Featured Where Do You Disagree With the "Conventional Wisdom" on the Civil War?

JeffBrooks

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Where do you disagree with the "conventional wisdom" on the Civil War. In other words, what commonly accepted "truths" about the war do you believe are incorrect?

I'll start.

1. I do not think that Gettysburg and Vicksburg marked the turning point of the war and I believe that the Confederacy had as much of a chance at winning the war at the start of 1864 as it did at the start of 1863, if not better.

2. On a strategic level, I think the performance of Ulysses Grant in 1864 was rather poor.

3. Aside from his logistical abilities, I think that Sherman was a poor general.

4. I think that the Confederacy lost the war more due to its own mistakes than due to the superior numbers and resources of the Union.
 
These are two that I would really enjoy digging deeper into.
From an early age most of what I can remember reading, the studying I did (which to be honest is simply reading all I can, talking to others, comparing books, stats, along with the use of war games and coming to a decision.) seemed to agree that at least Vicksburg was a turning point. Wasn't the fact that the Federals now controlled the Mississippi important in that it split the South.

I've been under the "conventional" thought that unless the length of the war caused the British to intervene, the longer the South fought the smaller the chances of winning became due to the differences in resources between them and the North.

After losing Vicksburg and Gettysburg wouldn't that have made the British less likely to intervene and put the South into an even deeper hole resource wise? I don't understand how the South would have as good or better chance of winning in '64 than in '63.

I'll stick my neck out again and offer my perspective (which includes agreeing with the OP that neither Vicksburg or Gettysburg were "turning points").

Loss in the West was, indeed, significant. However, that wasn't where most people lived. Had the South been able to pull off a series of major victories in the East it would have negated any Union victories in the West or control of the rivers.

I don't think the British or the French were ever really going to come to the aid of the Confederacy. That's a bit of "conventional" thought that I also disagree with (I mean, with which I disagree).

I wouldn't say the Confederacy had a "better" chance of winning in '64 than in '63 by any stretch. However, they could still have 'won' in '64 in the sense of stalling Union victory long enough to just wear out the northern will to continue fighting such that the Republicans would lose the election and some truce would be enacted. It was a long shot by '63 but a possibility - thus Gettysburg not being the turning point (I'd agree Atlanta was).

OK, pitchforks and torches everybody !
 
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Conventional (or at least oft-heard): The declaration of a blockade instead of a closing of ports was an error made by the Lincoln administration due to Lincoln's or Seward's inexperience.

Actual: The declaration of a blockade was a carefully-considered decision made in the context of discussions with foreign diplomats as to their countries' probable reactions, with the implied belligerency of the Confederacy taken into account as undesirable but unavoidable.

Conventional/oft-heard: The blockade was Winfield Scott's idea.

Actual: Blockades were standard naval strategies used in nearly every war for decades or centuries in which at least one side had significant naval forces.
 
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That is interesting. Would you explain why not?
If you compare battle losses of the ACW to those of the Napoleonic Wars, there is no significant difference. And as we know, the Napoleonic Wars was primarily fought with smoothbore weaponry.

For instance, at Waterloo the French numbered 80,000 men, and 252 guns; the Allies numbered 72,000 men, and 186 guns. At Gettysburg, the AoP numbered 82,000 men, and 300 guns; the ANV 70,000 men and 250 guns. At Waterloo, Wellington's army lost 23,185; at Gettysburg, Meade's army lost 23,003. The loss of the French at Waterloo is estimated at 26,300; the Confederate loss at Gettysburg, as officially reported by the Confederate Surgeon-General, was 20,448, to which must be added 7,077 wounded and unwounded prisoners whose names were omitted from his lists, but whose names appear on the records at Washington. The battles of Waterloo and Gettysburg were fought with 70,000 to 82,000 men on each side, and the combatants lost about 23,000 men each.

