Why did Hood Fail at Atlanta?

I'd say that for a man of such a great pre-war record (being major in 2nd Cavalry and Lt.Col. in 1st Cavalry, writing Hardee's Tactics, etc.) Hardee's performance was quite pale and sometimes really mediocre.
He could be better than other corps commanders (like S.D. Lee or B.F. Cheatham, I leave Polk out of this on purpose), but they didn't have a record and reputation even close to his.
So Bragg (who, despite his constant failures in interpersonal relationships with his subordinates was a decent judge of military professionalism) may have been right assessing Hardee as "A competent drill instructor, but little more".

He did manage to escape from Savannah. I think a lesser general, a Pemberton, would have got bagged by Sherman.
 
In regard to Maryland, with hindsight the invasion of Maryland was a net negative for the Confederacy. However after 2nd Bull Run it seemed like a great opportunity and I don't blame Lee for rolling the dice. The Union army was in bad shape, its amazing that the Union was able to organize and field a new force in only two weeks.

I think it was Stephen Sears who pointed out Maryland was Lee's best option, especially with the AotP/AoV in disarray. He couldn't attack Washington and wasn't willing to surrender the initiative so what other option did he have? He probably did push the ANV too hard though, as evidenced by the resulting epidemic straggling.
 
I think it was Stephen Sears who pointed out Maryland was Lee's best option, especially with the AotP/AoV in disarray. He couldn't attack Washington and wasn't willing to surrender the initiative so what other option did he have? He probably did push the ANV too hard though, as evidenced by the resulting epidemic straggling.

Yeah I agree not many other options available. Sitting back on the defensive would just allow McClellan to build up another massive force. Attacking into Maryland keeps the initiative in your hands and at least gives the potential of scoring a victory.
 
Hardee was better than Polk or S. D. Lee, but otherwise he was just kind of there.



12k Union and 10k Confederate casualties at Antietam (NPS)
2300 Union & 2600 Confederate at South Mountain (CW Trust)

Other than the men captured and paroled at Harpers Ferry (who were not permanently impacted, unlike KIA/WIA) the loses in the Maryland Campaign were fairly close.
Why not count them? I think most of them were exchanged which brought more Confederate troops back into play. Should we not count Grant's capture of the Vicksburg garrison?
Plus, many of the Confederate wounded in battle recovered to fight again.
I think Lee should have retreated once Harper's Ferry fell and avoided the battle at Antietam. But you can't ignore the many positive results achieved by the campaign. Plus it got the AoP out of most of northern Virginia.
Counting the men at Harper's Ferry makes the casualties South 12,200 versus North 28,300. If every campaign were like that, the South would have won.
 
I'd say that for a man of such a great pre-war record (being major in 2nd Cavalry and Lt.Col. in 1st Cavalry, writing Hardee's Tactics, etc.) Hardee's performance was quite pale and sometimes really mediocre.
He could be better than other corps commanders (like S.D. Lee or B.F. Cheatham, I leave Polk out of this on purpose), but they didn't have a record and reputation even close to his.
So Bragg (who, despite his constant failures in interpersonal relationships with his subordinates was a decent judge of military professionalism) may have been right assessing Hardee as "A competent drill instructor, but little more".

I am somewhat inclined to agree, but in fairness to Hardee, he had three really good days as a corps commander in the war - Stones River (the December 31 assault in particular), Averasboro (a classic study of defense in depth), and saving Johnston's line of retreat from Mower at Bentonville.

Yet Albert Castel stated in Decisions in the West that by July of 1864, Hardee was, with perhaps the exception of Longstreet, the best corps commander in the Confederacy. I think the historical record does not bear this out. His performance on the whole at Shiloh was good but problematic. His first major action as a commander of more than a company makes me inclined to forgive how his command splintered, given the rough terrain and fierce resistance he encountered. He did very well helping to organize a defense on the right during April 8 counterattack, yet his baffingly refusal to forward Forrest's intelligence about Buell's arrival the night previous to Beauregard is one of the worst decisions made in the battle and helped to bamboozle Beauregard about where the Army of the Ohio actually was.

