Kentucky Derby Cavalier.
First Sergeant
- Joined
- Oct 24, 2019
Thoughts?
At least 20%? Are you sure?i doubt there were 10,000 Federal infantry formed on the ridges. My concern was the artillery that the Confederates could not answer.
Assuming the CSA troops pushed the infantry, and the guns limbered up, Lee would have lost at least 20% of his army gaining a town with little value
What I meant was a fifth of Lee's infantry. While the 2nd Corps attacked, Hill's 3rd Corps would still be catching shells even though it was not attacking. Of the 4 CSA divisions engaged, 4 would be wrecked.At least 20%? Are you sure?
As for the town being of little value, the area of the town is the junction which Meade needs to unite his army in a reasonable time frame. (Specifically he needs to be able to unite forces marching along the Baltimore Pike and the Taneytown Road without having to either bridge Rock Creek or funnel everything south to the next crossing south of the Baltimore Pike bridge, with attendant loss of time.) There's a reason why armies have fought over crossroads and junction towns for centuries - it only really started to go away with the rise of air-mobile forces - and if Lee takes the ridge on day one then Meade has only two options.
1) Pour the rest of his army into the Gettysburg area along roads that are not mutually supporting, letting Lee essentially get the benefit of interior lines to crush only part of Meade's army.
or
2) Concentrate his army at the next set of junctions south, which in practice means the Pipe Creek Line. This is losing a battle on Union soil.
How? Unless they're hanging around in artillery range for long enough that the "overs" wreck them, when it seems like they'd just withdraw or disperse to skirmish line or otherwise avoid casualties.What I meant was a fifth of Lee's infantry. While the 2nd Corps attacked, Hill's 3rd Corps would still be catching shells even though it was not attacking.
By Day One that ship has sailed - Meade can either concentrate his whole army at Gettysburg or surrender the field after taking a spanking. In the latter case Lee has beaten Meade in a battle on Northern soil, and everyone would know it.Gettysburg could not be important to Lee unless Meade wanted it to be.
Actually, with Halleck's and Lincoln's permission, Meade might find Gettysburg a really great place to cut Lee off from Virginia.
1. What army?Five lost opportunities? Neat question. I'll probably forget something really important, but here is a quick list:
1. First Bull Run. The US Army was a mass of confusion due to the loss of many officers who defected to the Confederacy, but the Confederate Army was still in its formative stage. The Army that pre-existed the war really should have won the fight. A convincing victory for the Union might have dashed the hopes of the rebelling states. This was a missed chance to crush the rebellion.
Heh. It's a good question, isn't it?1. What army?
3rd Corps was not on the same vector as 2nd. The Federals were firing on 3rd Corps near Seminary Ridge as S O P.How? Unless they're hanging around in artillery range for long enough that the "overs" wreck them, when it seems like they'd just withdraw or disperse to skirmish line or otherwise avoid casualties.
If a significant amount of Federal artillery fire is going "over" enough that it's "wrecking" Hill's divisions, then the Federal gunners as a whole are shooting high and they're unable to inflict significant casualties on the actually attacking divisions; Confederates take the ridge.
However distasteful allowing Lee the field at Gettysburg, having Lee concentrated at Gettysburg put the ANV in a bad spot. Lee has miles and miles of wagons representing a main purpose in entering PA which would then be in jeopardy.By Day One that ship has sailed - Meade can either concentrate his whole army at Gettysburg or surrender the field after taking a spanking. In the latter case Lee has beaten Meade in a battle on Northern soil, and everyone would know it.
But in that case then there's even fewer guns to stop 2nd Corps. The Federals only have 54 guns on the field (before any losses on the 1st day already such as any abandoned on the Seminary Ridge), which is simply not enough to "wreck" two Confederate corps.3rd Corps was not on the same vector as 2nd. The Federals were firing on 3rd Corps near Seminary Ridge as S O P.
Before chasing the Federals out of Adams County, Ed Johnson's Confederates and the Federal 12th Corps would be involved.
But how high are you thinking? There's simply not all that many Federal troops actually on the ridge in a state to defend, and not all that many guns available.If 2nd Corps moved the Federals out, i would have been at a very high price.
