Which Confederate Victory in the West Would Have had the Greatest Consequences?

Saphroneth

Major
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
Having Vicksburg be a Confederate victory is one thing, but having Vicksburg fail is another and rather more possible to my understanding. Hmm...

I suspect that if Bowen had not blown up the Grand Gulf fortifications and withdrawn (instead holding the line of Bayou Pierre), Grant would then have had rather more difficulties conducting his campaign; this might have turned the trick, for example by giving JEJ more time to concentrate troops in the vicinity for a field battle?
 

Belfoured

Sergeant Major
Joined
Aug 3, 2019
The reasonable best case for the Confederates at Shiloh essentially boils down to better Confederate discipline during the approach march (i.e. they don't eat all their multiple days' rations on the first night) and the plan being better worked out, or to be more precise the initial plan being more fully followed with the left wheel and a deployment to match.

What you then have is five Union divisions in camp (about 62-64 regiments by my count) being attacked by the whole of ASJ's field army (totalling about 78 infantry regiments by my quick count) with operational surprise and a good deployment. Historically they had a poor deployment rather than a good one and managed to push the AoT back a long way, but that meant they were falling back on Pittsburg Landing instead of being forced away; the Confederate army was also disrupted by the troops breaking ranks because they were hungry, and the loss of ASJ meant there was no centralized command to have them bypass and encircle hard points like the historical Hornet's Nest.

This means that there are two to three reasons for the fighting to go better (troops better fed, better deployment) and the structure of the fighting is to force the Union troops on the field against Owl Creek Swamp, and cut them off from Pittsburg Landing rather than force them back on it. Even with their historical problems the Confederates made most of the headway (on the 6th) they'd need to make in this alternate, so this is merely "things going better where there were historical screwups".

The outcome of that is not the loss of every man of Grant's forces on the field; it's heavy casualties and the loss of most of their equipment. The remainder would be the ones who could either escape the wheel by moving north or escape over Owl Creek Swamp in the night of the 6th, which would then link up with Lew Wallace's division (to the north) and Buell's arriving forces on the 7th.

Given the casualties that were suffered historically (13,000 men lost including the surrender of a division) despite all the problems that were involved, it seems reasonable to me that you could have on the order of 20,000 Union casualties in this situation. The result is that the Army of Tennessee would be down to one formed division (Lew Wallace) and enough fragments to count as one or two more, but without their equipment - at best they'd have their personal weapons.

At this point the Confederate army might be able to turn on Buell, if he's transported his divisions over the river to Pittsburg Landing (he'd be outnumbered around 2:1 once all four of his divisions arrived); if he's instead linked up with Lew Wallace to the north then the Confederates would probably be best served by retiring from the field.


The result of this is that the Army of the Tennessee needs a virtual rebuilding, especially in terms of morale.
There are actually some very significant historical realities that would have to change - and you've identified a few.

To be clear, however, I think the following is the deal-breaker even if all those go the right way:

"At this point the Confederate army might be able to turn on Buell, if he's transported his divisions over the river to Pittsburg Landing (he'd be outnumbered around 2:1 once all four of his divisions arrived); if he's instead linked up with Lew Wallace to the north then the Confederates would probably be best served by retiring from the field."

How would Buell be outnumbered 2:1 once his four divisions arrived? You need to calculate Johnston as "c.40,000 - X" and measure that against the Army of the Ohio's four divisions (the 4 divisions in question had c. 40,000 pfd later that month). But I think you're correct about a link-up of Buell with Lew Wallace - retreat by the A of T is the only sensible move.
 

Saphroneth

Major
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How would Buell be outnumbered 2:1 once his four divisions arrived? You need to calculate Johnston as "c.40,000 - X" and measure that against the Army of the Ohio's four divisions (the 4 divisions in question had c. 40,000 pfd later that month). But I think you're correct about a link-up of Buell with Lew Wallace - retreat by the A of T is the only sensible move.
My understanding was that the AoO had ~17,000 men at Shiloh (counting all four divisions at the time, though possibly after straggling), and that if Johnston had suffered as many as ~8,000 casualties (putting him down to ~33,000) then it'd be about 2:1. It wasn't intended to be exact and the AoO numbers were based on Wikipedia.

