Who was the better General: Braxton Bragg versus Joseph E. Johnston?

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As it stands, with all the samples available to judge their prowess of leading an army, who was the better General? I think their resume's are comparable, what are your thoughts?

Discuss.
 
Again if one thinks Johnston was correct is irrelevant. As the call to defend and attempt to relieve Vicksburg was from a superior, JJ role was to defend, then to carry out a relief effort, not set policy contrary to his superiors.

In principle, you are correct that superior orders are to be obeyed by a subordinate commander. But in the case of Johnston, I'm not quite sure whether the orders emanating from Davis did not leave a certain amount of wiggle room. Specifically, War Secretary Seddon instructing Johnston under Davis' authority on June 16, 1863 wrote, " Vicksburg must not be lost without a desperate struggle. The interest and honor of the Confederacy forbid it. I rely on you still to avert the loss." But in a further telegram to Johnston on June 21st, Seddon writes, "On every ground I have great deference for your superior knowledge of the position, your judgment, and military genius, but feel it right to share-if need by, to take-the responsibility, and leave you free to follow the most desperate course the occasion may demand." In other words, given the fact that Johnston had been given supreme command of the forces in Mississippi, Johnston believed he had a certain amount of discretion in carrying out the wishes of the War Department and the Davis government.
 
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In principle, you are correct that superior orders are to be obeyed by a subordinate commander. But in the case of Johnston, I'm not quite sure whether the orders emanating from Davis did not leave a certain amount of wiggle room. Specifically, War Secretary Seddon instructing Johnston under Davis' authority on June 16, 1863 wrote, " Vicksburg must not be lost without a desperate struggle. The interest and honor of the Confederacy forbid it. I rely on you still to avert the loss." But in a further telegram to Johnston on June 21st, Seddon writes, "On every ground I have great deference for your superior knowledge of the position, your judgment, and military genius, but feel it right to share-if need by, to take-the responsibility, and leave you free to follow the most desperate course the occasion may demand." In other words, given the fact that Johnston had been given supreme command of the forces in Mississippi, Johnston believed he had a certain amount of discretion in carrying out the wishes of the War Department and the Davis government.
Well his not defending or cooperating with Pemberton who did followed orders resulted in the loss of Vicksburg, which he had in fact been tasked with defending.

Any speculation of how it would have went if he had aggressively defended and cooperated will always be speculation.
 
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Well his not defending or cooperating with Pemberton who did followed orders resulted in the loss of Vicksburg, which he had in fact been tasked with defending.

Any speculation of how it would have went if he had aggressively defended and cooperated will always be speculation.
I never heard this before, did JJ blow it in Mississippi? I always assumed he got to Jackson to little to late.
 
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You didn't know Vicksburg he was tasked to defend and relieve fell? Yes it did, so he rather obviously failed in his task. He had been in the position for some time......yes would think his waiting so long to go to actual scene might have contributed.....as he could have been in Jackson well before.

I hadn't heard he was new to Army of the West when he goes to Jackson.......thought he had been appointed in 1862 to the command.......if he was just realizing Vicksburg was Grants focus when he arrives at Jackson.....it would reflect rather poorly on his acumen.
 
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Johnston held himself in limbo, trying to determine whether his own area of operations should be sacrificed by committing himself to Pemberton's defense. I don't agree with the decisions he made and feel he was sluggish, to a point equaling Buell the previous year, once he forced himself to take action.
Lubliner.
 
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I never really saw JJ as at fault for Vicksburg, it kinda felt like he was put in a bad position by his superiors, no?
I originally thought that as well, but now... I see where Johnston bears some blame. Davis seems to have envisioned him as a theater commander, able to make broad strategic decisions in the west and, if necessary, take field command to address the greatest threat. This is a point for those who believe he should have had a better grasp on needs and means (as archieclement states, he's been in the position for six months already). The battle of Raymond should have been a clue that delaying actions while Grant's columns were still south of the rail line could be very effective; he seems to have arrived at Jackson, taken a quick look around, and basically given up.

