actually be receiving new build gunboats from March onwards. The recommended complement for Lake Erie was 20 gunboats and 3 newly built ironclad batteries. There are 53 gunboats recommended for the St. Lawrence, Richelieu, Lake Ontario and Lake Erie and they're drawing on a reserve stock of 106 vessels plus those in Commission (with 23 slated for the blockade, and some to take up UK harbour defences). It doesn't seem unlikely the RN would have fielded a significant number on the Lake some 16 days after navigation from Montreal to Lake Ontario opened.

I'm not immensely surprised by the numbers, there's more than a few. However, new builds would be necessary more than anything. There's enough gunboats probably to pad out the armed steamers on the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario, while also being able to pad out the blockading squadrons on station and perhaps relieve the gunboats reassigned from harbor defence duties and the Med. There's not enough in service for the proposed 53 from that plan, that would completely drain the available supply of gunboats!

These boats are also beginning to show their age. For instance, in the most numerous class. the Albacore class, 31 are broken up or out of service between 1862-64 which is a third of those constructed. I'm assuming those broken up in 62-64 were most likely done so because they were no longer suitable for service. But there's a similar story from all the Crimean gunboats.

Michigan, with her 1863 armament of 1x 30 pdr Parrott on a pivot, 5x 20 pdr Parrotts (1 aft pivot and 2 each side) and 6x 24 pdr howitzers (3 each side) (the boats had a 12 pdr each) presents a 7 gun broadside and is fairly powerful, sure. However, RN gunboats of the time were smaller and only carried two guns. However they were a 110 pdr and a 40 pdr Armstrong. I'm not sure I'd fancy my chances, as the 110 pdr shell would be devastating to the thin iron hull of Michigan.

Possibly, but it's unlikely she would ever end up going toe to toe with the British gunboats in the first place, and her heavier broadside would make a bit of a difference.
 
Depends on if the militia and regulars can seize them all, or even remember to destroy them. Then it's not impossible to have rail stock on hand for the Union, especially from the Grand Trunk.

Well, assuming the US acquired 5 ft 6 locomotives and stock at Portland, and moved them on a ship to NY or elsewhere, is there a 5 ft 6 gauge track that gets the locomotive(s) onto the Lakes? I really don't think there is, and a quick check seems to confirm this.

The depot for the line was at Hamilton, which is where engines and stock were stored. Arguably the US will have seized whatever was in Windsor station if they achieved surprise.

The worst flooding is gone in south Ontario by mid May most years, probably at the start of June at the worst. Also, I think you're underestimating draft amimals. They don't need to carry fodder with them in rich country like this, and they are in a rich country full of forage and grass.

I'm not underestimating draught animals at all. Assume we're dealing with a force of 10,000 men. The two methods of wagon supply are:

1. Circuits

The wagons constantly run from the supply base to the front, empty their supplies and return again. The animals on good days move 15 miles. To go:

30 miles: 144 wagons (864 horses)
45 miles: 226
60 miles: 314
75 miles: 411
90 miles :515
105 miles: 628
120 miles: 750

My chart (adapted from Hagerman) ends there, but I drew a 2nd order regression and to venture 160 miles (11 days) to London with 10,000 men requires 1,476 wagons (8,854 horses). In perspective that's 37% of the wagons the Army of the Potomac needed for an overland movement against Richmond in 1862. It's a problem is distance from depot.

As the number of wagons goes up, the proportion of men involved in operating and protecting the wagon trains becomes a larger percentage of that 10,000. At a rate of 6 men per wagon (the norm, equal to the number of horses) of that 10,000 men ca. 1,150 are available to attack London. This is strategic consumption. At about 180 miles the wagon train supports one man, the general.

Horses sadly can't be force marched with wagons, or they go lame and die quite quickly. The horse is a lot less hardy than a human. The distance of 15 miles was what was reckoned sustainable in good weather with good roads. Down on the Virginia Peninsula in late April wagon trains are finding it impossible to move more than a few miles a day. McClellan's troops start suffering short rations less than ten miles from their supply base because the roads are terrible.

2. Flying columns

If covering fresh ground the idea is to take all the wagons with you, take half the fodder in forage, and detach empty wagons to return to the base when empty, not to return. This is good for expeditions and raiding, and for movement from base to base. It is not good to sustain oneself in hostile country. A 19 day expedition (i.e. a raid against London with enough to return if unsuccessful) by 10,000 men requires 1,352 wagons (8,112 horses), assuming 50% of fodder can be foraged.

I'm not immensely surprised by the numbers, there's more than a few. However, new builds would be necessary more than anything. There's enough gunboats probably to pad out the armed steamers on the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario, while also being able to pad out the blockading squadrons on station and perhaps relieve the gunboats reassigned from harbor defence duties and the Med. There's not enough in service for the proposed 53 from that plan, that would completely drain the available supply of gunboats!

The Lake sqaudrons would consume half the gunboats in reserve, or less than a third overall. Why would one need a large reserve? Also, it takes two months to build a gunboat, and from receiving Lincoln's rejection to "now" dozens of newly built vessels could have entered service.

