Who was the better George? McClellan or Thomas?

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I am actually on your side on this, 67th. I don't believe you cherry-picked from Wallace's account. I believe you cherry-picked Wallace's account from all the other accounts of the battle because it agrees with your preconceptions. The name of this type of argument is special pleading - ignoring evidence contrary to your argument and expounding only evidence in agreement with your argument.

If there are additional sources I'd be interested. I'm working back from Gott's Fort Donelson book, and it gives Wallace as the only primary source he has for these events. For the events the next morning I found Mesch's CF Smith book had a greater range of references. Basically I formulated my opinion from the references in those books, plus the OR and the Grant Papers. Did I miss anything?
 
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Bloss and his superiors decided this was no hoax and passed the paper upward to headquarters, where an officer authenticated the handwriting before an understandably skeptical McClellan."

Having constructed timelines, the authentication occurred at 12th Corps HQ, not at McClellan's HQ. Some time around 1300 a party consisting of Capt. Kop (the OC of the Coy that found it), Col Golgrove (CO 27th Indiana) and BG Nathan Kimball (who was talking to Colgrove when Kop arrived at his HQ) brought SO191 to 12th Corps HQ. BG Williams, the Corps Commander wasn't there, but Capt Samuel Pittman (AAG), Capt Clermont Best (Chief of Arty) and Capt Ben Morgan (Provost Marshal) were. There spent some time reading it and discussing if it were a ruse. Pittman recognised the signature. The initial three then left to find Williams, and when they did Williams immediately endorsed it up. Nathan Kimball was probably the man who carried it to McClellan's HQ, and delivered it around 1430.
 
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Allow me to allude to a few of the facts in the case. You and your officers at one interview estimated the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at 200,000 men.
At this time McClellan's actual estimate was:
180,000 AP during Seven Days (down from 200,000 as Beauregard's army had not shown up)
- 40,000 casualties inflicted (McClellan's estimate of casualties caused during Seven Days)
= 140,000 AP in Virginia (this including both Jackson's force and the force at Richmond).
Possibly this goes to ca. 150,000 AP due to the reinforcements during July.

Since McClellan's calculations pegged Jackson at 30,000 AP pre-Seven-Days (thanks to reports from other commanders facing Jackson) then it seems fair to assume McClellan's estimate of Jackson's force in July was about 25,000 AP and thus the force at Richmond was 115,000-125,000 AP.

I know one of his officers (I think Keyes?) thought the enemy force was larger than this.

The actual value was about 100,000 AP, plus Jackson's force (perhaps 20,000 AP). Jackson can of course be called in at any time to augment the Richmond defenders, but if he is then he's not able to menace the North.

General Pope's army covering Washington is only about 40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000.
In fact Pope's army covering Washington was 60,000 PFD on June 30, or about 72,000 Aggregate Present, once you discount the two brigades en route to McClellan on that date.
McClellan's force was about 90,000 PFD, or about 110,000 Aggregate Present, excluding the Dept. of Virginia.


Note that Halleck is at best playing games with army definition numbers here, and at worst doesn't understand how AP differs from Effectives.
McClellan had started talking in Aggregate Present because that was what Lincoln used to refer to his own force (and because it's the kind of number his spies could more easily get, of course).

But you will reply, why not re-enforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this you said at our interview that you required 30,000 additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought that you would have "some chance" of success with 20,000. But you afterward telegraphed me that you would require 35,000 as the enemy was being largely re-enforced.
The telegram was actually sent before the meeting, while Halleck was en route. It was waiting for him at his office.

The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James River, and even after you received the re-enforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance on Richmond. It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time, perhaps as much as those at Yorktown.
Oh, the inhumanity, it might take a month to reach Richmond... that would mean McClellan reached Richmond in September 1862!

But all of your plans require re-enforcements, which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to ask for re-enforcements, but it is not so easy to give them when you have no disposable troops at your command.
As of the time Halleck is sending this telegram, there are about 14,000 PFD afloat with Burnside at Fort Monroe. There are disposable troops right there amounting to close to 20,000 AP.
Of course, Halleck himself had during the Seven Days flat refused to release any troops from his own department (numbering 215,000 AP in June 30 - he was asked for 25,000 or even 10,000 and rebuffed it) so there's a source of potential reinforcements right there.

Essentially Halleck is lying about "no disposable troops" - Burnside's force is disposable troops. He's not been doing anything but wait at Fort Monroe to be sent up to join McClellan for the past month.


