Why were Civil War casualties so high?

Why were Civil War casualties so high?

  • 1. Because Civil War generals employed outdated tactics?

    Votes: 27 36.0%
  • 2. Because it lasted four years?

    Votes: 14 18.7%
  • 3. Because death and sickness due to disease were common in that era, especially in cities?

    Votes: 55 73.3%
  • 4. Because the United States did not fully and properly engage its advantage in naval power?

    Votes: 3 4.0%
  • 5. Because Grant was a butcher?

    Votes: 3 4.0%
  • 6. Because Jefferson Davis did not want to admit that the Confederacy was beaten?

    Votes: 6 8.0%
  • 7. Because minie`ball wounds could not be treated with existing medical technology?

    Votes: 24 32.0%
  • 8. Because casualties of both combatants are counted as US casualties?

    Votes: 17 22.7%

  • Total voters
    75
In effect, the US could not decide on what type of war it was fighting -- destroy the CS army and take key points OR pacify a rebellion (ie occupy the enemy country). Campaigns in Florida, Texas, western Louisiana, Arkansas and the North Carolina Sounds did not effect the winning of the war, but were political and pacification projects (all of which failed). The US in the Pacific in WW2 is a great example of bypassing unimportant enemy units and positions in order to defeat the main enemy force.
Southerners that remained loyal, like the Tennessean Farragut and the Virginian Winfield Scott probably understood this better. Capture the main cities and close off the smugglers and limit the killing.
 
The blockade could also have been completed in 1863 by capturing the remaining entry ports -- Mobile and Wilmington were especially important and easy to take. Charleston was a tougher nut and would still have required the ships freed by taking Wilmington.
You have to give credit to General Lee. His ferocious attacks caused the US administration to pull Burnside from North Carolina when expanding that enclave would have cut the best railroad from the south to Richmond.
 
You have to give credit to General Lee. His ferocious attacks caused the US administration to pull Burnside from North Carolina when expanding that enclave would have cut the best railroad from the south to Richmond.
I think you have to give credit to Lincoln -- he knew politics and had determination, but knew little about how to win a war quickly.
 
On that front I think there's a valid argument to say that what the US should have done is to run what is basically modern US doctrine (in spirit).

This means the following things:

Shock and Awe
- Overwhelming military force. The Union is a richer country and it has more men, so pay for raising more men; aim to outnumber the Confederates 2:1 across the continent.
- Simultaneous pressure along three land axes combined with coastal landings.
- Defend your own vulnerable points, but emphasize pressure on the enemy.
- Decline to launch a campaign if it is not as stacked in your favour as possible.

The intent behind this is the same as the intent of modern Shock and Awe. You're not Shocking and Awe-ing the enemy you're fighting, you're doing it to the guys who heard about how roughly you handled the enemy you just beat.
Since victories give the enemy hope, deny them any sense that the fight is winnable to the greatest possible extent.

Hearts and Minds
- Respect civilian property, as you currently define it. (You can fight an abolitionist war, but it will make this bit harder - that tradeoff must be knowingly considered, and you can opt to take it.)
- Do not allow your soldiers to loot, plunder or pillage.
- Pay for any forcible requisitions, except in cases where the owner is an active enemy combatant and you can demonstrate that.
- Allow surrenders and treat the prisoners well as honourable combatants.

The intent behind this is to make it clear that compliance (returning to the fold, in other words) is not onerous. Treat the civilians like US civilians except where operational security denies the possibility (because that is what they are) and treat enemy combatants as enemy belligerents.


The idea here is to promote a strong discrepancy between resistance (hard, futile) and compliance (easy, painless).
 
Lincoln and Seward were trying to manage the politics. Stanton was trying to manage the money being spent and was looking for generals that could accelerate the pace of the war. I think the army ended up with too much power and too much money, and the US navy did not get enough of each.
 
Lincoln and Seward were trying to manage the politics. Stanton was trying to manage the money being spent and was looking for generals that could accelerate the pace of the war. I think the army ended up with too much power and too much money, and the US navy did not get enough of each.
The Navy got a lot of ships and guns, though; at some point you hit diminishing returns for what can be done with more money. The Casco class is perhaps an indication that money was being spent rashly.
 
Lincoln and Seward were trying to manage the politics. Stanton was trying to manage the money being spent and was looking for generals that could accelerate the pace of the war. I think the army ended up with too much power and too much money, and the US navy did not get enough of each.
If the US had mobilized an army of the size necessary to fight a vigorous war against the large-area enemy they faced (near peer) they could have won the war years earlier.

