Why do historians focus on certain battles?

Blockaderunner

First Sergeant
Joined
Oct 25, 2006
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North Durham, England
By historians, I mean all of us who have an interest in the Civil War. Certain battles such as Gettysburg, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and Vicksburg are disected in minute detail. Other major engagements such as Murfreesboro, Perryville, Cedar Creek and even Chickamauga are often no more than footnotes. I appreciate the importance of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, but all of the battles I have listed were significant events. Just what makes certain battles more interesting to you? Is it the personalities involved? The scale of the battle?
 
I think that your last few word of the post has it right. The Scale, the Personalities and the location of the battle are what makes it intresting to most people. Unfortunatly, there are hundreds of small actions that are just as intresting at the large battles. How many people know, other than many students of the war, about a short 5 hour battle where 900 Union men held off Forrest and his force of 4500 in a small fort, suffered through 850 rounds of artillery during that time, and surrendered only after running out of ammo. Or how many people know that Longstreet could not crack the town of Knoxville and had just a lousy time in East Tennessee. For that matter, look at Morgan's raid through Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio.
 
Dear Blockaderunner,

Have to agree with Richard. As well as your last paragraph -- the 'personalities' or 'characters' of interest usually draw connections to battles and their importance following an individual that holds someone's interests.

Little is researched on the first Confederate officer killed in the Civil War, John Marr, at Fairfax Court House in 1861.

There are many battles where there was no shortage of heros on either side and no shortage of horror, terror, woundings and death.

On the ground battles have always been a major focus, I suppose it is because it is 'accessable.' Those Civil War battles on the waterways are scarcely mentioned or studied, other than the introduction of the 'submarine' and the iron clads. The Naval 'firsts' and or 'introductions' of new types of battle.

Just as an example, there were 800,000 horses plus used on the Union side. Few are known by names, few riders are connected to their mounts yet--somebody had to ride, drive and or care for these mounts. Other than officers and an occassional focus--the rest of the men of the artillery, cavalry, wagon trains, Quartermasters, Sergeant Saddler and Saddlers, Blacksmiths and farriers,have all faded into history.

It is no different from the wars past and wars after the Civil War. Might have been a veteran, even a medal winner but--doesn't mean one's name will be subjected to historical interest. Generals on the other hand, are subjected to focus due to the orders they give and or receive.

Just some thoughts.

Sincerely,
M. E. Wolf
 
I believe you've collectively touched on many of the reasons. My favorite farrier is 'remembered' by me cause he was my gg grandpa and had my last name. I live near half a dozen battlefields, so logically I know a bit more about them and some other sites. Gettysburg gets attention from most everyone because of it's drama and the fact most all of us were connected to a soldier there (three in my extended family). As Richard said not all fields or battles are well known. My interest in Sugar Creek in southern Lawrence/Giles counties in Tennessee has to do with the terrain and two of my gg grandpas, mixed with Nathan Bedford Forrest and a good story. There is much more to this war than politics and statistics. Humans and horses coupled with the good land and some irony were involved. Heck, this is almost as interesting as the American Revolution. (As Ole would say, incoming!)
 
By historians, I mean all of us who have an interest in the Civil War. Certain battles such as Gettysburg, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and Vicksburg are disected in minute detail. Other major engagements such as Murfreesboro, Perryville, Cedar Creek and even Chickamauga are often no more than footnotes. I appreciate the importance of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, but all of the battles I have listed were significant events. Just what makes certain battles more interesting to you? Is it the personalities involved? The scale of the battle?


I think several books have been devoted to the battles at Chicagmauga and Stones River (Murfreesboro), and a few on the other's that you mention.

My particular enthralment with Stones River are several.
One is that New Year's Eve battle of the bands. Another is the odd symetry of that battle in which each army attacked the other's right, so there was an odd battle in which to taken in extremes, might have been a complete wheeling movement of both armies. Finally the fact that the Union army was so bent back on itself, and managed to extricate itself from that precarious position. It was a wonderful battle, one of my favorites.


-
 
Other major engagements such as Murfreesboro, Perryville, Cedar Creek and even Chickamauga are often no more than footnotes.
I have about 4 books on Stone's River, 2 on Perryville, 1 on Cedar Creek and about 5 on Chickamauga. I have Wilson's Creek and Pea Ridge and at least one on every battle involving thousands.

The books are out there. But now, as then, the east and Lee remain of primary interest. I don't know why.

ole
 
I like to read about battles where Texans participated, particularly the 2nd TX. They were drawn from and mustered in from the counties where I work and live. Their big hurrahs were Shiloh and Corinth (Battery Robinett where the new interpretive center is)

Mike T.
 