Talking AP, if those troops with Burnside are released to McClellan (along with the extra three regiments Hunter was willing to send once transport arrived, to bump it up to a full 20,000 AP) then the force strength becomes:

Confederate in Richmond ~ 100,000 (McClellan est. about 120,000)
Confederate with Jackson ~ 20,000 (McClellan est. about 25,000)
Union with McClellan ~ 130,000 (up from 110,000)
Union protecting Washington ~ 75,000 (Pope)


Not all of these forces convert quite so cleanly into Effectives as one another (chiefly because the Confederacy used black non-enlisted people on the logistics, while the Union handles them out of their Aggregate Present) but it's the sort of numbers one has to work with. If McClellan advances on Richmond and Lee calls in all his possible reinforcements the ratio is 1:1.15 Union:Confederate by McClellan's numbers, using AP (or 1.08:1 Union:Confederate using AP by the true numbers.)

As a comparison, the numbers on June 30 1864 are:

Confederate in Richmond ~ 70,000-75,000 (Dept. of Richmond is about 5,000 and may not be included in AoNV returns)
Confederate with Early - no good returns, but 15,000-30,000 was estimated at the time.
Union with Grant ~ 110,000 PFD (i.e. 120-130,000 AP)
Union protecting Washington ~30,000 (Augur)

If Lee calls in all his possible reinforcements and Grant advances on Richmond the ratio is about 1.33:1 Union:Confederate.


It's better to compare Effectives because the Confederates are more efficient at converting AP into Effectives, but using AP is an interesting exercise.
 
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The thing which I've noticed tends to happen during discussion of McClellan is that people are happy to point out where they think he made mistakes, but when you ask for alternative courses of action things suddenly dry up - or people suggest what McClellan actually did in some cases. People suggest McClellan should have attacked during the Seven Days, when he was actually launching (small, bite-and-hold) attacks up to the day of Gaines Mill.

I recall seeing on another site some years ago when 67th wanted to present a what-if scenario, and his first post was called completely unrealistic for McClellan - except what he'd done was write up the Loudoun Valley campaign, it hadn't got to the alternate history bit yet...

Essentially people view McClellan as a total failure on almost everything - I've seen people even assume he was no good in bed, based on nothing but that reputation - and yet the commonly presented view of him misses out a great deal of nuance. There are several Lincoln witticisms widely reported about McClellan's endless calls for reinforcements, but it's rare indeed that someone will actually point out that McClellan kept calling because he never got them! And Sears spends several pages criticizing McClellan for not moving against Lee during October 1862, before casually mentioning "supplies arrived" so as to not quite completely omit the fact that McClellan's army had not been getting essential campaign supplies for about a month.

Any dispassionate analysis of McClellan shows that in nearly all cases he made sound decisions and moved as quickly as was tactically and logistically prudent.

It is rather ironic that critics accuse McClellan of being hesitant to attack when he attacked over and over again and when his main attack at Antietam produced the most casualties for a single day of any attack during the war.
 
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It is rather ironic that critics accuse McClellan of being hesitant to attack when he attacked over and over again and when his main attack at Antietam produced the most casualties for a single day of any attack during the war.
Yes - indeed, it's often missed that the Seven Days began with a McClellan attack (Oak Grove) and that he launched two more attacks on the next two days (Garnetts Hill and Goldings Farm). McClellan only stopped attacking Richmond when the line collapsed at Gaines Mill and he had to leave or get his entire army captured.
And I've seen some people completely ignorant of the Loudoun Valley campaign or its potential, though I'm not sure why people somehow manage to simultaneously think these things:

1) McClellan missed an opportunity because he could have attacked the whole Army of Northern Virginia at once at Antietam and destroyed it.
2) McClellan couldn't have successfully attacked Culpeper about 10 November because half the Army of Northern Virginia was there and was too strong for him.


But ultimately the core issue with McClellan is that people refuse to grant that if the following two things are true:

1) The enemy is strong enough to give you a difficult fight.
2) Substantial reinforcements will arrive within a few days
3) There are no substantial enemy reinforcements en route within a few days
4) The enemy position is important to the enemy

The militarily correct thing to do is to wait, not to attack. If a delay of a few days moves the force ratio considerably towards you then that is a good thing; if gaining the enemy position without a fight improves your own military situation then their abandoning the position would also be a good thing.

Once that's understood, a significant fraction of McClellan's "failures" become understandable - they're because he had information that he had reinforcements en route and they did not arrive.
 
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At this time McClellan's actual estimate was:
180,000 AP during Seven Days (down from 200,000 as Beauregard's army had not shown up)
- 40,000 casualties inflicted (McClellan's estimate of casualties caused during Seven Days)
= 140,000 AP in Virginia (this including both Jackson's force and the force at Richmond).
Possibly this goes to ca. 150,000 AP due to the reinforcements during July.