It's interesting to contemplate whether the first AoO division to arrive would have been moved over the river by itself. If it did and it escaped the "kessel" (but was unable to contribute by itself) then it'd be very vulnerable unless either evacuated or Buell reinforced it.
 

Saphroneth

Major
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Nelson's division return (4th Div) for March is 6,724 men PFD inclusive of cavalry.
They suffered 716 casualties all told at Shiloh (which should put them at 6008 after casualties) - meaning that the May 31/June 1 report which gives them 6512 is after the recovery of 504 casualties (5/7 of those suffered) despite the Corinth fighting. The April report gives 5,743 PFD, though, which is lower than we'd expect and is a bit weird.

2nd Division I can't find a March return, but their April return is 10285; their May return is 8155.
5th Division is missing one 3-regiment brigade in April (and is 3669 without that brigade). In May they're 3659.
6th Division is 4825 in April and 6569 in May.

Adding all the April returns gives 24522; adding the May ones gives 24895. It looks like the number I gave was either incorrect or the April return reflects substantial numbers of troops who arrived after Shiloh itself (possibly it did not include 6th Division, though this wouldn't make up for the difference by itself).
 

Belfoured

Sergeant Major
Joined
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Nelson's division return (4th Div) for March is 6,724 men PFD inclusive of cavalry.
They suffered 716 casualties all told at Shiloh (which should put them at 6008 after casualties) - meaning that the May 31/June 1 report which gives them 6512 is after the recovery of 504 casualties (5/7 of those suffered) despite the Corinth fighting. The April report gives 5,743 PFD, though, which is lower than we'd expect and is a bit weird.

2nd Division I can't find a March return, but their April return is 10285; their May return is 8155.
5th Division is missing one 3-regiment brigade in April (and is 3669 without that brigade). In May they're 3659.
6th Division is 4825 in April and 6569 in May.

Adding all the April returns gives 24522; adding the May ones gives 24895. It looks like the number I gave was either incorrect or the April return reflects substantial numbers of troops who arrived after Shiloh itself (possibly it did not include 6th Division, though this wouldn't make up for the difference by itself).
I think it's virtually impossible to pin down exactly how many the Army of the Ohio would have brought to the field. The April returns for the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth are larger but include some troops not there and the Second also has a note indicating its total is from an unspecified earlier date. The hypothetical assumes Johnston's plan for April 4/5, meaning the A of the T would be defeated before Buell arrived (and with Wallace up at Crump's/Stony Lonesome). And whether Buell would do anything before Thomas also was up is questionable (Mitchel seems off the table). My point is simply that even defeating Grant leaves Johnston still having to confront a significant enemy force after suffering his own substantial losses. I just don't see defeating Grant as being a "game changer" in that arena. But that's why there's no "right" or "wrong" with these hypotheticals.
 

Saphroneth

Major
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My point is simply that even defeating Grant leaves Johnston still having to confront a significant enemy force after suffering his own substantial losses. I just don't see defeating Grant as being a "game changer" in that arena. But that's why there's no "right" or "wrong" with these hypotheticals.
It leaves Johnston with a significant enemy force to confront, yes - but what I'm thinking about is the wider consequences as much as anything.

Those including:

The Army of the Tennessee has been badly damaged and will need a virtual rebuilding, taking many months. Either Halleck's campaign to take Corinth will be substantially delayed or he will have to go ahead with about five fewer capable divisions (as the remnants of the Shiloh divisions will not be capable).

Thus far the Union and the Confederacy have fought major field battles twice (First Bull Run and now here) and in both cases the Union has come out of it unambiguously defeated. If things go much as in our timeline in the Peninsular campaign then that's followed by Seven Pines (inconclusive) and then the Seven Days once Lee's reinforcements have arrived, which creates the general impression that the Confederacy's winning formula is to concentrate on a strategic scale followed by smashing a Union army attempting to take the offensive. This will in turn shape strategy for both sides in future, probably leading to a heavier Union emphasis on coordination in time (something that was historically lacking).

