Why didn't the Rebs put a higher priority on defending New Orleans?

Kentucky Derby Cavalier.

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Oct 24, 2019
Iv'e always wondered this. As the South's biggest sea port, you'd think that they would've commited more men and resources to that area of the war. Did they really think Forts Jackson and St.Phillip were enough? I know they had that floating boat chain to block ships (which actually wasnt a bad idea,) why not put multiple rows of boat chains? I knows there was alot of infighting between privateers, local milita, and the CS navy, but even with all that I'm of the opinion that Farragut and Co. shouldn't have slipped by so easy.

The Rebs missed alot naval opputunities in the ACW. Is hindsight just 2020, or did the Rebs completely blow it?

battle of fort.jpg
 
Sir, I've always felt that one of the reasons that the South didn't put more effort into the defense of New Orleans was that they didn't believe that the North was capable of launching a successful operation at that point in time. With the more than a few officers that came south from the USN and USA, they might have brought with them an assessment that with the current state of readiness of the USN and USA, an operation of this magnitude, so far away from an easily supplied Northern controlled base, was beyond the capacity of the North.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
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I've always felt that one of the reasons that the South didn't put more effort into the defense of New Orleans was that they didn't believe that the North was capable of launching a successful operation at that point in time. With the more than a few officers that came south from the USN and USA, they might have brought with them an assessment that with the current state of readiness of the USN and USA, an operation of this magnitude, so far away from an easily supplied Northern controlled base, was beyond the capacity of the North.


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
Very well articulated my friend, I think what you said is highly probable. I imagine early in the war there some type of learning curve. If your thesis is correct, the Confederates gravely under-estimated the North's ability to lauch large scale naval operations on a whim
 
Yes, NO was the South largest seaport, but like Norfolk and Richmond, it was very easily blockaded. Its value was probably more in its industry and manpower than its seaport.

As far a defending the city, the South was being attacked on all sides and had no more to give to NO that would have made a difference. Infantry could not have held the city against the large naval force, field artillery was likewise immaterial, and the heavy guns were too few to have done the job if the forts and ships were taken out. NO, like Norfolk, was going to be taken because of its vulnerable position and the relative ease of taking it -- the only question was when the North would choose to devote the resources to take it.
 
Yes, NO was the South largest seaport, but like Norfolk and Richmond, it was very easily blockaded. Its value was probably more in its industry and manpower than its seaport.

As far a defending the city, the South was being attacked on all sides and had no more to give to NO that would have made a difference. Infantry could not have held the city against the large naval force, field artillery was likewise immaterial, and the heavy guns were too few to have done the job if the forts and ships were taken out. NO, like Norfolk, was going to be taken because of its vulnerable position and the relative ease of taking it -- the only question was when the North would choose to devote the resources to take it.
Question though, I'm in firm agreeance that Norfolk and NO were easy to blockade, but technically speaking, weren't all ports easy to blockade? the only two ports I can think of that really gave the USN problems were Wilmighton NC, and maybe Mobile AL.

In regards to the defense of the city, do you beleive that there was anything else that could've been done? I thought the boat chain idea was an excellent.

I took this paragraph from Wiki.
The forts around the city[22] were supplemented by two defensive chains stretched across the river to prevent passage. (The chains were sometimes referred to as either 'rafts' or 'booms' in the reports.) One chain was placed above the city, and had no effect on the battle.[23] The other was placed just below the forts, where enemy vessels trying to break it would come under their fire. This barrier was much more important than its counterpart. Originally put in place soon after Lovell took command of the Department, it broke under the weight of debris washed down the river in the spring floods. It was repaired, but Lovell did not consider the replacement as good as the original.[24]
 
The Union had been conducting amphibious operations along the North and South Carolina coasts since August 1861; the naval and army forces at Port Royal in November were not much inferior to Farragut's and Butler's at New Orleans.

I think the basic problem was the overall lack of resources that plagued the Confederacy. Defenses mainly had to be constructed from materials, labor, and industries available in each area; we might recall for example how hard it was to get material from Tredegar for the ironclads. There were some inefficiencies, but overall I think they did the best they could.

They also faced conflicting demands from other fronts. After the loss of Fort Donelson, troops and artillery were sent north, joining the force that tried to stop the Union advance at Shiloh. Some of the River Defense Fleet were sent upriver to Memphis; we might consider whether a few more boats would have helped against Farragut's squadron.
 
I read where Mallory was partially to blame for the fall of New Orleans. He supposedly refused jurisdiction over the River Defense Fleet and caused the command of the fleet to be in some sort "limbo".
That's interesting, I'll look into that. I'd totally believe it, there was a percievable lack of organization on the part of the confederacy, I guranteed it reach there navy.
 
