Why Didn't Johnston Attempt to Lift the Seige of Vicksburg???

The 'Battle of Jackson' was fought several miles toward Clinton from Jackson. It was fought between the troops of Johnston's command and the federal forces that had been at Clinton the night before. The fighting happened in the morning. Johnston did not leave Jackson until the afternoon.

which is precisely he got to leave in the afternoon...because Gregg's brigade gave him the time to evacuate....
The Battle of Jackson was a delaying action..and nothing more.

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which is precisely he got to leave in the afternoon...because Gregg's brigade gave him the time to evacuate....
The Battle of Jackson was a delaying action..and nothing more.

To me, one of the curious aspects of the battle of Jackson is the way the Confederates deployed.

US forces were advancing toward Jackson on two roads in equal strength on each road -- McPherson with two divisions coming in on the road from Clinton and Sherman with two divisions coming in on the road from Raymond.

Yet the Confederates sent 3 brigades miles out toward Clinton while leaving just one regiment and a sharpshooter battalion with one battery to face Sherman. Why? Why put >90% of your strength part way toward Clinton?
 
To me, one of the curious aspects of the battle of Jackson is the way the Confederates deployed.

US forces were advancing toward Jackson on two roads in equal strength on each road -- McPherson with two divisions coming in on the road from Clinton and Sherman with two divisions coming in on the road from Raymond.

Yet the Confederates sent 3 brigades miles out toward Clinton while leaving just one regiment and a sharpshooter battalion with one battery to face Sherman. Why? Why put >90% of your strength part way toward Clinton?
There is little doubt that Johnston screwed up majorly there.
 
I think too that perception at the time weighs much more heavily for those men than we can know. I think that even a limited success against Grant would have paid dividends much greater than the effort/risk made, in the same way Grierson and Streights Raids did. A move that would have cut Grants supply or a limited battle field success would have left the Federal army in a bad position in middle MS. Perhaps a solid defense of Big Black with a bare minimum force at Vicksburg and a sizeable drive across Grants supply lines south, pre-Champion Hill. I don't think it would have destroyed the army, Grant could have driven, all in straight at Big Black and Vicksburg and maybe he takes the city early. But if he drives north to reach Corinth or TN border, it is a major setback for the Union and Grant personally.

I don't claim to know what the scenarios could be. I do think an energized/charasmatic leader would have made some his own luck and a better situation possible.

I think of Field Marshal Walther Model when he took command of the overrun and decimated 9th Army on the Eastern Front. When he got off the plane, he met his new staff who explained the dire situation of the army. When a staff officer asked him where are the reinforcements, Model replied "I am the reinforcements!". He immediately jumped to work and stabilized the situation. I know the example is a different war, different situation, different time, but the leadership trait is timeless.

Just some thoughts.
 
To me, one of the curious aspects of the battle of Jackson is the way the Confederates deployed.

US forces were advancing toward Jackson on two roads in equal strength on each road -- McPherson with two divisions coming in on the road from Clinton and Sherman with two divisions coming in on the road from Raymond.

Yet the Confederates sent 3 brigades miles out toward Clinton while leaving just one regiment and a sharpshooter battalion with one battery to face Sherman. Why? Why put >90% of your strength part way toward Clinton?

From looking at a few maps..including Grabau...it appears the smaller force occupied the earthworks while the larger force went beyond the works to make contact in the field. (correction...3rd MTD KY, a GA BTRY and a GA BN blocked the Raymond RD several hundred yards in front of the works..MS State troops occupied part of the works..) Apparently Johnston put Gregg in charge of the troops while he eveacuated everything of military value from Jackson..

And it appears that Gregg conducted an almost textbook delaying action...
 
From looking at a few maps..including Grabau...it appears the smaller force occupied the earthworks while the larger force went beyond the works to make contact in the field. (correction...3rd MTD KY, a GA BTRY and a GA BN blocked the Raymond RD several hundred yards in front of the works..MS State troops occupied part of the works..) Apparently Johnston put Gregg in charge of the troops while he eveacuated everything of military value from Jackson..