I think in some sense, it becomes an eternal cycle. The general public is drawn to a particular batle because it is dramatic, or because it was decisive, or because of the colorful personalities involved. The historians write books about same. The battles thus become more famous and thus more historians write about that battle because it is more likely they will sell books. With so many books on the topic, people learn more about that battle and want to know a little more. Or they have casual interest and pick up a book about a battle they have heard of over some battle they have never heard of.

The same is true of World War II. Books on Midway, D-Day and the Battle of the Bulge fill hole shelves while books on the Phillipines, Gudalcanal or the Italian Campaign are not nearly so prevalent.

If an author wants to get published, he is much more likely to get published with a new book on Gettysburg than he is with a book on Stones River. And the cycle goes on.
 
Your general Civil War history reader

has a limited interest, over the decades, in the battles of significance, and not all aspects of the war.

A Civil War book on logistics, on intelligence, on foreign policy decisions gets little or no interest. Yet one can see the results of the war in what happened in these sub-fields.

We seem to have unlimited knowledge and debate over why General Longstreet slowly approached Cemetery Ridge on July 2, but never a good reason why. Of course, who studies where the U.S. Signal Corps was on July 2nd, and what they were observing. For all practical Civil War reading purposes, the Army of the Potomac Signal Corps never existed.
 
I believe it's because of the political and symbolic importance of the east. The west was more important, militarily. but for both sides, their souls were but a hundred miles apart on the east cost. as a result, Richmond, and Washington took on a significance exponetially more valuable than its actual worth to the war effort. Those two cities and the armies committed to defending/taking them, thus got most of the press attention, as well as for geographic reasons.

Gettysburg is studied ad infinitum more than others because it is the last possible turning point, politically. Had Lee won at Gettysburg without destroying himself in the process, a march on Washington DC would have commenced, thus nullifying the greater military defeat of Vicksburg.

Just as the fall of Paris and Mexico City ended the war for all intensive purposes in 1815, and 47-48 , so would Washington's fall have damaged the Northern War effort, maybe beyond repair....

Someone raised the revolution, there were far fewer men under arms, thus more likely that someone would stand out, even if just in local lore.

In contrast the Civil War was so large in scope and scale that standards underwent an enormous shift, the extraordinary of 1859, had become commonplace. For instance, look at the discussions by the CSA whether or not to mine the James River. In 1861, it was ungentlemenly and dishonorable, by 1864, not only commonplace, but necessary. when honor is faced off against self-preservation, many times, honor will yield.
 
I write about what interests me. That's why I've had a wide variety of subjects, ranging from The Battle of Monroe's Crossroads (March 10, 1865) to and including Gettysburg.

Eric
 
Perhaps an Inherent Weakness

Battles, particularly, a Perryville, Kentucky should be remembered more often. But Perryville is more than a vicious draw of two brave armies. It also is on close inspection, a synopsis of why the war went badly for the Confederacy.
Perryville was the last gasp of the Confederacy to greatly control Kentucky. It had later raids, as did Missouri and western Virginia, but Perryville showed a valiant army and an inherent weakness. That weakness was strategic supply problems. A tale of an army out of touch with a supply system and an army that ran out of ammunition and forage, quite quickly.

The Union army could bring more troops to the point of attack, eventually, and keep them supplied.

Perhaps by avoiding the Battle of Perryville, we are allowed for a time to imagine some sort of Confederate victory; a victory the Perryville's would not allow.
The Confederacy could fight once at a Perryville, but never hold it for long.
It was combating a Union army that had supply depots across the northern edge of Kentucky, where the Ohio River layed. The Confederates had no railroads to move supplies inland in Kentucky, and the Union had less distance to travel, from those depots, to combat the lesser sized army fielded by the Confederates.

The Confederacy could never hold Kentucky, despite the bravery of its armies. It had too few supplies, too few effective ways to get those supplies to the small army that received them. It had both the components of victory and the reasons for defeat.

Perhaps it is too uncomfortable to consider that Kentucky was never winable. That the Confederacy could never really imagine, holding all the states represented in their battle flag. Thirteen stars - too far beyond their reach. Even at the beginning.
 
Dear List Members,

There are many battles that deserve more focus and study then the most notable ones.

Brandy Station was where the Cavalry really pit against one another and for many hours with charge after charge. This is when the US Cavalry 'grew up' per se. First Bethal is another battle, as is Five Forks,
Seven Pines, etc.