Of the Napoleonic Wars:
At the battle of Borodino there were 30,000 - 45,000 casualties on either side and the battle was fought primarily on a single day. The battle of Borodino created more casualties than the battle of Gettysburg in a single day. The battle of Friedland produced up to 48,000 casualties on a single day with around 150,000 troops involved. Austerlitz produced 35,800 casualties in a single day with over 150,000 troops involved. The battle of Eylau saw up to 41,000 casualties in two days with around 151,000 men involved. The battle of Leipzig produced around 114,000 casualties total with 605,000 troops involved in three days. Note that I do not know the exact number of troops actually engaged in these battles. The number of those "involved" probably represent those present, but not necessarily engaged.

For comparison, Antietam produced over 24,000 casualties with over 84,000 engaged. Shiloh saw 23,700 casualties out of over 109,000 engaged.
 
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Loss in the West was, indeed, significant. However, that wasn't where most people lived. Had the South been able to pull off a series of major victories in the East it would have negated any Union victories in the West or control of the rivers.

No pitchforks! But, the Southwest was where a lot of the money was being made. Control of the Mississippi was a huge deal to Northern states dependent upon it for commerce. Lee's aide Charles Marshall wrote (posted in another thread), postulating that the Gettysburg campaign was an attempt not only to draw Union troops away from Richmond, but to defeat them and draw Grant's Army back East, to defend Washington, thus saving Vicksburg. So yes, a major victory in this regard may have turned the tables. Doesn't mean G'burg was a 'turning point,' but that the rivers in the West were of huge strategic and political value to the Union.
 
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No pitchforks! But, the Southwest was where a lot of the money was being made. Control of the Mississippi was a huge deal to Northern states dependent upon it for commerce. Lee's aide Charles Marshall wrote (posted in another thread), postulating that the Gettysburg campaign was an attempt not only to draw Union troops away from Richmond, but to defeat them and draw Grant's Army back East, to defend Washington, thus saving Vicksburg. So yes, a major victory in this regard may have turned the tables. Doesn't mean G'burg was a 'turning point,' but that the rivers in the West were of huge strategic and political value to the Union.

I agree that the West was of great importance; just not that victories there necessarily meant a Union victory overall.
 
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If you compare battle losses of the ACW to those of the Napoleonic Wars, there is no significant difference. And as we know, the Napoleonic Wars was primarily fought with smoothbore weaponry.

But to what extent were tactics adjusted during the ACW to deal with this? I'm no expert, but 'digging in,' preparing relatively secure defenses, was commonplace during the ACW, particularly later. Was this done during the Napoleonic Wars? I'm not arguing, just asking to what extent things may have changed (no matter how slowly) with the advent of these new weapons.
 
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I'll stick my neck out again and offer my perspective (which includes agreeing with the OP that neither Vicksburg or Gettysburg were "turning points").

Loss in the West was, indeed, significant. However, that wasn't where most people lived. Had the South been able to pull off a series of major victories in the East it would have negated any Union victories in the West or control of the rivers.


I wouldn't say the Confederacy had a "better" chance of winning in '64 than in '63 by any stretch. However, they could still have 'won' in '64 in the sense of stalling Union victory long enough to just wear out the northern will to continue fighting such that the Republicans would lose the election and some truce would be enacted. It was a long shot by '63 but a possibility - thus Gettysburg not being the turning point (I'd agree Atlanta was).

OK, pitchforks and torches everybody !

I'm getting you on Gettysburg but still not Vicksburg. Didn't a lot of the confederate beef come from Texas and wasn't the fact that Virginia was so decimated already that one of the reasons Lee went North was to feed the army off of Northern crops as well as winning battles in the North hoping for a administration change and peace in '64?
So even before the lose of the western states the AoNV was already in trouble materally, right? would the lose of Vicksburg PLUS the lose at Gettysburg, which was a moral boost for the North be a pretty big turning point if compared to the war only a week before?