This battle could also lead to significant negatives for the CSA, however, if the need to rebuild the Army of the Tennessee (or just the sense that the offensive armies need to be larger) results in a resumption of recruitment. Reopening the manpower tap for the Union in April rather than July solves most of the Union's summer 1862 strategic issues, and I would say that this is a significant consequence... not a positive one for the Confederates, but it's a significant consequence!
Similarly if the Confederates get the sense that their winning formula involves heavy attacks on the enemy then they're going to start to run into big problems the first time they follow that formula against strong entrenchments. This is effectively the trajectory of warfare in WW2 between the Western Allies and the Germans, with the CSA here playing the role of the Germans.

Also, Grant and Sherman probably don't get out of this with a major military career in their future, which probably means different generals rise to the top. That could have significant implications both positive and negative for the Union - perhaps an Easterner goes west this time. Franklin's Operations Against Vicksburg?
 

Belfoured

Sergeant Major
Joined
Aug 3, 2019
It leaves Johnston with a significant enemy force to confront, yes - but what I'm thinking about is the wider consequences as much as anything.

Those including:

The Army of the Tennessee has been badly damaged and will need a virtual rebuilding, taking many months. Either Halleck's campaign to take Corinth will be substantially delayed or he will have to go ahead with about five fewer capable divisions (as the remnants of the Shiloh divisions will not be capable).

Thus far the Union and the Confederacy have fought major field battles twice (First Bull Run and now here) and in both cases the Union has come out of it unambiguously defeated. If things go much as in our timeline in the Peninsular campaign then that's followed by Seven Pines (inconclusive) and then the Seven Days once Lee's reinforcements have arrived, which creates the general impression that the Confederacy's winning formula is to concentrate on a strategic scale followed by smashing a Union army attempting to take the offensive. This will in turn shape strategy for both sides in future, probably leading to a heavier Union emphasis on coordination in time (something that was historically lacking).

This battle could also lead to significant negatives for the CSA, however, if the need to rebuild the Army of the Tennessee (or just the sense that the offensive armies need to be larger) results in a resumption of recruitment. Reopening the manpower tap for the Union in April rather than July solves most of the Union's summer 1862 strategic issues, and I would say that this is a significant consequence... not a positive one for the Confederates, but it's a significant consequence!
Similarly if the Confederates get the sense that their winning formula involves heavy attacks on the enemy then they're going to start to run into big problems the first time they follow that formula against strong entrenchments. This is effectively the trajectory of warfare in WW2 between the Western Allies and the Germans, with the CSA here playing the role of the Germans.

Also, Grant and Sherman probably don't get out of this with a major military career in their future, which probably means different generals rise to the top. That could have significant implications both positive and negative for the Union - perhaps an Easterner goes west this time. Franklin's Operations Against Vicksburg?
Certainly possible - but we'll never know. I do think it could well have derailed Grant and Sherman, and if it left Buell in charge ... Of course, it might also have left Pope in charge in a realm where he was better off than against Lee, Halleck might also have taken a face-plant with Grant - and on and on and on we could go.
 

Saphroneth

Major
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Certainly possible - but we'll never know. I do think it could well have derailed Grant and Sherman, and if it left Buell in charge ... Of course, it might also have left Pope in charge in a realm where he was better off than against Lee, Halleck might also have taken a face-plant with Grant - and on and on and on we could go.
Well, the whole thread is about speculation! Arguably the whole forum is...
 
Joined
Aug 7, 2019
In my opinion, the successful Union advance in Kentucky and Tennessee between January-March 1862 definitely shaped the course of following actions later fought in the West.

