Who's More to Blame for Vicksburg's Fall: Johnston or Pemberton?

Who's More to Blame for Vicksburg's Fall: Johnston or Pemberton?

  • Johnston

    Votes: 20 55.6%
  • Pemberton

    Votes: 16 44.4%

  • Total voters
    36
I think Pemberton tried his best, with inadequate cavalry resources, disloyal and traitorous lieutenants (Loring and Bowen), and conflicting orders, it is a wonder he did as well as he did. He inflicted 3199 casualties in just one day, on May 22. I dislike criticizing Johnston, but he just didn't have his heart in his work, playing not to lose as usual, when being aggressive would have at least disconcerted Grant and Sherman. He needed to move in late May or early June. Yes by late June or July the Federals had too many troops for the siege to be raised. It was Pemberton's first campaign, and even Lee didn't do so well at first ( in West Virginia and at Mechanicsville). But once Vicksburg fell, there was no way Pemberton was getting a second chance. Pemberton at least tried, and yes he was a loyal and brave man.
 
I didn't vote in the poll because Grant is not an option. It was all his fault.

However, he was unable to ever break Pemberton's lines and starved them all out. Johnston running in the wrong direction is something I've never been able to forgive. I don't even really understand it. Maybe if I study harder I'll get why.
 
loyal man.
Depends on your definition of loyal. :tongue: He was a Northerner, after all.
Ha! Was thinking the exact same thing. I think the fall of Vicksburg was less the fault of Pemberton or Johnston or even Davis (though that wacky West command structure didn't help) than the triumph of Grant.
Well said. It's not for nothing that the campaign is often cited in Army Manuals even today.
 
Well, with the new-fangled telegraph, communication was a hell of a lot easier. Also, since all three were technically independent of each other, someone needed to try to coordinate them together. Besides, the strategy wasn't really that bad. It just so happened that the guy it was directed against was Stonewall Jackson, a man who had a habit of frustrating enemy plans.

Except it utterly failed. By the time Lincoln issued any order, it was outdated, as he couldn't possibly know the situation. Granted those three were need of leadership, but Lincoln simply wasn't it.
 
I recently read this well written biography of Pemberton. Originally, I thought of him to be an incompetent having been relieved of his post at Charleston and then the loss at Vicksburg. This book offers a broad sympathetic look at a man who at his core always tried to do the right thing, follow orders and defend his adopted confederacy despite the disloyalty of his officers and the lack of respect from many of his soldiers and the people of Vicksburg. Johnston should be vilified for his abandonment at Pemberton's time of need. And Davis, who regarded him kindly and as a friend should never have appointed him to Vicksburg. What I found most interesting about the man was the abandoning his loyalty to the Union, his social position and family standing in Philadelphia, his friends and some of his family for the love of a woman. She, Martha (Pattie) Thompson-Pemberton, sure must have been something!!!

Pemberton.jpg
 
Pemberton:
  • neglected Jackson and thereby exposed the main transportation hub for the region
  • sent only one division to reinforce Bowen after recieving report of Grants failed crossing at Grand Gulf
  • occupied Edward's Station and permitted Grant to maneuver unmolested around Mississippi
  • allowed himself to be convinced to abandon his Edward's Station line resulting in confused march which left his army disorientated and unprepared for battle
  • fell back into Vicksburg with the majority of his army leaving the Confederates free and able to manuever against Grant vastly outnumbered.
Johnston:
  • send Van Dorn's Cavalry to Bragg and did not respond promptly to Pemberton's requests for more Cavalry
  • ordered Pemberton to abandon his prepared line and march to Clinton on scarce and faulty intelligence
  • failed to link up with Pemberton or assist him in combatting Grant prior to AoM falling back into Vicksburg
  • made no attempt to lift the seige of Vicksburg citing the hopelessness of any such attempt
  • spent months quarrelling with Pemberton trying to convince him to break out with the army

Pemberton made some bad choices and abandonned his own judgement in how best to defend against Grant which led to his ruin, while Johnston was placed in the difficult position of having to take charge mid-campaign with no up-to-date intelligence and made bad decisions which contributed to Pemberton's defeat. As far as the decisions made on the ground go they both share responsibilty.