Since McClellan's calculations pegged Jackson at 30,000 AP pre-Seven-Days (thanks to reports from other commanders facing Jackson) then it seems fair to assume McClellan's estimate of Jackson's force in July was about 25,000 AP and thus the force at Richmond was 115,000-125,000 AP.

I know one of his officers (I think Keyes?) thought the enemy force was larger than this.

The actual value was about 100,000 AP, plus Jackson's force (perhaps 20,000 AP). Jackson can of course be called in at any time to augment the Richmond defenders, but if he is then he's not able to menace the North.


In fact Pope's army covering Washington was 60,000 PFD on June 30, or about 72,000 Aggregate Present, once you discount the two brigades en route to McClellan on that date.
McClellan's force was about 90,000 PFD, or about 110,000 Aggregate Present, excluding the Dept. of Virginia.


Note that Halleck is at best playing games with army definition numbers here, and at worst doesn't understand how AP differs from Effectives.
McClellan had started talking in Aggregate Present because that was what Lincoln used to refer to his own force (and because it's the kind of number his spies could more easily get, of course).


The telegram was actually sent before the meeting, while Halleck was en route. It was waiting for him at his office.


Oh, the inhumanity, it might take a month to reach Richmond... that would mean McClellan reached Richmond in September 1862!


As of the time Halleck is sending this telegram, there are about 14,000 PFD afloat with Burnside at Fort Monroe. There are disposable troops right there amounting to close to 20,000 AP.
Of course, Halleck himself had during the Seven Days flat refused to release any troops from his own department (numbering 215,000 AP in June 30 - he was asked for 25,000 or even 10,000 and rebuffed it) so there's a source of potential reinforcements right there.

Essentially Halleck is lying about "no disposable troops" - Burnside's force is disposable troops. He's not been doing anything but wait at Fort Monroe to be sent up to join McClellan for the past month.


Talking AP, if those troops with Burnside are released to McClellan (along with the extra three regiments Hunter was willing to send once transport arrived, to bump it up to a full 20,000 AP) then the force strength becomes:

Confederate in Richmond ~ 100,000 (McClellan est. about 120,000)
Confederate with Jackson ~ 20,000 (McClellan est. about 25,000)
Union with McClellan ~ 130,000 (up from 110,000)
Union protecting Washington ~ 75,000 (Pope)


Not all of these forces convert quite so cleanly into Effectives as one another (chiefly because the Confederacy used black non-enlisted people on the logistics, while the Union handles them out of their Aggregate Present) but it's the sort of numbers one has to work with. If McClellan advances on Richmond and Lee calls in all his possible reinforcements the ratio is 1:1.15 Union:Confederate by McClellan's numbers, using AP (or 1.08:1 Union:Confederate using AP by the true numbers.)

As a comparison, the numbers on June 30 1864 are:

Confederate in Richmond ~ 70,000-75,000 (Dept. of Richmond is about 5,000 and may not be included in AoNV returns)
Confederate with Early - no good returns, but 15,000-30,000 was estimated at the time.
Union with Grant ~ 110,000 PFD (i.e. 120-130,000 AP)
Union protecting Washington ~30,000 (Augur)

If Lee calls in all his possible reinforcements and Grant advances on Richmond the ratio is about 1.33:1 Union:Confederate.


It's better to compare Effectives because the Confederates are more efficient at converting AP into Effectives, but using AP is an interesting exercise.
Actually, no, Halleck was told by McClellan and his officers on July 25th that the enemy numbered at least 200,000. See Hallecks Memorandum for the Secretary of War, dated July 27, 1862. So Halleck was making decisions based on the information he was receiving from McClellan.
 
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When did Halleck refuse to send troops? He had McClernand preparing to go. Simply told Lincoln and stanton that the east Tennessee move would have to be postponed. How is that a refusal?

As I have read this letter from halleck many times, I have looked for any note from Mac refuting any of it. Not a peep. He moaned about the order, but that's about it.

In short Halleck wanted to unite the two armies while covering DC. How else could this be accomplished except as Halleck ordered?
 
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Actually, no, Halleck was told by McClellan and his officers on July 25th that the enemy numbered at least 200,000. See Hallecks Memorandum for the Secretary of War, dated July 27, 1862.

But the only source we have for "McClellan" saying so in the meeting is Halleck. We know one of McClellan's corps commanders (Keyes, IIRC) saying the enemy had 200,000 during the Seven Days.
McClellan does pass on his int debriefs (that "prisoners state" there are 200,000) but he caveats them by noting that rebels talk of regiments as 1,000 men each - indeed by the same measure Lincoln had been saying in July 1862 that McClellan had 160,000 minus the casualties of the seven days. This is actually Grand Aggregate, yet another strength measure, and by these standards Lee has 200,000 (212 regiments) and McClellan has 160,000 (172 regiments). McClellan passed on the int debrief in response to Lincoln saying McClellan had 160,000, so it can be viewed as a case of "well, if you want to measure that way then..."

