Worst general of the Army of the Potomac..

I would be the last to defend the Young Napoleon, but I do take into accout two things. First, it had not been very long since he was rousted out of the Virginia Peninsula by Lee, and two, Pope had just been defeated at second Manassas a scant 3 weeks earlier. Given McClellans penchant for overestimation and having just gone through a mighty battle at Sharpsburg, I wonder if this enhanced his timidity to the point of debilitating him. Just like in the Seven Days, his mind defeated him while his army was still capable of a major victory even if he could not see it. Was he the worst Potomac General? No but he was far from the best.
 
In fairness to McClellan he did have skills but his flaws were magnified by his being so out of sync, especially after Antietam, with the goals of his govenment. Contrast him to Grant who meshed perfectly with Lincoln and "got it" so to speak as to what the war was all about. Mac never quite understood. This is not rocket science. Many many others over the years have made note of this. It was a very political war.
 
Which is why, all in all, Ambrose Burnside seems to be winning hands down over both lesser known and better known people :smile:

Yes he is and that is quite understandable. This thread is getting old and most who had something to say have said it. May start a new one on worst Condederate general.
 
Sometimes, Doug, it's good to let a thread sit a while and wait for a new crop of members to come along with new ideas.

Hohoho. Found your new thread, BTW.....so many to name and so little time :smile:
 
Hopefully one of you can help me out. I'd read in one source that Allan Pinkerton's work as a spy for Mcclellan was the reason why McClellan believed he was always outnumbered. If this was so, I could understand why Mcclellan would've been hesitant to attack. I can't find that resource now, and none of the sites I've found say anything in regards to this.
 
Hopefully one of you can help me out. I'd read in one source that Allan Pinkerton's work as a spy for Mcclellan was the reason why McClellan believed he was always outnumbered. If this was so, I could understand why Mcclellan would've been hesitant to attack. I can't find that resource now, and none of the sites I've found say anything in regards to this.

That's partially true. Pinkerton was always grossly overestimating the strength of the enemy. But a commanding general had several possible sources of information concering the strength of the enemy. If one of them was out of line with everyone else, he'd be expected to discard the outlier and go with the more reasonable estimates. Instead, McClellan consistently chose to believe Pinkerton, because Pinkerton was telling him what he wanted to hear.
 
Sometimes, Doug, it's good to let a thread sit a while and wait for a new crop of members to come along with new ideas.

Hohoho. Found your new thread, BTW.....so many to name and so little time :smile:

Yes of course! This thread NOT dead and Burnside is not winner yet. Will wait 5 years to announce that he is worst. Heh.

Ya new thread. I did it. I gonna float Joe Johnston maybe and flush out his defenders. Lots will probably say Bragg cause his eyebrows meet in middle of forehead and and he looked kinda goofy.
 
Except for Meade, all other commanders were removed from the AoP by Lincoln, at the very least due to an incapability of doing their jobs. But Burnside takes the cake as being not just the worst commander of the AoP, but the most incompetent commander in United States history. He's at Antietam, sending wave after wave of troops that get funneled on a bridge named for him only to be mowed down by Confederates on the other side, yet he could have crossed the stream in water less than three feet deep just a half mile away. He gets outflanked by Lee at Fredericksburg and loses, despite a 2-to-1 numerical superiority. He does the infamous "mud march" and has to quit. At the Crater, he refuses to send a trained regiment around it, choosing to send an untrained regiment into it, and loses that battle.

A very likable guy, yes, but as a battlefield commander, forget it.
 
Burnside suffers badly from the Fredericksburg disaster, as he should as commander. The fact of the matter is that his move across to the Confederate left was well conducted and placed the AoP in position to gain the advantage he envisioned. The poor coordination concerning the bridges let a stolen march go unrewarded. Burnside understood this and wanted to wait but was forced into a battle he knew he couldn't win by political pressure. He was competent but became victim to circumstances not necessarily under his control.
 
