What Was The Strategic Thinking On This Objection to Pickett's Charge?

MikeyB

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Sep 13, 2018
Sorry, I know Pickett's charge has been debated tons here. But one question is not clear to me.
Let's say that everything goes right for Pickett's charge. Alexander drives off the Federal artillery, Hancock doesn't have a strong cup of coffee that morning, and the Confederate advance is largely successful in driving off the II corp and causing a split in the Federal line.

Then what? What did Lee think would happen next? What was his response to the objection that any support to take advantage of a breach would have to come from miles away versus the Federals with the superior interior lines and who could get a lot more men there quicker?

Did he think that attacks on the Federal flanks would pin down any support from coming? And this was just mis-execution? Did he think that his men would drive off the Cloverleafs, causing a general panic and the Federal army and will to fight would just evaporate? Did he think that his reinforcements in support could beat the Federals reinforcements? You've got 3 divisions, just walked miles over open ground in the hot July sun, took artillery fire, drove off very veteran troops. Sure, they're in the breach. But now they're disorganized and unsupported. Feel like Federals can counterattack from both flanks and destroy them.

As I think about how these conversations with Longstreet may have gone, I just never understand why Lee didn't say "That's a good point Pete!" when this topic comes up.
 
So who are the troops who come in and plug Armistead's breakthrough? is it just adjacent regiments from the line, versus reserves waiting behind the line?
The penetration was extremely local, is my understanding. So the local units could handle it.

This is distinct from having a large (division+) force of unengaged units to move in and counterattack.
 
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Sorry, I know Pickett's charge has been debated tons here. But one question is not clear to me.
Let's say that everything goes right for Pickett's charge. Alexander drives off the Federal artillery, Hancock doesn't have a strong cup of coffee that morning, and the Confederate advance is largely successful in driving off the II corp and causing a split in the Federal line.

Then what? What did Lee think would happen next? What was his response to the objection that any support to take advantage of a breach would have to come from miles away versus the Federals with the superior interior lines and who could get a lot more men there quicker?

Did he think that attacks on the Federal flanks would pin down any support from coming? And this was just mis-execution? Did he think that his men would drive off the Cloverleafs, causing a general panic and the Federal army and will to fight would just evaporate? Did he think that his reinforcements in support could beat the Federals reinforcements? You've got 3 divisions, just walked miles over open ground in the hot July sun, took artillery fire, drove off very veteran troops. Sure, they're in the breach. But now they're disorganized and unsupported. Feel like Federals can counterattack from both flanks and destroy them.

As I think about how these conversations with Longstreet may have gone, I just never understand why Lee didn't say "That's a good point Pete!" when this topic comes up.
My thoughts exactly. The Rebs break the center. Then what? I don't think the Confederates were in any shape to take on the Union reserves.
 
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My thoughts exactly. The Rebs break the center. Then what? I don't think the Confederates were in any shape to take on the Union reserves.
What reserves do you mean,and where were they?

This is a critical point. If Pickett does break into the position (i.e. overcome the forces that form the defensive line itself) where are the Union reserves?

Ideally (in the worst case for the Confederates) there would be a large force of units drawn up ready to react and about 400-1600 yards away. This is far enough away they're not caught up in the immediate chaos, but close enough to hit the Confederates while disrupted.
 
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What reserves do you mean,and where were they?

This is a critical point. If Pickett does break into the position (i.e. overcome the forces that form the defensive line itself) where are the Union reserves?

Ideally (in the worst case for the Confederates) there would be a large force of units drawn up ready to react and about 400-1600 yards away. This is far enough away they're not caught up in the immediate chaos, but close enough to hit the Confederates while disrupted.

Several divisions were rushing to the area as the Confederates were falling back. Birney and various elements of the Third Corps were coming from the south, Robinson from the north, elements of Wheaton's Division were already in the area east of the Taneytown Road (south of the Leister Farm), and Shaler's Brigade was coming from Culp's Hill. Not to mention that there were several Twelfth Corps units nearby that could have been sent if needed. While there was no immediate, ready reserve, there were plenty of troops close at hand to plug a hole or stop a breakthrough.

Ryan
 
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What has been left out of the discussion is Lee’s announced strategic goal for his offensive. In his letters to Davis, Lee cogently stated his analysis & reasoning. The CSA was running out of recruits. Not only were combat losses not being made up, desertion was increasing at exponential levels. Lee believed that 1863 was the last year that the CSA would have the manpower to successfully confront the Union army.