Thus it's a matter of stength estimates. If Lee has 200,000 by Grand Aggregate (the int debrief number) then McClellan has 160,000 by Grand Aggregate (the number Lincoln was using for McClellan) and Pope has:
1st Corps
9 (Schenk) + 5 (Steinwehr) + 6 (Schurz) + 4 (Milroy) + 4 (Cav)
2nd Corps
13 (Williams) + 9 (Augur) + 4 (Cav)
3rd Corps
13 (King) + 13 (Ricketts) + 5 (Cav)
=85 regiments = ~80,000

Exclusive of things like the Railroad District and Washington defences themselves.

(And there are 20 regiments, thus 20,000, at Fort Monroe, which McClellan refers to as such. Similary he refers to the 9 regiments he did get as reinforcements in early July as "9,000 or 10,000".)


This is what is causing the confusion - there are several different measures for the size of an army. McClellan has 160,000 by Grand Aggregate, 110,000 by AP, ~90,000 by PFD and as low as 60,000 by Effectives - but they're all different expressions of the same army.

What Halleck is doing is the equivalent of saying that McClellan's 90,000 (PFD) can't possibly beat McClellan's 160,000 (GA) without an unfeasible amount of reinforcement...


As I have read this letter from halleck many times, I have looked for any note from Mac refuting any of it. Not a peep. He moaned about the order, but that's about it.


McClellan did go down to Fort Monroe (IIRC it was there) specifically to have a telegraph conversation with Halleck, but Halleck dashed off a reply and then left the telegraph office without waiting for McClellan to send something back - thus rendering McClellan's journey pointless. I suppose you could call it a failing by McClellan that he didn't reply to explain to the author of Elements of Military Art and Science about what the columns on a US Army trimonthly return mean...

Mind you, Halleck did estimate 200,000 at Corinth on 5th April, the day before Shiloh.




The thing I find interesting about this argument is that it sort of assumes that McClellan was "caught out" in some way. But the reason why the discussion came up at all was because McClellan hadn't been reinforced on schedule (again!) - if he'd got the reinforcements that were at Fort Monroe and been told clearly that that was all he was getting then he'd have already been on the move. There is no point McClellan is told the truth about how many reinforcements he will get and when between about 20 May 1862 (when he's told to wait for 1st Corps) and about 4th August 1862 (when Halleck tells him there are no reinforcements en route, and orders him back to Washington.) In other words, he was misled for about two and a half months.

And, of course, if Halleck had stripped out 10,000 from his 200,000+ AP at the end of June then those could have joined McClellan as well. There was no force in Halleck's operational area in June which was of remotely the calibre to need 200,000 AP to fight, and no objective of importance comparable to Richmond secured in that time.



Of course, it's clear that what Halleck wanted by pulling McClellan back was to strip him of all his troops and send Pope off on an Overland campaign. This immediately fell apart, and historically the 1864 Overland Campaign resulted in... over 50,000 casualites and a Union force on the James, right where McClellan was when Halleck sent that letter.
 
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But the only source we have for "McClellan" saying so in the meeting is Halleck. We know one of McClellan's corps commanders (Keyes, IIRC) saying the enemy had 200,000 during the Seven Days.
McClellan does pass on his int debriefs (that "prisoners state" there are 200,000) but he caveats them by noting that rebels talk of regiments as 1,000 men each - indeed by the same measure Lincoln had been saying in July 1862 that McClellan had 160,000 minus the casualties of the seven days. This is actually Grand Aggregate, yet another strength measure, and by these standards Lee has 200,000 (212 regiments) and McClellan has 160,000 (172 regiments). McClellan passed on the int debrief in response to Lincoln saying McClellan had 160,000, so it can be viewed as a case of "well, if you want to measure that way then..."

Thus it's a matter of stength estimates. If Lee has 200,000 by Grand Aggregate (the int debrief number) then McClellan has 160,000 by Grand Aggregate (the number Lincoln was using for McClellan) and Pope has:
1st Corps
9 (Schenk) + 5 (Steinwehr) + 6 (Schurz) + 4 (Milroy) + 4 (Cav)
2nd Corps
13 (Williams) + 9 (Augur) + 4 (Cav)
3rd Corps
13 (King) + 13 (Ricketts) + 5 (Cav)
=85 regiments = ~80,000

Exclusive of things like the Railroad District and Washington defences themselves.