This seems slightly odd to me because Lee's wagons retreated historically without coming to any harm - and if Meade's not concentrating his force at Gettysburg then he's got to be concentrating it somewhere south. Either that's protecting Washington (the Pipe Creek line) or it's not, but if it's not then he's left Lee an open goal into Washington and Lincoln would be screwing himself into the ceiling.However distasteful allowing Lee the field at Gettysburg, having Lee concentrated at Gettysburg put the ANV in a bad spot. Lee has miles and miles of wagons representing a main purpose in entering PA which would then be in jeopardy.
Who exactly are you thinking of for this duty? When do they start to move?If the Federal Administration cooperates , 15,000 men from W. and SE Virginia could be on the Potomac, guarding any crossing.
Famous as Jackson would become, at Bull Run he was just one of twelve brigade commanders, in his first major action; and his brigade had suffered the heaviest losses, about one quarter of its strength. If the Confederates were going to organize a pursuit, it probably would not have been a matter of following Jackson. Johnston's four brigades suffered most of the Confederate casualties, so a pursuit would probably have been conducted by Beauregard's Army of the Potomac. Perhaps some of our knowledgeable friends can suggest which units were in position and in a state to take the lead.
The guns are supporting the wrecking, as I indicated the Rebs could not answer them. I have no doubt that Early and Rodes could gain the northern end of Cemetery Ridge, but that was only the beginning. And that would be at a cost.But in that case then there's even fewer guns to stop 2nd Corps. The Federals only have 54 guns on the field (before any losses on the 1st day already such as any abandoned on the Seminary Ridge), which is simply not enough to "wreck" two Confederate corps.
The historical fighting on Day One saw 9,000 Federal casualties and 6,000 Confederate casualties, and with how Fed. corps were about half the size of Confed. corps you need about twice the casualties to wreck a CS one (at minimum). So if for example 4,500 casualties wrecks a Union corps you need to inflict another 12,000 casualties to the CS corps to "wreck" both of them - but you're having to do it with two corps that are already "wrecked"!
Historically, elements of the 12th corps began arriving as the Federals settled on the ridges. Other than Johnson's division which arrived after 12 corps, Lee only had Anderson's division, which Lee seemed disinclined to use except for defense. Lee seemed to want a secure hold on Seminary Ridge.As for the Federal 12th Corps, yes, they'd be involved but if the Confederate troops had gained the fish hook 12th Corps would only be involved as part of a separate fight - they'd actually be at risk of destruction themselves, because Lee could concentrate a large force against them alone.
And the 6 or 7 brigades Early and Rodes can attack with are not that formidable. But easily able to suffer 50% casualties.But how high are you thinking? There's simply not all that many Federal troops actually on the ridge in a state to defend, and not all that many guns available.
Lee lost quite a few wagons historically, but got most into Virginia. Historically, Lee moved most of his wagons in front, with his army intervening wirh his chief menace, the AoP. Had Lee followed Meade to Pipe Creek, his wagons would have been in greater danger.This seems slightly odd to me because Lee's wagons retreated historically without coming to any harm - and if Meade's not concentrating his force at Gettysburg then he's got to be concentrating it somewhere south. Either that's protecting Washington (the Pipe Creek line) or it's not, but if it's not then he's left Lee an open goal into Washington and Lincoln would be screwing himself into the ceiling.
There were 20,000 men formed in an "army" on the James, not doing anything, really.At least 10,000 could be withdrawn and Harvey Hill, commanding CSA forces could not have done a thing. Same for 5,000 in western Va. Add various militia units and other forcesWho exactly are you thinking of for this duty? When do they start to move?
Troops from SE Virginia would take several days to move assuming that the sea transport for them was available, and they arrive at Aquia or Alexandria or possibly Washington itself. Then you have the problem that they were doing a job where they were - can that job be done without the troops?
Lee probably cannot be destroyed, but can be hurt really badly.And if what happens is that the Army of the Potomac moves to stay between Lee and Washington, then Lee has the ability to march down west of the Cacotins, stop up the South Mountain passes and cross the Potomac in any or all of Williamsport, Harpers Ferry and Boteler's Ford. This disperses the effort of the men in question because it means they have to cover all of the crossing points rather than just one.