Just like there are more generals that are under the radar and though important, are not as 'recognized.' The same with Brevet Generals on the Union side.

To me, personally --there is much furtile ground to explore, study, appreciate and discuss. The 'behind the scenes' per se is there for all of us to look into.

I'm looking forward to anybody who has knowledge about Brig. General States Rights Gist of the CSA, who was killed at the battle of Franklin, Nov. 30, 1864. One of the many unique names if not below the radar Generals; to include Brig. General Robert Selden Garrnet, cousin of General Richard "Dick" B. Garnett who was killed at Gettysburg. Brig. General Robert S. Garnett is reported to be the first CSA General killed in the Civil War; on July 13, 1861 at Corrick's Ford.

Just some thoughts.

M. E. Wolf
 
Battles, particularly, a Perryville, Kentucky should be remembered more often. But Perryville is more than a vicious draw of two brave armies. It also is on close inspection, a synopsis of why the war went badly for the Confederacy.
Perryville was the last gasp of the Confederacy to greatly control Kentucky. It had later raids, as did Missouri and western Virginia, but Perryville showed a valiant army and an inherent weakness. That weakness was strategic supply problems. A tale of an army out of touch with a supply system and an army that ran out of ammunition and forage, quite quickly.

The Union army could bring more troops to the point of attack, eventually, and keep them supplied.

Perhaps by avoiding the Battle of Perryville, we are allowed for a time to imagine some sort of Confederate victory; a victory the Perryville's would not allow.
The Confederacy could fight once at a Perryville, but never hold it for long.
It was combating a Union army that had supply depots across the northern edge of Kentucky, where the Ohio River layed. The Confederates had no railroads to move supplies inland in Kentucky, and the Union had less distance to travel, from those depots, to combat the lesser sized army fielded by the Confederates.

The Confederacy could never hold Kentucky, despite the bravery of its armies. It had too few supplies, too few effective ways to get those supplies to the small army that received them. It had both the components of victory and the reasons for defeat.

Perhaps it is too uncomfortable to consider that Kentucky was never winable. That the Confederacy could never really imagine, holding all the states represented in their battle flag. Thirteen stars - too far beyond their reach. Even at the beginning.


Whitworth, this is well stated and I believe accurate opinions, for what that's worth, (and with me you never know the value...too many scholars lurking around here.) Seems to me the battle at Fishing Hook Creek - Mill Springs, Kentucky early in the war had similar characteristics, ie, a group of Tennessee farmboys trying to take on the US Army. Mismatch, much like Vanderbilt playing a real football team. The establishment of Camp Nelson as a federal supply depot, hospital etc. brought the end to Confederate activity in that area for the most part.
 
All the little ones were important in setting up the larger ones. Seems that the books concentrate on a watershed moment. There have been lately, for example, books on Lee's retreat from Gettysburg. There's hope for the lead-in activities and follow-ups. The scholarship is still maturing.

ole
 
There is a book that was written a few years ago about the Forrests' raid through Middle Tennessee in 1864. It is less than two hundred pages but filled with some very interesting facts. The book is called "The Railroad War".

The book is well written and very well researched. It is hard to find as it is out of print. Another thing about this book is that it was written by a southener about what happened in his home area. The author actually shows no bias to any side in this question. It is just "the facts" and the results.
 
i also think "ease" of information is also a reason for certain battles to rise to the top of the media's glass. Larger battles are easier to research and are usually well documented whereas smaller battles take time and effort to research and require alot of "digging" through old archives and records. Unfortunately people who are willing to do that or even enjoy doing that are few and far between (although there is no shortage of them here on this web site..kudos to you all). I would think that is one of the factors of why certain battles get more lime light than others. BTW I'm kinda sweet on Antietam, ggg grampa Andrew Bermingham wounded there fighting with 69th N.Y. inf. GO IRISH!
 
Similarity in Logistics

There are similarities between battles at Gettysburg, Westport(Kansas City, Mo.) and Perryville, Kentucky. Lee at Gettysburg, Price at Westport, and Bragg at Perryville all had the same severe problem, a limited amount of ammunition and supplies. None had enough supplies to sustain their army for long, as an offensive army.

Bragg in his 1862 raid into Kentucky had some 10 day supplies. At Perryville, Bragg was nearly 300 miles from his military depot in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The Union army had a great depot, some eighty miles away at Louisville, Kentucky, served by steamboats on the Ohio River. Bragg couldn't sustain a relatively small army in Kentucky; the Union had the supplies to sustain an army of 60,000. Time wasn't on Bragg's watch, as he made a quick retreat back to Tennessee.
 
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