With some support from the Trans-Mississippi District, Sidney Johnston can delay the evacuation of Bowling Green which brings him enough time to fortify Nashville. Therefore, Van Dorn's forces is reduced to the Missouri division under the command of Sterling Price (8,000), one Texas cavalry brigade under James McIntosh (3,000) and one Indian brigade under Albert Pike (2,500), all in all 13,500 men to confront an equally-sized Union force. Ben McCulloch's Arkansas units (4,000) are transferred to either Polk or Buckner. Floyd and Pillow can be transferred to New Orleans or to Pensacola.

Lovell keeps at least 4,000 infantry manning New Orleans Defenses to prevent the further capture of the town. Bragg stills transfer part of his command (8,000) to Sidney Johnston, sooner than historically. Crittenden prevents Zollicoffer to attack Thomas at Mill Springs and await for Union advance, securing Cumberland Gap with his three brigades (Zollicoffer's, Carroll's and Rains').

Order of Battle January 10, 1862

Western Department : Gen. Albert S. Johnston (46,000 to 54,000 men)
- - - Cavalry Brigade : Lt-Col. Nathan B. Forrest

- - McCulloch's Division : Brig-Gen. Benjamin McCulloch (4,000)
- - - Hébert's Brigade : Col. Louis Hébert
- - - McNair's Brigade : Col. Evander McNair

- Army of Central Kentucky : Maj-Gen. William J. Hardee (24,000)
- - Hindman's (Hardee's old) Division : Brig-Gen. Thomas C. Hindman (6,000)
- - - Marmaduke's (Hindman's old) Brigade : Col. John S. Marmaduke
- - - Wood's Brigade : Col. Sterling A. M. Wood
- - - Cleburne's Brigade : Col. Patrick R. Cleburne
- - Buckner's Division : Brig-Gen. Simon B. Buckner (6,000)
- - - McCausland's (Floyd's old) Brigade : Col. John McCausland
- - - Baldwin's Brigade : Col. William E. Baldwin
- - - Brown's Brigade : Col. John C. Brown
- - Breckinridge's Division : Brig-Gen. John C. Breckinridge (6,000)
- - - Trabue's (Breckinridge's old) Brigade : Col. Robert P. Trabue
- - - Bowen's Brigade : Col. John S. Bowen
- - - Clark's Brigade : Col. Marcellus J. Clarke
- - Tilghman's Division : Brig-Gen. Lloyd Tilghman (6,000)
- - - Heiman's Brigade : Col. Adolphus Heiman
- - - Drake's Brigade : Col. Joseph Drake
- - - Johnson's Brigade : Col. Bushrod R. Johnson

- District of Columbus : Maj-Gen. Leonidas Polk (12,000)
- - Cheatham's Division : Brig-Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham (4,000)
- - - Smith's Brigade : Col. Preston Smith
- - - Stephens' Brigade : Col. William H. Stephens
- - Clark's Division : Brig-Gen. Charles Clark (4,000)
- - - Stewart's Brigade : Brig-Gen. Alexander P. Stewart
- - - Russell's Brigade : Col. Robert M. Russell
- - McCown's Division : Brig-Gen. John P. McCown (4,000)
- - - Walker's Brigade : Col. Lucius M. Walker
- - - Gantt's Brigade : Col. Edward W. Gantt

- District of East Tennessee : Maj-Gen. George B. Crittenden (6,000)
- - - Zollicoffer's Brigade : Brig-Gen. Felix K. Zollicoffer
- - - Carroll's Brigade : Brig-Gen. William H. Carroll
- - - Rains' Brigade : Col. James E. Rains

- Bragg's Command (Dept. Alabama & West Florida) : Maj-Gen. Braxton Bragg (8,000)
- - Withers' Division : Brig-Gen. Jones M. Withers (4,000)
- - - Walker's Brigade : Brig-Gen. Leroy P. Walker
- - - Chalmers' Brigade : Brig-Gen. James R. Chalmers
- - Gladden's Division : Brig-Gen. Adley H. Gladden (4,000)
- - - Jackson's Brigade : Brig-Gen. John K. Jackson
- - - Anderson's Brigade : Brig-Gen. James P. Anderson

- Lovell's Command (Dept. Southern Mississippi & Est Louisiana) : Maj-Gen. Mansfield Lovell (4,000)
- - Ruggles' Division : Brig-Gen. Daniel Ruggles (4,000)
- - - Gibson's Brigade : Col. Randall L. Gibson
- - - Pond's Brigade : Col. Preston Pond

Now, the Confederates have the choice of fighting Grant at Fort Donelson, waiting the Union attack at Nashville or launching their own offensive against either Grant or Buell.
 