The naval issue could have been handled by declaring various ports closed and stationing ships off those ports to enforce that rule. Imports through small, out of the way ports could be ignored until forces were available to capture the small ports -- but only as part of a plan to defeat the enemy army (ie taking Jacksonville, Fl or Sabine Pass, Tx or Washington, NC were wastes of forces). Washington or New Bern, NC should be taken only if they are the launching pad for campaigns against Raleigh and the railroad north to Richmond.

Allocation of forces and strategic priorities setting are the tasks of the US president. Lincoln did not do his job well and thus the war we had.
 
Allocation of forces and strategic priorities setting are the tasks of the US president. Lincoln did not do his job well and thus the war we had.
I would instead say that the US president can either leave the General in Chief to run the war in that sense (of allocation of forces and strategic priorities) or he can do it himself (where "himself" includes the SecWar). He was unwilling to do the first and did not do well at the second.
 
I suddenly and belatedly see that the discussion is rather “why did the war last as long as it did?” than the more derivative “why were the casualties so high?”…In which case my emphasis on tactics has missed the point.
The length of the war was indeed a reflection, in agreement with @DaveBrt , @wausaubob, and @Saphroneth , of how long it took for Union leaders to focus a strategic vision to match resources and will. (Lincoln did not so much ‘find a general’ in 1864 as finally allow one to direct things - and even then not with a completely free hand.)
Of course, the war might have been even longer had Confederate leadership been able to find a consistent overall strategic plan anywhere near the level of their will to fight.

But cut them all some slack for facing what were unprecedented organizational challenges as well as they did…
 
I think it's just the case that a long war is a war with lots of casualties, both camp diseases and because a lot of fighting is going on.

There are possible tactics/doctrinal improvements though that might shorten the war - so long as just one side adopts them!
 
Of course, the war might have been even longer had Confederate leadership been able to find a consistent overall strategic plan anywhere near the level of their will to fight.
Over the years, we have had many statements that the South needed to adopt a strategy that matched its capabilities --- but no one has ever articulated such a plan. Was there one that could have been adopted?
 
Over the years, we have had many statements that the South needed to adopt a strategy that matched its capabilities --- but no one has ever articulated such a plan. Was there one that could have been adopted?
Here is my opinion on the requisite strategy.


Firstly - the Confederacy cannot win a long war, at best it can tire the Union out that way. If it is going to win it must fight a short war.
Secondly - this means it should front load everything. Sell cotton early rather than hoarding it, buy up weapons, etc. in 1861 in quantities as large as possible. Every Enfield they get hold of robs the Union of one in the critical 1861-2 months, and they can compete on price. Go for whatever methods you can to maximize enlistment, maximize logistical support etc.
Thirdly - the Confederacy cannot match the Union on quantity, not if the Union is trying hard as well, but it can exceed the Union on quality. Adopt a set of tactics which rely on maximizing the utility of the modern rifles they can import, which means sharpshooter training for some men per regiment giving all regiments organic long ranged support; aside from that, drill well.
And fourthly - commit to strategic concentration somewhere with all disposable units at some point early in the war, and fight a manoeuvre campaign (possibly including sections of defending strong works) in order to trap a Union field army in a "kessel" before destroying it with concentric attacks.

This is the methodology with which Prussia gradually parlayed a small, poor province into the German Empire.
 
Which battle are you thinking is an example of a Civil War battle which has higher percentage casualties than any Napoleonic Wars battle of comparable (or greater) size? Remember that that article only includes a few examples because there were far more big battles in the Napoleonic War, but I won't hold you to just that list for Civil War battles either.

If you don't give an alternative I'll assume it's Gettysburg.
First you have to consider battles that are similar in nature, i.e. size of comparable forces, weather conditions, duration, results of combat(is the vanquished routed or still an effective fighting force?)
A routed army’s loss cannot be separated from those received in fighting. Often then only the victorious percentage is a valid comparison, especially since most ACW fights were not followed up with mercilessly with cavalry.
 
Which battle are you thinking is an example of a Civil War battle which has higher percentage casualties than any Napoleonic Wars battle of comparable (or greater) size? Remember that that article only includes a few examples because there were far more big battles in the Napoleonic War, but I won't hold you to just that list for Civil War battles either.