It is my view that the reason the bulk of Johnston's men was sent out the Clinton road several miles (about 1/3 of the way from Jackson to Clinton) is because of the communication with Pemberton from the night before in which he told Pemberton that the troops from Jackson could cooperate if he could come up on the rear of the US force at Clinton.
 
It is my view that the reason the bulk of Johnston's men was sent out the Clinton road several miles (about 1/3 of the way from Jackson to Clinton) is because of the communication with Pemberton from the night before in which he told Pemberton that the troops from Jackson could cooperate if he could come up on the rear of the US force at Clinton.

I believe Pemberton moved toward Dillon before he received the message. He was not sure of Union troop disposition because of a shortage of cavalry, but moved to a position to the flank/rear of Grant. He learned that the Baker Creek bridge over which he wished to cross was washed out. He was perplexed by the message as he was now aware that the Feds were in Clinton and rendezvous/combined attack did not make sense from that vantage point. ..if I remember the sequence of messages correctly...

It took messages 12 hours one way at this point, even when read by the enemy. Either way, that would have been a near impossible way to coordinate an attack.
 
It is my view that the reason the bulk of Johnston's men was sent out the Clinton road several miles (about 1/3 of the way from Jackson to Clinton) is because of the communication with Pemberton from the night before in which he told Pemberton that the troops from Jackson could cooperate if he could come up on the rear of the US force at Clinton.

that is possible...what is also possible would have been for him (Johnston) to reverse direction once he abandoned Jackson..and become the force falling on the rear of the Union army...once they reversed course to face Pemberton.
 
I think too that perception at the time weighs much more heavily for those men than we can know. I think that even a limited success against Grant would have paid dividends much greater than the effort/risk made, in the same way Grierson and Streights Raids did. A move that would have cut Grants supply or a limited battle field success would have left the Federal army in a bad position in middle MS. Perhaps a solid defense of Big Black with a bare minimum force at Vicksburg and a sizeable drive across Grants supply lines south, pre-Champion Hill. I don't think it would have destroyed the army, Grant could have driven, all in straight at Big Black and Vicksburg and maybe he takes the city early. But if he drives north to reach Corinth or TN border, it is a major setback for the Union and Grant personally.

I don't claim to know what the scenarios could be. I do think an energized/charasmatic leader would have made some his own luck and a better situation possible.

To begin with, Grant has no supply line to cut or drive against; he has cut loose from such things to gain freedom of movement and does not re-establish a line of supply again until he reaches the Mississippi River at Vicksburg. Pemberton had much the same idea, that Grant must have a supply line out there and that he could move SE against it, that Grant would have to react. Pemberton was wrong, and his plan was wrong, because Grant had no supply line out there to worry about.

When you have an enemy cut loose like that, running wild in your rear, the very first thing you need to do is to administer a sharp whack to him somewhere. You need to get him to slow down, to move more cautiously, to concentrate against you. Then you need to narrow the frame -- like a bigger boxer trys to cut off part of the ring against a fast opponent, trying to pen him in where he can get at him.

If the Confederates could do that to Grant in central MS, they can beat him. An army living off the land that way needs to keep moving and spread out or they will, very literally, "eat out" the countryside. So if the Rebels can slow Grant down and then close in on him, Grant will be in a lot of trouble.

The problem, of course, is that the opposite happened. Grant kept rolling on, smacking aside one Confederate force after another. He kept the Rebels reacting to his movements, back on their heels, always bringing the fight to them. Pretty soon Pemberton is penned up in Vicksburg, useless for offensive actions; Grant has a supply line again; and Union reinforcements are arriving faster than Confederate ones.

I think of Field Marshal Walther Model when he took command of the overrun and decimated 9th Army on the Eastern Front. When he got off the plane, he met his new staff who explained the dire situation of the army. When a staff officer asked him where are the reinforcements, Model replied "I am the reinforcements!". He immediately jumped to work and stabilized the situation. I know the example is a different war, different situation, different time, but the leadership trait is timeless.

Just some thoughts.

It is true enough that neither Pemberton nor Joe Johnston was a Walther Model. Johnston probably had the knowledge and the skill, but not the aggressive personality. Pemberton ... well, Grant had served with Pemberton during the Mexican War, and Grant didn't have the faintest doubt he could handle Pemberton in an open-field battle.

