Just to be clear - are you suggesting Hood would have been a better commander in the early stages of the campaign?
I know all What-Ifs are ultimately unknowable, but when I try to envisage a CSA general doing better than Johnston, I come up short. Hood's actual record doesn't exactly suggest success, and quite possibly an earlier cataclysmic defeat.
No, I am not suggesting Hood be appointed in January of 1864. I think Hood was an excellent combat commander for a division. I am unsure if he was a good commander for a Corps. I think he was a very questionable choice for an Army. He was very good at moving troops under his personal command quickly; he had the ability to look at a battlefield and see the opportunities in the terrain and deployment instinctively, at a glance. Those are valuable talents, but he lacked others that are essential to command of a large force.
Are you saying Johnston was the wrong commander, a bad commander, the best available at the time and still not good enough, or simply that no CSA commander could win at all anyway?
Just trying to understand your point here - and it may be you are just analyzing the campaign overall in general. Thanks.
The Confederacy had a real problem developing high commanders during the war. They had Robert E. Lee and .. those other guys.
The other guys they tried during the war and could have tried in January 1864: J. E. Johnston, Beauregard, Bragg, Hood, E. Kirby Smith, Pemberton, Mansfield Lovell. Those guys look like a bunch of heroes from Greek Tragedy, usually doomed by flaws in their own character. A. S. Johnston (dead) is not available and his Civil War career ended too quickly to know if he would have been a good choice if he had lived. Hood was probably too junior to be tried in January (no matter my opinion). Joe Johnston was probably the "best" choice available to Davis in that group. That doesn't make him a good choice.
Having done that, the Confederates really needed to have a replacement available if Johnston did not work out. Ideally, that man would be a Corps commander in the AoT, so that he would be involved in the operations of the AoT, build relationships with other commanders, be aware of plans, etc. Hardee was obviously one of those, but he doesn't seem to have had a lot of support with Davis and he sure did not have any with Bragg. Hood was playing for Davis' favor and got the Corps command. As noted above, I don't think he could handle the job -- but the end result of that decision was another bad choice, a very limited one, in July.
Joe Johnston had lots of good qualities, viewed in the abstract. In January-April of 1864, he did an excellent job of rebuilding the AoT troops. Morale improved. Unit cohesiveness and training improved. Morale improved. The AoT was a better army after four months with Johnston than it was before he arrived. That may have been the best thing Joe Johnston ever did for the Confederacy. Unfortunately, he did nothing to improve the higher command of the AoT and get rid of the back-stabbing politics and lack of coordination. That looks very similar to the Bragg days.
As to the campaign itself, Johnston's approach seems to me to be exactly the wrong one to use against Sherman, a bad fit for the terrain in the area where the combat would be fought, and unlikely to accomplish the Confederate goals on the Atlanta front that year.
- the execution of Johnston's plan gives up the more difficult terrain above the Chattahoochee too quickly
- Johnston's refusal to keep his higher command informed undermines his own army's efforts and leads to his own removal
- Johnston's passive defense builds Yankee confidence (in particular Sherman's confidence) and undermines Rebel morale by the constant retreats
- Johnston's refusal to share his plans with his own commanders leaves Hood in an intolerable situation when he does assume command
I think a much more active scheme was needed to counter Sherman. Sitting in fortified positions and hoping Sherman would smash into them was not going to work. Sherman wanted to avoid large combats and advance by maneuver, aiming at RRs and industry. Johnston's approach gave all the initiative to Sherman, put no pressure on him, built Sherman's confidence.
Johnston needed to slow Sherman's advance, but he let it progress rapidly. If the Confederate "strategy" is to win by making Lincoln and the Republicans lose the Election, they need to hold Atlanta into the Fall. Mid-October would probably be a minimum, and they should have been aiming at holding it into November. All the retreats under Johnston give up too much territory much too quickly, at too little cost.
Johnston did have one idea that he was denied on that I like. He wanted three Corps instead of two (and he did not suggest Hood as a commander). The three would have been smaller, but it would have made operational maneuver easier (and probably would have meant four corps when Polk arrives). Among other things, this would give experience to some people who might grow into new roles and offer another choice or two to replace Joe Johnston.
I suspect what was really needed was an aggressive and talented commander who could lead a small combined arms force independently of the main army. Call it something like 8-10,000 strong infantry-cavalry-artillery, fast moving with a commander who takes chances with a gambler's nerve and ice-cold reasoning and judgement (IOW, exactly the person they cannot find). That force needs to operate on the flanks of the main campaign, threatening and striking at Sherman's LOC, forcing Sherman to expend troops to deal with him and defend the LOC. Of course, I am suggesting Stonewall Jackson (dead) or J. E. B. Stuart (about to die in May); maybe Jubal Early could come somewhat close, but no one knew that in early 1864. Maybe Longstreet, but he comes with a some AoT baggage and a certain attitude. Maybe Cleburne, but he really doesn't have the background to know if he's right. Taylor or Forrest would be good tries, but neither of those would be picked.
So if there are four Confederate "corps" and one of them is really a very small army acting independently to assist the main army, then Johnston with three of them fights to block Sherman's main thrust and the fourth acts to threaten Sherman's flanks and rear. Conceptually, that is more likely to work than a passive hope-they-attack-and-die plan, particularly against a Sherman.
The reason for the all-arms independent force is that Civil War cavalry generally can't do serious damage and interruption of a RR (unless Nathan Bedford Forrest is involved). This force needs to be able to break the RR and keep it broken. This means doing heavy work, staying in place long enough to do a thorough job, fighting off Union reaction forces and potentially facing moderate Yankee forces (5,000+) coming after them from different directions. It means potentially staying in place and sitting on the RR until the Yankees come in strength to boot you off it. Your average Corps commander in the Civil Wr, on either side, is not likely to be able to do this difficult task.