Desertion was at an all time high under burnside at the end as well. The army was disintegrating in winter quarters and not being taken care ofI doubt anything about the relationship between McClellan and Lincoln was ever going to change.
Burnside could have been sacked after the Fredericksburg disaster. He then attempted an offensive that bad weather turned into the Mud March and was cancelled before getting anywhere. Winter had really stopped the campaign season. Burnside's removal really stemmed by the near mutiny of some of his chief subordinates. The insubordinate malcontents were reassigned for their backhanded dealings, but Burnside left too - as well he should. Unlike Braxton Bragg, Burnside knew when to bow out gracefully.
There's no reason to think McClellan wouldn't go after Longstreet if Longstreet stayed in place, so long as McClellan could keep himself in supply; when McClellan thought he'd caught part of an army larger than his own at Sharpsburg, he launched the bloodiest day of combat in American history. Here he thinks he's caught part of an army smaller than his own.+Sooo.......what happens if McClellan remains in command? He had created a favorable situation to concentrate against Longstreet before Jackson could intervene; would it go forward?
On we go. There's a difference between screening and scouting - especially organized scouting to gather intelligence. The Loudoun Valley campaign occurred in late October, after Lincoln had badgered McClellan into actually moving. It featured a few skirmishes. Suggesting that they remotely rose to a full-fledged battle, let alone something analogous to Brandy Station, is alternative history. You might also fill us in on the results of that campaign. Both armies also had horses which suffered from sore tongue. But none of that stopped Stuart's second ride. As for the "supply" of horses, when did Davis provide all of those replenishments? Fitz Lee could not come close to mounting a full division by November and, unlike the Union side, a good portion of the Confederate cavalry's mounts were supplied by the individual soldiers themselves.My understanding is that the outbreak hit the ANV after the AotP, which is why Jackson stayed immobile in the Valley despite Lee ordering him to join Longstreet roughly every other day for about a fortnight.
Jackson is ordered to move to unite with Longstreet on the 6th.
And on the 8th.
And on the 10th.
And on the 11th.
And on the 14th.
And on the 18th.
Jackson moves on the 21st.
It's also worth considering two parallel situations.
McClellan and Lee both complained in this time period about their horses being sick.
Lincoln asked McClellan what his horses had been doing to tire them out; Davis sent Lee fresh horses.
This is such a broad statement it's easy to disprove.
During the Maryland campaign, the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac scouted after Lee's army effectively enough to discern his rough movements even before SO 191 was found; they also captured the Catoctin passes without needing significant line infantry help, and thus helped to enable McClellan's strategic surprise on the 14th.
During the Loudoun Valley campaign, the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac effectively screened and scouted McClellan's movements including taking the gaps in the Blue Ridge Mountains and preventing Jackson and Stuart from pushing through them. This was done well enough that Lee was unaware of McClellan's intentions (i.e. to strike south towards Culpeper instead of west into the Valley) for several days.
Subsequent to this the cavalry seized the crossings of the Hazel river, thus meaning that McClellan wouldn't have to fight for the crossings and setting him up nicely to advance on Culpeper.
That second one by the way (Loudoun Valley) featured the biggest all-cavalry battle until Brandy Station.
Using one's cavalry for screening is an appropriate use of cavalry, surely. It prevents enemy scouting - indeed, they're much the same, with the cavalry out in advance of the army.On we go. There's a difference between screening and scouting - especially organized scouting to gather intelligence.
Strictly it happened after McClellan had begun recieving supplies (and after Halleck had permitted McClellan to move). It couldn't have happened earlier on because of the lack of supplies, though Lincoln may not have been aware of this; nevertheless the fact that there were actual food riots happening in the Army of the Potomac indicates how bad the supply situation was.The Loudoun Valley campaign occurred in late October, after Lincoln had badgered McClellan into actually moving.
What do you think all-cavalry actions look like? They're mostly small because the cavalry components of both sides are small and screening cavalry is widely spread out. Nevertheless, what happened in Loudoun is that the cavalry successfully screened the movements of McClellan's army; if you can find a battle larger than the battles in Loudoun before Ashby's Gap which was all-cavalry, I will of course apologize.It featured a few skirmishes. Suggesting that they remotely rose to a full-fledged battle, let alone something analogous to Brandy Station, is alternative history.
McClellan moved south from the Potomac to Warrenton (thus changing his base of operations to a much better one for offensive operations) and was preparing to thrust further south when Lincoln sacked him, the decision to sack him coming the day after the midterms. This may or may not be coincidental.You might also fill us in on the results of that campaign.
Well, no; it's quite hard to prevent a ride-around-the-army if the enemy is willing to detach most of their cavalry to do it, unless you have enough cavalry to outfight them after providing for other duties. The riding-around cavalry is mobile enough to decline engagement by infantry forces, while if you spread out most of your infantry force in a "cordon" you end up with an army that can prevent enemy cavalry raids but isn't concentrated enough to do anything else (including, in the state McClellan's logistics were in in October 1862, eat.)Both armies also had horses which suffered from sore tongue. But none of that stopped Stuart's second ride.
