What was the Union Army's Worst Blunder of the War?

gem

2nd Lieutenant
Joined
Oct 26, 2012
What was the Union Army's Worst Blunder of the War?
 
I would say there are many to pick from. How about attacking strong positions that were suicidal at Fredericksburg and Cold Harbor. Not abandoning Harper's Ferry and allowing 12,000 troops & huge amount of stores to be captured. Not walking into Petersburg after crossing the James thus allowing reinforcements to arrive resulting in a nine month siege. Not winning the Battle of the Crater after having punched a huge hole in CS lines which prolonged the capture of Petersburg again for several months. But I think the biggest blunder, at least in the east, was when McClellan captured Lee's orders before Sharpsburg. Little Mac knew Lee's battle plan, had Lee outnumbered 2:1 and Lee had his army divided and still couldn't beat him. He should have annihilated/captured the ANV right then and there had he played his cards right.
 
Hoseman - Let's not overlook the western theater!

Union blunders there include:

-- Rosecran's confused order on Sept. 20, 1863 that lost the Battle of Chickamauga and almost destroyed the Army of the Cumberland.

-- Rosecran's allowing an over extended corps to be trapped in McLemore's Cove (just before the Battle of Chickamauga) and then only extricated due to major Confederate blunders.

--- the Red River Campaign -- a major disaster here was narrowly averted due to Kirby Smith's lack of strategic vision. A loss of the gunboat fleet might have forced the Lincoln Administration to divert resources from Georgia to Louisiana, potentially leaving Atlanta in CSA hands until after the 1864 elections.

-- Grant allowing himself to be surprised at Shiloh.

-- Rosecrans allowing himself to be surprised at Stone's River (do you notice that the name Rosecrans is coming up repeatedly on this list?)

--- Grant's failure to support McClernard in the second assault on Vicksburg.

-- Sherman's assaults on Chickasaw Bluffs.

- Sherman's assault at Kennesaw Mountain.
 
If Fredrickersburg was the worst blunder the bigget lost opportunity was at Antietam.
The biggest lost opportunity for me was when McClellan was at the gates of Richmond. He could have ended the war right there, but slavery, the cause of the war, wouldn't have been abolished, so it would have been a hollow victory.

Or when Lee was on the northern side of the flooded Potomac and Meade didn't pursue and destroy Lee's army when he had the chance. Lee got away and the war continued.
 
Hoseman - Let's not overlook the western theater!

Union blunders there include:

-- Rosecran's confused order on Sept. 20, 1863 that lost the Battle of Chickamauga and almost destroyed the Army of the Cumberland.

-- Rosecran's allowing an over extended corps to be trapped in McLemore's Cove (just before the Battle of Chickamauga) and then only extricated due to major Confederate blunders.

--- the Red River Campaign -- a major disaster here was narrowly averted due to Kirby Smith's lack of strategic vision. A loss of the gunboat fleet might have forced the Lincoln Administration to divert resources from Georgia to Louisiana, potentially leaving Atlanta in CSA hands until after the 1864 elections.

-- Grant allowing himself to be surprised at Shiloh.

-- Rosecrans allowing himself to be surprised at Stone's River (do you notice that the name Rosecrans is coming up repeatedly on this list?)

--- Grant's failure to support McClernard in the second assault on Vicksburg.

-- Sherman's assaults on Chickasaw Bluffs.

- Sherman's assault at Kennesaw Mountain.
What about the Southern blunders in the West?
 
The Butterfly effect could be in operation here. As shermans_march pointed out; if some of the blunders are not made the subsequent events would be vastly different. For instance, if McClellan takes Richmond in 1862 and the war ends with slavery maintained where it then existed; perhaps President Lincoln is not murdered, perhaps his evolution toward emancipation is slowed; perhaps he serves two full terms with the end of slavery occurring more gently. Perhaps not. This may be more appropriate for the "what if" section but, it crossed my mind as I read and knowing my unfocused mind, I concluded to enter this while I still had it in mind.

All that being said; there, consequently, were no blunders. All was it is was supposed to be to achieve the result with which we are contending; to our chagrin, embarrassment, and pride.
 