These boats are also beginning to show their age. For instance, in the most numerous class. the Albacore class, 31 are broken up or out of service between 1862-64 which is a third of those constructed. I'm assuming those broken up in 62-64 were most likely done so because they were no longer suitable for service. But there's a similar story from all the Crimean gunboats.

Being built so rapidly some used green wood, and were condemned. Some soldiered on into the 20th century as merchants.

Possibly, but it's unlikely she would ever end up going toe to toe with the British gunboats in the first place, and her heavier broadside would make a bit of a difference.

Unless the Welland is seized before early May it is a certainty RN gunboats would ascend Neptune's Stairs to Thorold and hence via one of three available routes onto the Niagara or Lake Erie. The only question is how many?
 
Well, assuming the US acquired 5 ft 6 locomotives and stock at Portland, and moved them on a ship to NY or elsewhere, is there a 5 ft 6 gauge track that gets the locomotive(s) onto the Lakes? I really don't think there is, and a quick check seems to confirm this.

The depot for the line was at Hamilton, which is where engines and stock were stored. Arguably the US will have seized whatever was in Windsor station if they achieved surprise.

Arguably yes.

I'm not underestimating draught animals at all. Assume we're dealing with a force of 10,000 men. The two methods of wagon supply are:

These statistics are quite fascinating, however, applying them for my own purposes:

The forces under Palmer are 7,500 men strong, which going by that metric means that there are 980 wagons required for transport. However, since there are two columns (the one at Sarnia moving only some 80 miles) that means those resources are split, and the wagons would be moving in column with the formations.

The flying column is perfectly suited for this method, and the column from Windsor is taking advantage of the Thames river in its movements, which lessens the needed number of wagons somewhat. Supplying this force thus should be relatively easy, and then assuming they seize London their supply depot inland is secure.

The Lake sqaudrons would consume half the gunboats in reserve, or less than a third overall. Why would one need a large reserve? Also, it takes two months to build a gunboat, and from receiving Lincoln's rejection to "now" dozens of newly built vessels could have entered service.

Being built so rapidly some used green wood, and were condemned. Some soldiered on into the 20th century as merchants.[

Again, going by this TL, the British do not go full out until February at the declaration of war. There would be no need to, and thus most new building is not going to be ordered until March, then to put on the stocks, be launched and commissioned, crewed, and shepherded across the Atlantic might take until June at least.

Also, the gunboat plan you mention asks for 17 Clown class gunboats, as of 1862 only 7 are currently in service (3 of those in Asia) 3 are destined for the breakers based upon the criteria I'm examining for which might be suitable from the reserves.

It also asks for 9 ironclad batteries, of which there are also not enough in service or reserve to be used on the rivers and lakes and to assist the blockade with inshore work. This would require new construction, and for work on the rivers and lakes most likely an edited design, one which the Admiralty historically had not decided on before even 1864. This means wait time for any ironclads on the Lakes or rivers for the British.

Additionally, I'm not saying there needs to be a large reserve, I'm simply saying the existing reserve and gunboats in service are not large enough to accommodate that plan and maintain the RN's needs for blockade and its peace time stations. It would take time to mobilize the resources necessary to commit to such heavy work on the interior waterways. Hence my skepticism that Lake Erie could be contested, which the Admiralty historically shared.

Unless the Welland is seized before early May it is a certainty RN gunboats would ascend Neptune's Stairs to Thorold and hence via one of three available routes onto the Niagara or Lake Erie. The only question is how many?

As no one in the Admiralty believed that Lake Erie could be contested, and my own estimations of the time necessary to mobilize the resources to fight on the inland waterways, I stand by my belief that Lake Erie will remain in American hands.
 
Depends on if the militia and regulars can seize them all, or even remember to destroy them. Then it's not impossible to have rail stock on hand for the Union, especially from the Grand Trunk.

Given the amount of warning of hostilities and also the degree and general efficency of preparation by the defence I would be surprised if more than a small fraction of the Canadian rolling stock was captured. Apart from anything else it would be too valuable to Canada for its defence, hence giving it a high profile.


I'm not immensely surprised by the numbers, there's more than a few. However, new builds would be necessary more than anything. There's enough gunboats probably to pad out the armed steamers on the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario, while also being able to pad out the blockading squadrons on station and perhaps relieve the gunboats reassigned from harbor defence duties and the Med. There's not enough in service for the proposed 53 from that plan, that would completely drain the available supply of gunboats!

These boats are also beginning to show their age. For instance, in the most numerous class. the Albacore class, 31 are broken up or out of service between 1862-64 which is a third of those constructed. I'm assuming those broken up in 62-64 were most likely done so because they were no longer suitable for service. But there's a similar story from all the Crimean gunboats.

I wonder if the initial problem might be that the government is unwilling to deploy from reserve every such gunboat for reasons of expense, especially with people such as Gladstone so prominant in it? Once they realise that the US is intent on war to the bitter end and major attacks on Canada then the purse strings are likely to be seriously loosened but there may be some underestimation of the threat to Canada from the US in the early weeks/months of actual combat.

Possibly, but it's unlikely she would ever end up going toe to toe with the British gunboats in the first place, and her heavier broadside would make a bit of a difference.

