Wilder's Brigade and Henry Rifles

I am getting a little confused by this thread. If Wilder's first choice was the Henry rifle, but he was unable to obtain them because the factory could only produce 200 per month, then how exactly was Ripley supposed to arm the entire army with them?

Ripley was under enormous pressure to arm an entire army with modern arms as quickly as possible. He chose not to gamble everything on a new unproven technology. The army had spent a fair amount of time field testing the early breechloaders and had found them wanting. It was not unreasonable for the army to award contracts to make the Model 1861 rifle musket instead of the Henry or Spencer. The massive difficulties encountered with producing the much simpler weapon on a large scale can, and do, fill up an entire book.

You can believe what you want. There are some of us who simply think the idea that the entire army could have been equipped with Spencer's or Henry's ignores the realities of the day. Ripley certainly made mistakes and can be justifiably criticized, but replacing him with someone that would have jumped at the chance to adopt the Spencer still doesn't change the realities of the difficulties that were encountered in trying to produce weapons that plagued the army in '61-'63.

Amongst the realities being ignored:

1) Ripley placed an order for 10,000 Spencer rifles on Dec. 26, 1861. Commissioners Holt and Owens reduced the order to 7,500 rifles on May 31, 1862 because not a single weapon had been delivered yet!

2) The navy had placed an order for 700 Spencer rifles in July, 1861. It took Spencer until June, 1863 to complete even that small order!

3) The Burnside factory, which already existed, was in operation, and also had previous experience producing breechloading firearms was given a contact for Spencer carbines in June, 1864. They didn't deliver a single arm before the war ended!

4) The 1861 contracts for the much simpler Model 1861 rifle-musket that were placed with firms unfamiliar with firearms production did not result in substantial deliveries for the first 2 years of the war. The contractors were unable to find enough skilled workers, machinery, and raw materials to meet the demands. Many contracts went completely unfilled, and most contracts were consolidated, the numbers reduced, or were cancelled altogether due to lack of deliveries.

5) The reality is that both Spencer and Henry were given contracts that exceeded their capacities as it was.

Recognizing these facts doesn't make us "historians" that "simply cannot accept that things could have been different", but simply people that realize that getting rid of Ripley would not have solved the problems inherent in attempting to produce the repeaters on a large scale.

Two points were obvious. First, if the Union deployed many repeaters it would have a decisive combat advantage because the Confederates had no hope to getting many. Second, putting most any new invention into volume production is challenging.

No organization had more volume production experience than the Springfield Armory, which Ripley had managed. He could have helped Spencer and Henry, but instead he resisted them in every way.

Franklin Roosevelt authorized government support for the atomic bomb in October 1939. Not much happend for three years until General Leslie Groves took charge in September 1942. Less than three years later the nearly impossible had been accomplished.

As a rule, only very learned and clever men deny what is obviously true. Common men have less brains, but more sense." —William T. Stace
 
Two points were obvious. First, if the Union deployed many repeaters it would have a decisive combat advantage because the Confederates had no hope to getting many. Second, putting most any new invention into volume production is challenging.

Yes, I agree.

No organization had more volume production experience than the Springfield Armory, which Ripley had managed. He could have helped Spencer and Henry, but instead he resisted them in every way.

Ripley was the Superintendent at Springfield, in charge of administrative tasks. The Master Armorer was in charge of production. Ripley had no production experience to offer to Spencer or Henry.

Christopher Spencer's first .56 caliber rifle was ready in May, 1861. He sought the help of his employers, the Cheney's, to get a government contract. They went to their neighbor and friend, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, and got approval for a Navy test that took place in June. The Navy order was approved the same month. They then sought an order from the Army. This resulted in Captain Dyer of the Ordnance Department performing tests in August. His recommendation led to General McClellan ordering a Board of Examination to test the rifle in November. I haven't found anything that explains why there was a delay from August to November, maybe Ripley is at fault here, but perhaps they needed the time to produce more guns to be tested? One month after the conclusion of these tests Spencer's representative wrote to the Secretary of War proposing to manufacture 10,000 rifles. Ripley issued the contract the same day he received the proposal. Ripley was not an enthusiastic supporter, but he hardly dragged his feet on issuing a contract. The subsequent production delays had nothing to do with Ripley.

