Incidentally, no, I don't think that McClellan is always right. I think that there has been a pervasive pattern of incorrect criticism of him, including criticism where he took something that was a reasonable approximation of the best practical decision and people criticize him without offering a better alternative.
People do offer alternatives. You just think they are always -- no matter what -- worse than whatever McClellan chose.
My view of McClellan is that he is a technically capable commander who tends to make good decisions. That doesn't mean he aways makes the best decision, but it means that it is rare (i.e. not nearly as common as believed) for him to make a decision which is obviously in error. It is more common for him to make a decision which may not be the best but which is justifiable.
This is part of your self-convincing logic for asserting that McClellan should not be criticized. You confuse "justifiable" with "good".
For example, for the direct pursuit of Lee, here are the options.
- McClellan resumes the battle on the 18th. This would be significantly more aggressive than Meade was, and indeed it's not something Grant tended to do either after heavy fighting.
Not accurate, as I have already told you. Meade's
real actions on the 4th are much more aggressive than anything McClellan did on the 18th.
McClellan accepted a truce while Meade was willing to fight. Start out by admitting that to yourself before creating red herrings about what McClellan might have done.
On July 4th, Meade launches 8 of his 9 brigades of cavalry against Lee's flanks and LOC. Meade orders a division-sized probe by Warren of Lee's line (cancelled by the downpour that started at Noon, so it was expanded into a Corps-sized probe for the next morning). Meade's cavalry fights a significant battle on the night of the 4th-5th, doing heavy damage to Lee's trains and capturing a significant number of prisoners. Meade's
real actions on the 4th are much more aggressive than anything McClellan did on the 18th.
As to Grant, what in the world are you imagining here? Are you
really trying to say that George McClellan was
more aggressive than Grant?
Really? If so, I have no idea what you could possibly be looking at.
- McClellan pursues to the water's edge on the 19th. This actually happened; there's perhaps an argument he could have pushed faster, but that then gets into how fast a viable advance is.
By "to the water's edge", you appear to mean he moved forward from 2-4 miles after the enemy had already retreated to the other side of the river. He met no opposition at all in doing it that I recall. Late in the day, a small force does cross and captures Pendleton's artillery (showing why Pendleton should never ever command in a combat spot), which is then recovered by some Confederate infantry counterattacking.
Meanwhile, Meade's cavalry is striking the retreating Confederates and scooping up large numbers of Confederate POWs. VI Corps is following Lee's retreat, running into Ewell over by Fairfield.
- McClellan pursues over the river in significant force on the 19th. This is a possibility, and if that's the superior alternative then that's what the argument is, but we have to consider what Lee could do that day. Obviously most of Lee's army was close to the crossing since it had only recently crossed and could come back to hit the crossing troops (as happened at Shepherdstown historically).
On the 5th, Meade has 8 brigades of cavalry striking at and damaging Lee. VI Corps is moving directly after Lee's army in a recon-in-force to develop the situation. On the 19th McClellan -- after discovering the enemy is gone -- crosses the Potomac with two regiments of infantry.
You need to take a step back from all this and be more objective about evaluating the McClellan side. He did OK at Antietam. There is no way to describe his actions on the 18th and 19th as particularly aggressive -- and trying to make him look "more aggressive" than Meade is not believable.
- McClellan pursues over the river in force on the 20th. This is what McClellan did, though perhaps not as well as he could have done. The option of pursuing in greater force is worth considering, but it has to deal with the problem of Lee's historical reaction - how much force does McClellan need to pursue in to make it workable?
Meade, meanwhile has 8 brigades of cavalry pursuing and attacking the enemy for the last three days. He has pushed VI Corps after Lee, has them close enough to Lee's infantry that Lee has ordered Ewell to attack them if they come any closer. He is reading the rest of his army to follow -- and he does follow.
McClellan essentially ends the pursuit and the campaign at this point.
Why in the world are you trying to present Meade as timid and McClellan as aggressive?
At the same time there is an intel report late on the 19th that Lee is marching to Williamsport.
So? Do you think Meade might have gotten any intel reports about what Lee was doing? What is the point of this statement?
Now, obviously if Lee's army is in a sufficiently beaten state (such that he can be driven south by direct attacks) then McClellan doesn't need to mount what is basically an opposed river crossing (where he crosses as quickly as possible) but the evidence of the 20th and Lee's quick response with heavy force suggests that Lee's army is not in this sufficiently beaten state. In this light, McClellan tries (and is repulsed), repulses Lee's own attempt to cross the Potomac, then begins shifting south to mount a new campaign.
So, again, you agree with me that McClellan's pursuit ended here. You just object to admitting that you do.
for the nature of that new campaign, obviously Lincoln and Halleck want one thing and McClellan wants another. What McClellan wants though is to cross into the Shenandoah, which is where Lee is.
Perhaps this is the wrong decision! But what it is not is McClellan outlining a plan which isn't aggressive.
So? We get back to what I said many posts back. McClellan's pursuit is over. Everything else you are posting is simply to avoid saying that.