The Union had been conducting amphibious operations along the North and South Carolina coasts since August 1861; the naval and army forces at Port Royal in November were not much inferior to Farragut's and Butler's at New Orleans.

I think the basic problem was the overall lack of resources that plagued the Confederacy. Defenses mainly had to be constructed from materials, labor, and industries available in each area; we might recall for example how hard it was to get material from Tredegar for the ironclads. There were some inefficiencies, but overall I think they did the best they could.

They also faced conflicting demands from other fronts. After the loss of Fort Donelson, troops and artillery were sent north, joining the force that tried to stop the Union advance at Shiloh. Some of the River Defense Fleet were sent upriver to Memphis; we might consider whether a few more boats would have helped against Farragut's squadron.
Sir, and Charleston, SC...

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
DAH! lol, how could I forget Charleston?
 
The Union had been conducting amphibious operations along the North and South Carolina coasts since August 1861; the naval and army forces at Port Royal in November were not much inferior to Farragut's and Butler's at New Orleans.

I think the basic problem was the overall lack of resources that plagued the Confederacy. Defenses mainly had to be constructed from materials, labor, and industries available in each area; we might recall for example how hard it was to get material from Tredegar for the ironclads. There were some inefficiencies, but overall I think they did the best they could.

They also faced conflicting demands from other fronts. After the loss of Fort Donelson, troops and artillery were sent north, joining the force that tried to stop the Union advance at Shiloh. Some of the River Defense Fleet were sent upriver to Memphis; we might consider whether a few more boats would have helped against Farragut's squadron.
The Rebs were definetely stretched thin, I thank one of the greatest illustrations of this was the lack of seasoned timber for CSS Louisana. The green timber they used made the **** thing leak horribly. moreover the engine they put in it couldn't do anything against the current of the Mississippi. They ended up just dragging the thing down near the forts and used it as a floating battery.

The Rebs blew it lol, I mean seriously they scuttled thier own Iron clad to avoid giving it up to the North.
NO fort.jpg


CSS_Louisiana_en_route.jpg
 
The US established a coaling station on Ship Island by September 1861. The plan available for public consumption was that the US would try to capture the Mississippi with a down river land force. By February of 1862 it was clear what was really intended was a down river combined arms force. That force captured the Tennessee forts and embarrassed A.S. Johnston, and he pulled all the available land forces he could gather in order to counter attack Grant's army.
In the meantime, Farragut got his ships over the bar at the passes, which the Confederates did not think possible. Porter got his mortar scows in place and threw shells into the forts. The garrisons of the forts could not shoot back.
The flotilla slipped the barrier chain. The Confederate home flotilla tried to fight back. But since New Orleans was cut off from down river traffic, and blockaded from communication with the outside world, it was hard to build a fighting force. Also Louisiana was full of slaves and some ex-Whigs, who were willing to keep the Yankees informed of preparedness.
The forts, the flotilla, the barrier chain, and the fire rafts, were more than adequate. The US captured the city of New Orleans anyway, because the naval officers were 100% professionals and the seamen maintained near perfect discipline.
 
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The only thing that prevented the US from capturing the entire Mississippi in the late spring of 1862 was distance and the lack of understanding of what was possible, especially on the part of Henry Halleck, who was more of a lawyer than a soldier. In 1863, the distance was reduced because the Yankees were based in Memphis, and Halleck was in Washington, D.C. With Halleck out of the way, Grant and Porter plugged away at it until Vicksburg fell.
 
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US combined arms tactics improved rapidly. By January 1865, the Confederates put up a skilled and determined defense of a much stronger fort in NC, and it wasn't enough.
 
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Iv'e always wondered this. As the South's biggest sea port, you'd think that they would've commited more men and resources to that area of the war. Did they really think Forts Jackson and St.Phillip were enough? I know they had that floating boat chain to block ships (which actually wasnt a bad idea,) why not put multiple rows of boat chains? I knows there was alot of infighting between privateers, local milita, and the CS navy, but even with all that I'm of the opinion that Farragut and Co. shouldn't have slipped by so easy.

The Rebs missed alot naval opputunities in the ACW. Is hindsight just 2020, or did the Rebs completely blow it?

View attachment 331187
The land area south of New Orleans to the Gulf of Mexico was just swamp and marsh. I guess the Confederates assumed that would be defense enough. They guessed wrong.
 
The US navy was completely professional. Not every operation was successful, but by June of 1862 they had stations in Virginia, NC, SC and FL as well as control of the port facilities of NO. Since the Confederates could not blockade New Orleans, for the Yankees it was a port, not just a railroad station with warehouses.
 
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