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trice

Lt. Colonel
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the Atlanta battles (20-28 July 1864)
This is the last campaign which I think, given the right set of events, could have maybe, just maybe, resulted in a substantially improved Confederate strategic situation. It's arguable whether retaining Johnston as commander of the AoT would have saved Atlanta, and I've heard arguments for both sides.

The battles of Peach Tree Creek, Bald Hill, and Ezra Church, as they were fought historically, do not hold much promise. The first two were overly ambitious, and the third only occurred because S. D. Lee ignored his orders. I'm intrigued by the suggestion, fanciful though it may be, that a similar strategy to that used by Lee at Petersburg could have worked at Atlanta.

Franklin (30 November 1864)
With these last three battles, I don't see how victories at any of them are particularly likely. About the best chance I see for improving Hood's chances in this campaign may be if he actually manages to capture Schofield's wagons at Spring Hill. Other than that, perhaps an early attack at Franklin or Lee's corps being present from the beginning may improve the situation, but I doubt it. Forrest's flank attack, based on reading Stephen Hood's book, seems to have not been the guaranteed success many have claimed it would have been.

Nashville (15-16 December 1864)
Arguably, the battle of Nashville should have never been fought, and Hood's chances for anything like a victory here is very slim.

Bentonville (19-21 March 1865)
I don't believe it will come as a shock that I don't see how a decisive victory for the Confederates in 1865 is even possible, let alone how such an improbable victory could materially improve the strategic situation. I really don't have anything to contribute here, and it has been included for completeness. Of course, I'm willing to hear a case for it, but I doubt there is a particularly good one.
I think you missed one here.

If the Confederates are going to do something, it should have been earlier in 1864 -- above Atlanta, in the mountains. Doing so probably requires a better Confederate command structure, better commanders, and co-ordination -- things the Confederates were always short on. Probably they need the AoT in four corps instead of three, with no Polk and two better/more aggressive men in higher command (Cleburne and ??) of two small Corps. You need someone capable of handling a force of 10-12,000 infantry and cavalry ***independently*** of the main AoT on the flank of the Yankee advance -- probably on the Alabama flank -- to threaten the LOC Stonewall is dead by then, but he'd be perfect. You also need a Joe Johnston a bit more R. E. Lee in getting his army to actually act and strike.
 

Lubliner

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What really shines through all of the "what-if's" is the Union Army was able to recover considerably quicker than the confederates, whether they won or lost. Also on the draws, the stability of the Union for maintaining locations and furnishing supplies for building up was incrementally more productive than the confederates. So taking into consideration the original question that was posed; the ability for the confederates to stave off the Union at Donelson and Henry, saving Nashville, and keeping Arkansas and Missouri, Island #10 etc. had to be followed up by an adequate logistical operation. Somehow I never see this happen. Even holding ground the confederacy just doesn't have enough (1863-1864).
Lubliner.
 