What day in particular are you thinking of that McClellan should have done this?
So "24 hours earlier" is technically dawn on the 16th, but I'll instead assume midday on the 16th when the fog has burned off.
As of this time, the statuses of the divisions on both sides were as follows:
DH Hill, DR Jones, Hood+Evans - already there on the 15th.
Stuart - already there on the 15th.
This is 14,694 infantry, 4,500 cavalry (and 138 guns including the reserve artillery) in effectives.
Ewell - crossed the Potomac dawn of the 16th after camping south of the river overnight, ca. 4,400 infantry effectives.
Jackson - crossed the Potomac at dawn after having straggled heavily on the march, ~1,600 infantry effectives when they arrived at the field, but more troops straggle in over the course of the day.
Walker - crosses the Potomac at noon at ca. 3750 men after resting at Shepherdstown to bring up stragglers.
Total - about 20,700 inf effectives on the field at noon and perhaps another 4,000 by 1pm (counting 250 stragglers from Jackson as having arrived by noon, which is probably a low bar).
McClellan:
On the field
1st Corps: 8,600 infantry (this is based on Meade's estimate of strength carried into combat) and 46 guns around the Pry House to the Pry (upper) Bridge
Richardson's division and Sykes' division: ca. 6,700 infantry and 30 guns at the Porter (middle) bridge
Artillery Reserve: say 42 guns (42 guns engaged overall, haven't tracked batteries)
Cavalry: ca. 2,500 and 22 guns
At Keedysville etc.
Sedgwick's and French's divisions of 11,117 infantry and 30 guns
At Boonsboro etc.
12th Corps: 7,239 infantry and 22 guns
At Appletown etc.
9th Corps: 11,714 infantry and 32 guns
Hence the decision to send 12th Corps to support 1st makes sense, there was a road to the Pry Bridge.
At noon on the 16th (i.e. after the fog lifted at 1100 hrs), McClellan had around 26,400 infantry, 2,500 cavalry and 170 guns at the area of the Porter Bridge, facing ca. 24,500 infantry, 4,500 cavalry and 186 guns. He has two corps marching to the field (9th and 12th) within range to come into action by nightfall if he goes straight up the middle (that is, attacking down the one road to Sharpsburg) but he doesn't have time to get troops into position for a broad front attack.
So the numbers are actually about equal until 12th and 9th Corps can arrive.
The guns are supporting the wrecking, as I indicated the Rebs could not answer them. I have no doubt that Early and Rodes could gain the northern end of Cemetery Ridge, but that was only the beginning. And that would be at a cost.
...50% casualties from seven brigades?And the 6 or 7 brigades Early and Rodes can attack with are not that formidable. But easily able to suffer 50% casualties.
Where do the numbers come from, is what I'm getting at - is that the June 30 1863 strength reports? Are they PFD or Present?There were 20,000 men formed in an "army" on the James, not doing anything, really.At least 10,000 could be withdrawn and Harvey Hill, commanding CSA forces could not have done a thing. Same for 5,000 in western Va. Add various militia units and other forces
But when Lee's army attacked an enemy uphill in prepared defensive positions he usually lost as well - Malvern Hill being just one example and the closest tactical situation in recent memory for both sides.Classic example of of what Lincoln found so frustratin about the commmanders of thhe AoP(util the coming of Grant). That they could not(or would not) do what the confedertecommannders could do every day with inferiros numbrs, what the AoP could not do wiith equal or superior nummbers.
It absolutely did. The difference between an attack on the 16th and an attack on the 17th is the arrival of two Union corps (9th and 12th) able to spend the whole day fighting, plus a division (Morell) available in the morning and two (Franklin's two) available in the afternoon. The troop arrivals for McClellan more than doubled his strength compared to an attack on the 16th, while the troop arrivals for Lee did not.certainly waitiing those precious 24 had no perceptible effect on gaining any sort of advantage to McClellan, while it ceertainly did for Lee.