Good to point this out. Fair. Two fresh corps then...V and VI. And, he also still held a 2-1 advantage after the battle and Lee had no uncommited fresh men, all had been used on the boodiest day. No fresh reserves. Mac was still in much better shape than was Lee all things considered...cept between his ears. This sound better?

Several points.

Lee didn't commit his last reserve. Half of AP Hill's division never so much as got close to the line. Stuart's cavalry was untouched. Hood had about 1,000 usable men in the reserve, and much of Ewell's division had rallied and was in reserve. Depending how you count things Lee probably had ca. 8,000 men in reserve to counterattack late on the 17th.

As to McClellan. Much of his army was broken. His right barely existed, and most of 5th and 6th Corps were needed just to stabilise his lines, especially in light of Lee deciding to turn McClellan's right. At the end of the 17th McClellan had a single brigade in reserve after committing 2 brigades of Morell's division to reinforce his right against the Confederate attack which moved into position and was then stopped cold by 1st Corps gunline. Arguably Greene's weak division (maybe 1,000 bayonets) could also be used again as it had had time to rally and reform after being relieved from the firing line ca. 1230.

In terms of usable reserves it's arguable that neither had the advantage. Hence the decision to stabilise and await further reinforcements (Couch's, Humphreys' and Reynold's divisions) was probably sensible.
 
That's partially true. Pinkerton was always grossly overestimating the strength of the enemy. But a commanding general had several possible sources of information concering the strength of the enemy. If one of them was out of line with everyone else, he'd be expected to discard the outlier and go with the more reasonable estimates. Instead, McClellan consistently chose to believe Pinkerton, because Pinkerton was telling him what he wanted to hear.

Yes, and indeed Pinkerton's numbers (which aren't as far off as some would believe, but are usually an expression of "aggregate present" rather than effectives).

The reference you're pointing too and not quite remembering is an interesting one because it is referring to a Confederate overestimate of McClellan's strength, as I point out here: http://67thtigers.blogspot.com/2010/06/yorktown-some-context.html

By stripping away the context that after adding in the force multiplier of the entrenchments and ground that the Confederate forces had far more combat power than the National forces that quote has been misused for generations.
 
Yes of course! This thread NOT dead and Burnside is not winner yet. Will wait 5 years to announce that he is worst. Heh.

Ya new thread. I did it. I gonna float Joe Johnston maybe and flush out his defenders. Lots will probably say Bragg cause his eyebrows meet in middle of forehead and and he looked kinda goofy.

Poor Burnside. Can't even win this contest :smile:

And Bragg's eyebrows were the least of his problems.
 
Except for Meade, all other commanders were removed from the AoP by Lincoln, at the very least due to an incapability of doing their jobs. But Burnside takes the cake as being not just the worst commander of the AoP, but the most incompetent commander in United States history. He's at Antietam, sending wave after wave of troops that get funneled on a bridge named for him only to be mowed down by Confederates on the other side, yet he could have crossed the stream in water less than three feet deep just a half mile away. He gets outflanked by Lee at Fredericksburg and loses, despite a 2-to-1 numerical superiority. He does the infamous "mud march" and has to quit. At the Crater, he refuses to send a trained regiment around it, choosing to send an untrained regiment into it, and loses that battle.

A very likable guy, yes, but as a battlefield commander, forget it.

Don't forget 1st Manassas. I personally think a gypsy cursed him at birth--something about being unable to cross small streams....
 
I just spent two hours writing out a detailed reply and quoting etc. only to have the interface say "you've logged out" when I hit send and everything gone. Hence now I'll be brief....

Can you point to the order where Halleck denies McCellan’s request for this? I cant find it.

OR1, 19(2), 353-5.

Essentially McClellan proposes crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry and advancing on Winchester. Halleck says it will unmask Washington.


See Rafuse, McClellan's War, 371.
 
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