The Confederates had enough troops to fight Grant -- they were just too scattered about and disorganized to do it well. The chaos Grierson's raid caused was part of this -- but that in turn was caused by the transfer of most of Pemberton's cavalry (Earl van Dorn) to Bragg's command in TN in February and the refusal to send any part of it back despite Pemberton's pleadings.

I'd agree that replacing Pemberton with a talented and aggressive commander would improve things for the Confederacy. Joe Johnston was good enough (and too short on troops) to do much with the situation and a commander who didn't obey orders in Pemberton. Once Grant gets to Jackson, smacks Johnston back to the East, and turns back, squarely between him and Pemberton, the Confederates are in bad shape.

Tim
 
To begin with, Grant has no supply line to cut or drive against; he has cut loose from such things to gain freedom of movement and does not re-establish a line of supply again until he reaches the Mississippi River at Vicksburg. Pemberton had much the same idea, that Grant must have a supply line out there and that he could move SE against it, that Grant would have to react. Pemberton was wrong, and his plan was wrong, because Grant had no supply line out there to worry about.

When you have an enemy cut loose like that, running wild in your rear, the very first thing you need to do is to administer a sharp whack to him somewhere. You need to get him to slow down, to move more cautiously, to concentrate against you. Then you need to narrow the frame -- like a bigger boxer trys to cut off part of the ring against a fast opponent, trying to pen him in where he can get at him.

If the Confederates could do that to Grant in central MS, they can beat him. An army living off the land that way needs to keep moving and spread out or they will, very literally, "eat out" the countryside. So if the Rebels can slow Grant down and then close in on him, Grant will be in a lot of trouble.

The problem, of course, is that the opposite happened. Grant kept rolling on, smacking aside one Confederate force after another. He kept the Rebels reacting to his movements, back on their heels, always bringing the fight to them. Pretty soon Pemberton is penned up in Vicksburg, useless for offensive actions; Grant has a supply line again; and Union reinforcements are arriving faster than Confederate ones.



It is true enough that neither Pemberton nor Joe Johnston was a Walther Model. Johnston probably had the knowledge and the skill, but not the aggressive personality. Pemberton ... well, Grant had served with Pemberton during the Mexican War, and Grant didn't have the faintest doubt he could handle Pemberton in an open-field battle.

The Confederates had enough troops to fight Grant -- they were just too scattered about and disorganized to do it well. The chaos Grierson's raid caused was part of this -- but that in turn was caused by the transfer of most of Pemberton's cavalry (Earl van Dorn) to Bragg's command in TN in February and the refusal to send any part of it back despite Pemberton's pleadings.

I'd agree that replacing Pemberton with a talented and aggressive commander would improve things for the Confederacy. Joe Johnston was good enough (and too short on troops) to do much with the situation and a commander who didn't obey orders in Pemberton. Once Grant gets to Jackson, smacks Johnston back to the East, and turns back, squarely between him and Pemberton, the Confederates are in bad shape.

Tim

Tim, I agree with you in the main. I have not mentioned Pemberton much as the thread was about Johnston. But, certainly in the very least, he was timid and indecisive.

As to the supply situation, I think there is too much faith stored in the ability to forage to meet the needs of a modern army in middle MS in 1863. Certainly, foraging could supplement the needs:

"By the afternoon of May 12 two of Grant's three corps, supplied by daily foraging and caravans from Grand Gulf, had crossed north of Fourteenmile Creek." From page 64 "Champion Hill" by Timothy Smith.

But I believe that the essential needs of the army still had to be transported to it. Had an aggressive effort been made to block/disrupt that vital supply line, then Grant would have been very hard pressed. Or, as you point out, had Grant been fixed in place (ie, held up at Jackson even for a short period - let's say 24 hours as that would have given Johnston many more men) and forced to expand or disperse strength to forage, especially if he was as dependant on foraging as you submit, then he is in trouble. If this is the case then, you support the position that action was an imperative by Johnston to pin Grant or force him to battle and use those supplies or disrupt a daily essential routine of foraging. Grant would not have had the leisure to forage had the threat of imminent action to his army, or even parts thereof, been projected by Johnston.