I think if a few gunboats are operating together then their likely to have a deterent effect on US activities by water. Which would reduce the threat to Canadian territory by naval attack.

Also what were the defence of US ports on the lower lakes like? Would it be practical to, having got gunboats on them, attack such ports and hence prevent/delay the build-up of US forces on them? After all the shipyards are likely to be on-near the water so should be relatively easy to disrupt them if there are no defences.

Steve

Ah see you replied to Tigers covering some of those points while I was writing.
 
Okay, so the invasion force across the Detroit is 5 regiments of infantry (with percussion smoothbores), 6 companies of riflemen (with M1841 rifles), 3 batteries with 11 guns (7th Wisc with 2x 6 pdrs and a 12 pdr howitzer, 2nd Iowa with 2x 6 pdrs and 2x 12 pdr howitzers and 3rd Mich with 3x 10 pdr Parrotts and 1x 12 pdr howitzer) and 5 squadrons of cavalry (mainly sabres, but may be partly equipped with Smith Carbines).

That's less than expected, and I should have checked the orbat. So a moving force of 3,500 infantry (say 2,600-2,700 shooters), 300-400 riflemen, 450 artillery (11 guns) and 6-700 sabres of cavalry. Yes, there the force is getting so light the best solution is the to move with wagons.

Gunboats

OTL they were pulling them out of storage in December to cross the sea (in convoy) when the weather calmed down. Way before the decisions were made. Of course you are right that the Duke of Somerset before the Trent was trying to argue that in any war the US would have occupied the line of the St. Lawrence before the RN could send gunships from the UK. However in War Cabinet in early December he stated he would immediately activate the gunboats and have them on the St. Lawrence before navigation opened ready to steam upriver with the thaw (Cabinet Memo. from Somerset to Palmerston, 6th December 1861*). He also indicated he was detailing "an intelligent officer" to take command of the Provincial Gunboats to be built.

That is certainly what the RN were preparing for in December '61/January '62. Gunboats were inspected, repaired, rearmed and made ready to be convoyed to Cape Breton probably setting off in packets from mid or late February. What Somerset was keen to avoid was the worst of the winter weather from these light vessels. That perhaps there was a suspicion that the US would have effectively cut the Welland we can but speculate.

I see no reason, baring US action, why in mid-May there would not be a large force of gunboats on Lake Erie.

*If anyone is near Kew apparently this is in box GC/SO/70 according to Prof. Andrew Lambert, whom I am using as a reference.
 
Chapter 20: The Invasion of Canada: Part 2

"The day was hot, I was thirsty, and we knew the Yankee's were coming." - Veteran of the Queens Own Rifles describing the Battle of Lime Ridge[6]

“The mettle of the Canadians was first tested when the enemy crossed the Detroit frontier. Col. Newdigate did admirable work in slowing their advance to the interior, but a single brigade, no matter how well led cannot hold such a flat country against an invader. Especially a force such as ours, which was woefully deficient in cavalry for reconnaissance purposes, meaning we had to often rely on local guides or citizens for information which was simple hearsay or rumour more often than not.

The enemy had a force of approximately 8,000 men at his disposal, nearly equal in numbers to our own. I was able to observe the fighting from my position with Napier’s headquarters in Coombs Mound, and thus can relate much of the battle. The enemy first advanced upon our position at the Delaware Cross Roads where he engaged the defenders under, Newdigate who held firm despite hot fire and a skillfully employed cannonade. The enemy, thus with our southern flank emplaced, turned his attention to those forces in that unenviable position on Komoka.

It was there that the fire was hottest, and I later learned that amongst the forces of the enemy was a unit of Yankee sharpshooters. Having read about the mischief they caused for us in their Revolution and in the 1812 war, I saw that they did their legacy proud that day. In the space of one hour, the battalion commanders for each militia battalion were killed or wounded, which greatly demoralized the Canadian defenders. General Napier was slow to react to this threat to the northern flank, and despite having a strong reserve of 2,000 men he hesitated in the face of determined attack. It was this hesitation which would cost us the battle.

The sharpshooters having done their terrible work, our force was met with a well handled bayonet charge. The lack of remaining officers, and the demoralized state of those forces caused the militia of the 3rd Brigade to break in the wildest confusion. Even though we possessed the strength to plug such a gap, Napier dawdled in sending in the reserve, and when the militia at Delaware Cross Roads saw the rout of their fellows, the bugle call for withdrawal was mistakenly sent up. Though order might have been restored, it was too late. The withdrawal had become general, and Napier seemed to lose what little nerve he possessed with it. It was then left to our reserve under Brigadier General Fordyce to stall the Yankee pursuit, and in conjunction with our guns atop Coombs Mound, they could not mount a hasty attack and thankfully many men would live to eat their dinner at the bivouac that night.

Speaking with my own significant experience of the Canadian Militia, who I have every reason to think highly of, I should believe that had they been well led that day we should never have been forced to withdraw. Instead they were led to a panic by their own officers, who at that time were not well drilled in the ways of war. Instead they had been mishandled by our commanding officer and taught the childish barrack maneuvers which were perfectly useless in the field. And so we were compelled to withdraw up the highway, protecting the immense train carriage which withdrew our heavy equipment.