Lee’s conclusion was that breaking the morale of the Union population was the only way independence would be achieved. He proposed making disingenuous peace offers & directly engaging peace parties in the North. To that end, Lee proposed to defeat the A of the P on Pennsylvania & take Washington. He believed that would cause a collapse of Northern morale & herald the success of peace party members to congress. Lee’s analysis was spot on.

Of course, a meeting engagement in nowhere Pennsylvania was never a part of Lee’s strategic plan. Unlike Sherman, Lee had not faked his opponents into dividing their forces to defend points he had no intention to attack. Instead, he ran head on into the entire A of the P after an an advance of only 40 miles into Union territory.

From the first shot fired on the Battle of Gettysburg, there was no way for Lee to achieve his announced strategic objectives. As history shows, CW era armies were incapable of winning a battle of annihilation. Even in victory, the ratio of casualties in both winning & looser were remarkably similar. Even if the Battle of Gettysburg was some kind of technical tactical victory, the A of NV was physically incapable of achieving the kind of victory Lee’s strategy required.
This raises a big question mark for me in where was Lee really headed? His purposes of strategic opportunities you mentioned, but where on earth was his destination, if not the 'important' State of Pennsylvania; New York, Canada?
Thanks,
Lubliner.
 
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This raises a big question mark for me in where was Lee really headed? His purposes of strategic opportunities you mentioned, but where on earth was his destination, if not the 'important' State of Pennsylvania; New York, Canada?
Thanks,
Lubliner.
His announced plans intent was to pin the A of the P against Washington just like Grant did to him. Nowhere PA is a far cry from Washington, so the other guy gets to play, too. Lee knew he had one big battle’s wort of supplies & none on the way. At that point, Lee’s thinking seems to have been tactical, i e, beat them where they stand, not strategic. I abandon the reading of those signs & wonders to the professionals.
 
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This raises a big question mark for me in where was Lee really headed? His purposes of strategic opportunities you mentioned, but where on earth was his destination, if not the 'important' State of Pennsylvania; New York, Canada?
Thanks,
Lubliner.
Depends on where Meade retreats towards. If Washington? then Baltimore or Philadelphia are an easy mark. Where ever Lee go's Stuart is now back with the army. That had to increase Lee's confidence on day 3, and he will now know what is in his front. Confederates had been well fed since entering Pa. so I don't see food as a problem. But even with all that ammunition is going to be the big problem.
 
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Several divisions were rushing to the area as the Confederates were falling back. Birney and various elements of the Third Corps were coming from the south, Robinson from the north, elements of Wheaton's Division were already in the area east of the Taneytown Road (south of the Leister Farm), and Shaler's Brigade was coming from Culp's Hill. Not to mention that there were several Twelfth Corps units nearby that could have been sent if needed. While there was no immediate, ready reserve, there were plenty of troops close at hand to plug a hole or stop a breakthrough.
That's not really good battle management, though, because those units are being pulled out of the existing line and are doing so under no central control. They are not true reserves and it is true reserves which are by far the most effective at defeating a penetration like this.
Otherwise the Napoleonic method of exhausting reserves simply would not work.
 
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I don't think it has been mentioned that if you actually go to the battlefield and stand where Lee and Longstreet discussed the charge on the morning of July 3rd, just north of the Peach Orchard, and look toward the Union line there is a very low ridge that obscured their view and actually hid thousands of Union troops just south of the Angle. This is just one more small factor that would have effected Lee's perceptions and the outcome of the charge. Another is that he would have seen the smoke rising from the fighting on Culp's Hill and believed that those Union Troops were pinned down or maybe being defeated by Early and at the least, unavailable to Meade.

It is not difficult for me to imagine Lee thinking "the Union right is crumbling, there are few Union troops in the center, the Union left is wasted by the previous days fighting, Alexander will severely reduce the Union center, I will send my Cavalry around to the Union rear to check the retreat, and a three Division Charge will break them easily and it will be a rout."

I just think he didn't really think it through. I can see how it seemed possible, but so many little things went against him...?
 