Let's not forget about sick, wounded, ammunition/powder, etc? McClernand carried his sick and wounded with him to Jackson, and the added burden as well. Had a major effort or engagement been made/offered prior to Jackson or at Jackson, then the use of powder would have been greater as would the burden of increased numbers of sick/wounded.

Attacking the supply line, though was an option that could have been pursued - encouraged and supported by Johnston, the Department commander AND the commander on the scene.

I continue to believe that Johnston did not do due diligence to his duty and position. He surrendered Jackson without a fight (delaying action at best), the capital of MS and an important position in it's own right. He fled north, away from reinforcements and from Pemberton. His messages to Pemberton were generally badly written and based on a communication route he knew was poor. His message to Pemberton, relating the loss of Jackson, and a proposal to unite forces at Clinton, was written 24 hours earlier and received on the morning of May 16, after the opening shots at Champion Hill had begun! In addition, the message was written as Johnston was moving 10 more miles north and east away from Clinton/Pemberton!

I just think Johnston could have done better and possibly altered the course of events. Further, and more speculative on my part, in light of his feud with Davis, his belief that Vicksburg should not/could not be held, and his knowledge that Pemberton was committed to defending Vicksburg (demanded by Davis), he washed his hands of it and wrote it off. I also think that the men in the Army of Mississippi deserved better leadership all around, from Johnston, Pemberton, Davis, et al.

I love the debate and conversation, especially being a former Infantry Officer, and I am open-minded. I will continue my own reading and consider the information/opinions offered here. If only a Cleburne, Bowen or Wirt Adams were in a position of higher authority...

Respectfully

Mark
 
But, even if Johnston had beaten the Feds at Jackson, what was he going to do? Grant had him and Pemberton outnumbered combined. Pemberton was trapped (thanks, IMO, to Davis' interference). Grant could have sent any number of troops to hold Johnston off. To me this was Grant only strategic campaign of the war, and he played it perfectly.
 
But, even if Johnston had beaten the Feds at Jackson, what was he going to do? Grant had him and Pemberton outnumbered combined. Pemberton was trapped (thanks, IMO, to Davis' interference). Grant could have sent any number of troops to hold Johnston off. To me this was Grant only strategic campaign of the war, and he played it perfectly.


How many troops do you believe Grant had? Pemberton? Johnston?

Tim
 
Grant, at his height, had about 70,000. Johnstons was about 31,000 and Pemberton, after the two battles before he went into Vicksburg, had about 25,000 (I have seen as few as 18,000 and as many as 30,000) . Accordingto battles and leaders, Grant had from 43,000 at the start and ended with about 70,000. Johnston had, on June 4th, 24,000. Pemberton had at he start of the campaign over 40,000, and surrenderd 29,491 )he states no more than 28,000 effectives)
 
Tim, I agree with you in the main. I have not mentioned Pemberton much as the thread was about Johnston. But, certainly in the very least, he was timid and indecisive.

As to the supply situation, I think there is too much faith stored in the ability to forage to meet the needs of a modern army in middle MS in 1863. Certainly, foraging could supplement the needs:

"By the afternoon of May 12 two of Grant's three corps, supplied by daily foraging and caravans from Grand Gulf, had crossed north of Fourteenmile Creek." From page 64 "Champion Hill" by Timothy Smith.

But I believe that the essential needs of the army still had to be transported to it. Had an aggressive effort been made to block/disrupt that vital supply line, then Grant would have been very hard pressed. Or, as you point out, had Grant been fixed in place (ie, held up at Jackson even for a short period - let's say 24 hours as that would have given Johnston many more men) and forced to expand or disperse strength to forage, especially if he was as dependant on foraging as you submit, then he is in trouble. If this is the case then, you support the position that action was an imperative by Johnston to pin Grant or force him to battle and use those supplies or disrupt a daily essential routine of foraging. Grant would not have had the leisure to forage had the threat of imminent action to his army, or even parts thereof, been projected by Johnston.