On the other hand, not giving him ultimate command of defense on both sides of the Mississippi was probably the biggest overall mistake (and, to his credit, he pointed this out). It would have been better to make his "theater" the Mississippi valley with all forts, ships, and troops in the area, with Holmes as a subordinate rather than Bragg. Doesn't necessarily make coordination of the separate forces any easier but at least in conjunction with Pemberton's actually quite good active defense (before Grant crosses the river) it makes the Federal problem that much more complicated.
 
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I originally thought that as well, but now... I see where Johnston bears some blame. Davis seems to have envisioned him as a theater commander, able to make broad strategic decisions in the west and, if necessary, take field command to address the greatest threat. This is a point for those who believe he should have had a better grasp on needs and means (as archieclement states, he's been in the position for six months already). The battle of Raymond should have been a clue that delaying actions while Grant's columns were still south of the rail line could be very effective; he seems to have arrived at Jackson, taken a quick look around, and basically given up.

On the other hand, not giving him ultimate command of defense on both sides of the Mississippi was probably the biggest overall mistake (and, to his credit, he pointed this out). It would have been better to make his "theater" the Mississippi valley with all forts, ships, and troops in the area, with Holmes as a subordinate rather than Bragg. Doesn't necessarily make coordination of the separate forces any easier but at least in conjunction with Pemberton's actually quite good active defense (before Grant crosses the river) it makes the Federal problem that much more complicated.
Oh wow, I didn't know this, maybe JJ isn't as good as I thought.
 
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I do agree with @Lubliner that Johnston was a good organizer and supplier. His men did like him. However, is that because of how well supplied they were, or because a lot like McClellan, he wasn't getting a lot of them killed?

When I first read this topic when it came up my knee jerk reaction was Johnston. After thinking it over my answer is Bragg. As someone else pointed out, Bragg's campaign plan to defeat Rosecrans as he marched south from Chattanooga far surpasses anything Johnston ever planned.
 
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I never heard this before, did JJ blow it in Mississippi? I always assumed he got to Jackson to little to late.

Johnston was the architect of Vicksburg's demise. As Department Commander, he stripped Mississippi of all its cavalry (Van Dorn, Forrest etc.) leaving Pemberton blind to Grant's movements during the campaign. Pemberton was forced to scatter his infantry to protect the State's industry, railroads, and other assets. If Pemberton had been allowed to retain some decent cavalry, it would have been much easier for him to concentrate his infantry in response to enemy movements.
 
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I never heard this before, did JJ blow it in Mississippi? I always assumed he got to Jackson to little to late.

Johnston was probably annoyed at being ordered to Mississippi in May 1862 even though he had already been appointed nominal chief of the western armies that included Bragg in Tennessee and Pemberton in Mississippi. Johnston, while believing that holding Vicksburg was futile, made half hearted attempts to support or "relieve" Pemberton as his orders required but he was probably correct in that the Confederacy could not muster enough force to overcome Grant's command in front of Vicksburg.
 
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Johnston was probably annoyed at being ordered to Mississippi in May 1862 even though he had already been appointed nominal chief of the western armies that included Bragg in Tennessee and Pemberton in Mississippi. Johnston, while believing that holding Vicksburg was futile, made half hearted attempts to support or "relieve" Pemberton as his orders required but he was probably correct in that the Confederacy could not muster enough force to overcome Grant's command in front of Vicksburg.

The timetable is important here. [You mean May 1863, right? In May 1862, Johnston is 'waiting for the perfect opportunity' to hit McClellan...] Johnston probably was annoyed - and, as I said before, it was probably because he recognized that without authority over resources in the Trans-Mississippi he was in a tight spot overall.

Holding Vicksburg was probably futile in an ultimate sense because of Union naval strength. But a long, carefully planned delaying action was not out of the question (note what Pemberton accomplished - and without cavalry, as Saruman says). Grant is in trouble with "folks back home" who don't understand military possibilities in off-seasons as it is. Johnston might have capitalized on that so that when better weather comes and Grant does get across the river he has strong forces south of the rail line to block the roads while Pemberton's main force moves up to join them. Vicksburg likely still eventually falls in the end but Johnston can honestly tell a disappointed Davis that he put up a good fight - and still has some 30,000 men available. This is all speculative, of course, since it depends on Johnston deciding to supervise things earlier than May and retain cavalry in the area.
In the actual event, the Confederacy absolutely could not muster enough force once Grant had set up his siege lines, as a result of failures to coordinate defensive efforts.