(And there are 20 regiments, thus 20,000, at Fort Monroe, which McClellan refers to as such. Similary he refers to the 9 regiments he did get as reinforcements in early July as "9,000 or 10,000".)


This is what is causing the confusion - there are several different measures for the size of an army. McClellan has 160,000 by Grand Aggregate, 110,000 by AP, ~90,000 by PFD and as low as 60,000 by Effectives - but they're all different expressions of the same army.

What Halleck is doing is the equivalent of saying that McClellan's 90,000 (PFD) can't possibly beat McClellan's 160,000 (GA) without an unfeasible amount of reinforcement...





McClellan did go down to Fort Monroe (IIRC it was there) specifically to have a telegraph conversation with Halleck, but Halleck dashed off a reply and then left the telegraph office without waiting for McClellan to send something back - thus rendering McClellan's journey pointless. I suppose you could call it a failing by McClellan that he didn't reply to explain to the author of Elements of Military Art and Science about what the columns on a US Army trimonthly return mean...

Mind you, Halleck did estimate 200,000 at Corinth on 5th April, the day before Shiloh.




The thing I find interesting about this argument is that it sort of assumes that McClellan was "caught out" in some way. But the reason why the discussion came up at all was because McClellan hadn't been reinforced on schedule (again!) - if he'd got the reinforcements that were at Fort Monroe and been told clearly that that was all he was getting then he'd have already been on the move. There is no point McClellan is told the truth about how many reinforcements he will get and when between about 20 May 1862 (when he's told to wait for 1st Corps) and about 4th August 1862 (when Halleck tells him there are no reinforcements en route, and orders him back to Washington.) In other words, he was misled for about two and a half months.

And, of course, if Halleck had stripped out 10,000 from his 200,000+ AP at the end of June then those could have joined McClellan as well. There was no force in Halleck's operational area in June which was of remotely the calibre to need 200,000 AP to fight, and no objective of importance comparable to Richmond secured in that time.



Of course, it's clear that what Halleck wanted by pulling McClellan back was to strip him of all his troops and send Pope off on an Overland campaign. This immediately fell apart, and historically the 1864 Overland Campaign resulted in... over 50,000 casualites and a Union force on the James, right where McClellan was when Halleck sent that letter.
There is no reason to complicate what McClellan was telling Halleck.

Halleck's memorandum is a report to Stanton of the discussion Halleck had with McClellan, and it lays out the discussion very simply and clearly. Here it is:

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Memorandum for the Secretary of War.

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 27, 1862

In accordance with the directions of the President, I left here on the afternoon of the 24th and reached the camp of General McClellan on the afternoon of the 25th.

I stated to the general that the object of my visit was to ascertain from him his views and wishes in regard to future operations. He said that he proposed to cross the James River at that point, attack Petersburg, and cut off the enemy's communications by that route south, making no further demonstration for the present against Richmond. I stated to him very frankly my views in regard to the danger and impracticability of the plan, to most of which he finally agreed.

I then told him that it seemed to me a military necessity to concentrate his forces with those of General Pope on some point where they could at the same time cover Washington and operate against Richmond, unless he felt strong enough to attack the latter place with a strong probability of success with the re-enforcements which could be given to him. He expressed the opinion that with 30,000 re-enforcements he could attack Richmond with "a good chance of success." I replied that I was authorized by the President to promise only 20,000, and that if he could not take Richmond with that number we must devise some plan for withdrawing his troops from their present position to some point where they could unite which those of General Pope without exposing Washington. He thought there would be no serious difficulty in withdrawing his forces for that purpose, but the movement he said would have a demoralizing influence on his own troops, and suggested the propriety of their holding their present position till sufficient re-enforcements could be collected. I told him that I had no authority to consider that he must decide between advising the withdrawal of his forces to some point to be agreed upon to meet General Pope or to advance on Richmond with the re-enforcements which the President had offered; that I was not sufficiently advised in regard to the position of our forces and those of the enemy to say how many additional troops could be given to him with safety, but that the President had decided that question by fixing his re-enforcements at 20,000 and I could promise no addition to that number.

I inferred from his remarks that under these circumstances he would prefer to withdraw and unite with General Pope; but I advised him to consult his officers and give me a final answer in the morning. He did so, and the next morning informed me that he would attack Richmond with the re-enforcements promised. He would not say that he thought the probabilities of success were in his favor, but that there was "a chance", and he was" willing to try it."

In regard to the force of the enemy, he expressed the opinion, that it was not less than 200,000 and I found that in this estimate most of his officers agreed. His own effective force was, officers and men, about 90,000,which with 20,000 re-enforcements, would make 110,000.

I had no time or opportunity to investigate the facts upon which these estimates were based, and therefore, can give no opinion as to their correctness.

