Pickett Longstreet Golden Thread Why Did Lt. Gen James Longstreet Feel So Strongly The Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble Assault Would Fail?

Lee took what information he had and made an educated guess. He had made attacks on both ends of the Union line, and after both were reinforced was repulsed. It was logical and reasonable to assume that the center was weaker. He knew that making an attack based upon that assumption was a risk, but Lee was willing to take it; he believed that if the attack was successful, the entire AotP might be put at risk. It is important to remember that the attack had a real chance of succeeding. The what ifs that might have turned in its favor are numerous and have been remarked on for years. But Longstreet's warnings were all correct also. While Pickett's division was relatively sheltered from artillery fire for most of the advance, the other two divisions were hammered the entire way. The Union position also lent itself to quick reinforcements to any point along the line. Both were right.


Lee ASSUMED!!
Lee had seen the failure of previous attacks. Lee knew he was facing the entire AOP and knew it was reinforcing from the beginning.. Lee knew from the previous two days of the AOP s artillery disposition. Lee knew of the AOPs terrain advantage. Lee knew of his own shortcomings in artillery ammunition and reinforcements. Lee could pick up a telescope and see the strength of the Union position. Lee didn't need Stuart to tell him any of this. What was it that Lee didn't know? A Field General should and must act on what he knows, not what on he assumes.

Lee was a brilliant military leader, but made a mistake on day three at Gettysburg.
 
If I remember Lee had planned for the assault for another location on the union line and ask Longstreet's opinion. Longstreet suggested moving the assault to another location on the union line which became Pickett's charge. In truth Longstreet pick the location of the assault so should he not bear some of the blame. As far as I know no one has ever compared Lee's original location of the assault to where Longstreet chooses to assault. As far as I know no one knows why Longstreet suggests his location over Lee's first choice. I think Lee was going to assault the cemetery ridge. Would not have assaulted the ridge have been better than assaulting the hill?

If Longstreet picks the location of the charge, how could he have been so against the charge? If he would have been against the assault he would have either tries to talk Lee out of it but he picks the location of the assault and Lee's agree?


Under what logic would Longstreet say attack there and then tell everyone it wouldn't work?

Of course no source.
 
It is well recorded that James Longstreet was not in favor of R.E Lee's decision to attack the Union Center with approx. Thirteen Thousand men on day three at Gettysburg. His actions during the 3rd day have been used ever since by his critics. Were his actions insubordination? The answer to that question is, No. Was it his belief that a movement around the Unions left flank was a better option? Again the answer is, No. The reason James Longstreet stated "Never Was I So Depressed" is because he believed he was sending his men to a slaughter pen. Why would he feel this way? Lee order the assault and believed it would be successful if properly executed. Was Lee wrong? Again the answer would be, No. How can both generals be correct? Lee using sound tactical reasoning had assumed his punishing assaults the previous two days on the enemy's flanks would have caused them to reinforce those positons making the center the likely weak point in the line. This was sound military thinking done by a West Point trained officer. Lee completely understood the negatives of his plan and accepted them. He was audacious in nature. Longstreet on the other hand also a West Point trained officer realized the futility of the movement. While he would agree Lee's proposed attack was sound military reasoning, Longstreet was cautious in nature. The attack order by the Commanding General defied the training both men received at West Point. The army on the offensive should numerically outnumber the army on the defensive by a margin of four or five to one. The confederates simply did not have anywhere near this numeric superiority. Lee was depending on several factors to work in his favor. He depended on Ewell's early morning attack on Cemetery Ridge to fool Meade into moving sufficient troops to his flanks, Lee depended on the past splendid performance of his army vs the past poor performance of the AOP. Lee expected the critical mistake to be made at the critical time that had always lead to his past successes. The audacious general had forgotten the prediction he had made just a few days earlier when he learned George Gordon Meade had taken command of the AOP. "Meade will make no mistake in my front and will take advantage of any that I make" Longstreet being a conservative thinker understood the odds and felt no mistake would be made and was not willing to gamble the lives of his men on such a longshot. Had the Confederacy processed the numbers necessary Longstreet would have undoubtable been much more than agreeable. Was he wrong? Both men completely understood the situation fully.
IMO there are other faults of Longstreet on day three that hold much more validity to criticize than his lack of enthusiasm for an assault that was destined to fail before it began. As it turns out Longstreet was correct and the assault failed.
Not being a student of Gettysburg nor of the players involved, I can't offer much commentary, except to say I like your analysis. Everyone here is commenting long after the fact, with the benefit of hindsight. We are all armchair generals in that sense. I like what you have written.
 
