Why didn't Jefferson Davis try to stop Sherman's march to the sea?

To me it's less insane but desperate. A child whistling in the dark. To me, Davis is a true tragic figure. Trapped as leader (that he did not want to be) in a conflict (that he did not want to break out) and losing all except his immediate family. He paid a lot for what he thought was best. And so did the entire South.



Right. And I wonder if at least he himself still believed in what he was saying.

The loss of Atlanta was a huge blow to Confederate morale and Davis was pumping sunshine to avoid secession by Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia. If he did believe what he was saying, which I doubt, he was certainly delusional.
 
I think the question should not be why didn't Davis try to stop Sherman's March to the Sea but why was Davis's plan to stop Sherman's March to the Sea so ineffective? I do not believe that Davis was unaware of the possibility of Sherman's move, but that Davis did not believe Sherman could move so fast and was caught off balance. The Confederacy's military resources were strained to the point of breaking. The Confederacy might have been able to put together the forces needed to stop Sherman, but it would have taken time and time was not in the Confederate's favor.
 
I think the question should not be why didn't Davis try to stop Sherman's March to the Sea but why was Davis's plan to stop Sherman's March to the Sea so ineffective? I do not believe that Davis was unaware of the possibility of Sherman's move, but that Davis did not believe Sherman could move so fast and was caught off balance. The Confederacy's military resources were strained to the point of breaking. The Confederacy might have been able to put together the forces needed to stop Sherman, but it would have taken time and time was not in the Confederate's favor.

Wasn't it ineffective because Hood did not follow the plan and instead moved into Alabama to avoid a fight? Sherman may have moved east quickly but, under Davis's plan, he was not supposed to go in that direction at all. By the way, where would that force come from that you envision stopping Sherman?
 
I would think that once Sherman gave up his supply lines that both Hood and Forrest could have supplied some troops. To these I would add the men in home guard type units and a few men called up in a general mobilization of all citizens. The problem being the home gourds and beat militia would need to replace Confederate troops guarding static positions and those troops be sent to the forming army. Sadly even the Confederate troops guarding static positions were not of the highest quality. The Confederacy was starting to run out of available man power. I do not believe the army the Confederates formed would be able to conduct offensive operations, but may have been good enough for defending prepared positions.
 
Could it not be because after the war the south could not blame it's generals - so they blamed Davis? Hence the lack of deification?
 
Noah Andre Trudeau's excellent book "Southern Storm" is a must read about Sherman's March.

The Confederates were determined to guard Augusta and Macon, especially when Sherman fiented at both. The largest battle of the campaign, besides Fort McAllister, at Griswoldville happened basically because CSA forces blundered into Sherman by accident. They often didn't know quite where Sherman was, much less where he was going.

Sherman's engineers deserve a great deal of credit for ensuring the army wasn't held up by rivers.

After Hood rolled the dice in TN, the biggest mistake of the Confederates was probably failing to use the Savannah garrison to contest Sherman at some of the river crossings in the low country. As Sherman got close to Savannah the resources got poor so he really couldn't afford delays.
 
Noah Andre Trudeau's excellent book "Southern Storm" is a must read about Sherman's March.

The Confederates were determined to guard Augusta and Macon, especially when Sherman fiented at both. The largest battle of the campaign, besides Fort McAllister, at Griswoldville happened basically because CSA forces blundered into Sherman by accident. They often didn't know quite where Sherman was, much less where he was going.

Sherman's engineers deserve a great deal of credit for ensuring the army wasn't held up by rivers.

After Hood rolled the dice in TN, the biggest mistake of the Confederates was probably failing to use the Savannah garrison to contest Sherman at some of the river crossings in the low country. As Sherman got close to Savannah the resources got poor so he really couldn't afford delays.
What few engagments with the Home Guard, Union men were saddened by the old men and boys with no training that were killed.
 
I'll admit up front that my understanding of the background to this question is shaky. But as I understand it, after the fall of Atlanta the Confederacy made no attempt to defeat Sherman on the field of battle. Sherman thought he would fight Hood's army, but Hood wouldn't cooperate. Then Sherman conducted his march to the sea. Wheeler's troops engaged in some hit-and-run attacks that never seriously threatened to stop Sherman or even slow him down. When Sherman arrived at Savannah, the badly outnumbered Confederate forces holding the city packed up and left without firing a shot.

Jefferson Davis had compared Sherman's actions to Napoleon's unsuccessful invasion of Russia. So one possible answer to my question is that Davis saw no need to fight Sherman's army because he expected Sherman's army to spontaneously self-destruct. Another possibility is that Davis had concluded that Sherman's army could not be defeated, and the Napoleon comparison was political spin to allow the Confederate military to throw in the towel without publicly admitting defeat. Your thoughts?

Stop it with what? The Army of Tennessee was bumbling around its namesake state. There wasn't anything left.
 
I think this passage from Journal History of the 73rd Ohio Volunteer Infantry by Col. Samuel H. Hurst is instructive. The regiment was in Georgia on the March to the Sea, November, 1864.

journalhistoryof00hursam_0165.jpg

So much for Napoleon's Russia.
 
it's not much of an explanation but we all know by that point the war was winding down especially after Franklin. They had biggest concerns with Gen. Grant in the Army of the Potomac starting to push hard with no let up .
 
They didn't have an army large enough to slow Sherman down significantly, apart from Hood's Army of Tennessee, which was attempting to stop Sherman indirectly by striking at his rear areas.

Incidentally, it's not true that the Savannah area was given up without a fight. There was a quite intense battle to take Fort McAllister, for instance.

McPherson's book on Davis as Commander in Chief says that Davis figured Hood would have success in Tennessee and that Sherman would be forced to abandon the March to the Sea and backtrack to Tenn. to fight Hood.
 
Yupper. Sherman obviously had other plans.

(One of my great-great-grandfathers-- not the one who was at Chickamauga-- was in one of the regiments guarding railroads in southeastern Tennessee at about that time, but his regiment ultimately saw no action.)
 
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