If you don't give an alternative I'll assume it's Gettysburg.
Chickamauga is most like Wagram imo. Two days of heavy fighting with the victor unable to pursue.

CSA 27%
French 10%
Figures are from Henderson
 
The religious war idea is an interesting comparison. Europe's last great one, the Thirty Years' War, came during the transition from "pike" to "musket" tactics (completed around 1700 with the socket bayonet). It was more common then for the losses on the defeated side to average about twice that of the victor once units were broken. But 15 to 25% actual combat casualties per side was still pretty normal. Determination to fight (which I agree is in clear evidence in the ACW) does not necessarily correlate to how armies operate on the battlefield.

Speaking of percentages, does anyone know offhand if any horse-and-musket battle topped Zorndorf in 1758 (Frederick the Great inflicts almost 40% on the Russians and suffers 30-35% of his own army doing so)?
On Zorndorf I can find no equal in losses
 
So 2nd Manassas is

battleCSA Loss %USA Loss %
Second Manassas18%21%

So about 20% casualties on each side.

But look at these two:

battleFrench Loss %Enemy Loss %
Eylau19%35%
Borodino23%33%

Casualties here are higher than 2nd Manassas.

I asked for a battle in the Civil War which was outside the expectations for the Napoleonic Wars, not for a Civil War battle which happened to have higher casualties than a single Napoleonic Wars battle.
Gettysburg/Borodino
Both 23% for the victor
 
Which battle are you thinking is an example of a Civil War battle which has higher percentage casualties than any Napoleonic Wars battle of comparable (or greater) size? Remember that that article only includes a few examples because there were far more big battles in the Napoleonic War, but I won't hold you to just that list for Civil War battles either.

If you don't give an alternative I'll assume it's Gettysburg.
Ligny/Sharpsburg

French 16%
USA 23%
 
First you have to consider battles that are similar in nature, i.e. size of comparable forces, weather conditions, duration, results of combat(is the vanquished routed or still an effective fighting force?)
A routed army’s loss cannot be separated from those received in fighting. Often then only the victorious percentage is a valid comparison, especially since most ACW fights were not followed up with mercilessly with cavalry.
But we don't have to match comparable battles, because if the casualties are different then one possible reason would be battles that are not comparable.


If ACW battles tended to produce similar casualty figures to Napoleonic battles but there was no cavalry pursuit typically involved, this would mean perhaps that ACW battles were less decisive (which I'd agree with, by the by) and that ACW armies typically didn't include the capacity for pursuit as a matter of course, but it would not change the casualty figures which was the claim in the first place.

Similarly if ACW battles tended to see the victor taking almost as many casualties on a % basis as the loser, that would mean perhaps that ACW armies are less capable on the attack; it doesn't change the number of people who get killed or otherwise become casualties.


Chickamauga is most like Wagram imo. Two days of heavy fighting with the victor unable to pursue.

CSA 27%
French 10%
Figures are from Henderson

I didn't ask for you to line up specific Napoleonic and specific Civil War battles; otherwise I could point to the Waterloo campaign on one side of the ledger and the North Anna on the other.
I asked you for a Civil War battle and I'd point to a Napoleonic battle of comparable or greater size with a similar casualty count.

So at Chickamauga both sides suffer about 27% casualties.
Eylau sees both sides taking 20%-40% casualties (depending on estimates) which at the middle (30%) makes it an almost exact match. Eylau is also about the same size, or a little larger (75,000 per side instead of 60,000 per side).
The Waterloo campaign (which is a four-day campaign) of course sees Napoleon suffer about 50% casualties and the Allies about 25% or a little less.

It seems fundamentally self-evident that if ACW battles are beyond expectations for Napoleonic battles we should expect there to be ACW battles which are on a different level to Napoleonic ones. There should be at least one, if not several, which have no Napoleonic battle of similar size with a similar casualty rate.
 
So 2nd Manassas is

battleCSA Loss %USA Loss %
Second Manassas18%21%

So about 20% casualties on each side.

But look at these two:

battleFrench Loss %Enemy Loss %
Eylau19%35%
Borodino23%33%

Casualties here are higher than 2nd Manassas.

I asked for a battle in the Civil War which was outside the expectations for the Napoleonic Wars, not for a Civil War battle which happened to have higher casualties than a single Napoleonic Wars battle.
Aspern/Murfreesboro

Austrians 26%
USA 27%
 
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