Anyway,sorry I'm hijacking the thread. This part just really interests me. I've never heard the argument t that the South had a real chance after '63.

Let me really think what my disagreements are with the "conventional" war. :smile:
 
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If you compare battle losses of the ACW to those of the Napoleonic Wars, there is no significant difference. And as we know, the Napoleonic Wars was primarily fought with smoothbore weaponry.

For instance, at Waterloo the French numbered 80,000 men, and 252 guns; the Allies numbered 72,000 men, and 186 guns. At Gettysburg, the AoP numbered 82,000 men, and 300 guns; the ANV 70,000 men and 250 guns. At Waterloo, Wellington's army lost 23,185; at Gettysburg, Meade's army lost 23,003. The loss of the French at Waterloo is estimated at 26,300; the Confederate loss at Gettysburg, as officially reported by the Confederate Surgeon-General, was 20,448, to which must be added 7,077 wounded and unwounded prisoners whose names were omitted from his lists, but whose names appear on the records at Washington. The battles of Waterloo and Gettysburg were fought with 70,000 to 82,000 men on each side, and the combatants lost about 23,000 men each.

Of the Napoleonic Wars:
At the Battle of Borodino there were 30,000 - 45,000 casualties on either side and the battle was fought primarily on a single day. The battle of Borodino created more casualties than the battle of Gettysburg in a single day. The Battle of Freidland produced around 48,000 casualties on a single day with around 150,000 troops involved. Austerlitz produced 35,800 casualties in a single day with over 150,000 troops involved. The Battle of Eylau saw up to 41,000 casualties in two days with around 151,000 men involved. The Battle of Leipzig produced around 114,000 casualties total with 605,000 troops involved.

There's a book written by an English gentleman that argues this exact thing. I don't remember
His name and I left the book I. The hotel in Chattanooga, but his book uses tons of stats trying to prove his idea. It still seemed a bit off to me though. I know that in the ACW they dug trenches and defenses but I thought that that was only AFTER the soldiers got smart to the rifle.
I don't think that there was much ditch digging in the Napolionic wars was there? Wasn't it even considered cowardly to do?
Also weren't the soldiers in the ACW slightly father apart than in the Nap. Wars and fired in two lines instead of three? I would think a those factors combined would be a reason for similar casualty rates.
 
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But to what extent were tactics adjusted during the ACW to deal with this? I'm no expert, but 'digging in,' preparing relatively secure defenses, was commonplace during the ACW, particularly later. Was this done during the Napoleonic Wars? I'm not arguing, just asking to what extent things may have changed (no matter how slowly) with the advent of these new weapons.
To some extent, depending on the campaign, but overall most of the major battles seen throughout the Napoleonic Wars were mainly fought over open ground with some use of field fortifications, but probably nothing like that seen throughout the Overland or Atlanta Campaign. The Battle of Borodino was primarily fought over field fortifications and earthen redoubts, and was without a doubt one of the bloodiest battles of the Napoleonic Wars. If I am going to compare an ACW battle to one of the Napoleonic Wars (in similarity) I would pick a battle like Antietam, Gettysburg, or Manassas.
 
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If you compare battle losses of the ACW to those of the Napoleonic Wars, there is no significant difference. And as we know, the Napoleonic Wars was primarily fought with smoothbore weaponry.

For instance, at Waterloo the French numbered 80,000 men, and 252 guns; the Allies numbered 72,000 men, and 186 guns. At Gettysburg, the AoP numbered 82,000 men, and 300 guns; the ANV 70,000 men and 250 guns. At Waterloo, Wellington's army lost 23,185; at Gettysburg, Meade's army lost 23,003. The loss of the French at Waterloo is estimated at 26,300; the Confederate loss at Gettysburg, as officially reported by the Confederate Surgeon-General, was 20,448, to which must be added 7,077 wounded and unwounded prisoners whose names were omitted from his lists, but whose names appear on the records at Washington. The battles of Waterloo and Gettysburg were fought with 70,000 to 82,000 men on each side, and the combatants lost about 23,000 men each.

