Why? did General Lee fight at gettysburg after witnessing the carnage at Fredricsburg

After many years of reading and researching the Napoleonic wars, the wars of ancient Greece I have now began reading the American civil war and would like not only to have my views and questions answered but to listen and learn from others.

I had to re-open this discussion. I just joined and I have been reading through the forums and really enjoying the insight of all the members. I have a lot to learn, but we all have to start somewhere.

I live 1 hour north of Gettysburg and have always wondered why General Lee chose to engage the troops here. Of course, this is all 20/20 hindsight, but had he marched on Harrisburg and on to Philadelphia, the mood in the North would have changed dramatically against the war. We know now that Hooker and later Meade were tasked only to stay between Lee and Washington.

So my questions are…

  1. Could Lee have supported his army logistically on a march to Philadelphia? Seems to me he could have, but would the Union army to the south have disrupted supply lines?

  2. I have read many of your posts suggesting that Lee was trying to take pressure off of Virginia with his incursion. Did he fear that not engaging union troops would free them to harass the Virginia he was trying to relieve?

  3. I generally agree that Lee was overconfident at this point and for good reason, but why did he feel a military victory was so much more important than the political one that would have been won with such a march around Pennsylvania?
 
I had to re-open this discussion. I just joined and I have been reading through the forums and really enjoying the insight of all the members. I have a lot to learn, but we all have to start somewhere.

I live 1 hour north of Gettysburg and have always wondered why General Lee chose to engage the troops here. Of course, this is all 20/20 hindsight, but had he marched on Harrisburg and on to Philadelphia, the mood in the North would have changed dramatically against the war. We know now that Hooker and later Meade were tasked only to stay between Lee and Washington.

So my questions are…

  1. Could Lee have supported his army logistically on a march to Philadelphia? Seems to me he could have, but would the Union army to the south have disrupted supply lines?

  2. I have read many of your posts suggesting that Lee was trying to take pressure off of Virginia with his incursion. Did he fear that not engaging union troops would free them to harass the Virginia he was trying to relieve?

  3. I generally agree that Lee was overconfident at this point and for good reason, but why did he feel a military victory was so much more important than the political one that would have been won with such a march around Pennsylvania?

Good questions, and welcome to the forum. I think the key to answering your question is to realize what Lee's primary objective was - both in his invasion of Pennsylvania, and throughout his stint as commander of the ANV, as expressed by his own aide-de-camp:

'The great object then of the Confederate operations in Virginia was to defend Richmond, and that was the principal end that General Lee proposed to himself. Of course the incidental advantages of preserving that part of Virginia north of the James and of keeping it free from the presence of the enemy were not disregarded, but the defence of Richmond controlled all other considerations.

Now from the time that General Lee was first placed on duty in Richmond in March 1862 by the order of President Davis, and even before that time, as I have heard, he was convinced that the only way of defending the city successfully was by occupying the Federal Army at a distance from the capital and preventing the formation of a siege.

He frequently spoke and often wrote to the effect that if the siege of Richmond were once undertaken by an army too strong to be beaten off, the fall of the place would be inevitable, no matter how successfully it might be defended against a direct attack. '


- Charles Marshall, Lee's Aide-de-Camp, pp. 182-183

Source: https://books.google.com/books?id=RyNvCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT189
Invading Pennsylvania was useful towards his primary goal inasmuch as it would draw Union troops away from Richmond. But if he overdid it - if he put too much distance between himself and Richmond and left the Union army in the gap - then the Union army might just march right into Richmond. Lee wasn't willing to let that happen. There was little strategic or long-term advantage to him capturing Philadelphia. He could capture it, but he would be unable to hold it. By contrast, the strategic advantage to the Union of capturing Richmond would be huge. It's like a chess match where you have the opportunity to take your opponent's bishop, but in doing so you put him in a position where he can checkmate you.
 
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Thanks for taking the time for such a great reply! I never considered that. My 20/20 hindsight again. I think the Union troops would have never marched on Richmond but Lee may not have been so sure. Lee seemed to be on the offensive so often, but it was all part of a greater defense.
I really appreciate the insight.
 
Welcome to the forums!

Lee had every reason to believe he could take the AotP at Gettysburg and arguably he could've if he had all of the necessary intelligence he had become accustomed to receiving. Stuart's Cavalry wasn't where Lee needed it to be, Lee didn't know exactly what he was facing, and he acted in accordance with the situation he was in. If Lee had any action at Gettysburg that I disagreed with, it would be the assault on July 2nd.

After Day 1, Lee essentially had the AotP trapped. The only real options Meade had were to hold ground or retreat from the battle. Instead of waiting for Stuart or using July 2nd to better scout his opposition and options, Lee pressed the assault on well-defended positions and almost won in spite of it. The ANV all-but routed the AotP on July 1st and, in my opinion, Lee had the morale advantage. I understand his want to maintain the momentum and keep his men emboldened in spirit, but a day's delay could've made for a much different outcome at Gettysburg.
 
Neither Grant nor Cold Harbor were at Gettysburg, so I fail to see the relevance.
There is a similarity ... Both were looking at "One more time and this all can be over."



IF Lee had been able to confront the AOTP
P on ground of his choosing, there Might have been a different outcome, but
We'd have to discount Meade.
 
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