Gavrilo Sartorys
Private
- Joined
- Aug 7, 2019
- Location
- Orléans, France
Yes, indeed ! It is more detailed than I first thought.This sounds like it would make a great after-action-report from your strategy game project...
Yes, indeed ! It is more detailed than I first thought.This sounds like it would make a great after-action-report from your strategy game project...
The problem with control is the threat to the civilian population, and all the territory between the Rapidan and the Potomac, and out into the Shenandoah or Martinsburg was hugely confederate. The government of the confederacy could not protect their citizens with the continual flip-flop, such as at Winchester. No wonder the confederates called foul more often than the north.It's worth pointing out that the Confederacy is the weaker power and the one which needs to manoeuvre for advantage. Launching an all-up assault on the main strength of the enemy is not to be done, but manouevering them out of position or attacking at advantage as a result of manoeuvre is perfectly feasible - look at what Lee does in June-August 1862. That period starts with Union armies on the Rappahannock/Rapidan and within miles of Richmond, and by the end of the period the Union armies have retreated largely north of the Potomac.
Of course Lee concentrates superior fighting power to do it, but he does it. That's triage on a continental scale.
I would argue however that if Confederate movements resulted in the Union "abandoning" an area and moving on, then they have functionally retaken it - they've just done it by presenting a threat to something more important (including "the army there"). The Confederates are not obligated to launch mass attacks on the enemy armies holding a position for it to count.
So which areas do you think the Confederacy recovered?It's worth pointing out that the Confederacy is the weaker power and the one which needs to manoeuvre for advantage. Launching an all-up assault on the main strength of the enemy is not to be done, but manouevering them out of position or attacking at advantage as a result of manoeuvre is perfectly feasible - look at what Lee does in June-August 1862. That period starts with Union armies on the Rappahannock/Rapidan and within miles of Richmond, and by the end of the period the Union armies have retreated largely north of the Potomac.
Of course Lee concentrates superior fighting power to do it, but he does it. That's triage on a continental scale.
I would argue however that if Confederate movements resulted in the Union "abandoning" an area and moving on, then they have functionally retaken it - they've just done it by presenting a threat to something more important (including "the army there"). The Confederates are not obligated to launch mass attacks on the enemy armies holding a position for it to count.
There are obviously no areas which the Confederacy recovered permanently, because that's tantamount to saying "the Confederacy lost the war" but that's not really a helpful claim- one could make the same claim of WW2 Germany after all. However, I would hold that the areas of:So which areas do you think the Confederacy recovered?
There are obviously no areas which the Confederacy recovered permanently, because that's tantamount to saying "the Confederacy lost the war" but that's not really a helpful claim- one could make the same claim of WW2 Germany after all. However, I would hold that the areas of:
- Eastern Henrico County and down to the mouth of the Pamunkey etc.
- The space between the Orange-Spotsylvania line and the Centreville-Leesburg line
- The Valley north of Port Republic up to at least Winchester
Were all areas which the Confederacy controlled (winter 1861), lost (up to June 1862) and then regained control of subsequently. In some cases this was by directly defeating a Union army, while in other cases this was by presenting a threat that pulled the Union army defending the area elsewhere.
I think the problem with it is that it's defining things increasingly narrowly. It gets to the point that it's almost tautological - the Confederacy never took anywhere the Union wanted to hold to such an extent that they didn't give it up, but if the Union moved troops out of the area because Confederate threat elsewhere compelled them to do so then it doesn't count? Which means manoeuvre doesn't count.Does that explain my position a bit better?
Echoing this one, especially since it and Pensacola, Florida essentially became the "home bases" for the Gulf Blockading Fleet in all of its subsequent operations until Mobile fell in 1864.Stopping Farragut before he got to New Oreans
No, I don't think that's it.I think the problem with it is that it's defining things increasingly narrowly. It gets to the point that it's almost tautological - the Confederacy never took anywhere the Union wanted to hold to such an extent that they didn't give it up, but if the Union moved troops out of the area because Confederate threat elsewhere compelled them to do so then it doesn't count? Which means manoeuvre doesn't count.
I would argue for example that the Union certainly wanted to control the Valley (specifically they wanted to hold it at least as far south as Front Royal) both to protect the line of the Baltimore and Ohio - something which is a major concern to Lincoln at various times - and as part of the defensive network of Washington more generally.