Of the Napoleonic Wars:
At the battle of Borodino there were 30,000 - 45,000 casualties on either side and the battle was fought primarily on a single day. The battle of Borodino created more casualties than the battle of Gettysburg in a single day. The battle of Friedland produced up to 48,000 casualties on a single day with around 150,000 troops involved. Austerlitz produced 35,800 casualties in a single day with over 150,000 troops involved. The battle of Eylau saw up to 41,000 casualties in two days with around 151,000 men involved. The battle of Leipzig produced around 114,000 casualties total with 605,000 troops involved. Note that I do not know the exact number of troops actually engaged in these battles. The number of those "involved" probably represent those present, but not necessarily engaged.

For comparison, Antietam produced over 24,000 casualties with over 84,000 engaged. Shiloh saw 23,700 casualties out of over 109,000 engaged.

Interesting. Nice job with the stats, Aug! :thumbsup:
 
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I'm getting you on Gettysburg but still not Vicksburg. Didn't a lot of the confederate beef come from Texas and wasn't the fact that Virginia was so decimated already that one of the reasons Lee went North was to feed the army off of Northern crops as well as winning battles in the North hoping for a administration change and peace in '64?
So even before the lose of the western states the AoNV was already in trouble materally, right? would the lose of Vicksburg PLUS the lose at Gettysburg, which was a moral boost for the North be a pretty big turning point if compared to the war only a week before?

There is a fairly recent thread about when the war was really lost (sorry, I don't have good luck with the search engine) that has a lot of discussion about the West vs the East and such. Try to find that one and slog through it; lot's of good info.

As I've said, I'm in the 'war of attrition' school so yes, I agree the ANV and the Confederacy in general was in trouble materially (men and materiel) from the get-go. However, if the Union lost the will to continue to try to suppress them then they could have 'won' at many points including after July '63. I think we have to recognize that much of what we now know and can link up was not known by those who lived at the time in question. So, if defeats to the Union had been delivered in '64 and, say, Atlanta had not fallen when it did then some kind of truce was a real possibility even in '64. Even Lincoln said he didn't think he'd win if there weren't some Union victories. It's one of those debatable points that many have differing opinions about but I'm giving my opinion. Others may chime in to dispute such. The notion that the Confederacy could have 'won' as late as '64 isn't a new notion BTW. Debatable perhaps, but not new (e.g. read Gary Gallagher).
 
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There is a fairly recent thread about when the war was really lost (sorry, I don't have good luck with the search engine) that has a lot of discussion about the West vs the East and such. Try to find that one and slog through it; lot's of good info.

As I've said, I'm in the 'war of attrition' school so yes, I agree the ANV and the Confederacy in general was in trouble materially (men and materiel) from the get-go. However, if the Union lost the will to continue to try to suppress them then they could have 'won' at many points including after July '63. I think we have to recognize that much of what we now know and can link up was not known by those who lived at the time in question. So, if defeats to the Union had been delivered in '64 and, say, Atlanta had not fallen when it did then some kind of truce was a real possibility even in '64. Even Lincoln said he didn't think he'd win if there weren't some Union victories. It's one of those debatable points that many have differing opinions about but I'm giving my opinion. Others may chime in to dispute such. The notion that the Confederacy could have 'won' as late as '64 isn't a new notion BTW. Debatable perhaps, but not new (e.g. read Gary Gallagher).
Thanks for the leads and answers.
 