If I remember Lee had planned for the assault for another location on the union line and ask Longstreet's opinion. Longstreet suggested moving the assault to another location on the union line which became Pickett's charge. In truth Longstreet pick the location of the assault so should he not bear some of the blame. As far as I know no one has ever compared Lee's original location of the assault to where Longstreet chooses to assault. As far as I know no one knows why Longstreet suggests his location over Lee's first choice. I think Lee was going to assault the cemetery ridge. Would not have assaulted the ridge have been better than assaulting the hill?

If Longstreet picks the location of the charge, how could he have been so against the charge? If he would have been against the assault he would have either tries to talk Lee out of it but he picks the location of the assault and Lee's agree?
Now that's a real smoking gun. In all my reading I have never heard this before. Please supply your source, history will be rewritten.
 
Lee ASSUMED!!
Lee had seen the failure of previous attacks. Lee knew he was facing the entire AOP and knew it was reinforcing from the beginning.. Lee knew from the previous two days of the AOP s artillery disposition. Lee knew of the AOPs terrain advantage. Lee knew of his own shortcomings in artillery ammunition and reinforcements. Lee could pick up a telescope and see the strength of the Union position. Lee didn't need Stuart to tell him any of this. What was it that Lee didn't know? A Field General should and must act on what he knows, not what on he assumes.

Lee was a brilliant military leader, but made a mistake on day three at Gettysburg.
Lee's mistake was in going north with a new command structure and untried men in important positions.
Lesser men lament "How can I do this?" Wile a true leader sees it as a puzzle to be solved saying " How do I do this."
 
If I remember Lee had planned for the assault for another location on the union line and ask Longstreet's opinion. Longstreet suggested moving the assault to another location on the union line which became Pickett's charge. In truth Longstreet pick the location of the assault so should he not bear some of the blame. ...

Eeeeeeeehhh .... any source for that??? Besides, using your words, suggesting moving it somewhere else is not the same as actually moving it somewhere else, aye?
 
Not being a student of Gettysburg nor of the players involved, I can't offer much commentary, except to say I like your analysis. Everyone here is commenting long after the fact, with the benefit of hindsight. We are all armchair generals in that sense. I like what you have written.
Very find of you Patrick. Thank you :smile:
 
He recognized the obvious.

Lee didn't because he had become infected by what the Japanese historians who analyzed their country's defeat in the Second World War, would have called victory disease. Success had made Lee overconfident and it led to perhaps the greatest mistake any military commander can make...to underestimate his enemy.
Also, the poor man was sick the whole time. Considering how much pain or discomfort most of those guys were in, most of the time, I'm amazed they were all as functional as they were.

Also, I've read that at Gettysburg, Lee spent a lot of time at his headquarters and was not in close communication with his generals. So he didn't have as good of an "eyes on" or "hands on" feel for the situation as Longstreet had.
 
Lee knew he was short of men for the attack. He tried to use massed artillery as a combat multiplier. This made some sense, but Lee greatly over estimated damage his artillery would/could cause. This brings me to a place where I have to ask a question: did Lee have reason to believe that his artillery could do the required damage, or was this based on unfounded hope?

When Lee could not find enough troops to make the attack, he tried to substituted artillery. This is good tactics, but only if the general has a reasonable expectation of how much help the artillery will be. I have never been sure if the Union positions and Union artillery made the Confederate artillery less effective or if Lee expected more than the Confederate artillery could possibly accomplish.
 
Lee knew he was short of men for the attack. He tried to use massed artillery as a combat multiplier. This made some sense, but Lee greatly over estimated damage his artillery would/could cause. This brings me to a place where I have to ask a question: did Lee have reason to believe that his artillery could do the required damage, or was this based on unfounded hope?

When Lee could not find enough troops to make the attack, he tried to substituted artillery. This is good tactics, but only if the general has a reasonable expectation of how much help the artillery will be. I have never been sure if the Union positions and Union artillery made the Confederate artillery less effective or if Lee expected more than the Confederate artillery could possibly accomplish.

The failure of the Confederate artillery at Malvern Hill to do the exact thing that Lee was hoping it would do on July 3rd at Gettysburg is something that should have been on somebody's mind that day.
 
Lee knew he was short of men for the attack. He tried to use massed artillery as a combat multiplier. This made some sense, but Lee greatly over estimated damage his artillery would/could cause. This brings me to a place where I have to ask a question: did Lee have reason to believe that his artillery could do the required damage, or was this based on unfounded hope?