Additional:
  • Jefferson Davis splitting the Western Theater off from the Trans-Mississippi in department organization making cooperation between Confederates both sides of the river difficult.
  • Theophilus H. Holmes failing to organize his forces in the Trans-Mississippi theater to effectively support the Confederate attempts to defend Vicksburg
 
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Once Grant had crossed the Mississippi, what should Pemberton have done? It seems after Champion Hill that Pemberton was left to retreat into Vicksburg or abandon the city. I don't see him saving the city and defeating Grant after May 16.
 
Once Grant had crossed the Mississippi, what should Pemberton have done? It seems after Champion Hill that Pemberton was left to retreat into Vicksburg or abandon the city. I don't see him saving the city and defeating Grant after May 16.

Once it became apparent that Grant was attempting a crossing to the south then Pemberton should have immediately transfered the majority of his army south to reinforce Bowen. Sherman at Snyder's Bluff could have been held with a division or so - it was a strong defensive position and leaving Stevenson's big division there would have been more than enough to hold it - which would have freed the majority of the AoM for mobilization against Grant. This would have given the Confederates the opportunity to meet Grant on near parity of numbers in open battle, giving them the chance to prevent him rapidly exploiting his gains in crossing the river and stop him from moving around Mississippi at his leasure - this, of course, assuming they weren't decisively defeated, but chances are they would have been.

Alternatively, Pemberton should have stuck to his guns and remained in his prepared position at Edward's Station so that he could meet the Federals on his terms. He might have been insubordinate for not complying with Johnston's orders if he had done so but meeting his enemy at a position he had chosen without pointlessly marching his army backwards and forwards all morning leaving it confused and unprepared for battle would have made his chances of success far greater.
 
I admire Pemberton for the fact that after the loss of Vicksburg, when Davis couldn't find another command for him, he resigned his commission as a Lt. Gen and accepted a position as a Lt. Col of artillery in Virginia and fought out the rest of the war. Other Generals would have gone home, sulked, and written bitter diatribes to be leaked to the newspapers. Pemberton was a loyal and brave man.
And likely much happier in that position.
 
Pemberton should have sent a text to Davis and Johnston stating "You say I have to defend the city and you say I need to abandon the city. Please clarify".
Bingo!

Johnston urged him to come out and help engage Grant outside the city. Davis said, "hold." I have sympathy for his quandary, and I haven't figured out how I would turn given the same situation. My commander says this and my commander-in-chief says that.

Given all that, he was placed well above his skill. Leap-frogged over the Peter Principle
 
Disloyal and traitorous? Bowen? Explain please.
Warren Grabau says in his "98 Days" that in some countries (armies) in the world, the Champion Hill antics of Loring and Bowen would have likely caused them to be lined up before a firing squad. Bowen did come to Carter Stevenson's assistance, although he hesitated for awhile which certainly couldn't have helped matters. Considering Stonewall Jackson's charges against Loring when Loring was in Virginia, this substantiates Pemberton's resentment of Loring. The circumstantial evidence points to the fact that that both Bowen and Loring were willing to risk a defeat to have Pemberton replaced.
 
Warren Grabau says in his "98 Days" that in some countries (armies) in the world, the Champion Hill antics of Loring and Bowen would have likely caused them to be lined up before a firing squad. Bowen did come to Carter Stevenson's assistance, although he hesitated for awhile which certainly couldn't have helped matters. Considering Stonewall Jackson's charges against Loring when Loring was in Virginia, this substantiates Pemberton's resentment of Loring. The circumstantial evidence points to the fact that that both Bowen and Loring were willing to risk a defeat to have Pemberton replaced.
Plenty of blame to go around. Problem is that Grant was pressing them. They wer severiously outmatched.
 
