Kentucky Derby Cavalier.
First Sergeant
- Joined
- Oct 24, 2019
Thoughts?
On the north area of the battlefield the CSA guns were never very effective. I hope the point is that an unsupported infantry attack by the ANV's 2nd Corps would have been costly if resisted, and would have been even if undertaken as soon as possible after being directed by the commanding general.Okay, so you've assigned four or five batteries to delivering long range fire against the Confederate 3rd Corps. Call it 27 guns.
Now think about how many casualties you're actually expecting those ~27 guns to actually do.
As for the 2nd Corps attack, well, we started with 54 guns so there's a maximum of ~27 guns on that side as well.
You've previously indicated that the thing causing the casualties would be "the guns that the Confederates could not answer", but guns cause casualties over time - so you'd need the Union infantry on the ridges to be capable of holding back the attack more or less by themselves to create the situation where the Confederate troops are in the area to take casualties.
(This is before considering that the Confederates did actually have guns as well - 3/4 of the Union number in their army - so I suspect they could in fact "answer".)
I don't argue that it might be "costly". The idea I'm questioning is how much 1st and 11th Corps can realistically do to hold off what is actually a (Union) corps-level attack after a day in which they've already been broken - and whether it's reasonable to expect them to resist so fiercely that it sees a Confederate army corps badly damaged.On the north area of the battlefield the CSA guns were never very effective. I hope the point is that an unsupported infantry attack by the ANV's 2nd Corps would have been costly if resisted, and would have been even if undertaken as soon as possible after being directed by the commanding general.
By June 1862, the "Warwick Line" meant nothing to the CSA as the Federal navy could by-pass it nearly as if it were not there; any CSA force placed to interdict the York would be lost.But those Union men are exerting pressure on Richmond - they're why Hill was left with such a significant force in the Dept. of NC in the first place. Withdraw them and either there's more men to march north and join Lee or there's the scope for a bit of proactive defence.
As for the Warwick line, the river still exists. But even just reoccupying Yorktown with a single brigade and some guns makes a Union advance overland or up the York logistically impractical - it would mean any attempt to supply close to Richmond except via the James river needs to clear Yorktown, which would impose a delay of weeks.
The short response is Ewell's guns could not "see" their targets and generally avoided bringing counter battery fire down on them. From Cemetery Ridge the Federals had a fair view of most CSA operations on their front.I don't argue that it might be "costly". The idea I'm questioning is how much 1st and 11th Corps can realistically do to hold off what is actually a (Union) corps-level attack after a day in which they've already been broken - and whether it's reasonable to expect them to resist so fiercely that it sees a Confederate army corps badly damaged.
As for CSA guns never being very effective on the north area of the battlefield, why is that? Is there a systemic reason for it?
Surely if there's a couple of dozen Union guns directing fire on a CS corps, there are one of three options.
1) The fire is not considered bad enough to be worth reacting to, in which case it's not doing much damage.
2) The fire is considered bad enough to be worth reacting to by pulling back out of effective range, in which case it doesn't do much damage.
3) The fire is considered bad enough to be worth serious counter-battery fire, in which case what you then have is a gun duel between ~27 Union guns and however many Confederate guns they have forward. In which case either the Union guns fight a counter-battery shoot (and don't target the CS infantry) or they continue targeting the CS infantry (and are at risk of falling to the CB shoot).
Agreed. As Johnston said, "No one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack." Even some of McClellans officers, like Keyes, thought a general attack along the line would have succeeded.2. McClellan not blowing through the thin defenses of Yorktown line with forces at hand.
If there were Federal ships in the York as a matter of course, I'd agree without hesitation, but without that I'm not seeing how a CS force in Yorktown with the guns needed to close the river to shipping (even supply shipping) is necessarily automatically lost. Without a force on the Warwick then the Union can of course bypass Yorktown, but then to reduce it by siege would take a month or so (unless naval bombardment was used).By June 1862, the "Warwick Line" meant nothing to the CSA as the Federal navy could by-pass it nearly as if it were not there; any CSA force placed to interdict the York would be lost.