Franklin Roosevelt authorized government support for the atomic bomb in October 1939. Not much happend for three years until General Leslie Groves took charge in September 1942. Less than three years later the nearly impossible had been accomplished.

The perfect example of the problems faced when theory confronts reality. In spite of limitless resources they only managed to produce 2 A-bombs due to a lack of materials.
 
The Spencer was carried over into the Indian wars until replaced by the trapdoor. The Spencer was a more rugged weapon than the henry and won out on the military trials. The henry was reported to be too prone to breakage as reported by the trial results. I like the Henry and I like the Spencer and I like the Sharps. If you have a favorite rifle, you are going to your grave defending it. I really don't have a problem with that. My favorite weapon is the 1911A1 Colt and the AR-15. My favorite Civil War handgun is the 1860 Colt Army and the favorite long arm is the Sharps Rifle. My favorite CW Carbine is the Maynard.
 
“On average, each regiment in Wilder’s brigade during 1863 had 10 scouts.Documentation that the 17th Indiana scouts carried Henrys is provided in the 1863 diary of Pvt. James H. Bolens of Company F, to wit, May 20. “In camp. Laying a round reading. Cleaning up our Spencers. A number of the boys have bought Henry rifles. Sixteen shooters. Scouts all have them.” “This is corroborated in the diary of brigade clerk Henry W. Tutewiler (also of the 17th Indiana),
 
Yes, I agree.

Ripley was the Superintendent at Springfield, in charge of administrative tasks. The Master Armorer was in charge of production. Ripley had no production experience to offer to Spencer or Henry.

As ordnance chief he was in charge of the people who had the experience.

One month after the conclusion of these tests Spencer's representative wrote to the Secretary of War proposing to manufacture 10,000 rifles. Ripley issued the contract the same day he received the proposal.

According the Pulitzer Prize winner Robert Bruce, Ripley only approved it because he was instructed to do so by President Lincoln. A month after Gettysburg, Lincoln had enough of Ripley's foot-dragging and fired him.

The perfect example of the problems faced when theory confronts reality. In spite of limitless resources they only managed to produce 2 A-bombs due to a lack of materials.

It is publicly known that at least three nuclear bombs were completed by August 6, 1945. Only the Uranium version proved to be difficult to mass produce. That is why reliance shifted to Plutonium. The Army Air Corps was instructed to prepare for dropping fifty bombs.

A fourth bomb was scheduled for delivery on August 24th. Three more bombs were set for production in September. Starting in December the production rate was seven or more bombs monthly.*

*Wyden, Peter Day One: Before Hiroshima & After
 
According to the Tutewiler diary the scouts for the 17th Indiana Infantry had their Henry Repeating rifles as early as May 7, 1863. He states the following in his May 7th entry: "The 17th Scouts were attacked by the same party but having Henry rifles they repulsed them killing five and wounding others." This is an earlier date than most of Wilder's Brigade had their Spencer rifles.

While 900 Henry rifles were not available to Wilder's troops to purchase they were able to purchase several, likely as many as a couple of hundred.
 
According the Pulitzer Prize winner Robert Bruce, Ripley only approved it because he was instructed to do so by President Lincoln. A month after Gettysburg, Lincoln had enough of Ripley's foot-dragging and fired him.
My point was that Ripley's actions, or rather inaction, did not cause any delays in production save possibly the 2 months previously noted and even that is not clearly his fault.

Robert Bruce points the finger somewhere else:
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Bruce also does a nice job of summarizing the difficulties faced by Ripley in acquiring any weapons at all:
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Finally, Bruce also does a nice job of summarizing Ripley's arguments against breechloaders:
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As ordnance chief he was in charge of the people who had the experience.
Lincoln wanted to fire Ripley in 1862 over a flap involving Navy mortar boats of all things. He offered the job to Capt. Dyer, but he refused on the grounds that his work at Springfield Armory was too important for him to be elsewhere. Lincoln ended up keeping Ripley because he was unable to find a suitable replacement. It stands to reason that if Lincoln couldn't find anybody with enough experience to replace Ripley, then Ripley couldn't find anybody with enough experience to help speed production.