When Lee could not find enough troops to make the attack, he tried to substituted artillery. This is good tactics, but only if the general has a reasonable expectation of how much help the artillery will be. I have never been sure if the Union positions and Union artillery made the Confederate artillery less effective or if Lee expected more than the Confederate artillery could possibly accomplish.

The confederate artillery should have done more damage than it did. There was a problem with the fuses which caused the rounds to explode much later than Alexander expected. This combined with the failure to bring up reserve ammunition seriously handicapped the effectiveness of the Confederate artillery borage.

Good points @major bill and I also think Lee did not have a clear grasp of how badly decimated Hood's and McLaws divisions were from the July 2 action.

I would agree with this. Lee also didn't have a grasp on the damage done to A.P Hills division. His participation on the left of the charge was made with inexperienced officers leading the men. This resulted in their men being the first to break ranks and flee.

One could argue Lee didn't have a true grasp of the condition of his army.
 
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The failure of the Confederate artillery at Malvern Hill to do the exact thing that Lee was hoping it would do on July 3rd at Gettysburg is something that should have been on somebody's mind that day.
This charge was actually the first frontal assault made by the ANV since Malvern Hill. That says a lot doesn't it!
 
If I remember Lee had planned for the assault for another location on the union line and ask Longstreet's opinion. Longstreet suggested moving the assault to another location on the union line which became Pickett's charge. In truth Longstreet pick the location of the assault so should he not bear some of the blame. As far as I know no one has ever compared Lee's original location of the assault to where Longstreet chooses to assault. As far as I know no one knows why Longstreet suggests his location over Lee's first choice. I think Lee was going to assault the cemetery ridge. Would not have assaulted the ridge have been better than assaulting the hill?

If Longstreet picks the location of the charge, how could he have been so against the charge? If he would have been against the assault he would have either tries to talk Lee out of it but he picks the location of the assault and Lee's agree?
You nailed it! Longstreet disobeyed General Lee's orders.
 
This charge was actually the first frontal assault made by the ANV since Malvern Hill. That says a lot doesn't it!

There's a fine line between a calculated risk and a warrentless gamble, and Pickett's Charge sits squarely in between them. That Lee would attempt a frontal assault on that scale after both Malvern Hill and Fredricksburg says something about what he must have thought the stakes were at that point.
 
Under what logic would Longstreet say attack there and then tell everyone it wouldn't work?

Remember, Longstreet the last man standing so he gets to tell the final tale at Gettysburg.

Now that's a real smoking gun.

Maybe it is if you interpret history correctly.

Besides, using your words, suggesting moving it somewhere else is not the same as actually moving it somewhere else, aye?

It was moved by Longstreet...


Okay, here we go...( I will paraphrase)

Lee still wants to attack the right of the union line and once again wants to use Hood's and Mclaws men to do with Pickett in support. Longstreet whines about Hood's and Mclaws men are exhausted and bloody from the day before action. Lee's listen and decides a new battle plan must be drawn up and Longstreet and Lee ride out to the line to recon.

Once again they discuss the new battle plan in which Pickett will be the point of the spear and Hood and McLaws men will be in support which forces Lee to move the point of the attack towards the center of the union line and Cemetery Hill. Longstreet whining forces Lee to changes his original plans and moves the point of attack.

Longstreet has been given a pass for 150 years about his action on the morning of July 3rd 1863. He changed Lee's original plans which force the attack more towards the center than on the flank and causes the attack to take much later in the day.

Funny Longstreet was going to use Hood and Mclaws men to flank the union line so why could they not attack the union lines the nest morning with Pickett in support. They had a night of rest and could have pushed on again. Was not Ewell using the same divisions on his attack on Culp's hill, he use the day before?

I think Longstreet was being disingenuous with Lee and about the state of his men. He was pouting over Lee changing his plans about flanking the union army. He is displaying guilt the whole time Pickett men are advancing towards the union lines, not because he thinks its doomed. He knows his whining lead to this miscalculation by Lee and He knows if he had not acted like a child Hood and Mclaws men would have continued their attack on the union flank. Pickett men would not be crossing open fields to their doom.

Pickett's charge only happens because Longstreet whined... We act as if he against Lee's orders and the attack but in truth, he feels guilty because he knows it was he, not Lee that sent Pickett men to their doom.




refence... Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, by Noah Trudeau pages 434 to 463...
 
Was not Hood on the left of the Union line (right of the Confederate line, but left of the Union line)? Also Longstreet was the best judge of if his men had another in attack in them, we simply can not know. To believe Longstreet internally lost the battle and the campaign just because he was pouting, would require a bunch of proof. I do believe Longstreet was giving what he thought was good advice. We can not know how a fresh attack on the Union left flank would worked out.
 
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