Let's not forget about sick, wounded, ammunition/powder, etc? McClernand carried his sick and wounded with him to Jackson, and the added burden as well. Had a major effort or engagement been made/offered prior to Jackson or at Jackson, then the use of powder would have been greater as would the burden of increased numbers of sick/wounded.

Attacking the supply line, though was an option that could have been pursued - encouraged and supported by Johnston, the Department commander AND the commander on the scene.

I suppose it comes down to what you mean by a supply line.

Of course Grant took ammunition with him when he left Grand Gulf. He took all the hard rations he could pack along as well, and every troop column that followed after him seems to have had a tail of wagons carrying ammo and hard rations. Grant was an efficient quartermaster and always had been; he probably have told you down to the last cracker how much you would load into an Army wagon.

But once the last of those columns left, that was pretty much it. Grant wasn't sending long supply columns after his army without escort. Long columns of empty wagons were not heading back to Grand Gulf to reload and return to Grant. The LOC and supply was truly abandoned at that point. Any Pemberton attempt to move SE to strike it would have been a blow into the empty air, because there was nothing there to hit -- which was why Grant was unconcerned by such a move.

Grant also knew that if Johnston/Pemberton struck to the south of his columns, all he would have to do is turn on Vicksburg. They would have to come after him, and as soon as he could touch the river again north of Vicksburg he would instantly be back in supply courtesy of the Union Navy.

The sick and wounded are normal parts of calculations such as Grant would be making here. So would the expenditure of ammo -- and Grant made ammo in the wagons a big priority. He figured on extending the food he carried by foraging on the countryside -- and he did. Just as the opposite side of the success of Grierson's Raid is shown by Forrest's action known ever since as "The Pursuit of Streight", happening at the same time.

This is all routine for that day and age. The Armies of the French Revolution made it work, and Napoleon made it his normal method of warfare. Taylor and Scott certainly understood how to do it down in Mexico, and Grant had served under both of them. Robert E. Lee showed in June 1863 that he knew how to do this very, very efficiently when he entered Pennsylvania.

Johnston/Pemberton needed to do that to Grant, force him to slow down and concentrate, and they need to get their forces into supporting positions. Once they can do that, Grant is in trouble. Until they can do that, they are in trouble, and Grant has the whip hand.

Tim
 
I suppose it comes down to what you mean by a supply line.

Of course Grant took ammunition with him when he left Grand Gulf. He took all the hard rations he could pack along as well, and every troop column that followed after him seems to have had a tail of wagons carrying ammo and hard rations. Grant was an efficient quartermaster and always had been; he probably have told you down to the last cracker how much you would load into an Army wagon.

But once the last of those columns left, that was pretty much it. Grant wasn't sending long supply columns after his army without escort. Long columns of empty wagons were not heading back to Grand Gulf to reload and return to Grant. The LOC and supply was truly abandoned at that point. Any Pemberton attempt to move SE to strike it would have been a blow into the empty air, because there was nothing there to hit -- which was why Grant was unconcerned by such a move.

Grant also knew that if Johnston/Pemberton struck to the south of his columns, all he would have to do is turn on Vicksburg. They would have to come after him, and as soon as he could touch the river again north of Vicksburg he would instantly be back in supply courtesy of the Union Navy.

The sick and wounded are normal parts of calculations such as Grant would be making here. So would the expenditure of ammo -- and Grant made ammo in the wagons a big priority. He figured on extending the food he carried by foraging on the countryside -- and he did. Just as the opposite side of the success of Grierson's Raid is shown by Forrest's action known ever since as "The Pursuit of Streight", happening at the same time.

This is all routine for that day and age. The Armies of the French Revolution made it work, and Napoleon made it his normal method of warfare. Taylor and Scott certainly understood how to do it down in Mexico, and Grant had served under both of them. Robert E. Lee showed in June 1863 that he knew how to do this very, very efficiently when he entered Pennsylvania.

Johnston/Pemberton needed to do that to Grant, force him to slow down and concentrate, and they need to get their forces into supporting positions. Once they can do that, Grant is in trouble. Until they can do that, they are in trouble, and Grant has the whip hand.