His performance at Perryville was okay, but his poison pen campaign with Polk that began during that campaign was responsible for the toxicity within the Army of Tennessee. However, Hardee seemly disliked the responsibility of overall command yet was critical of anyone who took on the burden themselves. He would be critical of Bragg, Joseph Johnston, and Hood, yet refused command of the army when it was offered after Bragg's resignation. At Stones River, as noted above, he did very well. His assault was tactically articulate and managed as well as it could be. This could not be said for Polk's corps. Again at Tullahoma, Hardee would seemingly withold vital intelligence about enemy movements from his commander, including the notice that the gaps assigned to his corps front were being forced and that Bragg's line of communications were in danger. Without this knowledge, Bragg was actually planning an offensive with Polk's corps that only Polk's obstinate refusal prevented a disaster.

The biggest marks on Hardee's record are at Atlanta. Peachtree Creek, where he threw a hissy fit about Hood being promoted over him (and it really shows), disobeying orders and refusing to verify them, refusing to ensure that most of his divisions were commited (including not checking on Bate's lost division on the right) meant that Hardee squandered a pretty good opportunity to gobble up Newton's isolated divison of Howard's Fourth Corps. His attack gained ground at Bald Hill, but it was a terrible policed night march and an assault that he potentially launched to early (attacking the Federal left instead of its' rear). Yet for all the criticisms of Hardee's flank march at Bald Hill, it was the most successful of any of Hood's sorties during Atlanta. Jonesboro speaks to itself. Hardee commanding the field could not stop S.D. Lee from attacking early or keep Cleburne's corps from coming apart at the seams during its' assault, though to his credit he extracted his isolated corps from a pretty precarious position the next day.
 
Why not count them? I think most of them were exchanged which brought more Confederate troops back into play. Should we not count Grant's capture of the Vicksburg garrison? Plus, many of the Confederate wounded in battle recovered to fight again.

POWs are better than nothing, but given paroles and prisoner exchanges they were only a temporary measure for most of the ACW. Paroles were violated on many occasions.

Killed are fine for good and wounded are sometimes permanently disabled. Even those that recover from wounds are often permanently reduced in some way, physically or mentally, by their wound. Especially in an era before antibiotics and germ theory any wound is essentially life-threatening even if minor.
 
I am somewhat inclined to agree, but in fairness to Hardee, he had three really good days as a corps commander in the war - Stones River (the December 31 assault in particular), Averasboro (a classic study of defense in depth), and saving Johnston's line of retreat from Mower at Bentonville.

Yet Albert Castel stated in Decisions in the West that by July of 1864, Hardee was, with perhaps the exception of Longstreet, the best corps commander in the Confederacy. I think the historical record does not bear this out. His performance on the whole at Shiloh was good but problematic. His first major action as a commander of more than a company makes me inclined to forgive how his command splintered, given the rough terrain and fierce resistance he encountered. He did very well helping to organize a defense on the right during April 8 counterattack, yet his baffingly refusal to forward Forrest's intelligence about Buell's arrival the night previous to Beauregard is one of the worst decisions made in the battle and helped to bamboozle Beauregard about where the Army of the Ohio actually was.

His performance at Perryville was okay, but his poison pen campaign with Polk that began during that campaign was responsible for the toxicity within the Army of Tennessee. However, Hardee seemly disliked the responsibility of overall command yet was critical of anyone who took on the burden themselves. He would be critical of Bragg, Joseph Johnston, and Hood, yet refused command of the army when it was offered after Bragg's resignation. At Stones River, as noted above, he did very well. His assault was tactically articulate and managed as well as it could be. This could not be said for Polk's corps. Again at Tullahoma, Hardee would seemingly withold vital intelligence about enemy movements from his commander, including the notice that the gaps assigned to his corps front were being forced and that Bragg's line of communications were in danger. Without this knowledge, Bragg was actually planning an offensive with Polk's corps that only Polk's obstinate refusal prevented a disaster.

The biggest marks on Hardee's record are at Atlanta. Peachtree Creek, where he threw a hissy fit about Hood being promoted over him (and it really shows), disobeying orders and refusing to verify them, refusing to ensure that most of his divisions were commited (including not checking on Bate's lost division on the right) meant that Hardee squandered a pretty good opportunity to gobble up Newton's isolated divison of Howard's Fourth Corps. His attack gained ground at Bald Hill, but it was a terrible policed night march and an assault that he potentially launched to early (attacking the Federal left instead of its' rear). Yet for all the criticisms of Hardee's flank march at Bald Hill, it was the most successful of any of Hood's sorties during Atlanta. Jonesboro speaks to itself. Hardee commanding the field could not stop S.D. Lee from attacking early or keep Cleburne's corps from coming apart at the seams during its' assault, though to his credit he extracted his isolated corps from a pretty precarious position the next day.

Great post; very informative.
 
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