Everyone had a plan. No one's plan workedWait … McDowell had a plan? …
Everyone had a plan. No one's plan workedWait … McDowell had a plan? …
As the very wise Mike Tyson once said, “Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.”Everyone had a plan. No one's plan worked
This is one of the interesting things, because those troops were green but they were also as experienced as the Union government could legally produce. (The Militia Act only allowed for a callout for three months in any twelve.). Probably too much marching for green troops on a hot summer day
As the very wise Mike Tyson once said, “Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.”
This is not really accurate. The US depended on the Volunteer Service, not the Enrolled Militia, to provide the bulk of forces in war time. This service had been established by wording in the 2nd Militia Act of 1792:This is one of the interesting things, because those troops were green but they were also as experienced as the Union government could legally produce. (The Militia Act only allowed for a callout for three months in any twelve.)
It's interesting to contemplate how much First Bull Run showcases the shortcomings of the US military structure of the pre-ACW period. If a war broke out with Britain (say) and the British avoided invading until the US volunteer army was at the greatest strength and experience they would reach... it'd be an army of the quality of First Bull Run.
I’d like to think that Tyson was just “dumbing down” Moltke for the masses. I may, however, be mistaken.....The military equivalent is that no battle plan survives contact with the enemy intact.
That is fair enough, though I'm sort of wondering how many enlistments would have been called for.What had happened in 1861 was a militia call, and volunteer enlistments for a limited period. This was politically useful, as it suggested a very short war. That would not have been the case with a war against Great Britain. The public would have been accepting of year enlistments in such a case.
Actually I believe that McDowell's plan was executed about as well as could be expected and also achieved what he set out to do. There are a couple of reasons its happened later than it could have which were mistakes in the plan itself (which I will profile my thoughts about as a "critical decision" in the future), but overall by approximately noon the plan had been very successful. Of course it all fell apart at that point for a few reasons -- but i believe that up until then was executed about as well as an plan for battle was during the war. Quite an achievement for raw troops and inexperienced commanders.As the very wise Mike Tyson once said, “Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.”
Of course there was a plan. Just not one that mattered after the actual battle began.
Actually I believe that McDowell's plan was executed about as well as could be expected and also achieved what he set out to do. There are a couple of reasons its happened later than it could have which were mistakes in the plan itself (which I will profile my thoughts about as a "critical decision" in the future), but overall by approximately noon the plan had been very successful. Of course it all fell apart at that point for a few reasons -- but i believe that up until then was executed about as well as an plan for battle was during the war. Quite an achievement for raw troops and inexperienced commanders.
To be fair, i think, it was Kirby Smith's brigade, the 4th of Johnston's, that actually precipitated the Federal rout. That unit, under Arnold Elzey, cooperating with Jubal Early's brigade, pushed the Federals off Chinn Ridge beginning the Federal withdrawal. This day's fight could have easily ended with the two armies preparing to face each other the next day.One key factor being that Johnston's troops had arrived from the Valley, giving the Confederates a reserve that could counter McDowell's flanking force. Johnston's three brigades - Bee, Barlow, Jackson - suffered most of the casualties on the Confederate side.
Union general Patterson not only failed to hold Johnston in the Valley, he let his superiors believe that he was holding Johnston's army and that it could not intervene in McDowell's battle.
This day's fight could have easily ended with the two armies preparing to face each other the next day.
Lines had been breaking all day, points changing hands. Panic might have got either army at several points.It would seem like quite a feat for two green armies to fight to a stalemate. Someone usually breaks.