Tim

OK. Attacking the supply line was one option I posed. Pemberton himself thought that it was an option as well. He surely, despite his faults, would have appreciated the difficulty of living off the land and the psychology on the troops of being completely dependant on food in a foreign land. I'm aware Grant took ammunition with him, but forcing him to fight means he needed more than he carried and therefore reliance on the roads to Port Gibson. The wounded were transported to Port Gibson, but the conditions were less than ideal even for the time, hence McClernand taking his with him.

The assault on Grants supply line aside, what do you suppose was the possibility of Johnston defending Jackson or at least putting up a stiff fight? Moving northwest to pose a threat to Grants right and closer to Pemberton while culling together reinforcements? More reinforcements from Bragg sooner? Actually entering the area of operations sooner and taking control? Appreciating the importance of not just Vicksburg, but the entire Mississippi from Vicksburg to Port Hudson? More cavalry in Mississippi?

I know there's a lot there, and you need not reply to each, but these are some of the options that I think are reasonable, and within his abilities to make/grab some initiative. They were all risky considering the situation and the extended Department issues, but a motivated, aggressive leader would have taken more risk for a worthy objective.

As for Lee in VA, he was in VA, a much smaller area in which to operate, albeit in a war torn one. He still had that vital rail line to Richmond through friendly territory. Grant drove down the Miss River, with considerable areas still controlled by the enemy on both sides and long distances seperating him from Memphis or even Helena. Napoleon DID take great risks, but more so than Grant, he had a mathematicians mind and knew numbers down to cannon along the English Channel. He calculated distances, hours to march them and how to plan the movement of converging columns to meet when he said meet. He also established advance supply depots along the way.
 
But once the last of those columns left, that was pretty much it. Grant wasn't sending long supply columns after his army without escort. Long columns of empty wagons were not heading back to Grand Gulf to reload and return to Grant. The LOC and supply was truly abandoned at that point. Any Pemberton attempt to move SE to strike it would have been a blow into the empty air, because there was nothing there to hit -- which was why Grant was unconcerned by such a move.

The notion that Grant was operating without a supply line is a myth...he never lost connection to supplies...at all...

Staff Ride Handbook for the Vicksburg Campaign Dec. 1862-July 1863
Dr. Christopher R. Gabel
Combat Studies Institute
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Page 49:
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Page 50:
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The notion that Grant was operating without a supply line is a myth...he never lost connection to supplies...at all...

Staff Ride Handbook for the Vicksburg Campaign Dec. 1862-July 1863
Dr. Christopher R. Gabel
Combat Studies Institute
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Page 49:
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Page 50:
View attachment 13601
The evidence seems to contradict. Grant (and others?) talk about cutting loose, but this historian says no. Do we have the evidence of the latter? I understood that the only thing Grant carried was ammunition and he foraged (stole) for food and forage. Perhaps we can unpack the "steady stream of wagons" and divine how things really were.
 
The evidence seems to contradict. Grant (and others?) talk about cutting loose, but this historian says no. Do we have the evidence of the latter? I understood that the only thing Grant carried was ammunition and he foraged (stole) for food and forage. Perhaps we can unpack the "steady stream of wagons" and divine how things really were.

OR 24 Pt. 1 Page 35:
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OR 24 Pt. 1 Page 83:


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OR 24 Pt. 1 Page 84:

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I always thought that Grant moved north with two Corps (McPherson and McClernand) to hook up with the navy north of Vicksburg to ensure supplies. The reason that the navy had to come south of Vicksburg was to get Grant's troops across the Mississippi from the end of his supply route on the western bank. I think I read that in Shelby Foote's trilogy.
 
I always thought that Grant moved north with two Corps (McPherson and McClernand) to hook up with the navy north of Vicksburg to ensure supplies. The reason that the navy had to come south of Vicksburg was to get Grant's troops across the Mississippi from the end of his supply route on the western bank. I think I read that in Shelby Foote's trilogy.

I'd be more inclined to trust Parker Hills over Shelby Foote on Vicksburg matters...
http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/vicksburg/vicksburg-history-articles/vicksburgsupplyhillpg.html
 
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