Ripley couldn't send Gorgas, Huger, Benton, or Burton to help Spencer, they were busy working for the other side. Mordecai resigned, but stayed out of the war. Ripley's depleted office was grossly undermanned; he didn't have any capable officers to spare and didn't have anyone with production experience.

Ripley was replaced by Ramsey who only lasted 1 year. Dyer replaced him after Ramsey resigned and eventually presided over the adoption of a breechloader for the infantry in 1873, but it wasn't a repeater. No European army adopted a repeater after the Civil War either. Ripley didn't have the benefit of the experience of Hoover's Gap when he decided not to adopt a repeater for the infantry, but even those who did have the ACW as hindsight still did not do so either.

Ripley was a bureaucrat in the worst sense of the word, but the lack of repeaters in the hands of the infantry is a much bigger picture than just him. He is always accused of being against innovation, but he approved of the use of breechloaders by the cavalry and the fact is that an amazing assortment of them reached the field during his tenure. No other ordnance chief of the era can claim likewise.
 
How many of Wilder’s men opted to armed themselves with Henry rifles? We know that Wilder’s brigade was armed with over 1000 Spencer rifles. Wilder’s men knew they were to be armed with the Spencer Rifle so those that opted for the Henry rifle did so making the Henry rifle their choice. According to one historian: “It is very likely certain individuals (other that the regimental scouts of the 17th Indiana) carried privately purchased Henry rifles from mid 1863 to war’s end."

By May of 1863 Wilder’s Brigade was taking delivery of Spencer repeating rifles. The scouts and others in Wilder’s Brigade also were armed with Henry repeating rifles by the end of May at their own expense. Colonel Wilder was concerned about attaining enough ammunition not only for the Spencer rifles but also for the Henry repeating rifles. Wilder had contacted the Adjutant General of Indiana William Henry Harrison Terrell with an inquiry about Henry ammunition. There would have been no need for Wilder to make such an inquiry if his brigade did not have Henry repeating rifles among their ranks. Terrell writes to Wilder the following in his letter of May 29, 1863, “Dear Col. I send you a copy of a letter from the War Dept. in relation to ammunition for the “Henry Rifles”. I have not been able to locate the letter from the War Department that was included along with Terrell’s letter. Generally the government agreed to purchase Henry ammunition for those regiments that purchased their own Henry repeating rifles. The government purchased over 4,000,000 Henry cartridges during the war. More than likely some of these found their way to Wilder’s Brigade.

Concerning the Ripley distraction: Ripley had absolutely nothing to do with Wilder's men purchasing their own Henry Repeating rifles.
 
My point was that Ripley's actions, or rather inaction, did not cause any delays in production save possibly the 2 months previously noted and even that is not clearly his fault.

Robert Bruce points the finger somewhere else:
View attachment 16369View attachment 16370

Bruce also does a nice job of summarizing the difficulties faced by Ripley in acquiring any weapons at all:
View attachment 16371

Finally, Bruce also does a nice job of summarizing Ripley's arguments against breechloaders:
View attachment 16372


Lincoln wanted to fire Ripley in 1862 over a flap involving Navy mortar boats of all things. He offered the job to Capt. Dyer, but he refused on the grounds that his work at Springfield Armory was too important for him to be elsewhere. Lincoln ended up keeping Ripley because he was unable to find a suitable replacement. It stands to reason that if Lincoln couldn't find anybody with enough experience to replace Ripley, then Ripley couldn't find anybody with enough experience to help speed production.

Ripley couldn't send Gorgas, Huger, Benton, or Burton to help Spencer, they were busy working for the other side. Mordecai resigned, but stayed out of the war. Ripley's depleted office was grossly undermanned; he didn't have any capable officers to spare and didn't have anyone with production experience.

Ripley was replaced by Ramsey who only lasted 1 year. Dyer replaced him after Ramsey resigned and eventually presided over the adoption of a breechloader for the infantry in 1873, but it wasn't a repeater. No European army adopted a repeater after the Civil War either. Ripley didn't have the benefit of the experience of Hoover's Gap when he decided not to adopt a repeater for the infantry, but even those who did have the ACW as hindsight still did not do so either.