Pat Answer

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The resources disparity between the two sides is perhaps nowhere as markedly apparent as in the west. I think the greatest what-if may yet be Kentucky going Confederate. Not that the Ohio River could have long remained a viable defense line without a brown-water fleet (again the importance of the navy), but having a buffer zone for central Tennessee for even a little while could have had important consequences. ...Or not if Davis would still feel obliged to keep the “hold all points” grand strategy....
As others here have said, if not in so many words, logistics and leadership ultimately make a battle mean something and in this theater the CS had some pretty serious disadvantages throughout the war.
 

trice

Lt. Colonel
Joined
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What really shines through all of the "what-if's" is the Union Army was able to recover considerably quicker than the confederates, whether they won or lost. Also on the draws, the stability of the Union for maintaining locations and furnishing supplies for building up was incrementally more productive than the confederates. So taking into consideration the original question that was posed; the ability for the confederates to stave off the Union at Donelson and Henry, saving Nashville, and keeping Arkansas and Missouri, Island #10 etc. had to be followed up by an adequate logistical operation. Somehow I never see this happen. Even holding ground the confederacy just doesn't have enough (1863-1864).
Lubliner.
One of the things that stands out about the Civil War is that once the Union was able to take and occupy any particular area for a time, the Confederacy was never able to retake it. Sometimes the Union would abandon it and move on, letting the Confederates have it. Sometimes the Confederates could launch a raid, even an army-level raid, to run through it -- but they could not take and hold anything they lost.
 

Saphroneth

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It's worth pointing out that the Confederacy is the weaker power and the one which needs to manoeuvre for advantage. Launching an all-up assault on the main strength of the enemy is not to be done, but manouevering them out of position or attacking at advantage as a result of manoeuvre is perfectly feasible - look at what Lee does in June-August 1862. That period starts with Union armies on the Rappahannock/Rapidan and within miles of Richmond, and by the end of the period the Union armies have retreated largely north of the Potomac.

Of course Lee concentrates superior fighting power to do it, but he does it. That's triage on a continental scale.

I would argue however that if Confederate movements resulted in the Union "abandoning" an area and moving on, then they have functionally retaken it - they've just done it by presenting a threat to something more important (including "the army there"). The Confederates are not obligated to launch mass attacks on the enemy armies holding a position for it to count.
 

Pat Answer

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My understanding is that he'd given that up even before Fort Donelson, and that Fort Donelson was unusually well garrisoned because they were holding it temporarily while they moved to a more flexible defensive line.
I had thought the concentration at Corinth (Polk from Columbus, Bragg from Mobile, Ruggles from New Orleans(?)) was more in response to the fall of Donelson but I wouldn’t be surprised to be wrong about that.

I do know A Johnston was trying to buy time at that point, as you said, and there was some disagreement/confusion over how long the forts were supposed to hold before withdrawal.
 

Saphroneth

Major
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I had thought the concentration at Corinth (Polk from Columbus, Bragg from Mobile, Ruggles from New Orleans(?)) was more in response to the fall of Donelson but I wouldn’t be surprised to be wrong about that.
The understanding I have is specifically that Donelson was to be held long enough to protect the Clarksville Rail Bridge and allow the withdrawal from Bowling Green. Can't get confirmation at the moment though.
 

Pat Answer

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The understanding I have is specifically that Donelson was to be held long enough to protect the Clarksville Rail Bridge and allow the withdrawal from Bowling Green. Can't get confirmation at the moment though.
That's ok - that's what I meant about A Johnston wanting to buy time, so I agree. I'm conflating early Feb with late March. (A bad habit... :D)
 

Pat Answer

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In my opinion, the successful Union advance in Kentucky and Tennessee between January-March 1862 definitely shaped the course of following actions later fought in the West.

With some support from the Trans-Mississippi District, Sidney Johnston can delay the evacuation of Bowling Green which brings him enough time to fortify Nashville. Therefore, Van Dorn's forces is reduced to the Missouri division under the command of Sterling Price (8,000), one Texas cavalry brigade under James McIntosh (3,000) and one Indian brigade under Albert Pike (2,500), all in all 13,500 men to confront an equally-sized Union force. Ben McCulloch's Arkansas units (4,000) are transferred to either Polk or Buckner. Floyd and Pillow can be transferred to New Orleans or to Pensacola.

Lovell keeps at least 4,000 infantry manning New Orleans Defenses to prevent the further capture of the town. Bragg stills transfer part of his command (8,000) to Sidney Johnston, sooner than historically. Crittenden prevents Zollicoffer to attack Thomas at Mill Springs and await for Union advance, securing Cumberland Gap with his three brigades (Zollicoffer's, Carroll's and Rains').