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There's a book written by an English gentleman that argues this exact thing. I don't remember
His name and I left the book I. The hotel in Chattanooga, but his book uses tons of stats trying to prove his idea. It still seemed a bit off to me though. I know that in the ACW they dug trenches and defenses but I thought that that was only AFTER the soldiers got smart to the rifle.
I don't think that there was much ditch digging in the Napolionic wars was there? Wasn't it even considered cowardly to do?
Also weren't the soldiers in the ACW slightly father apart than in the Nap. Wars and fired in two lines instead of three? I would think a those factors combined would be a reason for similar casualty rates.
The practice of digging into earthen fortifications dates back to ancient warfare, though the field and siege fortifications used throughout the ACW were primarily based off of French designs that date back to the 17th and 18th Century. The idea that fortifications were only used late in the ACW and that troops thought they were "cowardly" isn't completely true. Fortifications definitely saw an increase in later years of the ACW, but even early on field fortifications were used. The main difference was that in later campaigns, such as the Overland or Atlanta Campaigns, you saw whole armies stop and entrench heavily, then move again and do the same. The extensive entrenchments seen at Cold Harbor for example would never have been seen earlier in the war, with the exception of a siege.
 
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The practice of digging into earthen fortifications dates back to ancient warfare, though the field and siege fortifications used throughout the ACW were primarily based off of French designs that date back to the 16th and 17th Century. The idea that fortifications were only used late in the ACW and that troops thought they were "cowardly" isn't completely true. Fortifications definitely saw an increase in later years of the ACW, but even early on field fortifications were used. The main difference was that in later campaigns, such as the Overland or Atlanta Campaigns, you saw whole armies stop and entrench heavily, then move again and do the same. The extensive entrenchments seen at Cold Harbor for example would never have been seen outside of a siege earlier in the war.

Indeed. I just visited Cold Harbor for the first time a couple months ago. Even though I've been to a couple dozen Civil War battlefields, the entrenchments that were still visible at CH flabbergasted me. Compared to those entrenchments, the entrenchments of the earlier years of the war were child's play.
 
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Indeed. I just visited Cold Harbor for the first time a couple months ago. Even though I've been to a couple dozen Civil War battlefields, the entrenchments that were still visible at CH flabbergasted me. Compared to those entrenchments, the entrenchments of the earlier years of the war were child's play.
They were made not only for fighting in, but for living in.
 
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The SCOTUS cases I listed did not say that secession waa illegal under all circumstances. What they did say was that the two main ideas the seccesionists relied on to justify their secessionn were invalid.

The two main supports the secessionists relied on was the compact theory( ie; the union was merely a voluntary compact between soverign states therefore the states were free to simply leave if they wanted) and the "state soverignty" claims. Both theories were addressed and rejected by the SCOTUS long before the War.

The problem with any analysis of the 60-61 secession is that no one took the time to analyze it at the time, it was an assumed right. Had anyone stopped one of the major secessionists and quoted the court cases, the best outcome would be to be ignored. A fight or assassination the most likely outcome.
 
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2. On a strategic level, I think the performance of Ulysses Grant in 1864 was rather poor.
I agree with you on this one. As a subset of this point I think the conventional wisdom about Grant's role in the Red River campaign is wrong.


3. Aside from his logistical abilities, I think that Sherman was a poor general.
Seems to me that you are close to the 'Conventional Wisdom', or at least what I encounter on the net where I hear a lot of talk about how poor Sherman did in battles. Where I disagree with the 'conventional wisdom' is in the understanding and interpretation of the battle of Chattanooga.

I also disagree with some of the Conventional Wisdom on the so-called political generals [see some of my postings on Banks for example].
 
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The problem with any analysis of the 60-61 secession is that no one took the time to analyze it at the time, it was an assumed right. Had anyone stopped one of the major secessionists and quoted the court cases, the best outcome would be to be ignored. A fight or assassination the most likely outcome.

I agree about the likely outcome and think the only thing that was actually assumed was that they could do as they pleased. Southern society was practically fuedal in nature with only the wealthy slave owning elites really having any real say in things.

Look at how secession was handled. Most states never put it to a vote of the people. And even some that did disregarded majority votes against secession and seceded anyway.
 
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