Why so few artillery pieces in the Civil War?

He knew quite a lot, and whilst diplomatic, he doesn't disagree with me. As he notes, "all the artillery, except one battery for each division, was withdrawn from the corps and temporarily attached to the artillery reserve, and all arranged into four divisions. ... Altogether there were about 149 guns thus post. Eighteen batteries, about 100 guns, chiefly Napoleons, remained with the infantry divisions... " (page 100)

Talking of the artillery support for the main assault, "The seven batteries [NB some partial, 36 guns] that took part in the assaults boldly followed up the infantry, and while doing their utmost, shared in their fate. Some of them met with unprecedented loss in men and horses. The nature of the ground was such that the artillery could give but little support to the infantry. (109-110)
"The nature of the ground was such that the artillery could give but little support to the infantry" That's what he said about the terrain in the particular publication you were able to access. He must have inadvertently forgotten to add that the element you mention was dispositive, instead. And Tidball - like Hunt - was not regarded as "whilst diplomatic" in his views on the proper use of field artillery.

On and on we go, ever farther from the OP ....
 
"The nature of the ground was such that the artillery could give but little support to the infantry" That's what he said about the terrain in the particular publication you were able to access. He must have inadvertently forgotten to add that the element you mention was dispositive, instead. And Tidball - like Hunt - was not regarded as "whilst diplomatic" in his views on the proper use of field artillery.

On and on we go, ever farther from the OP ....
What about the ground made it unsuitable for artillery? That's a question many of us would ask.

In fact, a map study of the region of Marye's Heights shows many good artillery positions, which were used, but the attacking divisions simply don't have much artillery to put there.

Sunken-Road--December-13-1862-%28October-2019%29_0.jpg
 
You read Tidball - he actually answers the question. Or is he now unreliable? And there is at least one account by a battery commander who was positioned there concluding that the required elevation vis-a-vis Marye's Heights made his fire ineffective.

Enough of this detour from the OP. Let's close with Frank O'Reilly, who has forgotten far more about Fredericksburg than we will ever know. In his definitive study of the battle at p.502: "The only officers to distinguish themselves on the right were Burnside's artillery chief, Henry J. Hunt, and Second Corps division commander Winfield S. Hancock. Hunt handled his guns with expert zeal and showed innovation when establishing the bridgeheads on December 11."

On to more productive things.
 
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There was actually a higher combined troop total at Waterloo then Gettysburg, but Gettysburg had considerably higher total in artillery.
The artillery casualties at Waterloo (where all pieces were smoothbore) were largely a result of the high troop density on the battlefield, in fact the largest troop density in the whole of the Napoleonic Wars - over 24,000 men per mile.
The question why the Confederates stuck with 4 gun batteries is a good one and is difficult to answer. First point to make is the logistical problems caused by mixed types in a single battery and although individual pieces would have their own limber and caisson with ammunition for that particular piece, resupplying the battery after firing was the major problem. Up until Antietam the Confederates still made use of 6 pounder smoothbores even though they were obsolete as there was little else. Many of these cannon were left behind in the advance into Maryland in 1862.
For example look at S.D. Lee's battalion at Antietam consisted of the following batteries on the artillery line:
Bedford (Virginia) Artillery, Jordan’s Battery: Capt. Tyler Calhoun Jordan
1 x 3” Rifle, 1 x 10pdr Parrott, 1 x 12pdr Howitzer, 1 x 6pdr SB
Richmond (Virginia) Artillery, Parker’s Battery: Capt. William Watts Parker
2 x 3” Rifles, 2 x 12pdr Howitzers
Brooks' (S. C.) Artillery, Elliott’s Battery: Lt. William Elliot
2 x 10pdr Parrott, 2 x 12pdr Howitzers
Ashland (Virginia) Artillery, Woolfolk’s Battery: Capt. Pichegru Woolfolk Jr. (4 x mixed guns, vet)
2 x 10pdr Parrotts, 1 x 12pdr Howitzer (iron), 1 x 6pdr SB
The 6pdr was temporarily attached from Fleet’s (Middlesex) Virginia battery
Apart from the logistical problems, ranged against this line of artillery were Hunt's 'guns of position' stationed on the far side of Antietam Creek with interestingly at least four 4-gun batteries of 20pdr Parrott Rifles - Wever's, Kleiser's, Langner's and Taft's batteries. So in terms of counter battery fire it was largely one way traffic.
The Confederates were largely dependent on captured pieces for their higher calibre artillery at this stage of the war, for example 2 x 20pdr Parrott Rifles captured at Harper’s Ferry were issued to Elliott’s battery replacing the Howitzers after Antietam.
But perhaps the largest problem the Confederacy faced was the lack of potassium nitrate, the key ingredient of gunpowder. At the time of the civil war the sole supply was from British India and with the blockade this was out of reach for the duration of the war. In fact it was not until Spring 1862 that the Confederate Government out of pure necessity instituted a large scale nitrate program.
First were low grade deposits found in Kentucky and Tennessee but these places fell to Federal forces in early 1862 yet even with these deposits, the Confederacy was only producing under 500 pounds per day. Therefore a large scale search for suitable deposits was undertaken and were found in Texas. This was supplemented by further imports from Mexico and so production was able to be increased to around 2,000 pounds per day. Without this systematic search and discovery by Major I.M. St. John of the Nitre Corps the Confederacy would not have been able to continue as long as it did.
So largely the 4 gun battery was out of necessity with the continual lack of gunpowder, properly formed ammunition and suitably trained manpower all being limiting factors on the total amount of artillery available. As artillery was seen as supportive to the infantry as artillery batteries were attached to individual brigades, it was seen as better to have 6 brigades being supported by 4-gun batteries rather than only 4 brigades supported by 6-gun batteries. It was easier to combine these 4-gun batteries into an artillery firing line rather than having to split 6-gun batteries if that situation arose.
 