Order of Battle January 10, 1862

Western Department : Gen. Albert S. Johnston (46,000 to 54,000 men)
- - - Cavalry Brigade : Lt-Col. Nathan B. Forrest

- - McCulloch's Division : Brig-Gen. Benjamin McCulloch (4,000)
- - - Hébert's Brigade : Col. Louis Hébert
- - - McNair's Brigade : Col. Evander McNair

- Army of Central Kentucky : Maj-Gen. William J. Hardee (24,000)
- - Hindman's (Hardee's old) Division : Brig-Gen. Thomas C. Hindman (6,000)
- - - Marmaduke's (Hindman's old) Brigade : Col. John S. Marmaduke
- - - Wood's Brigade : Col. Sterling A. M. Wood
- - - Cleburne's Brigade : Col. Patrick R. Cleburne
- - Buckner's Division : Brig-Gen. Simon B. Buckner (6,000)
- - - McCausland's (Floyd's old) Brigade : Col. John McCausland
- - - Baldwin's Brigade : Col. William E. Baldwin
- - - Brown's Brigade : Col. John C. Brown
- - Breckinridge's Division : Brig-Gen. John C. Breckinridge (6,000)
- - - Trabue's (Breckinridge's old) Brigade : Col. Robert P. Trabue
- - - Bowen's Brigade : Col. John S. Bowen
- - - Clark's Brigade : Col. Marcellus J. Clarke
- - Tilghman's Division : Brig-Gen. Lloyd Tilghman (6,000)
- - - Heiman's Brigade : Col. Adolphus Heiman
- - - Drake's Brigade : Col. Joseph Drake
- - - Johnson's Brigade : Col. Bushrod R. Johnson

- District of Columbus : Maj-Gen. Leonidas Polk (12,000)
- - Cheatham's Division : Brig-Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham (4,000)
- - - Smith's Brigade : Col. Preston Smith
- - - Stephens' Brigade : Col. William H. Stephens
- - Clark's Division : Brig-Gen. Charles Clark (4,000)
- - - Stewart's Brigade : Brig-Gen. Alexander P. Stewart
- - - Russell's Brigade : Col. Robert M. Russell
- - McCown's Division : Brig-Gen. John P. McCown (4,000)
- - - Walker's Brigade : Col. Lucius M. Walker
- - - Gantt's Brigade : Col. Edward W. Gantt

- District of East Tennessee : Maj-Gen. George B. Crittenden (6,000)
- - - Zollicoffer's Brigade : Brig-Gen. Kelix K. Zollicoffer
- - - Carroll's Brigade : Brig-Gen. William H. Carroll
- - - Rains' Brigade : Col. James E. Rains

- Bragg's Command (Dept. Alabama & West Florida) : Maj-Gen. Braxton Bragg (8,000)
- - Withers' Division : Brig-Gen. Jones M. Withers (4,000)
- - - Walker's Brigade : Brig-Gen. Leroy P. Walker
- - - Chalmers' Brigade : Brig-Gen. James R. Chalmers
- - Gladden's Division : Brig-Gen. Adley H. Gladden (4,000)
- - - Jackson's Brigade : Brig-Gen. John K. Jackson
- - - Anderson's Brigade : Brig-Gen. James P. Anderson

- Lovell's Command (Dept. Southern Mississippi & Est Louisiana) : Maj-Gen. Mansfield Lovell (4,000)
- - Ruggles' Division : Brig-Gen. Daniel Ruggles (4,000)
- - - Gibson's Brigade : Col. Randall L. Gibson
- - - Pond's Brigade : Col. Preston Pond

Now, the Confederates have the choice of fighting Grant at Fort Donelson, waiting the Union attack at Nashville or launching their own offensive against either Grant or Buell.

This sounds like it would make a great after-action-report from your strategy game project... :smile:
 
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