Once it became apparent that Grant was attempting a crossing to the south then Pemberton should have immediately transfered the majority of his army south to reinforce Bowen. Sherman at Snyder's Bluff could have been held with a division or so - it was a strong defensive position and leaving Stevenson's big division there would have been more than enough to hold it - which would have freed the majority of the AoM for mobilization against Grant.

When was that apparent and where was Pemberton's command at the time?
We talking April 28? April 29?

After subtracting "a division or so" to hold the Bluffs and man the river front defenses of Vicksburg and Warrenton, there was only a division or so left on hand. He didnt have a very big command.

Of the disposable force, 2 brigades were sent in time to make it to the battle (Tracy, Baldwin) and 2 more brigades were sent but they didnt reach Bowen until the next day (Barton, Taylor). I find it difficult to see what more he could have done with the forces at Vicksburg at that time.

A big part of Pemberton's problem was that he had scattered several of his brigades: Buford was in Meridian, Tilghman was in Jackson; Featherston was up around Grenada. They had been scattered around in reaction to other demands -- dealing with the Yazoo pass expedition; chasing Grierson; responding to Johnson's demands. He did call them all back but they were too far to help Bowen.
 
When was that apparent and where was Pemberton's command at the time?
We talking April 28? April 29?

After subtracting "a division or so" to hold the Bluffs and man the river front defenses of Vicksburg and Warrenton, there was only a division or so left on hand. He didnt have a very big command.

Of the disposable force, 2 brigades were sent in time to make it to the battle (Tracy, Baldwin) and 2 more brigades were sent but they didnt reach Bowen until the next day (Barton, Taylor). I find it difficult to see what more he could have done with the forces at Vicksburg at that time.

A big part of Pemberton's problem was that he had scattered several of his brigades: Buford was in Meridian, Tilghman was in Jackson; Featherston was up around Grenada. They had been scattered around in reaction to other demands -- dealing with the Yazoo pass expedition; chasing Grierson; responding to Johnson's demands. He did call them all back but they were too far to help Bowen.
Good point Ned.
 
I just finished reading "Chain of Thunder" by Shaara. Prior to reading it, I would have blamed Johnston for not supporting Pemberton; however, now I'm quite influenced by Shaara and would place the blame mainly on Pemberton. Pemberton was caught between a rock and a hard place (Jefferson and Johnston's conflicting messages), but he didn't choose a plan based on one or the other (or a good one of his own) and implement successfully - following Davis' wishes, he could have set up on the Vicksburg side of the Black River and defended it; following Johnston's, he could have done exactly what Johnston demanded, then escaped the best he could when that plan failed - no one could have faulted him for implementing an order to the best of his ability. Instead, he took his army too far out to defend Vicksburg (past the Black River), but not far enough to meet up with Johnston (even if that was impossible). If he really agreed with Davis that Vicksburg was vital to the survival of the Confederacy and had to be saved, then why didn't he choose a plan that had the best chance of doing so? Clearly he defied Johnston's orders, yet he didn't really comply with Davis' wishes either. On top of all that, he didn't have enough food for a siege - by siege standards, this one wasn't really that long.

So...Davis should have allowed Johnston to handle his command without interfering, Johnston should have given clear orders to Pemberton and have his (Johnston's) actions and movements reflect the orders he was giving to Pemberton; however, Pemberton didn't do much of anything effectively.
 
Pemeberton as of the end of March (per the OR) had - counting all men in his department because decisions on what brigades were matters too - forty-seven thousand men or so.

Not a very large command, but Pemberton's decisions seem to be aiming to cover as much of his department as possible rather than to concentrate on the biggest threat.

I don't think there's a clear cut way to say Pemberton is more responsible than Johnston or vice-versa, but if I had to vote, Johnston seems to have made this more difficult.

And while it's all very appealing to pick on Davis, at some point the fact that these men were given authority and were using it has to be judged.
 
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