You read Tidball - he actually answers the question. Or is he now unreliable? And there is at least one account by a battery commander who was positioned there concluding that the required elevation vis-a-vis Marye's Heights made his fire ineffective.

Enough of this detour from the OP. Let's close with Frank O'Reilly, who has forgotten far more about Fredericksburg than we will ever know. In his definitive study of the battle at p.502: "The only officers to distinguish themselves on the right were Burnside's artillery chief, Henry J. Hunt, and Second Corps division commander Winfield S. Hancock. Hunt handled his guns with expert zeal and showed innovation when establishing the bridgeheads on December 11."

On to more productive things.
11th December =/= 13th December. His grand batteries did knock the town down as asked on the 11th, but that is not the 13th.

Which battery?
 
Here is some additional information regarding horses. 1st Ohio Battery A was at Chickamauga. The following items are from " A grassroots history of the civil war Volume III: Captain Cotter's Battery."

Pvt. James Walker of 1st Ohio Battery A stated: "any amount of horses starved to death at the picket rope from want of food"

Capt. Goodspeed of Battery A wrote: "Horses Wounded 15, and in consequence of not unharnessing for six days and the hardship they have undergone, I will loose 25 more horses"

With a battery normally having about 120 horses, this represents 1/3 of his horses lost in this battle alone.
 
11th December =/= 13th December. His grand batteries did knock the town down as asked on the 11th, but that is not the 13th.

Which battery?
He actually came up with the bridgehead idea, sold Burnside on it, and then assisted its development with his artillery. I have to check the battery id - I believe it's in the O'Reilly book.

I don't know Frank myself but I know some who do. As a highly qualified professional I'm sure he welcomes the input of anybody who has information that would cause him to reconsider his conclusions.

https://www.nps.gov/frsp/getinvolved/volunteer.htm
 
Have you been to Fredericksburg?
Good point - it's by no means easy, but even with the massive development in the area, one can get some idea by walking it. The descriptions of the 19th century terrain by those who were there should be accepted. There's a reason Lee/Longstreet viewed the position the way they did. There's a reason his subordinates vehemently urged Burnside to halt the assaults. And Tidball - an experienced professional gunner - was there. He was well qualified to determine what was acceptable terrain for effective artillery fire. If the terrain was difficult for "one battery per division", it was bad for "three per division" - not to mention adding more fat targets for the ANV. Last, and as repeatedly noted, a major problem was that the attack on the right was supposed to be a diversion for the main effort on the Union left. When that foundered, Burnside - not Sumner, not his corps commanders, and not Hunt - changed the plan midstream. All of his subordinates were playing "catch up".
 
In the 19th century armies here and in Europe generally used a calculation of X field guns per thousand infantry - something on the order of 2-4 per thousand, depending on the character of the terrain, etc. It was regarded for the most part (with exceptions) as a support arm, going back at least to the 18th century (for example, in the AWI the British usually followed applied the concept of the "battalion gun", parsing the guns out to infantry units.) I'm sure there's more to it ....
During the two days of battle south of Nashville in Dec. 1864 as well as the all day Battle of Champion Hill in May 1863 there were many CS cannon held in reserve that never participated in the battle. They just didn't have room for them. I have counted and listed all CS guns at these two battles.
 
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