What if McClellan had commanded the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg?

Whining about reinforcements is not the answer. You have to work with what you have with you.
Have you got any feasible alternatives yet? I've asked multiple times...
...and checked this to ensure that you hadn't provided any alternatives. I certainly didn't see them if they were there.


Incidentally...
Whining about reinforcements is not the answer. You have to work with what you have with you.
There are two arguments I can make against this.


The first is that this argument suggests anyone who ever asked for reinforcements was unjustified, which is obviously nonsense (but Grant only succeeded as much as he did in the Overland because he could simply order reinforcements to him).
The second is that McClellan was not whining for reinforcements in any sense of the word. He had been ordered to prepare for the imminent arrival of reinforcements (orders which were never rescinded) and he repeatedly made the point that without those reinforcements (which he had been promised) he could not safely attack Richmond, as his flank was exposed.

If the reinforcements had been outright cancelled and the order to operate against the rail lines north of Richmond rescinded, then McClellan could have pulled his entire force over the Chickahominy and used that as his flank guard. He would then have been technically able to very slowly and carefully attack Richmond, essentially fighting a battle of posts where he never risked uncovering his army (because Lee's army was larger than his) to get his guns in range to bombard.


But to do that historically would have meant disobeying orders and is my (4) option. You have claimed repeatedly that McClellan had alternatives to solve the operational conundrum, too many to list - so give one. Resigning does not solve the conundrum.
 
Have you got any feasible alternatives yet? I've asked multiple times...

...and checked this to ensure that you hadn't provided any alternatives. I certainly didn't see them if they were there.


Incidentally...

There are two arguments I can make against this.


The first is that this argument suggests anyone who ever asked for reinforcements was unjustified, which is obviously nonsense (but Grant only succeeded as much as he did in the Overland because he could simply order reinforcements to him).
The second is that McClellan was not whining for reinforcements in any sense of the word. He had been ordered to prepare for the imminent arrival of reinforcements (orders which were never rescinded) and he repeatedly made the point that without those reinforcements (which he had been promised) he could not safely attack Richmond, as his flank was exposed.

If the reinforcements had been outright cancelled and the order to operate against the rail lines north of Richmond rescinded, then McClellan could have pulled his entire force over the Chickahominy and used that as his flank guard. He would then have been technically able to very slowly and carefully attack Richmond, essentially fighting a battle of posts where he never risked uncovering his army (because Lee's army was larger than his) to get his guns in range to bombard.


But to do that historically would have meant disobeying orders and is my (4) option. You have claimed repeatedly that McClellan had alternatives to solve the operational conundrum, too many to list - so give one. Resigning does not solve the conundrum.

I don't know if you have ever served in the military but one thing a soldier understands is that excuses don't count for anything. You do with what you have.
 
Have you got any feasible alternatives yet? I've asked multiple times...
And I have told you repeatedly that I do not need to provide any. 155 years after the fact they won't matter.
...and checked this to ensure that you hadn't provided any alternatives. I certainly didn't see them if they were there.
see above

Incidentally...

There are two arguments I can make against this.


The first is that this argument suggests anyone who ever asked for reinforcements was unjustified, which is obviously nonsense (but Grant only succeeded as much as he did in the Overland because he could simply order reinforcements to him).
The second is that McClellan was not whining for reinforcements in any sense of the word. He had been ordered to prepare for the imminent arrival of reinforcements (orders which were never rescinded) and he repeatedly made the point that without those reinforcements (which he had been promised) he could not safely attack Richmond, as his flank was exposed.

If the reinforcements had been outright cancelled and the order to operate against the rail lines north of Richmond rescinded, then McClellan could have pulled his entire force over the Chickahominy and used that as his flank guard. He would then have been technically able to very slowly and carefully attack Richmond, essentially fighting a battle of posts where he never risked uncovering his army (because Lee's army was larger than his) to get his guns in range to bombard.


But to do that historically would have meant disobeying orders and is my (4) option. You have claimed repeatedly that McClellan had alternatives to solve the operational conundrum, too many to list - so give one. Resigning does not solve the conundrum.
 
And I have told you repeatedly that I do not need to provide any. 155 years after the fact they won't matter.

You said - specifically - that you disagreed with my list of the options. What's the alternative?

It does matter because it's about the quality of McClellan as a general, but it also matters because you've said you have alternatives and that my list was not exhaustive. Sir, you appear to me to be lying.

I don't know if you have ever served in the military but one thing a soldier understands is that excuses don't count for anything. You do with what you have.
And what do you do if you're promised something and then don't get it? How would a modern general planning on an amphibious outflanking move react if he was told while already under fire that the amphibious troops had been recalled and were going to spend the next month doing nothing in particular?
In not sending McDowell, Lincoln and Stanton violated the recommendations of every professional military man who weighed in on the subject at the time.


Of course, McClellan did "do with what he had", but success was simply not possible and the lack of reinforcements was directly tied to why he failed.
 
You said - specifically - that you disagreed with my list of the options. What's the alternative?
No I disagreed that those were the full extent of alternatives.
It does matter because it's about the quality of McClellan as a general, but it also matters because you've said you have alternatives and that my list was not exhaustive. Sir, you appear to me to be lying.
I said there were other alternatives that were not considered. Calling me a liar doesn't change the fact that this campaign was a miserable failure under Mac's leadership.