His officers, as I understood, were about equally divided in opinion in regard to the policy of withdrawing or of risking an attack on Richmond.

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief.

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So this is McClellan telling Halleck that even with 20k reinforcements, he will still be facing an enemy roughly twice his size. Is Halleck supposed to ignore this opinion? No wonder McClellan was withdrawn. It was his own exaggerations that sealed his fate.
 
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There is no reason to complicate what McClellan was telling Halleck.

Halleck's memorandum is a report to Stanton of the discussion Halleck had with McClellan, and it lays out the discussion very simply and clearly. Here it is:

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So this is McClellan telling Halleck that even with 20k reinforcements, he will still be facing an enemy roughly twice his size. Is Halleck supposed to ignore this opinion? No wonder McClellan was withdrawn. It was his own exaggerations that sealed his fate.

This is Halleck's account, but it doesn't match the accounts of others. For example, Heintzelman recorded in his journal:

"July 26, Saturday

After 8.30 p.m. got a note to call at Headquarters and see the Commander-in-Chief. I went and met General Halleck, and met there General Meigs and General Burnside and General Cullum. I had a few minutes conversation with General Halleck and in about half an hour, he went aboard the boat he came in to leave this morning at 9 a.m. Most of the Corps Commanders were there; Keyes went home.

After General Halleck left, General McClellan called us together to discuss future movements. One plan was to move this army, by land or water, to join Pope. We had enough of flank movements and voted both impracticable, and otherwise, if practicable, not desirable. Another was to advance at once or wait for more reinforcements, contingent some time off. We were all in favor of an immediate advance, as soon as General Burnside's forces arrive. There will be no advance on Chattanooga by Buell for some time and in view of this, General McClellan opposes us taking Petersburg. He favors moving up on this side. We have 90,000 men and when seven more regiments from North Carolina arrive, we'll have 20,000 more. This is deemed sufficient to take Richmond. There is a great difference of opinion as to the force at Richmond. Some make it quarter of a million. I don't make it nearly so many.

It was 1 a.m. when I got here. Generals McClellan, Sumner, Porter, Franklin, Burnside and myself were present. McClellan and Franklin were not in all the time..."

As you can read there were divided opinions about the forces at Richmond. Keyes, who left with Halleck, wrote Halleck a letter whilst apparently on the boat with him spelling out his opinion that they'd fought 200,000, but what of the others.

Checking Sears, and checking his references I find a commonly quoted letter from Halleck to his Wife, which has led me to other letters. That didn't help here, but it led to another letter dated 9th November 1862 wherein Halleck gives his reason for removing McClellan - he was causing too much division in the cabinet and the government was on the brink of collapse.

Ah, found Sears' source, Burnside's JCCW testimony, which says Halleck discuss anything with the subordinate generals. He'd overseen a gathering of McClellan's subordinates to get them to vote and then left them to discuss things. McClellan, Sumner and Burnside delivered the decision the next morning - they would advance directly at Richmond on the left bank of the James once Burnside with his current force plus another 7 regiments (20,000 men) arrived.

Burnside reports the three officers who agreed with Halleck's notion that McClellan was outnumbered and the two armies (McClellan's and Pope's) should be united before Washington were Keyes, Franklin and Newton (acting commander of Slocum's division - both of Franklin's division commanders had gone home on leave). The record shows this was a minority opinion.
 
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We had enough of flank movements and voted both impracticable, and otherwise, if practicable, not desirable.
The interesting point about this is that indeed the movement did turn out to be impractical. I think Halleck had this idea that the army could be moved in days, but what he'd missed is that a large force making a movement to somewhere can leave behind anything that doesn't fit in the transports, but a large force evacuating has to - well, evacuate. Specifically:

The sick and the wounded need to go first of all. (Historically this took considerably more than a week, because not many shallow-draft troop transports could come all the way up to where McClellan was and because sick men need a lot of space.)
Then you need to ship off supplies. (This is because, well, McClellan's trying to transport an army and not just X thousand men. Since there isn't enough lying around spare at Aquia to completely equip 90,000 PFD, then the force needs to be moved with all of that.)
And finally the actual army needs to be embarked, after marching down to somewhere with deeper draft and more wharf space. (This actual part of the process didn't take very long.)

The result of this is that, while it does "combine" the armies, there's first a period of weeks when McClellan's army is too busy packing up to leave to put as much pressure on Richmond. McClellan's actual movements prolonged his departure from Harrisons for as long as possible to maintain pressure on Richmond, but it simply took longer for him to march down from Harrisons to Fort Monroe and take ship up to Aquia than it took for Lee to send troops up to fight Pope.
 