Though many of my colleagues have attempted to use this battle at London to disparage the fighting prowess of the Canadian militia, I would simply direct them to the events of Lime Ridge or Doran Creek to assuage them of that opinion…” – The Story of a Soldiers Life, Volume II, Field-Marshal Viscount Garnet Wolseley, Westminster 1903


canadian-riflemen.jpg

The Royal Canadian Rifles skirmishing with Palmer's Division
“My troop was assigned to the headquarters of Colonel Mauleverer alongside that of Captain Teeter’s and it was there we learned the enemy had crossed the frontier. Much to my consternation our first week of the war was spend as messengers, delivering news to the front and in return as the Yankee’s cut the telegraph wires. Though they had landed on the 17th, their position was widely spread out and the enemies formations spent much time connecting with one another from the 17th to the 20th as their forward elements moved inland.

My first contact came with the enemy at St. David’s on May 22nd 1862. We had ridden in support of the 12th Volunteers under Lt. Col. Worthington, as he withdrew from Niagara against the enemies formations there. The day was damp, and the mud would have made the enemies advance precipitous at best, but on he came. When my troop arrived the 12th was engaged in withdrawing up the Queenston Road, but their flank was engaged by a party of the enemy concealed in the woods. Unable to ride them down I led my men around the wooded copse of trees, where I left a dozen good men to watch the horses, while the remaining forty of us advanced upon the enemy. We came upon him in the woods, and we opened fire with our old Victoria Carbines, weapons far better for scaring horses than killing men, and exchanged shot with him for over an hour driving him from the wood. However, our victory was short lived, as the enemy had the numbers and we were forced to withdraw in the direction of St. Catherines with the infantry.

It is here that I should relate the bravery of one of our newest members of the troop, a young trooper named John James. He proved himself most formidable in the skirmish, and with a whooping war cry like some Indian brave he had spent much of the skirmish popping in and out from behind various logs, making it appear like our company was more like a battalion. Cool under fire he had crawled forward to where a downed enemy lay and taken his pistol for himself, thereby making off with a second Colt revolver like the remainder of our corps used.

Though we would bivouac for two days at St. Catherines, our stay there was cut short by the Yankee’s landing at Port Colbourne on May 25th. An audacious landing of 2,000 men under the protection of the enemy fleet was undertaken and thus upended our forward defence. It had been our hope that we could prevent the enemy from advancing further inland, but with the enemy supreme in Lake Erie and contesting the waters of Lake Ontario, it was a forlorn hope. Our unhappy task was then to cover the engineers as they sabotaged the Welland canal to deny its use to the enemy and then withdraw towards Hamilton to rendezvous with the remainder of the division under Major General Rumley.

Our retreat was joined by throngs of citizens fleeing the depravations of the Yankees. Young and old alike had strapped their belongings to carts, drove their flocks ahead of them, rode with heavy saddlebags, or walked with their worldly belongings in hand. It brings at once to mind the flight of the Loyalists from the savagery of the so-called Patriots in the American Revolutionary War. For many they would be running for some time against the onslaught of Yankee raiders.

Amongst the desperation though, were true stories of bravery and stout heartedness of the local populace. On the frontier itself many men were former soldiers of the Queen’s forces settling themselves into a simpler life. One man, former Captain Lewis Palmer who had served in the 1812 war and the Rebellions of 1837-38, saw the approaching Yankee’s and despite being much advanced in age, mounted his horse and galloped about the countryside to give warning to his neighbors, before disappearing himself to cause mischief for the invader. Another veteran of those conflicts, Henry F. Angur, who though crippled by gout and at the age of 69, encouraged his family to leave without him as “he had survived two wars, and would risk a third” in this fashion he would harangue a column of Yankee cavalry so crossly that their officer would apologize for the destruction of his and his neighbors picket fences and even pay compensation for the damaged properties! It was thanks to the quick wit of one engineer of the Buffalo and Lake Huron Railroad which would save two railcars from American capture. 21 year old Robert Larmour was roused by the sounds of ruckus from the harbor as the Yankee’s landed and managed to steam up two engines of that rail line in and slip them away from the invaders in a wild chase, but for his actions all three engines would have fallen into American hands and eased their passage inland.[7]

Despite this heroism we were forced to steadily give ground as the number of American troops grew daily. By the start of June there were some 15,000 advancing inland towards Toronto. Our troops steadily withdrew, not easing the passage of the enemy one mile, but slowly we were pushed back to our defensive positions on the outskirts of Hamilton. General Dundas had, in accordance with our engineers, chosen an excellent defensive site near the old Stoney Creek battlefield.

