Winfield S Hancock: Not so Superb After Gettysburg?

I suppose Amazon reviews are nice to depend on if one knows nothing about the topic. But I regard depending on them the way I regard depending on a poll of folks who have read only one or two books at most to determine historical accuracy. Many responses on Amazon are written by people who have never even been in the same room with the book they are allegedly "reviewing."
I see, you don't research your sources and you can't accept a different viewpoint.
 
I don't accept the claim Grant didn't allow time for reconnaissance. Meade was in charge of the army and Grant approved delays Meade requested.

Thank you. I had not read this, myself (that Grant did not allow enough time for recon), and was hoping that @67th Tigers will provide a quote or a source.
 
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Meade requested, and Grant approved, a delay at Cold Harbor, site of the most egregious failure to reconnoiter.

I edited my above reply for clarity: I meant that I had never heard of an account that Grant did not allow for enough time for recon. The delays actually worked in favour of Lee to get better prepared.
 
Many of the criticisms of Hancock and Grant/Meade for not doing adequate reconnaissance overlook the fact that there were few, if any, topography maps of the areas, that visibility was extremely limited in many of the areas of battle and/or their approaches, that timing coordinated strikes relied on non-existent or inadequate roads and pathways--much of what they knew had or thought they had was really learned by touch--sometimes too late.
Lee however, along with his staff, were intimately familiar with the areas chosen as battlegrounds.
How does one recon a swamp? How does one plan to deliver 40,000 men to one spot at one time from three different directions along three different roads with three very different commanders? Put on top of that the fact that your enemy has interior lines and are knowledgeable of the terrain because of daily use and you set up an almost impossible situation, especially if you want to take the offensive.
 
Many of the criticisms of Hancock and Grant/Meade for not doing adequate reconnaissance overlook the fact that there were few, if any, topography maps of the areas, that visibility was extremely limited in many of the areas of battle and/or their approaches, that timing coordinated strikes relied on non-existent or inadequate roads and pathways--much of what they knew had or thought they had was really learned by touch--sometimes too late.
Lee however, along with his staff, were intimately familiar with the areas chosen as battlegrounds.
How does one recon a swamp? How does one plan to deliver 40,000 men to one spot at one time from three different directions along three different roads with three very different commanders? Put on top of that the fact that your enemy has interior lines and are knowledgeable of the terrain because of daily use and you set up an almost impossible situation, especially if you want to take the offensive.
Didn't Grant have an engineer on his staff that created maps of the battle area? David.
 
Didn't Grant have an engineer on his staff that created maps of the battle area? David.
Even the best engineer would have difficulty mapping territory held by the enemy. I understand that just moving men, large groups of men, along the "roads" that existed or didn't exist was very difficult. The latter battles of the war seemed to be fraught with many frustrations involving just getting the forces to a critical point on time to coordinate an offense. Add to that difficulty the untrained and untested nature of both the men and their junior officers and you have a recipe for disaster
 
I want to clarify a point: Lack of reconnaissance has been the only specific oversight/weakness in question, regarding Hancock and others. Troop attrition, experience, etc., has been taken into consideration in the few accounts that I have read, so I do not see these as points of criticism.

These are the points in question:
  • Did Hancock (and Meade) attempt to send others in his place to obtain the lay of the land?
  • Is it generally accepted that Grant did not allow time for proper recon? (due to the fact that I am reading from Grant's point of view, it wold be hard for me to ascertain this, thus far)

There was an attempted recce. Comstock and Babcock were the two senior Aide-de-Camps on Grant's staff with the ranks of Lt Col. Grant assigned them to take Hancock's staff officers and lead them on a recce. This all happened, but Comstock, leading the party, got lost. They got to a position a mile north of the target after dark, and could see nothing. In the darkness they didn't risk getting closer due to the fact that the enemy would be sending out fighting patrols to dominate no-mans land, and Hancock's staff needed to get back to help guide the divisions in. Comstock and Babcock went on to see Burnside, and deliver the attack orders to him. Indeed, Comstock told Burnside not to bother with a recce before attacking.

Grant's orders were simply delivered far too late, but he was not concerned with immediate operations until mid-afternoon.

Had Lee not misinterpreted Grant's intentions, and had the rebel artillery not have been pulled then it would have been a bloody slaughter. Despite the attack succeeding, Grant made a complete blunder in ordering it.
 
Ewell lost a leg, not the same after.
Hancock grievously wounded in the groin, not the same after.

Anyone else? Likely.

If you spill your blood, guts and body parts and return changed, you get a pass. If that person is unfit for duty it would be his superiors’ duty to find him a new one.
His detractors would also include George Pickett after he was severely wounded on the Peninsula.
 
There was an attempted recce. Comstock and Babcock were the two senior Aide-de-Camps on Grant's staff with the ranks of Lt Col. Grant assigned them to take Hancock's staff officers and lead them on a recce. This all happened, but Comstock, leading the party, got lost. They got to a position a mile north of the target after dark, and could see nothing. In the darkness they didn't risk getting closer due to the fact that the enemy would be sending out fighting patrols to dominate no-mans land, and Hancock's staff needed to get back to help guide the divisions in. Comstock and Babcock went on to see Burnside, and deliver the attack orders to him. Indeed, Comstock told Burnside not to bother with a recce before attacking.

Grant's orders were simply delivered far too late, but he was not concerned with immediate operations until mid-afternoon.

Had Lee not misinterpreted Grant's intentions, and had the rebel artillery not have been pulled then it would have been a bloody slaughter. Despite the attack succeeding, Grant made a complete blunder in ordering it.
Not defending Grant, but how can a successful attack be a "complete blunder." I can understand "dumb luck" or "blind luck" or some such, but by definition a successful assault is most comprehensively not a complete blunder.
 
There was an attempted recce. Comstock and Babcock were the two senior Aide-de-Camps on Grant's staff with the ranks of Lt Col. Grant assigned them to take Hancock's staff officers and lead them on a recce. This all happened, but Comstock, leading the party, got lost. They got to a position a mile north of the target after dark, and could see nothing. In the darkness they didn't risk getting closer due to the fact that the enemy would be sending out fighting patrols to dominate no-mans land, and Hancock's staff needed to get back to help guide the divisions in. Comstock and Babcock went on to see Burnside, and deliver the attack orders to him. Indeed, Comstock told Burnside not to bother with a recce before attacking.

Grant's orders were simply delivered far too late, but he was not concerned with immediate operations until mid-afternoon.

Had Lee not misinterpreted Grant's intentions, and had the rebel artillery not have been pulled then it would have been a bloody slaughter. Despite the attack succeeding, Grant made a complete blunder in ordering it.
Ah,yes. Thank you. The truth starting to come out re: Comstock,Babcock, and Simpson the author's, "inaccurate and biased" reportage.
 
Ah,yes. Thank you. The truth starting to come out re: Comstock,Babcock, and Simpson the author's, "inaccurate and biased" reportage.

In fairness to the author: I only quoted one section of the chapter that caught my attention. There is mention of Comstock & Babcock (If I recall correctly) however, it was the assessment of Hancock that I highlighted. I do not want to give the impression that all else was left out. It is more of a reflection on my own bias/unrealistic view that I thought that Hancock would not make mistakes.
 
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Hancock commanded the instrument he was given as well as anyone. Recon by fire is proven method, send a unit out, if it draws fire you've found the enemy.
 
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