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This raises a big question mark for me in where was Lee really headed? His purposes of strategic opportunities you mentioned, but where on earth was his destination, if not the 'important' State of Pennsylvania; New York, Canada?
Thanks,
Lubliner
Ewell's Corps, the vanguard of Lee's incursion, was headed to the line of the Susquehanna River and in particular Harrisburg. That made sense as a reachable goal, which would harm northern morale by the capture of a state capitol and potentially threaten the rear of Baltimore and Washington. Additionally, Lee could protect his long supply lines running through the Cumberland and Shenandoah Valleys. That movement would have also "smoked" out the AotP and allowed Lee to offer battle on his terms. Beyond that, I don't believe Lee had any specific plans but those initial goals were certainly enough to satisfy Lee's goals.
 
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I just think he didn't really think it through. I can see how it seemed possible, but so many little things went against him...?
It's Napoleonic in style. Besides, imagine what people would have thought if he'd called it off!

"Lee had the army of the Potomac on the ropes, they'd run out of reserves, but he didn't commit his last divisions and wasted his opportunity."
 
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Ewell's Corps, the vanguard of Lee's incursion, was headed to the line of the Susquehanna River and in particular Harrisburg. That made sense as a reachable goal, which would harm northern morale by the capture of a state capitol and potentially threaten the rear of Baltimore and Washington. Additionally, Lee could protect his long supply lines running through the Cumberland and Shenandoah Valleys. That movement would have also "smoked" out the AotP and allowed Lee to offer battle on his terms. Beyond that, I don't believe Lee had any specific plans but those initial goals were certainly enough to satisfy Lee's goals.

Napoleon once said, "You engage, and then you wait and see." Lee didn't have any detailed master plan. He wanted to get into the enemy's country, beat the main enemy field army on Northern soil, gather supplies, and then eventually get back to Virginia. The details would be dictated by events.
 
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One wonders if he was thinking of Borodino.
I suspect that he had the following in mind.

1) A sense of how likely victory was (less than certain but more than impossible).
2) An awareness of how badly he had damaged the AotP on days one and two (and make no mistake, he had done a lot of damage)
3) A knowledge that if he was ever going to get a chance to cripple the Army of the Potomac, this was that chance.
 
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It's Napoleonic in style. Besides, imagine what people would have thought if he'd called it off!

"Lee had the army of the Potomac on the ropes, they'd run out of reserves, but he didn't commit his last divisions and wasted his opportunity."
I agree he had passed a psychological point of no return and it would have been difficult to call it off as you point out. It was certainly his "Waterloo." In retrospect he did not have the best intelligence. I believe he should have listened to Longstreet and shifted his army to better ground in the first place. But he didn't and he was absolutely right to say, "it was all my fault" as his troops limped back to their lines. And it is also clear to me that Meade simply out-generaled him. Meade actively rode along his lines and fed in reinforcements where needed and played a much more active role than Lee did. Lee and A. P. Hill just watched. Lee could have been more active and ordered in his other reinforcements. He didn't. Maybe he expected Longstreet to do that because that was Lee's style, but if Longstreet wasn't doing it, he should have done it himself. Ultimately the buck stops with him. I happen to agree with Sears and others that Longstreet was the one subordinate Lee should have listened to and didn't and that Meade did out-general him. I know that is debatable, but I think the evidence supports it? Yet, you make good points.
 
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I agree he had passed a psychological point of no return and it would have been difficult to call it off as you point out. It was certainly his "Waterloo."
That's not what I mean. What I mean is that we consider it an overreach because it failed, but if he had not tried we would consider that an error as well.

Sometimes you make a reasonable gamble and it goes sour.


And it is also clear to me that Meade simply out-generaled him. Meade actively rode along his lines and fed in reinforcements where needed and played a much more active role than Lee did.
But Meade doesn't do this at all, or at least not consistently.

On day one, Meade wasn't on the field, which is fair enough.
On day two, Meade gets focused in on his right and doesn't listen to the commander holding his left flank (Sickles) and his artillery commander (Hunt) about the danger to his left, then when the attack comes in Meade overcompensates and throws all his available reserves in on the left - leaving him nothing left to respond to whatever else Lee is going to do that day.
On day three, of course, Meade is out of comms in the afternoon because his HQ was hit by "overs".
 
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That's not really good battle management, though, because those units are being pulled out of the existing line and are doing so under no central control. They are not true reserves and it is true reserves which are by far the most effective at defeating a penetration like this.
Otherwise the Napoleonic method of exhausting reserves simply would not work.
Not entirely accurate. Robinson's Division was already in reserve behind Cemetery Hill, 2 of Wheaton's brigades were nearby in reserve east of the Taneytown Road, and Shaler was in reserve around Culp's Hill. Only Birney was actually pulled from the line although there were plenty of Second and Fifth Corps soldiers in the area to cover the line.