To think when I joined this forum seven years ago, I was a big fan of Uncle Joe... :D
 
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To think when I joined this forum seven years ago, I was a big fan of Uncle Joe..

Interestingly, I have had the reverse reaction. I do not ignore Johnston's many flaws, but my ongoing interest in learning about him leads me to hold a greater opinion of his military leadership. Unfortunately, one of his big flaws, a strong ego and unwillingness to respect civilian control, often diminished his effectiveness in command and harmed his influence in determining the course of military affairs.
 
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What the confederacy needed, and what Davis wanted, in the West were victories, that reversed the steady onslaught of Federal Armies. of the two commanders in question, it is Bragg.

In the East Federal Armies could be driven back, Not in the West. Only Bragg could do that. That he could do very little with his victories, puts him in the same category as all other confederate generals, including Lee.

Between the two choices offered in the OP, Bragg was better qualified to fight the kind of war needed to win independence, was Bragg. As long as Johnston could not match the numbers of his opponents, he just would not, or could not, provide the victories needed for Southern Independence.
 
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Given the fact that Bragg had a rebellion among his general officers and Johnston did not, I think the answer is obvious. Also, Johnston was the better strategist WRT when and where to use his army. Unfortunately for him, Fabian tactics which kept the army intact in order to influence the political outcome of the war did not suit the spirit of the leaders of the Confederacy.
 
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i will go with johnston. he had the confidence of his men. also his subordinates. whereas, we all know what a trainwreck brag was. man, he couldnt even get along with himself!! once fined himself for being late to a mtg. now, who does that??? then letting longstreet go in the face of superior numbers, while trying to maintain a siege?? then he let another division commander go to " help" somewhere else. d.h. hill?? i cant remember at this time[ just on my 2nd cup of coffee! lol!! also, sherman himself said he was glad to be rid of johnston, who sherman knew ,would continue to fight him every step of the way.in, strategic defense johnston, was a master. add to his list of accomplishments kennesaw, where he stood like a mountain that shermans waves crashed upon to no avail. again, johnston had his mens confidence, bragg, not so much. in fact they were glad, ecstatic when he left the army. johnston immediatelty opened up the stores and issued all the neccessities that brag had been witholding.
 
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What the confederacy needed, and what Davis wanted, in the West were victories, that reversed the steady onslaught of Federal Armies. of the two commanders in question, it is Bragg.

Evaluating Bragg's military effectiveness tends to be subsumed by his irritability and his difficulty with personal relations. Looking at his military record by itself, Bragg, who commanded at some of the most important western battles, was neither a total incompetent or a brilliant tactician. His direct assault on the Hornet's Nest at Shiloh was not particularly imaginative or wise, but his plan for flanking the AotC at Stones River was a bold move that almost succeeded. His leadership in the Kentucky "Heartland" campaign was an aggressive move at a time when southern fortunes were at a low point in the west, but that campaign ran out of steam in part because of Bragg's emphasis on attaining political goals, rather than vanquishing federal forces. He was outmaneuvered by Rosecrans during the Tullahoma campaign, but almost made up for it by devising plans for attacking and destroying in detail the separated wings of the AotC when it reached the mountain ridges in northern Georgia. But those plans did not come to pass, and were followed by his lackluster oversight and follow-up of the victory at Chickamauga. His defense of Chattanooga was probably a low point in his military career in part due to flawed troop and artillery dispositions and his strength reduction by diverting forces to Knoxville. Perhaps if Bragg had the support and respect of his subordinate officers (not to mention the rank and file soldiery), things might have turned out differently.
 
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From everything I have read, I would bet on Joe Johnston. Despite Bragg's claims otherwise he was a failure due to his own innate lack of leadership. He always blamed others for his faults and he really seemed to inspire hate and not confidence in his men and subordinates. There were at least two attempts on his life during his career in the Army. That should have sent him a big message. Well I guess at least his life loved him, and his children. A commander who inspires men under his command to try to kill him, says a lot about the character of the man. Johnston may not have been loved by his men, or inspired hatred, but at least they were willing to follow him.
 
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