And the Union established that control of the Valley as far south as Front Royal in March and April 1862, with Banks establishing control of the Valley as far south as Harrisonburg by the end of April 1862, but at points after that date the Confederates instead established control of that section of the Valley. As of October 1862 Longstreet is at Martinsburg and no Union forces are in the Valley except for the perimeter around Harpers Ferry - that is a big swath of terrain which the Union would have rather kept but the Confederates gained control of, cutting a strategic rail line in doing so.
Similarly, as of June to July 1862 the Union's front line was along the Rapidan and they had a significant supply route stretching south from Washington to Culpeper; the area was under Union control and they were planning on using it as a base for further offensive operations. Then, in August and September, Confederate campaigning forced Pope back from that area, and no Union troops return to Culpeper until 1863 (while Longstreet is there November 1862 and his supply line is the one running to Culpeper). We could also include Fredericksburg itself in this categorization, as self-evidently it was under the control of McDowell in June 1862 and was not under Union control later in the year.
If there is any definition of establishing control of an area that is consistent, I think that having a major part of the primary field army based in that area for around a month would have to qualify.
But the plan at the time was certainly to occupy the Shenandoah down to the Front Royal area on a permanent basis, and that included keeping the Baltimore and Ohio safe.The Union wasn't trying to occupy the Shenandoah down to the Lynchburg area in 1862. They would not have minded doing it, but the only reason they are making the big effort they did there was to try to smash Jackson. It was a diversion, one that can be laid at the door of Lincoln and Stanton -- but even they thought all along the troops would be withdrawn and sent on to Richmond to McClellan. The operation was unwise, bungled in execution, and should have been avoided -- but it was never a Union effort to occupy the Shenandoah.
I think this is missing the fact that, as of July 1862, the Union was occupying the Culpeper area so as to use it as a launch point for an offensive (and Lincoln at least was likely not thinking in terms of the army being based on the York - if he was then he wouldn't have wanted the army withdrawn all the way back to Richmond before starting again.) But when the Union left that area it was not because they'd moved on to Richmond, it was because Lee had launched an offensive which Pope retreated from rather than get defeated.The Central Virginia area is useful as a route to advance on Richmond -- but if you can do that, you no longer need to hold it. If the Union had sent McDowell down to join McClellan by that route, it would probably have shifted to a base on the York River when it got close enough, abandoning the vulnerable overland LOC as Grant did. Again, no real Union plan to control and occupy central Virginia, just to move through it.
I did not include Donelson as I was uncertain if it could be considered large enough in numbers of men engaged, though it was certainly of massive importance.I would say Donelson and Shiloh.
Donelson was probably the earliest turning point of the war. The loss of Donelson lost all of Kentucky, most of Tennessee, and it was the emergence of Grant, which catapulted him into the spotlight. It's also when the Northern machine began to fire on all cylinders. Shiloh was a desperate attempt to stop the machine, which failed at a great cost. Basically from that point on, the Union continuously advanced, except Chickamauga, which ended up being a fruitless victory.
I believe that at the time the federal movement up those rivers was envisaged it was in the understanding that either they would gain those rivers or (so as to stop them) the Confederates would deploy forces there which would not be available for a campaign around Richmond. At the time of Fort Donelson the planned offensive in the East was still Urbana.This raises an interesting question: what was the Union plan in the West if they failed to gain the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers?
I agree, by then it was way too late to even think about a victory that would turn everything around.Bentonville (19-21 March 1865)
I don't believe it will come as a shock that I don't see how a decisive victory for the Confederates in 1865 is even possible, let alone how such an improbable victory could materially improve the strategic situation. I really don't have anything to contribute here, and it has been included for completeness. Of course, I'm willing to hear a case for it, but I doubt there is a particularly good one.
I make it about 100 men per original regimental organization (ca. 200 regiments and ca. 20,000 men), though a lot of those had undergone consolidation. Some Union divisions in the past had been temporarily down even lower due to battlefield disruption, though... (one US division at Antietam was mustering a bit less than 30 men per regiment on the afternoon of the 17th.)But, I am always struck by how even Union forces remarked that it was sad to see how close the regimental flags were to each other during Confederate movements. Regiments commanded by captains?