Lime Ridge is a limestone ridge which joins the local highlands above the city of Hamilton and overlooking Burlington Bay. It extends at a rough 90 degree angle along the coast, overlooking both the Queen’s Highway, the Great Western Railway on the lake shore, and observing the Thorold Road leading to the interior. At 90 feet in height a frontal assault is an impossibility, allowing guns to cover the roadways, and the infantry a relative position of safety from the enemy. Each flank has a weakness however, on the lake shore it may be assaulted in conjunction with gunboats, while the position at Albion Mills might be attacked by a force coming up the Thorold Road. However, each point had been strengthened by earthworks and covered with many guns, which General Rumley had spent many weeks inspecting by this point. By June 3rd our whole force had been collected, and numbered some 9,000 Volunteers and British troops.

The enemy had made good time in his pursuit in spite of our efforts, and he endeavored to break us here. I learned later that their commanding officer, Major General Charles Smith, had served in their war in Mexico, and so felt we would be in for a rough fight. He was skillful in his attack, directing a feint against the lakeside entrenchments up Barton Road along Albion Creek and probing our works there. Knowing his ships were driven to distraction by the daring do of Captain Bythesea, he gambled his assault on our more vulnerable landward position at Albion Mills.

Our positions were outlined as follows. On the Highway leading to Hamilton manning the earthworks was the 2nd Brigade under Col. Thomas Ross, comprised of the13th, 19th, and 20th Battalions of Volunteer Infantry. Col. Mauleverer’s 1st Brigade was atop the ridge, constituting a reserve. The 3rd Brigade under Col. Baron, John De Courcy comprising the 27th, 28th, and 30th Battalions of Volunteer Infantry, stiffened by the 45th which had withdrawn from Port Colbourne.

Our rear was protected by the Hamilton Garrison under Col. Booker who held the 38th Battalion in the city, while the 39th was guarding our lines of communication with Toronto.

Lt. Col. Boulton had the Dragoons protecting the flanks, skirmishing with the Yankee riders when the battle started, and I was present at Albion Mills when the attacks first came…” – Soldiering In Canada, Recollections and Experiences of Brigadier General George T. Denison III, Toronto Press 1900

Action%2Bat%2BEccles%2BHIll%2BNDM-2.jpg

Canadian militia skirmishing with Smith's scouts.
“As Smith moved inland, his engineers repaired bridges and railroads, establishing supply depots at Fort Erie and Port Colbourne fueling the American advance inland. He pursued Rumley’s retreating forces to the Welland Canal, where after the daring landing of Sweeney’s brigade he bypassed the British lines compelling their withdrawal.

Upon reaching the defences erected by Rumley he paused awaiting word from Palmer on his advance, upon which so much of his campaign was dependent. When he received word of London’s fall he was ecstatic and ordered the attack for the next day on June 6th. McArthur’s brigade was assigned to test the British defences on the lake shore, while Prentiss’s brigade would assault the British positions at Albion Mills in the hope of unhinging their lines and sweeping the British force into Hamilton.

The two divisions were organized as such:

1st Division (BG John McArthur)

1st Brigade: (Col. Isaac C. Pugh) 9th, Illinois, 12th Illinois, 41st Illinois, 7th Illinois
2nd Brigade: (Col. Thomas W. Sweeney) 50th Illinois, 52nd Illinois, 12th Iowa, 52nd Indiana, 13th Missouri
3rd Brigade: (Col. Jacob G. Lauman) 2nd Iowa, 7th Iowa, 14th Iowa, Birge's Western Sharpshooters

3rd Division (BG Benjamin M. Prentiss)

1st Brigade (Col. Everett Peabody) 21st Missouri, 25th Missouri, 16th Wisconsin, 12th Michigan
2nd Brigade (Col. Madison Miller) 18th Missouri, 61st Illinois, 16th Iowa
3rd Brigade (Col. John Turchin) 19th Illinois, 15th Iowa, 23rd Missouri, 18th Wisconsin

The attack began at 10am June 6th with McArthur’s leading brigade, Pugh’s, attacking against the British works on Albion Creek as a diversion. His guns kept up a steady cannonade on the British positions there and on the heights in order to try and tie the defenders down. His remaining two brigades demonstrated against the base of the ridge for effect, and moved as if to support Pugh, but in reality they were simply covering for Prentiss attack.

Prentiss attack began well with his leading division under Peabody coming on the Canadians as they were having breakfast, but the quick wits of their officers allowed them to recover, and repulse Peabody’s attack. The nature of the terrain chosen by the British allowed them to attack their attackers in a small ravine which lead to the low ground, breaking up the main thrust of Peabody’s brigade and diverting the second wave under Miller to the flank where it was hoped the Canadians would be less prepared, instead they found the vicious fighting of Stone Church.

Properly known as Barton Stone Church, it had been constructed in 1847 on the site of a former Lutheran Church it was eventually bought up by American Presbyterians who took charge of the property in 1850. In 1862 Reverend Anthony Gill was managing the congregation and would be well regarded in the aftermath of the battle for his ministrations to the wounded.

However, it had been absorbed by the militia for very un-Christian purposes. The Church now formed a strong point in a series of entrenchments dotting the high ground behind both Stone Church Road and the Thorold Road which ended at Rosseau Creek securing the positions flanks. Here the militia of the 30th Battalion made their stand against the men of Peabody’s attack, and then Miller’s as the action became general. This point was considered crucial to the defence and so they hung on tenaciously, egged on by their battalion’s commanding officer John Fitzroy De Courcy.

