Which Generals Understood The Real Nature Of The War?

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Sep 19, 2021
John Keegan, in my opinion the greatest military historian of the 20th century, wrote that only three Civil War generals understood that they were fighting a different kind of war: Grant, Sherman and Jackson. I might add D. H. Hill. Not because of battlefields; he was intensely disliked by Davis, Lee, Bragg and many of the Virginia generals and, as a result, had few important commands. However, from late 1861 he urged total mobilization of manpower and heavy taxation of resources. Failure to do so would result he correctly predicted in crushing defeat. Anyone else have any thoughts? I'd love to hear them.
 
I would have to be reminded how Keegan defined “different kind of war” before I answered.
(I admit to a bit of bias: I don’t think he ever really topped The Face of Battle. I especially remember his book on the ACW to be one of his weaker.)
 
I can understand Grant and Sherman, but not so sure about Jackson. As noted by @Pat Answer, it would be important to know how Keegan defined a "different" war. Grant and Sherman (and probably Sheridan), were in sync with the political objectives of the Lincoln administration, which by 1863 had been enlarged from simply preserving the Union to ending slavery. In line with those objectives, Grant and Sherman recognized that it was fighting an enemy that was not only the Confederacy's armed force, but included all disloyal southern civilians. To successfully fight the rebellion, those leaders acknowledged that the cause of the war (slavery), had to be wiped out and to do so, southern logistics and infrastructure were fair targets. This reasoning was the total opposite of the early northern war leaders such as McClellan and Buell, who believed in a limited war that only targeted armed force, and preserved the rights (particularly property rights to slavery), of southern civilians. As far as Jackson is concerned, the criteria were of course very different; Jackson was a brilliant practitioner of the art of maneuver and movement but whether or not that constitutes an innovation in warfare may be debatable.
 
Sherman understood it the most: take the fight to the slave owners and release the slaves the south's center of gravity.
 
Grant and Sherman, who has already been mentioned, but also Lee. Lee understood from the beginning that the south needed foreign recognition. He knew the south was at a disadvantage. Other Confederate generals thought the fighting spirit of the southern soldier/people would ultimately bring victory, and thus crush the northern will. Although Lee did not engage in "total war" he understood the window for the Confederacy to obtain independence was narrow and closing fast. Even from his letters prior to him taking command, he writes about not wanting war. He knew what awaited the south down the road and understood how the lack of men and material would affect the armies. Some southern politicians and generals were blinded by their will to achieve victory, Lee was not. He resisted war until it was his only course. Then when it began, he was all in, still knowing the odds were stacked against him. He even says in his famous quote how terrible war is. Grant knew the southern armies needed to be beaten into submission... that small victories here and there would not be enough. Lee understood this as well. While other generals were concentrated on Richmond, Grant knew the war would not end until Lee's army was destroyed. Grant began his flanking maneuvers to get around Lee's right. Once this began, Lee knew what the end result would be:

"We must destroy this Army of Grant's before he gets to the James River. If he gets there it will become a siege and then it will be a mere question of time,"

- Gen. R.E. Lee
 
Grant and Sherman, who has already been mentioned, but also Lee.

If you asked me how many generals understood the war they were fighting as opposed to a more abstract understanding of how that war was "different" than others, I wouldn't hesitate to include Lee as well. He knew he had to use his military victories to political effect. That is why he wasn't too excited by Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville.
 
I would have to be reminded how Keegan defined “different kind of war” before I answered.
(I admit to a bit of bias: I don’t think he ever really topped The Face of Battle. I especially remember his book on the ACW to be one of his weaker.)
agree with both statements. ACW book was written very late and I doubt he tried to break any new ground. But I have enormous respect for his opinions.
 
Keegan's book on the Civil War was so full of easily checked errors of fact, not interpretation, that he must have been delusional. As were his editors. The book is worthless. I annotated my copy and found error after error and then just threw it out. A shame because I read and liked many of his books.
 
Keegan's book on the Civil War was so full of easily checked errors of fact, not interpretation, that he must have been delusional. As were his editors. The book is worthless. I annotated my copy and found error after error and then just threw it out. A shame because I read and liked many of his books.

Keegan was a guy with great vision and grasp of the strategic, but often sloppy on the details. He needed a good editor or co-author.
 
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