McClellan and race don't belong in the same sentence.McClellan leaves one Grand Division there and the other two race for the Richmond and Fredericksburg
Like McClellan smashed Lee at Antietam with a similar advantage?If Longstreet STAYS AND FIGHTS, McClellan hits him with more than 2:1 numerical advantage and smashes him
Except all the actual cavalry stuff that the cavalry does.Talk about unsupported hyperbole - "McClellan understood cavalry better than most"? Feel free to fill us in on the evidence. McClellan's cavalry did nothing meaningful between August 1861 and November 7, 1862.
McClellan had an extremely effective scouting arm. Scouting is something that at it's core is one man on a horse having a sneaky-peaky, but the problem is the enemy screens to prevent infiltration. In turn, recce patrols have to get bigger to provide self-defence, and a viscous cycle ensues. The outcome is you have the armies with both sides cavalry screens in contact, trying to penetrate to gather intelligence and simultaneously attempting to deny the same to the enemy.Among other things he never developed any sort of competent scouting function in his cavalry and never figured out how to establish his cavalry as an effective organization.
The outbreak in the ANV was after the raid. Indeed, it was probably communicated to Stuart's horses during the raid.The post-Antietam outbreak was grease heel, not "hoof and mouth", and also affected the ANV equally. Somehow that didn't prevent Stuart from (once again) circumnavigating McClellan's army and his moribund cavalry.
Not really. They are on intimate terms, since the scout and counter-scout (screen) are the same troops.On we go. There's a difference between screening and scouting - especially organized scouting to gather intelligence.
Or, after Lincoln and Halleck ceased blocking McClellan from assuming the offensive.The Loudoun Valley campaign occurred in late October, after Lincoln had badgered McClellan into actually moving.
The question is not one of action, but rather attitude. The northern states had plenty of horses available to remount McClellan's cavalry, but Lincoln blocks this and scoffs at the notion. Randolph and Davis however take Lee's identical claims seriously. As I'm sure you know, on 10th November Lee wrote to Randolph suggesting that since the supply of remounts was becoming exhausted, they should be purchased in Texas. This was accepted.As for the "supply" of horses, when did Davis provide all of those replenishments?
Indeed, Fitz Lee's brigade of 4 regiments of Virginia cavalry was no-where near as strong as a full division.Fitz Lee could not come close to mounting a full division by November and, unlike the Union side, a good portion of the Confederate cavalry's mounts were supplied by the individual soldiers themselves.
Converted to effectives it was likely closer to 5:4, maybe 3:2 depending how things are cut. There is a bad habit of counting McClellan's roster strength and comparing to the rebel engaged effectives. If you bring either to the same measurement, then the strengths get a lot closer.Like McClellan smashed Lee at Antietam with a similar advantage?
On some days during the Loudoun Valley campaign McClellan's corps moved twenty miles a day. (Nov 6, Burnside and Porter's corps.) There is no way this can be viewed as slow.McClellan and race don't belong in the same sentence.
He didn't have a similar advantage; at Antietam the entire ANV was present, here half of it is. By definition McClellan's numerical advantage is almost twice whatever you think it was at Antietam.Like McClellan smashed Lee at Antietam with a similar advantage?
This view by the way is derived from three independent sources.I happen to think that the AoNV's strength in the Maryland campaign was 75,000 regulation PFD before straggling and the AotP's strength in the same campaign was 87,000 regulation PFD before straggling.
Which sounds a lot like the morning of September 16th at Antietam, considering that Lee’s army was missing Jackson, Walker, McLaws and Hill. McClellan has at least twice as many troops; probably something like 50,000 effectives. Even after Jackson’s arrival, Lee has little more than half as many men as the AotP. Thank goodness that fog finally lifted. Otherwise Mac may have never sent everyone piecemeal across the creek.However, in November the numbers really do allow for overwhelming Longstreet. Longstreet has ca. 23,400 effectives at Culpeper, and Walker and elm. Hood are a days march away with ca. 7,500. McClellan has ca. 60,000 effectives bearing down on Longstreet with ca. 35,000 effectives screening Jackson.
Apologies, that was supposed to be a funny comment (lead balloon)Doubtful; McClellan's static under exactly three conditions.
1) He's facing a strong enemy fortified line; if this lasts for a month, it's because he's moved his guns into place to blast the enemy out of it.
2) He's been ordered to wait for reinforcements which he's been promised are en route before advancing.
3) His army is not being supplied.
None of the three obtains in November 1862, which is why McClellan's army was concentrated around Warrenton (resupplying) when he was relieved. If he'd been going to just stay static he'd still be concentrated around Harpers Ferry when relieved.
But on the morning of the 16th McClellan's army wasn't all closed up. It depends what time you're calling "the morning", basically, and you have to count the same for both sides.Which sounds a lot like the morning of September 16th at Antietam, considering that Lee’s army was missing Jackson, Walker, McLaws and Hill. McClellan has at least twice as many troops; probably something like 50,000 effectives.