A nobleman of Anglo-Irish descent he was a career soldier in the British army, joining the 47th Regiment of Foot at the age of 17 in 1838. He was also a decorated veteran of the Crimea. He had also faced the Americans before in the stand-off over the San Juan Islands, the abortive “Pig War” which had made his series of decisions leading up to May of 1862 very confusing to follow. De Courcy was a fighter, not much else. So when the prospect of war beckoned to the south he decided that rather than moldering away from the fighting he would volunteer to lead a regiment of Union forces against the South, appointed command of the 16th Ohio Volunteer Infantry in 1861. However, as the rumours of war between the Union and Britain had deepened. He had felt it his duty to resign his commission and travel north to offer his services in Canada, where he was soon appointed a brevet Colonel and drilling a brigade of militia. The Canadian militiamen soon shared the opinion of the Union men he had commanded in that he was “cruel, but fair.” It was this disciplinarian attitude which allowed them to hold firm against two attacks, before finally facing their most pressing challenge yet.

John%2BFitzroy%2BDe%2BCourcy-2-3.jpg

John Fitzroy De Courcy
The 3rd Brigade of Prentiss’s Division was John Basil Turchin, or as he had previously been known, Ivan Vasilyevich Turchaninov. Turchin was a combat veteran from the Imperial Russian Army. He had fought in the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, as well as in the Crimean War against the British seeing action at Balaclava. After the war he would marry the daughter of his commanding officer, Nadezhda (or Nadine) Lovow and would immigrate to the United States in 1856. While there he grew to love his new country writing “I have to thank America for one thing. This country helped me destroy my nobleman’s ideals and put me on the level of an ordinary person. I am not afraid of any kind of work, no matter what situation I am in. It does not matter to me… I have been reborn.” Upon the outbreak of war he naturally sided with the North. He quickly rose through the ranks, soon commanding a brigade of Midwesterners who, much like their commander, felt a great deal of disdain for their foreign aristocratic opponents. They had in their minds, a score to settle.

Expired Image Removed
John Basil Turchin
That two noblemen, one reformed and the other a symbol of foreign aristocracy could end up at the head of brigades of more democratically minded soldiers is perhaps emblematic of this conflict. However, few had time for high ideals or romantic notions of war on that hot June day, and it soon turned to a contest of bullets and bayonets.

Turchin’s brigade led the renewed charge, led by his former regiment, the 19th Illinois. The fighting at the church was bloody, with men sniping one another amongst the gravestones of the church yard. De Courcy was in the middle of the fray, urging his men on, and eventually taking the graveyard back pushing out a determined assault by the 19th, he would be wounded twice that day, but despite the exhortations of his men, he refused to withdraw. Soon the vigor of Miller’s assault began to push and the militia were forced slowly but surely back.

However, this was when Rumleychose to commit his reserve, and Col. Mauleverer’s 1st Brigade rejoined the fray. The committal of perhaps the most veteran troops in Canadian ranks turned the tide and Prentiss was forced to withdraw. Smith, seeing his gamble failed, judged it would be prudent to end the day’s fighting and ordered his men to withdraw in the direction of St. Catherine’s at 2pm. The Canadians were left holding the ridge, and victorious. Over the course of battle the Canadians had suffered 1,100 killed, wounded and captured, while the Americans lost 2,600 to all causes.

The victory would be short lived though, as news of Napier’s defeat at London, and Smith’s ambitious turning movement through the countryside at Brantford unhinged the British defensive line around Hamilton, compelling Rumley to withdraw to Toronto, which would begin the long retreat. This might have demoralized the Canadians had it not been for their taste of victory and the infamous burning of Brantford…”– For No Want of Courage: The Upper Canada Campaign, Col. John Stacey (ret.), Royal Military College, 1966


-----

6] Based on a quote spoken by a veteran of Ridgeway in 1930. Funny how there’s more than once Lime Ridge in Canada!

7] It goes without saying these are all real people. I’ve based their actions primarily off what they did in the historic Fenian raids in 1866.
 

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Given the amount of warning of hostilities and also the degree and general efficency of preparation by the defence I would be surprised if more than a small fraction of the Canadian rolling stock was captured. Apart from anything else it would be too valuable to Canada for its defence, hence giving it a high profile.





Also what were the defence of US ports on the lower lakes like? Would it be practical to, having got gunboats on them, attack such ports and hence prevent/delay the build-up of US forces on them? After all the shipyards are likely to be on-near the water so should be relatively easy to disrupt them if there are no defences.

Steve

Ah see you replied to Tigers covering some of those points while I was writing.

During the winter, the Lakes are unnavigable due being frozen, while the lead up to and follow up after that frozen period is marked by really ugly storms (with Rogue Waves you wouldn't believe) while the breakup of the ice takes up to a month. So basically from November - March you can't really use them. In our day that is when the Lake ships and boats, as well a private craft from yachts to tour boats are laid up for the winter and under repairs and maintenance (and when many are built). The Lakes are very very seasonal. So in effect nature defends the ports of both sides from naval attack until sometime between April and May (seasons vary from year to year) and once the big storms come (The Gales of November from the "Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald") operations end.