Who were the other Federal forces in SE VA? Can you name them, and under what strength return are they carried on the June 1863 consolidated return?There were substantial Federal forces in SE VA and North Carolina that Harvey Hill had to consider in addition the the half hearted jab made by the 19,000 coming down from White House.
Okay, but while Cemetery Ridge is fairly commanding it's not enough that it'll let Federal guns fire without exposing themselves at all.The short response is Ewell's guns could not "see" their targets and generally avoided bringing counter battery fire down on them. From Cemetery Ridge the Federals had a fair view of most CSA operations on their front.
As I recall it was that what Keyes said was...Agreed. As Johnston said, "No one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack." Even some of McClellans officers, like Keyes, thought a general attack along the line would have succeeded.
Simple question - when he said that, what was Johnston's estimate of McClellan's numerical strength over the course of the confrontation?As Johnston said, "No one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack."
Who were the other Federal forces in SE VA? Can you name them, and under what strength return are they carried on the June 1863 consolidated return?
If there were Federal ships in the York as a matter of course, I'd agree without hesitation, but without that I'm not seeing how a CS force in Yorktown with the guns needed to close the river to shipping (even supply shipping) is necessarily automatically lost. Without a force on the Warwick then the Union can of course bypass Yorktown, but then to reduce it by siege would take a month or so (unless naval bombardment was used).
Who were the other Federal forces in SE VA? Can you name them, and under what strength return are they carried on the June 1863 consolidated return?
OR Chapt XXX, pp 350=
I think Johnston was taking into account not only the strength of the federals, but the weakness of the confederates and the confederate works.Simple question - when he said that, what was Johnston's estimate of McClellan's numerical strength over the course of the confrontation?
On the 11th Magruder's proclamation to those in the Peninsula was "McClellan, at the head of 100,000 men, is threatening our whole line" when in fact McClellan's force at the line at that point was roughly half that in PFD. The same day Magruder reported to the Confederate SecWar that McClellan's strength was "estimated at between 100,000 and 200,000" and that he had "about 23,000 men"; in fact on the 11th Magruder's total strength was 34,000 by Late April strengths, so Magruder is claiming he's outnumbered between 4:1 and 8:1 when the actual strength ratio is close to 3:2.
Unless Johnston had a much better picture of the numbers than Magruder did, Johnston would be basing his assessment on who might have "hesitated to attack" on an enemy outnumbering the defenders circa 4:1 to 6:1. Naturally this would lead to an incorrect picture of whether the enemy "should" attack.
1- Jackson was not there, so no missed opportunity. Had Jackson been there, he would have had no better guidance from army HQ than Ewell.
Understand Lee was asking 2 divisions to push 2 Federal Corps off ridges that had required 4 CSA divisions to run up on the ridges.
Agreed. As Johnston said, "No one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack." Even some of McClellans officers, like Keyes, thought a general attack along the line would have succeeded.
For me the issue was not Lee's discretionary order, but that he had warned against a general engagement without 1st Corps.No, Jackson was not there. Obviously.
And while he would have likely gotten the same amount of direction - or lack thereof - from Lee, there is little doubt that he would have interpreted it differently.
Recall if you will that Lee instructed Ewell to attack Cemetary ridge "if practicable". It's the kind of vague instructions he had usually given his corps commanders.
To Ewell, a cautious man, the qualifier was nothing less than permission to do nothing. To Jackson, it would almost certainly have served as a green light.
It absolutely did. The difference between an attack on the 16th and an attack on the 17th is the arrival of two Union corps (9th and 12th) able to spend the whole day fighting, plus a division (Morell) available in the morning and two (Franklin's two) available in the afternoon. The troop arrivals for McClellan more than doubled his strength compared to an attack on the 16th, while the troop arrivals for Lee did not.
In which case there's a problem, because of when it was that the reinforcements arrived and what caused them to do so.
Most of the reinforcements for Magruder arrived after the 28th March, but the problem is that most of McClellan's forces were also still arriving on that date. Remembering that the time taken to march to the Warwick line was two days, then based on the arrival dates for McClellan's divisions you have: