What Lee Thought About the Lost Orders

trice

Colonel
Joined
May 2, 2006
And - as I indicated - Leon Tenney has done a lot of work on Seven Days strengths, casualties, etc In his self-published 2012 expansion of the paper he did under Joseph Harsh's guidance at GMU, he concluded that McClellan's Seven Days casualties were materially higher than Fox's numbers.

In the big picture I don't see the significance (beyond earning debating stars) of the point attempting to be made about "casualty ratios". Once a war starts Job 1 of the military is to end it with a victory. It's not to earn some "style points" award that leaves the war ongoing and the opponent able to continue to inflict defeats like Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. Did Grant suffer heavy losses on May 19 and May 22 at Vicksburg? You bet he did. Did the CSA control the Mississippi after July 4? You bet they didn't. Grant beat Lee and he didn't beat Lee by accident. He also didn't spend all 10 months stupidly launching forlorn hopes against a well-entrenched foe. He mixed in multiple turning movements and even after he had Lee pinned at Petersburg - where it became just a matter of time - he resorted to several local offensives that kept the heat turned up and the throat constricting. Were Cold Harbor and the Crater successful ideas? Not hardly. But ultimately Lee - as he knew would liklely be the case once Grant had again gotten the jump by crossing the James - had to try a desperate escape on April 2, 1865. One week later he had been run to ground and was left with no options. And for the third time Grant accepted the surrender of his opponent's sword. As an aside, and as we know, in his Memoirs Grant had the wherewithal to admit that Cold Harbor was a mistake. Scan Own Story, correspondence with Ellen, etc. for a similar admission about anything. That's probably because the writer made absolutely no mistakes....

Numbers and Losses During The Seven Days 1862 Hardcover – January 1, 2012​

by Leon W. Tenney

I've never read that. Thanks for mentioning it.
 

67th Tigers

1st Lieutenant
Joined
Nov 10, 2006
So, if I'm read Trice right, casualties by McClellan inflicted on the Army of Northern Virginia under Johnston don't count?
 

Saphroneth

Major
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
So, if I'm read Trice right, casualties by McClellan inflicted on the Army of Northern Virginia under Johnston don't count?
It would be fair to discount them if we are looking specifically at combat performance vs. Lee, but if we are looking at overall damage to the AoNV then obviously they should count as well.

Actually...

McClellan defending versus JEJ at Seven Pines:
0.83 (about 6:5 in favour)

McClellan attacking versus JEJ at Williamsburg:
1.36 (about 4:3 against)

This is actually a bit worse than his figures vs. Lee.

This (by itself, and using this metric) implies that we can probably include the numbers since it's not "including an easy battle".
 

trice

Colonel
Joined
May 2, 2006
So, if I'm read Trice right, casualties by McClellan inflicted on the Army of Northern Virginia under Johnston don't count?
Not what I said. Saphroneth is the one who seemed to think actions against Joe Johsnton should not count.

Of course, you said: "In fact, if you count casualties then McClellan comes as the second most damaging enemy Lee fought." when presenting the numbers.
 

trice

Colonel
Joined
May 2, 2006
It would be fair to discount them if we are looking specifically at combat performance vs. Lee, but if we are looking at overall damage to the AoNV then obviously they should count as well.

Actually...

McClellan defending versus JEJ at Seven Pines:
0.83 (about 6:5 in favour)

McClellan attacking versus JEJ at Williamsburg:
1.36 (about 4:3 against)

This is actually a bit worse than his figures vs. Lee.

This (by itself, and using this metric) implies that we can probably include the numbers since it's not "including an easy battle".
What makes you think this "metric" proves anything worthwhile?
 

trice

Colonel
Joined
May 2, 2006
For someone that "didn't like battles", McClellan sure seems to have fought an awful lot of them.

In fact, if you count casualties then McClellan comes as the second most damaging enemy Lee fought. When loss ratios are counted, it's obvious why Grant is discounted. Only two Federal generals are really equal or better to Lee when looked at statistically; McClellan and Meade. Grant might have been a butcher, but he was a more competent butcher than Pope, Burnside or Hooker at least...

InflictedSustainedLoss Ratio
McClellan47,01743,4530.92
Pope9,47418,5651.96
Burnside5,37712,6532.35
Hooker13,76123,3851.70
Meade28,97326,9030.93
Grant74,028109,5261.48
Your numbers for Burnside seem too low to me. Would you please share with us what is included in them?
 

trice

Colonel
Joined
May 2, 2006
Yet it is true. Grant's habit of letting Lee entrench and then attacking him there was poor generalship.
Nope. It is obvious enough that you know a lot about military history, but you seem to see it as a pedant. You remind me of Henry Halleck.

All of what you do is designed to praise McClellan. Every other general must be derided and attacked so that you can praise McClellan. Thus your knee-jerk reaction to anyone who says something good about Grant, and your constant attempts to portray him as a "butcher" This is just another silly and misleading canard from you.

McClellan indeed did "pull it off", as his casualty ratios and overall number of casualties inflicted shows.
Your desire to believe this does not make it true.

I suspect you're pursuing a line of argument that since the enemy army didn't surrender to McClellan, everything that was achieved should be discounted. Also, because Grant did capture Lee's army, all Grant's mistakes and failures should also be discounted. It's what Showalter describes as "military calvinism". It eskews analysis. In fact it opposes analysis and simply sorts generals into "winners" and "losers". It is crude, and not a useful way of thinking.
Yes, I've seen your "military calvinism" blog post. I think you have seriously bent what Dennis Showalter was saying to use it for your ode to McClellan.

You see the world in terms of your own impulses. Mine are not what you imagine. Pay attention to what I actually say -- ALL of what I say -- instead of creating strawmen to pillory.
 

67th Tigers

1st Lieutenant
Joined
Nov 10, 2006
What makes you think this "metric" proves anything worthwhile?

To you, perhaps this coefficient is meaningless. This is likely because you don't know how to interpret it. However, it can tell us a lot.

Lets take the Grant (Overland, upto the James crossing) vs McClellan (Peninsula, upto arrival at Harrisons) as a point of comparison.

Federal Campaign StrengthEnemy Campaign StrengthRatio
McClellan129,467ca. 139,093 (>122,336)0.93
Grant201,21396,2002.09
Ratio1.550.692.25

In three cases these numbers are determined by rolls. In the case of the rebel strength in the Peninsula campaign it is easy to find at the Seven Days plus battle casualties already accumulated (122,336). It is thus an underestimate (probably by around 10-20,000) since it excludes sickness, desertion etc. The equivalent number for the AoP calculated in the same manner is 113,870 (88% of total campaign strength), and assuming the same rates of sickness in the two armies, about 139,093 is derived.

Both these campaigns to this point ended in the same manner - the Federal Army was on the James and in a position to cross it and attack. However, the campaign force ratios tell you that Grant had a much easier job of things. The ratio of ratios is 2.25, which shows how much harder things were for McClellan. It's like McClellan was playing on hard difficult and Grant easy difficulty.

Upto that point the result was effectively identical, with the Federal army on the James. The differences are:

1. Halleck forbid McClellan to cross the James and to retreat to Washington instead, whilst in 1864 Halleck wanted to forbid Grant's crossing of the James, but was unable to.
2. Despite much better strength ratios, Grant's army had suffered much more and without the huge strength advantage Grant was given that McClellan wasn't, he would likely have been destroyed.

Of course, the Overland Campaign did not destroy Lee's army or capture Richmond. By the standard, if the Peninsula Campaign is a failure, then so is the Overland Campaign. It is only the prolonged siege of Petersburg and the huge reinforcements poured in (by late March '65 the force ratio is about 2.3:1) that saved the campaign.

The questions should be asked:

1. What would McClellan have achieved with Grant's resources?
2. What would Grant have achieved with McClellan's resources?

For (1), given Grant's resources it is basically certain McClellan would have captured Richmond and destroyed Lee's Army.

For (2), given McClellan's resources it is basically certain Grant would have failed, and possibly (had he adopted the same plan without the strength to back it up) have had his entire army destroyed.
 

Belfoured

2nd Lieutenant
Joined
Aug 3, 2019
To you, perhaps this coefficient is meaningless. This is likely because you don't know how to interpret it. However, it can tell us a lot.

Lets take the Grant (Overland, upto the James crossing) vs McClellan (Peninsula, upto arrival at Harrisons) as a point of comparison.

Federal Campaign StrengthEnemy Campaign StrengthRatio
McClellan129,467ca. 139,093 (>122,336)0.93
Grant201,21396,2002.09
Ratio1.550.692.25

In three cases these numbers are determined by rolls. In the case of the rebel strength in the Peninsula campaign it is easy to find at the Seven Days plus battle casualties already accumulated (122,336). It is thus an underestimate (probably by around 10-20,000) since it excludes sickness, desertion etc. The equivalent number for the AoP calculated in the same manner is 113,870 (88% of total campaign strength), and assuming the same rates of sickness in the two armies, about 139,093 is derived.

Both these campaigns to this point ended in the same manner - the Federal Army was on the James and in a position to cross it and attack. However, the campaign force ratios tell you that Grant had a much easier job of things. The ratio of ratios is 2.25, which shows how much harder things were for McClellan. It's like McClellan was playing on hard difficult and Grant easy difficulty.

Upto that point the result was effectively identical, with the Federal army on the James. The differences are:

1. Halleck forbid McClellan to cross the James and to retreat to Washington instead, whilst in 1864 Halleck wanted to forbid Grant's crossing of the James, but was unable to.
2. Despite much better strength ratios, Grant's army had suffered much more and without the huge strength advantage Grant was given that McClellan wasn't, he would likely have been destroyed.

Of course, the Overland Campaign did not destroy Lee's army or capture Richmond. By the standard, if the Peninsula Campaign is a failure, then so is the Overland Campaign. It is only the prolonged siege of Petersburg and the huge reinforcements poured in (by late March '65 the force ratio is about 2.3:1) that saved the campaign.

The questions should be asked:

1. What would McClellan have achieved with Grant's resources?
2. What would Grant have achieved with McClellan's resources?

For (1), given Grant's resources it is basically certain McClellan would have captured Richmond and destroyed Lee's Army.

For (2), given McClellan's resources it is basically certain Grant would have failed, and possibly (had he adopted the same plan without the strength to back it up) have had his entire army destroyed.
To you, perhaps this coefficient is meaningless. This is likely because you don't know how to interpret it. However, it can tell us a lot.

Lets take the Grant (Overland, upto the James crossing) vs McClellan (Peninsula, upto arrival at Harrisons) as a point of comparison.

Federal Campaign StrengthEnemy Campaign StrengthRatio
McClellan129,467ca. 139,093 (>122,336)0.93
Grant201,21396,2002.09
Ratio1.550.692.25

In three cases these numbers are determined by rolls. In the case of the rebel strength in the Peninsula campaign it is easy to find at the Seven Days plus battle casualties already accumulated (122,336). It is thus an underestimate (probably by around 10-20,000) since it excludes sickness, desertion etc. The equivalent number for the AoP calculated in the same manner is 113,870 (88% of total campaign strength), and assuming the same rates of sickness in the two armies, about 139,093 is derived.

Both these campaigns to this point ended in the same manner - the Federal Army was on the James and in a position to cross it and attack. However, the campaign force ratios tell you that Grant had a much easier job of things. The ratio of ratios is 2.25, which shows how much harder things were for McClellan. It's like McClellan was playing on hard difficult and Grant easy difficulty.

Upto that point the result was effectively identical, with the Federal army on the James. The differences are:

1. Halleck forbid McClellan to cross the James and to retreat to Washington instead, whilst in 1864 Halleck wanted to forbid Grant's crossing of the James, but was unable to.
2. Despite much better strength ratios, Grant's army had suffered much more and without the huge strength advantage Grant was given that McClellan wasn't, he would likely have been destroyed.

Of course, the Overland Campaign did not destroy Lee's army or capture Richmond. By the standard, if the Peninsula Campaign is a failure, then so is the Overland Campaign. It is only the prolonged siege of Petersburg and the huge reinforcements poured in (by late March '65 the force ratio is about 2.3:1) that saved the campaign.

The questions should be asked:

1. What would McClellan have achieved with Grant's resources?
2. What would Grant have achieved with McClellan's resources?

For (1), given Grant's resources it is basically certain McClellan would have captured Richmond and destroyed Lee's Army.

For (2), given McClellan's resources it is basically certain Grant would have failed, and possibly (had he adopted the same plan without the strength to back it up) have had his entire army destroyed.
On we go.

"Of course, the Overland Campaign did not destroy Lee's army or capture Richmond. By the standard, if the Peninsula Campaign is a failure, then so is the Overland Campaign."

The Overland Campaign began in the Frederickburg area and Grant steadily drove Lee south. At the end of the campaign, Lee was pinned at Petersburg and the ANV had lost its ability to mount offensive operations. The Seven Days began with McClellan on Richmond's door step. The ANV mounted an effective offensive operation and at the end of the campaign McClellan was pinned back at Harrison's Landing. One of these things is not like the other. Give us the barrage of excuses, explanations, rationals, and tangents all you want, but don't distort the basic facts.
 

shooter too

Private
Joined
Mar 4, 2021
To you, perhaps this coefficient is meaningless. This is likely because you don't know how to interpret it. However, it can tell us a lot.

Lets take the Grant (Overland, upto the James crossing) vs McClellan (Peninsula, upto arrival at Harrisons) as a point of comparison.

Federal Campaign StrengthEnemy Campaign StrengthRatio
McClellan129,467ca. 139,093 (>122,336)0.93
Grant201,21396,2002.09
Ratio1.550.692.25

In three cases these numbers are determined by rolls. In the case of the rebel strength in the Peninsula campaign it is easy to find at the Seven Days plus battle casualties already accumulated (122,336). It is thus an underestimate (probably by around 10-20,000) since it excludes sickness, desertion etc. The equivalent number for the AoP calculated in the same manner is 113,870 (88% of total campaign strength), and assuming the same rates of sickness in the two armies, about 139,093 is derived.

Both these campaigns to this point ended in the same manner - the Federal Army was on the James and in a position to cross it and attack. However, the campaign force ratios tell you that Grant had a much easier job of things. The ratio of ratios is 2.25, which shows how much harder things were for McClellan. It's like McClellan was playing on hard difficult and Grant easy difficulty.

Upto that point the result was effectively identical, with the Federal army on the James. The differences are:

1. Halleck forbid McClellan to cross the James and to retreat to Washington instead, whilst in 1864 Halleck wanted to forbid Grant's crossing of the James, but was unable to.
2. Despite much better strength ratios, Grant's army had suffered much more and without the huge strength advantage Grant was given that McClellan wasn't, he would likely have been destroyed.

Of course, the Overland Campaign did not destroy Lee's army or capture Richmond. By the standard, if the Peninsula Campaign is a failure, then so is the Overland Campaign. It is only the prolonged siege of Petersburg and the huge reinforcements poured in (by late March '65 the force ratio is about 2.3:1) that saved the campaign.

The questions should be asked:

1. What would McClellan have achieved with Grant's resources?
2. What would Grant have achieved with McClellan's resources?

For (1), given Grant's resources it is basically certain McClellan would have captured Richmond and destroyed Lee's Army.

For (2), given McClellan's resources it is basically certain Grant would have failed, and possibly (had he adopted the same plan without the strength to back it up) have had his entire army destroyed.


Do you have a source for these numbers, or are they your own?
 

67th Tigers

1st Lieutenant
Joined
Nov 10, 2006
The Overland Campaign began in the Frederickburg area and Grant steadily drove Lee south. At the end of the campaign, Lee was pinned at Petersburg and the ANV had lost its ability to mount offensive operations. The Seven Days began with McClellan on Richmond's door step. The ANV mounted an effective offensive operation and at the end of the campaign McClellan was pinned back at Harrison's Landing. One of these things is not like the other. Give us the barrage of excuses, explanations, rationals, and tangents all you want, but don't distort the basic facts.

No, they are essentially identical aside from the Federal casualty counts, and whether Halleck allowed for a move over the James.

McClellan wasn't pinned to Harrison's - Lee was pinned to defending Richmond in both 1862 and 1864. In both 1862 and 1864 Lee felt he could only spare the "2nd Corps" to watch Northern Virginia, but in both cases had to hold his main body to defending Richmond and Petersburg. In 1862, it was only his determination that McClellan was being withdrawn that allowed Lee to move north in strength.
 

67th Tigers

1st Lieutenant
Joined
Nov 10, 2006
Do you have a source for these numbers, or are they your own?

Peninsula
Federal - from the returns in the OR
Confederate - from Tenney (end of June 1862), with casualties added back as discussed.

Overland
Federal - from the returns as calculated here (many writers fail to read the returns properly)
Confederate - from Young
 

shooter too

Private
Joined
Mar 4, 2021
Peninsula
Federal - from the returns in the OR
Confederate - from Tenney (end of June 1862), with casualties added back as discussed.

Overland
Federal - from the returns as calculated here (many writers fail to read the returns properly)
Confederate - from Young


An apparent blog post, I am impressed. sarcasm btw.
 
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Belfoured

2nd Lieutenant
Joined
Aug 3, 2019
No, they are essentially identical aside from the Federal casualty counts, and whether Halleck allowed for a move over the James.

McClellan wasn't pinned to Harrison's - Lee was pinned to defending Richmond in both 1862 and 1864. In both 1862 and 1864 Lee felt he could only spare the "2nd Corps" to watch Northern Virginia, but in both cases had to hold his main body to defending Richmond and Petersburg. In 1862, it was only his determination that McClellan was being withdrawn that allowed Lee to move north in strength.
You have a very odd definition of "pinned". Kindly advise of all actions McClellan took from HL between July 4 and August 1 (I know - he would have if only Halleck had given him 20,000 - 40,000 more men to face the 200,000 Lee had at Richmond). On June 26 Mac was about 6 miles from Richmond, on the door step of the Capital. On July 4 he was about 24 miles from Richmond and was on the doorstep of a lot of water and swamps. Meanwhile, Lee was so effectively "pinned" that he began sending Jackson northward on July 13 - right when Mac was beginning to posture with Washington about new, grand plans to take the offensive. And - speaking of that and prior posts regarding who Lee thought was his most able opponent - check out what the Rev. E.C. Gordon told Lee's interviewer William Allan by letter dated November 18, 1886 about his own interview of Lee on February 15, 1868 - that Lee told Gordon he thought McClellan was "timid". Lee took a lot of actions that were consistent with that.

Early was sent north by Lee on June 13, 1864, before Lee ended up being pinned at Petersburg after Grant surprised him by jumping the James. As Lee had predicted, if the ANV ended up in a siege at Petersburg, his defeat was only a "matter of time". Thereafter, the ANV took no important offensive actions until the desperate attempts to break out in late March/early April 1865.
 

trice

Colonel
Joined
May 2, 2006
To you, perhaps this coefficient is meaningless. This is likely because you don't know how to interpret it. However, it can tell us a lot.

Lets take the Grant (Overland, upto the James crossing) vs McClellan (Peninsula, upto arrival at Harrisons) as a point of comparison.

Federal Campaign StrengthEnemy Campaign StrengthRatio
McClellan129,467ca. 139,093 (>122,336)0.93
Grant201,21396,2002.09
Ratio1.550.692.25

In three cases these numbers are determined by rolls. In the case of the rebel strength in the Peninsula campaign it is easy to find at the Seven Days plus battle casualties already accumulated (122,336). It is thus an underestimate (probably by around 10-20,000) since it excludes sickness, desertion etc. The equivalent number for the AoP calculated in the same manner is 113,870 (88% of total campaign strength), and assuming the same rates of sickness in the two armies, about 139,093 is derived.

Both these campaigns to this point ended in the same manner - the Federal Army was on the James and in a position to cross it and attack. However, the campaign force ratios tell you that Grant had a much easier job of things. The ratio of ratios is 2.25, which shows how much harder things were for McClellan. It's like McClellan was playing on hard difficult and Grant easy difficulty.

Upto that point the result was effectively identical, with the Federal army on the James. The differences are:

1. Halleck forbid McClellan to cross the James and to retreat to Washington instead, whilst in 1864 Halleck wanted to forbid Grant's crossing of the James, but was unable to.
2. Despite much better strength ratios, Grant's army had suffered much more and without the huge strength advantage Grant was given that McClellan wasn't, he would likely have been destroyed.

Of course, the Overland Campaign did not destroy Lee's army or capture Richmond. By the standard, if the Peninsula Campaign is a failure, then so is the Overland Campaign. It is only the prolonged siege of Petersburg and the huge reinforcements poured in (by late March '65 the force ratio is about 2.3:1) that saved the campaign.

The questions should be asked:

1. What would McClellan have achieved with Grant's resources?
2. What would Grant have achieved with McClellan's resources?

For (1), given Grant's resources it is basically certain McClellan would have captured Richmond and destroyed Lee's Army.

For (2), given McClellan's resources it is basically certain Grant would have failed, and possibly (had he adopted the same plan without the strength to back it up) have had his entire army destroyed.
Look at this non sequitur. Great job of going off on a tangent and avoiding what you don't want to talk about!

Obvious in the above -- once again -- is your obsession with declaring McClellan pure and without blemish. One of the devices you constantly use in your attempt to do this is to blame everything on someone else, in this case Halleck. Obvious in the above -- once again -- is your obsession with attacking Grant as a tool for making McClellan look good in your own eyes.

Here is one thing you keep trying to hide from: McClellan was responsible for his own problems with his superiors (just as Joe Johnston was responsible for his own problems with his superiors). Grant worked to establish a good relationship with his superiors -- and was rewarded with their trust and support. Lee worked to establish a good relationship with his superiors -- and was rewarded with their trust and support. McClellan and Johnston constantly treated their superiors poorly -- and this is ***why*** they had so many difficulties with their superiors. If McClellan wants more trust and a better relationship with his superiors, McClellan needs to work to improve the situation. He did the opposite.

You try to avoid this simple truth by blaming McClellan's superiors (Lincoln or Stanton or Halleck). This is just silly. The decision made might be right or wrong, but more likely it is simply not the one McClellan wanted. You seem to have no concept of how the chain of command works, and seem to believe that whatever McClellan wants is always the best thing to do -- that not doing what McClellan wants is an outrage!. It is not. In particular, you seem to resent the fact that it is not McClellan's decision to make.

So: what would McClellan achieve if he had not been such a self-centered commander who thought everything should be given to him, no matter what? Try answering that question instead of trying to pass off these red herrings.

Note also the misdirection. The resources Grant used in 1864 generally did not exist to be used in 1862. The situation is very, very different. McClellan in 1862 has to deal with the situation in 1862. Your attempt to give him 1864 resources in 1862 is simply a non-starter. If you want McClellan to get Grant's resources and Grant's support from the high command, the requirement is for McClellan to first build up a record of success and a history of cooperation. His failure to do so is the reason is does not have them.

Try including all the data and making an objective analysis instead of starting from the position that McClellan must be the best. McClellan had a lot of good aspects, which I have always acknowledged -- but he was not the paladin without fault you want him to be. He also has faults and shortcomings -- which you refuse to acknowledge.
 

trice

Colonel
Joined
May 2, 2006
No, they are essentially identical aside from the Federal casualty counts, and whether Halleck allowed for a move over the James.

McClellan wasn't pinned to Harrison's - Lee was pinned to defending Richmond in both 1862 and 1864. In both 1862 and 1864 Lee felt he could only spare the "2nd Corps" to watch Northern Virginia, but in both cases had to hold his main body to defending Richmond and Petersburg. In 1862, it was only his determination that McClellan was being withdrawn that allowed Lee to move north in strength.
Well, this seems questionable.

In late July, Lee has already withdrawn most of his army and is concentrating on northern Virginia operations. Hearing rumor of this, Halleck orders McClellan to make a recon-in-force on Malvern Hill (July 31?). Somehow, McClellan takes four days to do that, sending Sumner -- who clears Malvern Hill with no problem. Surprised, Lee sends troops back, planning to attack -- but McClellan orders Sumner back, abandoning Malvern Hill again.

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XI/2 [S# 13]​
AUGUST 2-8, 1862.--Reconnaissance from Harrison's Landing and reoccupation of Malvern Hill by the Union forces.​
No. 6. -- Report of General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army, of operations August 5-7,​
HEADQUARTERS,
New Market, Va., August 7, 1862.
Mr. PRESIDENT: It having been reported to me Tuesday evening that the enemy in considerable force had occupied Malvern Hill, and that it looked like a general advance of McClellan's army, I directed the divisions of Generals Longstreet and McLaws and the brigades under General Ripley to advance next morning to the Long Bridge road. On reaching that road the enemy appeared in considerable strength, occupying the ground on which the battle was fought on Tuesday, July 1. His troops were drawn up in line of battle, his artillery in position, and he apparently was prepared to deliver battle in as strong force as he did on that day. Generals McLaws' and Ripley's divisions, re-enforced by that of General D. R. Jones, formed our left, while General Longstreet's formed the right. The day was intensely hot and the progress of the troops necessarily slow. Before the Long Bridge and Charles City roads were clear of his pickets and his line of battle disclosed the sun had nearly set. Orders were then given for our left wing to advance to Willis' Church, extending well to the left and threatening the enemy's communications with Westover. Two brigades of General Longstreet's division were ordered to advance upon Malvern Hill and drive in his parties extending over Curl's Neck. This latter operation was handsomely done by General Evans with his own and Cobb's brigades, and the enemy's parties were driven under their guns at Malvern Hill.

From the prisoners captured during the day it was ascertained that the enemy was in strong force--infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Hooker's, Sedgwick's, Kearny's, and Birney's divisions were mentioned as being present; [also] Emory's cavalry and Heintzelman's and Sumner's corps.
This morning upon the advance of the troops it was ascertained that the enemy had disappeared during the night, and he has now apparently retired within his former lines. I have directed the re-establish merit of our pickets and the return of our troops to their former positions and duties. The number of the killed and captured of the enemy I do not exactly know, but they are but few. Our casualties small.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General.
His Excellency JEFF. DAVIS,
President of the Confederate States of America.

On the 8th, Lee is writing that McClellan will not pose a threat to D. H. Hill at Petersburg.

Lee, who was already heading northwards before this, decides McClellan can be safely ignored.
 
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WScott

Private
Joined
May 6, 2021
I think we all know that Halleck didn't like Grant when he served under him in the Western Theatre (thought Grant had an issue with certain liquids), he failed to deliver the pontoons to Burnside at Fredericksburg on time, he did not have a clear plan for the execution of the War and he didn't get along with subordinates, including McClellen. In to many respects McClellen was a lot like Halleck, both were exceptional at organizing, training and equipping armies for war but neither was strong at "fighting". Based on the skills and capabilities of the Union Commanders in 1862 McClellen was no better and nor worse than the rest, even though I like McClellen.
 
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