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So what happens if Lincoln keeps McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac after Antietam. How does any winter campaign play out - if at all?
I could imagine McClellan making a similar move on Fredericksburg like Burnside did. Unlike Burnside, I think McClellan gets the pontoons there on time, but also moves the army slower so Lee still blocks him. McClellan looks at the situation and doesn't attack at all. So you get a winter campaign, but no battle.
I expect McClellan has the AotP in good shape by spring too, but he keeps Pleasanton in charge of the cavalry.
From there I'm not sure where we go. Lincoln would insist he do something in May and would deny another try at the Peninsula. I don't see Mac making a move like Hooker's Chancellorsville offensive. Maybe attempting a crossing downstream of Fredericksburg if he can get the shipping together?
To follow up on retaining Pleasonton, nothing in McClellan's track record suggests that his cavalry would ever have become more than an oversized HQ escort and a staff of couriers. Although Porter did put it to good use as an excuse for losing the field at Gaines's Mil. McClellan's failure to understand the proper role and use of cavalry brings to mind Lincoln's rersponse to Mac's latest "explanation" for their dominance by Stuart, asking what his horses had done that would fatigue anything.I could imagine McClellan making a similar move on Fredericksburg like Burnside did. Unlike Burnside, I think McClellan gets the pontoons there on time, but also moves the army slower so Lee still blocks him. McClellan looks at the situation and doesn't attack at all. So you get a winter campaign, but no battle.
I expect McClellan has the AotP in good shape by spring too, but he keeps Pleasanton in charge of the cavalry.
From there I'm not sure where we go. Lincoln would insist he do something in May and would deny another try at the Peninsula. I don't see Mac making a move like Hooker's Chancellorsville offensive. Maybe attempting a crossing downstream of Fredericksburg if he can get the shipping together?
Do we still have Lincoln's exasperation with Mac's attitude and inactivity, and Mac's distain and dismissal of Lincoln's requests and interference? Do we still have Mac being suspicious and not sharing plans, overestimating CSA strengths, and seeing conspiracies everywhere?
Burneside was basically sacked for unaccountable inaction and being most sluggardly in his actions.
If he didn't attack at Fredericksburg he is probably sacked. His November movements were supposed to set up some big battle, but they got nothing and Lincoln dismissed him in frustration. If he had been allowed to move on Fredericksburg and the same happened, same result a few months later.
To follow up on retaining Pleasonton, nothing in McClellan's track record suggests that his cavalry would ever have become more than an oversized HQ escort and a staff of couriers. Although Porter did put it to good use as an excuse for losing the field at Gaines's Mil. McClellan's failure to understand the proper role and use of cavalry brings to mind Lincoln's rersponse to Mac's latest "explanation" for their dominance by Stuart, asking what his horses had done that would fatigue anything.
The speed you’re hypothesizing seems very unlike the McClellan who stared across the Antietam for two days instead of moving against a force scarcely larger than two of his corps. If he’s looking at Lee atop Marye’s Heights there is no way he moves, even if the pontoons arrive on time.McClellan was relieved just as his army contacted Longstreet. Indeed, 9th Corps was in contact when McClellan was relieved. McClellan's relief is why no battle occurred - Burnside withdrew.
If McClellan had moved on Fredericksburg, he'd have seized it. He'd have had no problems with allowing Sumner to seize the far side before the enemy arrived, knowing that Sumner could hold off a larger force. See Rich Mountain, or Eltham's Landing, or Seven Pines, or the opening part of the Seven Days battles, or the reoccupation of Harper's Ferry ca. 21st September '62. Indeed, McClellan would have pushed over and gained the heights. Further, McClellan is not going to screw up his staff work and lose track of his pontoon train.
The speed you’re hypothesizing seems very unlike the McClellan who stared across the Antietam for two days instead of moving against a force scarcely larger than two of his corps. If he’s looking at Lee atop Marye’s Heights there is no way he moves, even if the pontoons arrive on time.
The speed you’re hypothesizing seems very unlike the McClellan who stared across the Antietam for two days instead of moving against a force scarcely larger than two of his corps. If he’s looking at Lee atop Marye’s Heights there is no way he moves, even if the pontoons arrive on time.
Talk about unsupported hyperbole - "McClellan understood cavalry better than most"? Feel free to fill us in on the evidence. McClellan's cavalry did nothing meaningful between August 1861 and November 7, 1862. Among other things he never developed any sort of competent scouting function in his cavalry and never figured out how to establish his cavalry as an effective organization. The post-Antietam outbreak was grease heel, not "hoof and mouth", and also affected the ANV equally. Somehow that didn't prevent Stuart from (once again) circumnavigating McClellan's army and his moribund cavalry.They'd done huge amounts of work, and their horses were shot, and suffering with a hoof and mouth outbreak.
McClellan understood cavalry better than most. He just never had much of it.
My understanding is that the outbreak hit the ANV after the AotP, which is why Jackson stayed immobile in the Valley despite Lee ordering him to join Longstreet roughly every other day for about a fortnight.The post-Antietam outbreak was grease heel, not "hoof and mouth", and also affected the ANV equally. Somehow that didn't prevent Stuart from (once again) circumnavigating McClellan's army and his moribund cavalry.
This is such a broad statement it's easy to disprove.McClellan's cavalry did nothing meaningful between August 1861 and November 7, 1862.
Doubtful; McClellan's static under exactly three conditions.The army would still be there
None of the three obtains in November 1862, which is why McClellan's army was concentrated around Warrenton (resupplying) when he was relieved. If he'd been going to just stay static he'd still be concentrated around Harpers Ferry when relieved.