Which means months to prepare defenses against naval attack so no matter what the (likely non existent) state of American defenses on the Great Lakes are when the crisis develops and leads to war, by the time the campaign season is an option there is plenty of time to do some work.

I would be surprised if much rolling stock was lost.

I am curious about the logistics issues claimed... the Erie Canal is in service and runs from New York City to Buffalo. The American supply terminus on thet Niagara front is Buffalo which is also being served by the New York Central Railroad.

Watertown (and modern day Fort Drum) is also served by rail (in this era) and it 30 miles to Alexandra Bay NY (right on the St Lawrence River)

Rail service goes to Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain, which is as we all know the traditional invasion route north into Canada and south into New York through several previous wars. It would of course thaw south to north as winter ends and spring returns.

The gap between Lake Champlain and Watertown is the Adirondack Mountains are barely developed now, and far less so in the era in question. Plus of course they are mountains. In fact between Watertown NY and the coast of Maine there is only Lake Champlain as an approach route for either side. The geography is a bit unfriendly in this part of the world, and winter ends late in those north woods and mountains and comes back early.
 
67th Tigers,

If I wanted to get std gauge locomotives and rolling stock onto the Canadian railway system I would put them on flatbeds running on the different gauge railways and take them there as cargo.

Also the Union could get hold of std gauge rolling stock by taking the bogies off of alternative gauge rail stock and rebuilding them with different sized axels and bed. It is much faster than building new rolling stock from scratch. It won't work for Locos of course.
 
67th Tigers,

If I wanted to get std gauge locomotives and rolling stock onto the Canadian railway system I would put them on flatbeds running on the different gauge railways and take them there as cargo.

Also the Union could get hold of std gauge rolling stock by taking the bogies off of alternative gauge rail stock and rebuilding them with different sized axels and bed. It is much faster than building new rolling stock from scratch. It won't work for Locos of course.

Other way round. The Canadian RWs, including the Grand Trunk to Portland run on 5 ft 6 gauge, as does the Vermont Central. Most other US RR in the area run on 4 ft 8.5 gauge.

The problem is moving locomotives sized for 5 ft 6 on a 4 ft 8.5 line. You'd have to start checking for tunnels through the Appalachians, because as far as I'm aware there is no railroad route from New York to Detroit that doesn't pass through a narrow tunnel as this point....
 
Other way round. The Canadian RWs, including the Grand Trunk to Portland run on 5 ft 6 gauge, as does the Vermont Central. Most other US RR in the area run on 4 ft 8.5 gauge.

The problem is moving locomotives sized for 5 ft 6 on a 4 ft 8.5 line. You'd have to start checking for tunnels through the Appalachians, because as far as I'm aware there is no railroad route from New York to Detroit that doesn't pass through a narrow tunnel as this point....

I seem to recall that gauges still varied widely in this period of history (from company to company). From a military perspective that answer is large supply and storage facilities at the points where one Railroad Company changes to another, and manpower to load and unload until more permanent measures can be taken.

Part of the ultimate solution is the US Military Railroad, which did amazing work in the Civil War

the article linked to addresses all of the relevant shortcomings of American railroads during the time period in question (as to what the Union did about them)

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Journals/JAMHF/2/2/Military_Railroads*.html
 
Ouch that's not good. :frown: With the Americans having clear superiority on Erie, which is pretty much secured now the canal is taken. Plus with both flanks retreating from Detroit and from Niagara it could be difficult defending any position on the lake. True their logistics will worsen as the distance of their advance increases but control of the Lake means shipping can be used to provide supply for forces by the shoreline and also there is the threat of amphibious landings.

Sounds like there is some naval resistance, from the mention of "the daring do of Captain Bythesea" or is that on Lake Ontario?

Steve
 
Given the amount of warning of hostilities and also the degree and general efficency of preparation by the defence I would be surprised if more than a small fraction of the Canadian rolling stock was captured. Apart from anything else it would be too valuable to Canada for its defence, hence giving it a high profile.

It would, but it should be recalled the Canadians are green at the strategic level and errors are always made, even by veterans.

I wonder if the initial problem might be that the government is unwilling to deploy from reserve every such gunboat for reasons of expense, especially with people such as Gladstone so prominant in it? Once they realise that the US is intent on war to the bitter end and major attacks on Canada then the purse strings are likely to be seriously loosened but there may be some underestimation of the threat to Canada from the US in the early weeks/months of actual combat.

The problem is that Britain would at first be looking into winning the war "on the cheap" as they say since they believe it will be a short war which won't seriously overtax their resources. So while they will mobilize the available resources, they won't be in a hurry to start gearing up until disabused of the "short war" notion they seem to have believed in historically.

So from my readings, I believe that Britain will probably lag behind in the mobilization of resources in early 1862 until they realize it won't be a short war. Then they will (probably IMO) decide that they need to mobilize in order to force a political decision to the war.

