- Nov 21, 2014
And as we previously discussed, but you ignored, that is not the case. The only time Lee disagrees with Jackson's intuition is on the 14th when he determines his presence neither threatens "McClellan" or the Federal force entirely nor that Jackson is himself threatened.You never formulated a coherent counterargument. Lee wrote continually to Lee to ask him to move his army to unite with his via Swift Run Gap. It took Jackson roughly two weeks to start moving.
Except he did. As previously stated, in his Report McClellan believed Jackson was at Chester and Thorton’s Gaps, when in reality he was closer to Snickers and Ashby Gaps. This isn't speculation, McClellan writes this down. He was flat out wrong in 1861, and he was wrong in 1864.Lee did not contradict McClellan. Understand, McClellan stated where he believed Jackson's troops were, and when we check we find that they were where McClellan said they were. There is no evidence supporting your assertion that McClellan didn't know Jackson's dispositions, and abundant evidence that he did. You reached the conclusion that he didn't know before examining the evidence, and then tried to fit the evidence to your theory.
So slowly then.Historical swiftness, surely?
McClellan was not moving with any stunning rapidity which would force Lee to battle, and we have zero indication save for McClellan's post-facto justification in 1864 that he was going to achieve some glorious victory in November. The few indications we have of any plan McClellan had was that he seemed to intend to push Lee into the Richmond fortifications, he did not seem to be expecting a battle before Richmond and if he had found one, he would not have been prepared for it.