The real problem with Lee's plan on the late morning-early afternoon on July 3 was that there was no real plan in the case of a breakthrough. Stuart was not ordered to do much more than defend the Confederate left (although he was probably looking to see what he could do offensively if the opportunity presented itself) and Ewell had already been driven off of Culp's Hill and was in no position to support an attack. Lee was definitely swinging for the fences and if he was going to continue the battle, this was probably the best that could have been put together.

Ryan
 
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The real problem with Lee's plan on the late morning-early afternoon on July 3 was that there was no real plan in the case of a breakthrough. Stuart was not ordered to do much more than defend the Confederate left (although he was probably looking to see what he could do offensively if the opportunity presented itself) and Ewell had already been driven off of Culp's Hill and was in no position to support an attack.
I think the reason why there's no plan for "in the case of" a breakthrough is that if the Charge succeeds then you don't need much plan besides that - it compromises the whole Union position.

I'm looking at a map that shows brigade positions, and e.g. I can see Robinson's divison behind Carrol but it just looks like a multiply deep line. That would mean Robinson was deployed, I think? They would then be local supports, or reserves for the 1st Corps line.
 
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I think the reason why there's no plan for "in the case of" a breakthrough is that if the Charge succeeds then you don't need much plan besides that - it compromises the whole Union position.

I'm looking at a map that shows brigade positions, and e.g. I can see Robinson's divison behind Carrol but it just looks like a multiply deep line. That would mean Robinson was deployed, I think? They would then be local supports, or reserves for the 1st Corps line.

They were in a supporting position for the front line. The First Corps was scattered over the field (Wadsworth was around Steven's Knoll and Culp's Hill while Doubleday was along Cemetery Ridge, just south of Gibbon) so I would say that Robinson was in reserve behind the various Eleventh Corps units and Carroll on Cemetery Hill. I would say that Robinson was a supporting/reserve unit that was shifted from one point of the field to another.

Ryan
 
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They were in a supporting position for the front line. The First Corps was scattered over the field (Wadsworth was around Steven's Knoll and Culp's Hill while Doubleday was along Cemetery Ridge, just south of Gibbon) so I would say that Robinson was in reserve behind the various Eleventh Corps units and Carroll on Cemetery Hill. I would say that Robinson was a supporting/reserve unit that was shifted from one point of the field to another.
And if a formation is scattered all over the place then it is not necessarily ready reserves; in particular a unit deployed to support a line facing north can't just suddenly turn around and move south to launch a counterstroke. This is the entire reason why undeployed reserves exist.



I didn't notice this beforehand but 1st Corps cannot really be called fresh (having routed on the 1st) though they may have somewhat recovered at this point, but on July 10 the entire corps had less than 4,000 infantry PFDE. A single division thereof is going to amount to a bit over a thousand men (60% of the corps' June 30 PFDE became casualties, which will have completely wrecked the corps as a fighting unit)
The same problem (though less acute) also applies to 3rd Corps - they've suffered casualties and disruption, with about a third of their June 30 PFD becoming casualties.

A coordinated four fresh brigades is one thing; a mix of tired brigades from different corps coming from different directions is something else entirely.

The field return for July 4 suggests:

Robinson (2/1st) is 1,030 officers and men.
Birney (1/3rd) is 2,990 officers and men.
The 6th Corps brigades are:

Torbett and Eustis: Detached from 6th Corps the morning of 3rd July to fill a gap in the line, and thus not in reserve.

Bartlett and Nevin: Detached from 6th Corps the morning of 3rd July to support Crawford (3rd Division, 5th Corps) around the Round Tops. Nowhere near.

Grant and Russell: Detached from 6th Corps the morning of 3rd July to protect the left flank of the Round Top position. Nowhere near.

Neill and Shayler: Detached from 6th Corps on the evening of the 2nd and attached to 12th Corps. Guarded the right flank of 12th Corps. (Shaler's report places him near Culps Hill).

Now, a couple of 6th Corps brigades in reserve (say, three) to deal with a breakthrough would be pretty helpful, but they're not there. Here's where they are (note that Shaler has been circled twice, including once where his report places him at this point, and that the 6th Corps bdes in the left side of the Union line are quite far south and in the front line)

6th-2bcorps-2bbdes-2bgb-png.png
 
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