OTL they were pulling them out of storage in December to cross the sea (in convoy) when the weather calmed down. Way before the decisions were made. Of course you are right that the Duke of Somerset before the Trent was trying to argue that in any war the US would have occupied the line of the St. Lawrence before the RN could send gunships from the UK. However in War Cabinet in early December he stated he would immediately activate the gunboats and have them on the St. Lawrence before navigation opened ready to steam upriver with the thaw (Cabinet Memo. from Somerset to Palmerston, 6th December 1861*). He also indicated he was detailing "an intelligent officer" to take command of the Provincial Gunboats to be built.

Have not seen this quote in my readings (either from Bourne or Stacey) which does change my impression, do you have that memo of Somerset's? Sound's like an interesting about face for a fellow who was rather obstinate about not incurring costs up to the last minute.

Mind you, I do believe that the presence of American steamers on Lake Ontario at the same time as the British would prevent the movement of British vessels up the Welland, for obvious reasons I would think.

That is certainly what the RN were preparing for in December '61/January '62. Gunboats were inspected, repaired, rearmed and made ready to be convoyed to Cape Breton probably setting off in packets from mid or late February. What Somerset was keen to avoid was the worst of the winter weather from these light vessels. That perhaps there was a suspicion that the US would have effectively cut the Welland we can but speculate.

Could be, or at least a concern they couldn't make the crossing in the face of the worst winter weather and that waiting until spring would be preferable.
 
Ouch that's not good. :frown: With the Americans having clear superiority on Erie, which is pretty much secured now the canal is taken. Plus with both flanks retreating from Detroit and from Niagara it could be difficult defending any position on the lake. True their logistics will worsen as the distance of their advance increases but control of the Lake means shipping can be used to provide supply for forces by the shoreline and also there is the threat of amphibious landings.

For the remaining of the campaign season they have reasonably good logistics provided they keep supply depots up and running. They have a bit more fighting to do so manpower may become a problem sooner rather than later, but they are pushing the Canadians back.

Smith was a daring general OTL, so my thinking is that rather than putter around and wait for more men he would try and find a way to force the Canadians off their defensive position. He will probably keep going until he simply can't go anymore.

Sounds like there is some naval resistance, from the mention of "the daring do of Captain Bythesea" or is that on Lake Ontario?

Ah yes! That is on Lake Ontario, and Bythesea (fascinating fellow IRL) will have quite the role to play on Lake Ontario!
 
Have not seen this quote in my readings (either from Bourne or Stacey) which does change my impression, do you have that memo of Somerset's? Sound's like an interesting about face for a fellow who was rather obstinate about not incurring costs up to the last minute.

I don't have the primary document. If anyone lives in London it would be an afternoon trip down to Kew.

It is mentioned in Bourne's "Preparations" but couched in negative language:

"On 6 December Somerset said that the Admiralty had been too busy
with 'more pressing questions ' and while he did then begin to
think the problem over he was content to allow the Cabinet to
postpone a decision until war became ' unavoidable'. In his
correspondence with the prime minister he did suggest that they
might send an officer, a shipwright and a clerk to help the Canadians
acquire, convert, and man what suitable ships could be found in
Canadian waters, but the large number of gunboats which were
ready in the United Kingdom could not now be sent until the
spring because of the freezing of the St. Lawrence
.2"

This fits Lambert. Lambert quotes part of the memo respecting the situation on the coast, ending with his worries for Canada:

"You will see that without commissioning any vessels we shall in a few
weeks have enough [battle]ships and frigates on the station to blockade
their ports. This list of our force does not include any of the frigates and
smaller vessels now preparing for commissioning, several of which could,
however, be sent in a few days, as we have men in the ports available for
them…I wish the Canadian affairs were as satisfactory as our prospects at
sea
."

Lambert's interpretation of the document wrt the Lakes:

"Later the same day, Somerset considered the role of the Royal
Navy in the defense of Canada. Even before the crisis, he had tried to hand over
any naval role on the Lakes to the Canadians, and he remained reluctant to incur
any expense. He would send ‘an intelligent officer’ to advise the Canadian
government and would prepare gunboats to be sent once the ice cleared
.83"

I don't think they're contradictory, merely that Bourne focuses on the fact they can't be sent until the thaw.

Mind you, I do believe that the presence of American steamers on Lake Ontario at the same time as the British would prevent the movement of British vessels up the Welland, for obvious reasons I would think.

Canada had a ridiculous tonnage advantage on Lake Ontario. Most US tonnage was concentrated on large steamers (typically 5-700 tons) that made the journey from Chicago down to Buffalo where cargo typically transshipped onto Erie Canal boats (the Erie is frozen at Buffalo until 1st May BTW) or onto Welland canal steamers. The Province of Canada can overwhelm the US on Lake Ontario easily with ships and guns to hand. When the RN enter the Lake it may have no US flags flying on it.

On Lake Huron and above the advantage is insanely towards the US - all those big steamers, sized to be the maximum vessels that can cross the St. Clair flats come into play essentially simultaneously with the RN down the St. Lawrence. The St. Clair flats opened around 1st May.

When the big question is then is what happened on Lake Erie. What vessels wintered there? Could they be converted into gunboats in time? What about the Canadians at Port Colborne and Port Maitland?
 
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