The Butterfly effect could be in operation here. As shermans_march pointed out; if some of the blunders are not made the subsequent events would be vastly different. For instance, if McClellan takes Richmond in 1862 and the war ends with slavery maintained where it then existed; perhaps President Lincoln is not murdered, perhaps his evolution toward emancipation is slowed; perhaps he serves two full terms with the end of slavery occurring more gently. Perhaps not. This may be more appropriate for the "what if" section but, it crossed my mind as I read and knowing my unfocused mind, I concluded to enter this while I still had it in mind.

All that being said; there, consequently, were no blunders. All was it is was supposed to be to achieve the result with which we are contending; to our chagrin, embarrassment, and pride.
If it is assumed that, with the Confederacy still having large armies in the field, they would have surrendered at the fall of Richmond, then you are quite correct. I think, rather, they were bitter-enders and would have fought on with a new capital. Look at April, 1865. With their armies about gone and Richmond gone, they still tried to hang on. The CSA government never did surrender. Only the armies did.
 
Last edited:
The biggest lost opportunity for me was when McClellan was at the gates of Richmond. He could have ended the war right there, but slavery, the cause of the war, wouldn't have been abolished, so it would have been a hollow victory.

Or when Lee was on the northern side of the flooded Potomac and Meade didn't pursue and destroy Lee's army when he had the chance. Lee got away and the war continued.

Old Googly Eyes gets assailed often for his "failure" to follow up the success after Gettysburg. The AOP was nearly as badly cut up as the ANV after the fight. Getting a pursuit organized and in motion quickly was probably more than could be asked of the AOP soldiers. By the time it did get moving in earnest it ran smack dab into the ANV's Falling Waters position. Meade was smart not to attack Lee there and risk a Gettysburg in reverse. Meade made the same wise decision at Mine Run. Maybe Grant could have learned something from those decisions before ordering the assault at Cold Harbor a year after Gettysburg.
 
Irish - the goals of the Red River Campaign were mainly political, rather than military (i.e. the Lincoln Administration was behind it). (1) Keep the CSA away from the Mississippi, and show the farmers of the upper midwest that the Lincoln administration was serious about protecting the Mississippi, (2) show the textile mill workers of New England that the Lincoln administration was serious about getting access to cotton for them. (3) Send a message to France - stay out of Texas, (4) re-establish a loyal government in a Louisiana that would be 100% under Union control, before the 1864 elections. The idea had merit - the execution under N. Banks was, however, a bit of a problem.
 
The biggest lost opportunity for me was when McClellan was at the gates of Richmond. He could have ended the war right there, but slavery, the cause of the war, wouldn't have been abolished, so it would have been a hollow victory.

Or when Lee was on the northern side of the flooded Potomac and Meade didn't pursue and destroy Lee's army when he had the chance. Lee got away and the war continued.
Was there ever a opportunity for Lee to have taken the Army of the Potomac ,thinking of the chances he had with McClellan or Burnside.As far Meade ,he may have erode on the side of caution.Sometimes its best not to attack a wounded animal he may still have the strength to attack.Did Lee have defenses in place as he retreated?He may have sent out the reserved units to block him at the river till he was able to mobilize the army.
 
Irish - the goals of the Red River Campaign were mainly political, rather than military (i.e. the Lincoln Administration was behind it). (1) Keep the CSA away from the Mississippi, and show the farmers of the upper midwest that the Lincoln administration was serious about protecting the Mississippi, (2) show the textile mill workers of New England that the Lincoln administration was serious about getting access to cotton for them. (3) Send a message to France - stay out of Texas, (4) re-establish a loyal government in a Louisiana that would be 100% under Union control, before the 1864 elections. The idea had merit - the execution under N. Banks was, however, a bit of a problem.

I dispute this. The goals of the campaign were mainly military, and it was Halleck plus Sherman who were behind it.
 
Lawdy! I don't even see how either side should have won with all of this. Good to see opinions and everyone active about it.

Old military axiom - the winner is he who commits the least harmful mistakes. Not the largest / fastest / biggest / strongest. :wink:

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
Old military axiom - the winner is he who commits the least harmful mistakes. Not the largest / fastest / biggest / strongest. :wink:

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
I was just responding to the way both sides beats on the other and so forth.
 
Back
Top