Ripley was a bureaucrat in the worst sense of the word, but the lack of repeaters in the hands of the infantry is a much bigger picture than just him. He is always accused of being against innovation, but he approved of the use of breechloaders by the cavalry and the fact is that an amazing assortment of them reached the field during his tenure. No other ordnance chief of the era can claim likewise.

1. I am favorably impressed by your ability to copy pages from Bruce's book and paste them into this forum. How is that done?

2. The quotes provided demonstrate Bruce's even-handed assessment of Ripley. However, Ripley was blaming inventors who he declined to help with production technology as already mentioned in this thread. More importantly, on the whole, Bruce concludes Ripley was an impediment to innovation.

Even after Hoover's Gap Ripley advised Secretary of War Stanton "against buying any Spencers at anytime." (Bruce p. 263)

By June 1862 Ripley could no longer honestly cite a shortage of small arms as a reason for failure to adopt new weapons because he had an excess of over 300,000 in storage. (Bruce: pp. 251-252)

Upon his retirement The New York Times described Ripley as an Ordnance Chief "...who combatted all new ideas in the fabrication of firearms." (Bruce: p. 264)

3. The repeater's superiority was so obvious any responsible Ordnance Chief should have made every effort to help get the best models into volume production. Ripley did the opposite by resisting the very concept.

No doubt he could have complied a lengthy list of reasons for his failure to do what he should have done. Similarly, James Conant who was the President of Harvard University and the man in charge of nuclear weapons for more than two years prior to Leslie Groves could have provided a long list of excuses why it was "impossible" to get such weapons developed in time to end the Second World War.

There's no way to prove either viewpoint. As Henry Ford put it, "Those who think they can and those who think they cannot are both correct."
 
The book is available online at the Univ. of Ill.
http://archive.org/details/lincolntoolsofwa00bruc

Jing is a program that allows for capturing screen images. I am sure there are many others available.
http://download.cnet.com/Jing/3000-13633_4-10744274.html


Okay. I am on a Mac and can use the "Grab" utility. But I don't see how to post an attachement from the Tool Bar above. Do I use the "Upload a File" button below?

It is interesting that Bruce book is available online because I had assumed it was still under copyright.
 
Okay. I am on a Mac and can use the "Grab" utility. But I don't see how to post an attachement from the Tool Bar above. Do I use the "Upload a File" button below?

It is interesting that Bruce book is available online because I had assumed it was still under copyright.
I love Macs, wish I had one.

Yes, use the "Upload a File" button. You then click on the "full image" option after it has finished uploading. The photo will insert wherever your cursor happens to be within the message. If you pick the "thumbnail" option it will only post a small version of it, and if you fail to click on either option then it will show a really small picture of it that can be clicked on to see the full version.

Apologies to 44 Henry for further muddying up the thread! At least we aren't talking about Ripley anymore.
 
This engagement took place about seventeen miles southeast of Murfreesboro on June 25 and 26, 1863.“The picket skirmishing yesterday was quite lively, and was carried on with great spirit on our side, by the infantry of Reynolds’ and Rousseau’s divisions.The 33rd Ohio, Colonel Moore, had four men wounded.One rebel skirmisher had perched himself upon a tree some distance from our extreme front, and by his persistent shooting annoyed our boys considerably, although he did no damage.A member of the 17th Indiana crawled up closely as possible to the rebel line, and from a secure hiding-place commenced operations upon the rebel in the tree.Seventeen bullets were hurled at him in vain; but at length one lucky ball hit him fairly, and with a savage yell he tumbled headlong from his perch to the ground.” The Henry repeating rifle had a magazine capacity of sixteen rounds plus one in the chamber making seventeen.The unfortunate rebel sharpshooters tumbled from the tree being on the receiving end of a Henry repeating rifle.
 
. ..
The perfect example of the problems faced when theory confronts reality. In spite of limitless resources they only managed to produce 2 A-bombs due to a lack of materials.

I don't intend to be picky, but the Manhattan Project - and potential delays - really doesn't apply to this situation. Although Roosevelt had authorized U.S. government resources to assist with the project, there was a considerable difference in the resources available and government authority between 1939 and 1942.

