To begin with, Grant has no supply line to cut or drive against; he has cut loose from such things to gain freedom of movement and does not re-establish a line of supply again until he reaches the Mississippi River at Vicksburg. Pemberton had much the same idea, that Grant must have a supply line out there and that he could move SE against it, that Grant would have to react. Pemberton was wrong, and his plan was wrong, because Grant had no supply line out there to worry about.
When you have an enemy cut loose like that, running wild in your rear, the very first thing you need to do is to administer a sharp whack to him somewhere. You need to get him to slow down, to move more cautiously, to concentrate against you. Then you need to narrow the frame -- like a bigger boxer trys to cut off part of the ring against a fast opponent, trying to pen him in where he can get at him.
If the Confederates could do that to Grant in central MS, they can beat him. An army living off the land that way needs to keep moving and spread out or they will, very literally, "eat out" the countryside. So if the Rebels can slow Grant down and then close in on him, Grant will be in a lot of trouble.
The problem, of course, is that the opposite happened. Grant kept rolling on, smacking aside one Confederate force after another. He kept the Rebels reacting to his movements, back on their heels, always bringing the fight to them. Pretty soon Pemberton is penned up in Vicksburg, useless for offensive actions; Grant has a supply line again; and Union reinforcements are arriving faster than Confederate ones.
It is true enough that neither Pemberton nor Joe Johnston was a Walther Model. Johnston probably had the knowledge and the skill, but not the aggressive personality. Pemberton ... well, Grant had served with Pemberton during the Mexican War, and Grant didn't have the faintest doubt he could handle Pemberton in an open-field battle.
The Confederates had enough troops to fight Grant -- they were just too scattered about and disorganized to do it well. The chaos Grierson's raid caused was part of this -- but that in turn was caused by the transfer of most of Pemberton's cavalry (Earl van Dorn) to Bragg's command in TN in February and the refusal to send any part of it back despite Pemberton's pleadings.
I'd agree that replacing Pemberton with a talented and aggressive commander would improve things for the Confederacy. Joe Johnston was good enough (and too short on troops) to do much with the situation and a commander who didn't obey orders in Pemberton. Once Grant gets to Jackson, smacks Johnston back to the East, and turns back, squarely between him and Pemberton, the Confederates are in bad shape.
Tim
Tim, I agree with you in the main. I have not mentioned Pemberton much as the thread was about Johnston. But, certainly in the very least, he was timid and indecisive.
As to the supply situation, I think there is too much faith stored in the ability to forage to meet the needs of a modern army in middle MS in 1863. Certainly, foraging could supplement the needs:
"
By the afternoon of May 12 two of Grant's three corps, supplied by daily foraging and caravans from Grand Gulf, had crossed north of Fourteenmile Creek." From page 64 "Champion Hill" by Timothy Smith.
But I believe that the essential needs of the army still had to be transported to it. Had an aggressive effort been made to block/disrupt that vital supply line, then Grant would have been very hard pressed. Or, as you point out, had Grant been fixed in place (ie, held up at Jackson even for a short period - let's say 24 hours as that would have given Johnston many more men) and forced to expand or disperse strength to forage, especially if he was as dependant on foraging as you submit, then he is in trouble. If this is the case then, you support the position that action was an imperative by Johnston to pin Grant or force him to battle and use those supplies or disrupt a daily essential routine of foraging. Grant would not have had the leisure to forage had the threat of imminent action to his army, or even parts thereof, been projected by Johnston.
Let's not forget about sick, wounded, ammunition/powder, etc? McClernand carried his sick and wounded with him to Jackson, and the added burden as well. Had a major effort or engagement been made/offered prior to Jackson or at Jackson, then the use of powder would have been greater as would the burden of increased numbers of sick/wounded.
Attacking the supply line, though was an option that could have been pursued - encouraged and supported by Johnston, the Department commander AND the commander on the scene.
I continue to believe that Johnston did not do due diligence to his duty and position. He surrendered Jackson without a fight (delaying action at best), the capital of MS and an important position in it's own right. He fled north, away from reinforcements and from Pemberton. His messages to Pemberton were generally badly written and based on a communication route he knew was poor. His message to Pemberton, relating the loss of Jackson, and a proposal to unite forces at Clinton, was written 24 hours earlier and received on the morning of May 16, after the opening shots at Champion Hill had begun! In addition, the message was written as Johnston was moving 10 more miles north and east away from Clinton/Pemberton!
I just think Johnston could have done better and possibly altered the course of events. Further, and more speculative on my part, in light of his feud with Davis, his belief that Vicksburg should not/could not be held, and his knowledge that Pemberton was committed to defending Vicksburg (demanded by Davis), he washed his hands of it and wrote it off. I also think that the men in the Army of Mississippi deserved better leadership all around, from Johnston, Pemberton, Davis, et al.
I love the debate and conversation, especially being a former Infantry Officer, and I am open-minded. I will continue my own reading and consider the information/opinions offered here. If only a Cleburne, Bowen or Wirt Adams were in a position of higher authority...
Respectfully
Mark