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As an aside, "200,000 at Richmond" is a true statement if the topic is "how many regiments" (much like Lincoln had referred in mid-July to McClellan having 160,000 men - 172 regiments) but "160,000 at Harrisons Landing" (the comparable statement about McClellan is true only if the topic is likewise "how many regiments". If the topic is "what is your strength for duty", then McClellan's strength is about 90,000 - but Lee's is not 200,000, it's more like 100,000 or a little more.

(The reason the Lee numbers are approximate is that the Valley force has to be estimated - it has no 20 July returns.)

Grand Aggregate (roster strength)
Lee 200,000: McClellan 160,000

Aggregate Present
Lee c. 120,000 (once forces called in): McClellan 110,000

PFD
Lee c. 100,000 (once forces called in): McClellan about 86,000 ("90,000")

Effectives currently present (all arms)
Lee c. 65,000 (without reinforcements): McClellan 65,000

Infantry Effectives
Lee c. 68,000 (once forces called in): McClellan 55,000


Thus the 200,000 number is there, and is the highest estimate for Lee's forces at Richmond (and is the number comparable to the number Lincoln was using for McClellan mid-month, 160,000) while 90,000 is also there and is the true statmement of how many of McClellan's men are not sick. It's the problem about "McClellan's 90,000 are outnumbered nearly 2:1 by McClellan's 160,000".

Now, if Halleck had thought something was odd about the idea of McClellan saying he could attack 200,000 with 110,000, then he could have quite easily asked a question right then and gotten an answer. Apparently he did not...
 
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I haven't seen any source which refutes that McClellan told Halleck that he was facing a confederate army of 200,000. After seeing the August 6 telegram, did McClellan ever deny telling Halleck that even with the 20k reinforcements, he would still be outnumbered 200k-110k?
 
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I haven't seen any source which refutes that McClellan told Halleck that he was facing a confederate army of 200,000. After seeing the August 6 telegram, did McClellan ever deny telling Halleck that even with the 20k reinforcements, he would still be outnumbered 200k-110k?

Why would he deny something he apparently never claimed? Numbers are tricky, because people use different ones.

Pinkerton's last report on 14th August reports he estimated the rebels had 200,000 (grand aggregate present and absent?*) during the Seven Days equaling 252 regiments of all arms (i.e. the quarter million), and that 80,000 (grand aggregate?) remained at Richmond and 80,000 (grand aggregate?) had gone to North Virginia upto 10th August.

The reality was at Richmond Lee had 219 regiments of all arms during the Seven Days, and had gained 24 since to equal 243 - Pinkerton's estimate was 9 regiments off.

McClellan had 170 regiments of all arms during the Seven Days and received 9 regiments to equal 179.

* There is no other number this can be.
 
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I haven't seen any source which refutes that McClellan told Halleck that he was facing a confederate army of 200,000. After seeing the August 6 telegram, did McClellan ever deny telling Halleck that even with the 20k reinforcements, he would still be outnumbered 200k-110k?

Right. The lawyer/general is telling the railroad exec./general, George you say they have 200,000 men. If that it the case we should concentrate and cover Washington, D.C., shouldn't we? And you're going to attack, though out numbered?
 
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Right. The lawyer/general is telling the railroad exec./general, George you say they have 200,000 men. If that it the case we should concentrate and cover Washington, D.C., shouldn't we? And you're going to attack, though out numbered?
...is a perfectly sensible question to ask during their face-to-face meeting at Harrisons, assuming that McClellan did indeed say himself that there were 200,000 Rebels and 90,000 Federals, but it wasn't asked for another week and a half. Why not?
 
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It's also probably worth considering that McClellan was generally pretty busy. He didn't get the telegram from Halleck (which, note, claims a general impression, not something McClellan said personally) until he was already involved in a massive logistical screw-up with trying to evacuate several thousand sick.
He'd also already been officially ordered off the Peninsula, after several days of being ordered to send off his sick and McClellan asking "is this so I can advance or so I can retreat?" so he might well have been too busy to quickly reply. On the other hand, if it's something McClellan never actually said himself to be comparable to the 90,000 number, then McClellan's actually pretty stuck - it's already abundantly clear that his "I will advance with 20,000" and Halleck's "I will send you 20,000" didn't lead to his getting 20,000, and he'd already been waiting more than a month for that and told "I have no reinforcements to give you".