Once the war started, it was almost a year later (Dec. 1942) that Enrico Fermi was able to create a test reaction in Chicago. In the meantime the massive infrastructure to develop the uranium was being built, including completion hydro-electric dams on the upper Tennessee to create the massive energy needed to make nuclear fuel and the building of the Oak Ridge reactor there (first going critical in 1943). Simultaneously, a plutonium reactor was built at Richland, Washington and powered by hydro-electric dams completed on the upper Columbia river, which went critical in 1944. The fact that the U.S. was able to build and power TWO nuclear facilities - just in case one didn't work - shows the immense resources available to the U.S. (German scientists, prisoners at the time of the Hiroshima bomb, were convinced the U.S. claims were propoganda, since their calculations were that it would take at least a decade to make enough fuel for one bomb). There was enough fuel available to build and conduct one test bomb during the Trinity blast in July 1945, and two bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nakasaki in August 1945. The U.S. was conducting a bit of a bluff, since it would take months before enough fuel was available for another bomb, but then production would accelerate quickly.

A better example from WWII might be the B-25 Superfortress. It had it's roots in 1938 with an Air Force request for Boeing to build a long-range, high-altitude bomber with a presurized forward cabin. It's first flight was in May 1942. But problems with the new technologies (especially the engines) meant there were extensive modifications and it wasn't until June 1944 that the first B-29's flew missions out of China.
 
William H. H. Benefiel Sergeant, Co. G, 17th Indiana writes in to the paper asking the following question, “I should like very much to hear from some of the boys.Where, let me ask, is Sergeant Burney and his twenty-five daring scouts, armed with the Henry rifle.” Once again reference is made to the scouts being armed with the Henry repeating rifle as well as being “daring” while in other accounts they are mentioned as “famous”.It would appear that the scouts for Wilder’s Brigade did indeed make a name for themselves using their Henry repeating rifles.
 
In some reports Wilder uses the reference “breech-loading repeating rifle” when he writes about the type of weapon his brigade was armed with.It is interesting that if he were just referring to the Spencer rifle that he would just call it a Spencer.So does his reference of “breech-loading repeating rifle” actually refer to both the Spencer repeating rifle as well as the Henry repeating rifle since his brigade was actually armed in part with both.

Here is an example of Wilder using this reference. This was written in a pamphlet by W. C. Dodge: “And, finally, the statement of Colonel Wilder, who has had more experience with breech-loaders than any other officer in the army, and who says: “I believe them to be the best arms for army use that I have ever seen.My Brigade of Mounted Infantry have repeatedly routed and driven largely superior forces of rebels. In some instances five or six times our number, and this result is mainly due to our being armed with the breech-loading repeating rifle.Since using this gun we have never been driven a single rod by any kind of force or number of the enemy.At Hoover’s Gap, in Tennessee, on June 24th, 1863, one of my regiments fairly defeated a rebel brigade of five regiments, they admitting a loss of over five hundred, whilst our loss was forty-seven.My experience is that no line of men, who come within fifty yards of another force armed with such rifles, can either get away alive, or reach them with a charge, as in either case they are certain to be destroyed by the terrible fire poured into their ranks by cool men thus armed. It is my belief that Wilder is making a reference to both the Spencer rifle since most of his men were armed with this rifle but he was also referring to the Henry repeating rifle since most if not all of his scouts were armed with the Henry rifle. For Wilder to make the statement “breech-loading repeating rifle” would indicate that both the Henry and Spencer rifles were in his Brigades’ ranks. Even Dodge uses the same reference to Wilder having more experience than any other officer dealing with “breech-loading repeating rifles”. Dodge also likely would have stated Spencer rifles if he was just referring to the Spencer rifle however he mentions breech-loaders.The two main types of “breech-loading repeating rifles” of the Civil War were the Spencer repeating rifle and the Henry repeating rifle.
 
I wish that the local relic hunters would find Henry cartridge cases so that we could visualize the scouts' locations during the Battle of Hoover's Gap. I've often wondered where they were deployed during the fight. The relic hunters just focus on the main battle line and of course have not found any of the scouts cartridges.
 
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