In which case there's a problem, because of when it was that the reinforcements arrived and what caused them to do so.As for Yorktown, attacking any time before the arrival of any substantial reinforcements would have been beneficial, I believe.
And yet it was better organized than was the Confed army, which was my point.1. What army?
The regular infantry regiments managed to deploy the impressive "army" of just one under-strength battalion at that battle... and it had a lot of new recruits in it.
By early 1861 all infantry companies was deployed all over the west. One company here, and two companies there. They very, very rarely did even battalion drill.
25% of the army was surrenders in Texas by the Traitor General Twiggs.
The regular army was in no position to effect the battle. Other than covering the retreat.
The two armies was close to even in numbers and attacking is way harder than defending. That is the case for experienced troops and both armies had plenty of issue even keeping battalion level formations when moving on an actual battlefield.
Thanks!Interesting! I never thought about the Ford's Theatre angle. Most folks look at either ways to win the war, or ways to avoid it. Very few look at post-war reconstruction opportunities. Well done!
I wrote of guns the rebs could not answer...the casualties would come in 3rd corps from 4 or 5 batteries hitting already chewed up infantry. 2nd corps casualties would come from attacking mutually supporting guns and infantry and the bulk of killed and woulded on the CSA sde would happen there.But you're talking at this point about only a few batteries being able to "wreck" an entire corps - at long range. (Realistically you'd have at most four batteries able to point at the Confederate 2nd Corps.)
I certainly agree there'd be a cost, but...
the only way the CSA forces could throw 2nd and 11th Corps out of the Gettysburg area would have been to continue the assault that drove the Feds uphill..the only way without sustaining huge casualties. Lee gave no orders for that....50% casualties from seven brigades?
The average brigade strength of the Confederate army at Gettysburg was roughly 2,000 men per brigade (all told) as there were ca. 40 brigades. How exactly are those ca. 3,000-3,500 casualties you're thinking of going to be inflicted?
If it's mostly by guns, then we're talking about nearly 200 casualties per gun directed at stopping the advance, which is a massive outperformance of what can normally be expected.
before the area was reorganized, there were 19,000 men facing Richmond. Hill commanded the Richmond defenses only for defense, as he kept his HQ in Petersburg and only had leave to defend from Ft Fisher to Richmonf in Lee's absence. The "Warwick Line" was a fantasy from months previous. Jeff Davis wanted Wilmington-Petersburg-Richmond defended.Where do the numbers come from, is what I'm getting at - is that the June 30 1863 strength reports? Are they PFD or Present?
You can't just conjure a new corps-scale manoeuvre force out of nowhere in a few days, you need to do the work of withdrawing them and consolidating them and that might affect the whole of Lee's campaigning so he doesn't go to Gettysburg in the first place. (They also need artillery, and there simply weren't many guns available.)
As for what Hill could do, he could pressure the Union into withdrawing south of the Warwick line and then reoccupy and fortify it - which would completely skotch any Union overland campaign! (Contemporary returns give D.H.Hill's Dept. of NC plus the Defences of Richmond a total of ca. 30,000 Present - and nearly that in PFD - so Hill has quite a lot of force available if opportunity presents itself.)
Okay, so you've assigned four or five batteries to delivering long range fire against the Confederate 3rd Corps. Call it 27 guns.I wrote of guns the rebs could not answer...the casualties would come in 3rd corps from 4 or 5 batteries hitting already chewed up infantry. 2nd corps casualties would come from attacking mutually supporting guns and infantry and the bulk of killed and woulded on the CSA sde would happen there.
But those Union men are exerting pressure on Richmond - they're why Hill was left with such a significant force in the Dept. of NC in the first place. Withdraw them and either there's more men to march north and join Lee or there's the scope for a bit of proactive defence.before the area was reorganized, there were 19,000 men facing Richmond. Hill commanded the Richmond defenses only for defense, as he kept his HQ in Petersburg and only had leave to defend from Ft Fisher to Richmonf in Lee's absence. The "Warwick Line" was a fantasy from months previous. Jeff Davis wanted Wilmington-Petersburg-Richmond defended.