Oddly enough, Halleck sent a message on the 30th July (which McClellan got on the 1st of August) saying to test whether the force in Richmond was "very small" as reports of deserters indicated. McClellan followed up on this, sending orders to occupy Malvern on the 2nd (delayed due to problems with the guides, as he continued to report to Halleck) but Halleck's order to evacuate the Peninsula was written on the 3rd August at 7PM because McClellan hadn't yet given intel on the recon towards Richmond. Looking at the message times (it seems from information later on this may be because a cable broke across the Chesapeake Bay, which is why McClellan crossed to Cherrystone Inlet for his failed conversation with Halleck) this actually indicates that Halleck was really quite impatient.
McClellan was sending telegraph messages pretty much daily to Halleck from the 28th to the 3rd, which means that the message delay time - the one resulting in McClellan getting orders two days after they were written - should have been pretty clear to Halleck by looking at the timestamps of the messages he was getting and when he was getting them. With a two-day one-way message travel time, expecting a recon report by 3rd August from a 30 July message is essentially expecting the recon to take no time at all...
 
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Both the July 27 memorandum and the August 6 letter state that McClellan personally gave the 200k estimate to Halleck.

Regarding the July 30 request for intel, perhaps it's because some in Washington thought McClellan's estimate was WAY off.

Meigs wrote this to Halleck on July 28:

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

Washington City, July 28, 1862.

Major-General HALLECK,

Commanding U. S. Army:

GENERAL: From the Richmond and Wilmington published notices of the battles of 26th and 27th June north of the Chickahominy I have with some care made out the following organizations of the attacking forces:*

The division of A. P. Hill is spoken of as 14,000 strong. I find notices of regiments: Second Florida went into action 250 strong; Twelfth Mississippi, 397; Eighteenth Virginia, 625; Eighth Virginia, 185; Forty-seventh Virginia, 275. From this it is evident that the old regiments are weak. The new conscript regiments may be strong, but the strongest regiment here named is less than 400 muskets.

I find four divisions, twelve brigades, and nine batteries names as in the battles north of the Chickahominy, as follows:

STONEWAL JACKSON'S DIVISION.

Brigadier-General Hood: Fifth and three other Virginia regiments. Brigadier-General Whiting: Eleventh, Sixteenth, Second Mississippi, and two other regiments. Brigadier-General Pender: (Five regiments)

D. H. HILL'S DIVISION.

Brigadiers not named.

A. P. HILL'S DIVISION.

Brigadier-General Ripley: Forty-fourth and Forty-eighth Georgia, Second and Third North Carolina. Brigadier-General Gregg: Five regiments. Brigadier-General Branch: Twenty-seventh, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-third, Thirty-seventh North Carolina, and one other regiment.

LONGSTREET'S DIVISION.

Brigadier-General Featherston: Eleventh and Nineteenth Mississippi and Second Mississippi Battalion. Brigadier-General Pryor: Fourteenth Louisiana, St. Paul's Louisiana Battalion, Third Virginia Fourteenth Alabama, and Second Florida. Brigadier-General Wilcox's Alabama regiments.

[ARTILLERY.]

Batteries named: Second Richmond Howitzers, Third Richmond Artillery, Johnson's, Donaldsonville, Thomas' (Purcell's), Crenshaw's, Andrews', First Maryland, Davidson's, Letcher Artillery, Milledge Artillery, and Morris Artillery.

These notes may be of use in dealing with this army, giving the distribution of some sixty regiments, which must be nearly one-half of the whole Richmond army.

An intelligent writer of Branch's division, writing in the North Carolina Wilmington Journal of 8th July, claiming credit for North Carolina, says that Carolina and Georgia contributed full one-half the regiments engaged in the Richmond battles-from 36 to 40 each. This would make the whole army, in his opinion, 152 regiments, which, at 700 men average, would give a total force of 105,000 men.

Permit me to suggest that a careful comparison of the notices which appear in the newspapers, lists of prisoners of war, and deserters, if made by an intelligent, educated man, would soon give us a tolerably correct idea of the forces opposing us. If this has ever been done in this part of the country there is, I fear, reason to believe that it has been done by incompetent of unfaithful hands.

Of 480 prisoners sent from Harrison's Bar to New York, the lists published in the New York Herald give the names of 74 regiments and 1 battalion of infantry, 5 batteries of artillery, and 1 regiment of cavalry. I find notices of 90 regiments infantry, 1 regiment cavalry, and 12 batteries of artillery all by name as in these battles.

I am, respectfully,

M. C. MEIGS,

Quartermaster-General.

----------------------------------------------------
 
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...is a perfectly sensible question to ask during their face-to-face meeting at Harrisons, assuming that McClellan did indeed say himself that there were 200,000 Rebels and 90,000 Federals, but it wasn't asked for another week and a half. Why not?
Halleck wrote that before leaving, he "inferred" that McClellan realized that withdrawal was right course of action. No reason to ask any question if he thought McClellan was leaning towards withdrawal.
 
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