And what do you do if you're promised something and then don't get it?
Apparently if you are Mac you whine like a little girl.

How would a modern general planning on an amphibious outflanking move react if he was told while already under fire that the amphibious troops had been recalled and were going to spend the next month doing nothing in particular?
He would seek other alternatives.
In not sending McDowell, Lincoln and Stanton violated the recommendations of every professional military man who weighed in on the subject at the time.
They did there duty as they saw fit. As a reminder the President is the Commander in Chief and can use the military at his discretion.


Of course, McClellan did "do with what he had", but success was simply not possible and the lack of reinforcements was directly tied to why he failed.
It is easy to say success was not possible under the circumstance. It is much more difficult to make success possible. Apparently Mac was not up to the task.
 
Whining about reinforcements is not the answer. You have to work with what you have with you.

Which McClellan did.

However, no amount of "spirit" makes a flank secure or digs a trench. A Pl Comd asking for FSp isn't "whinning like a little girl". To any commander on the ground, asking for assets to enable them to achieve their mission is a reasonable thing to do. Here in Britain we have a recent demonstration of what the proper "spirit" does from Goose Green. No amount of Colonel Jones screaming at his company commander (Farrar-Hockley) made the Argentine belt-fed weapons disappear. When Jones at his HQ group tried to show F-H the "proper spirit" by standing up in front of multiple belt-fed weapons they were literally cut in half with two seconds. With Jones dead F-H was able to ask B and D coys for fire support (which they'd been offering on the net, and were told in much ruder terms to "shut up" by Jones) and were able to take the enemy position.

Now, if you make a combat estimate of the situation at Richmond in June '62 you'll rapidly find you simply don't have enough forces to perform all the necessary tasks. You're really about two corps short, even without holding a reserve and without having a large force south of the Chickahominy ready to strike the defenders there. The absolute minimum to man a line from the White Oak to Chickahominy is 5 divisions (at 1 division/mile), and to man a line from the Chickahominy to the Pamunkey at the half the density (using Beaver Dam and Totopotamoy Creeks for the line) would be 5 divisions, plus another for the New Bridge Heights. Troops to task I've used 11 divisions (of 11 present) simply manning such a line, and I should have a 50% reserve (another 6 divisions or two corps). To really be sure on that route 17 divisions are necessary, and 17 divisions happens to be the number Grant had at Cold Harbor.

What McClellan did was "make do". He simply did not have sufficient forces to approach Richmond and secure a defensive line for his communications. He pushed on knowing it was a risk, and asked for resources to reduce the risk.
 
No I disagreed that those were the full extent of alternatives.
Same thing. You say there are alternatives, in other places you say there are too many to count, it all adds up to your asserting that my list is not exhaustive.

I said there were other alternatives that were not considered. Calling me a liar doesn't change the fact that this campaign was a miserable failure under Mac's leadership.
Yes, you keep saying there were alternatives, but you repeatedly decline to provide them when pressed - that is why I am saying you, sir, appear to be lying.
Disprove me by providing a viable alternative.

The rest of your post is pretty much the same thing over and over - McClellan's a failure for not succeeding and there are always alternatives, but you're not providing any.


To take a specific example, how could the Korean War have been won if there were no US reinforcements beyond the troops at Pusan? No Inchon Landing, no reinforcements? Surely, after all, there are alternatives...
...or to use another example, how would Meade have done at Gettysburg if 5th and 6th corps had been removed from his command and ordered back to Washington just before arriving at the field? Just the same?

They did there duty as they saw fit. As a reminder the President is the Commander in Chief and can use the military at his discretion.

The President being the Commander in Chief does not prevent him from being militarily wrong, and Lincoln here was wrong (as felt by everyone with military experience and also everyone he asked for advice. Lincoln asked repeatedly for someone to give him advice and then ignored it). He had the legal authority to make this mistake, and I've never disputed that, but I hold it is a mistake.
 
Well, all you would need to do to get an apology from me is to provide a viable alternative (as you have said you know of several).
I could care less about an apology from you

How very Calvinist. Circumstances don't matter, literally all that matters is whether a battle is a victory or a defeat.
In the military only success matters.

Then how do you judge if someone's a good general or not? By your logic, a commander who is barely defeated at 4:1 odds is a failure and his opponent is a good general.
By success
 
I could care less about an apology from you
Honestly, at this point I'm just convinced you're unwilling to back up your opinions. It's a pity, really, as I was really hoping you'd at least try to show how McClellan could have done better with what he had.


In the military only success matters.

Okay. So this means Lee was a good general until he suddenly became a bad one?

By success

Yes, you've repeated that often enough.

Let's say you have 65 troops pinned down in a house by 3,000 attackers. After killing 190 attackers and wounding over 300 more, the defenders finally surrender on the exhaustion of their ammunition.

Presumably the commander of the defenders was a failure, because he didn't find an alternative and win?
 
Honestly, at this point I'm just convinced you're unwilling to back up your opinions. It's a pity, really, as I was really hoping you'd at least try to show how McClellan could have done better with what he had.
There is always something better than failure and I could not give a #$%@ what you think of my opinions



Okay. So this means Lee was a good general until he suddenly became a bad one?
No, even good generals can experience failure. Mac was no Lee.


Yes, you've repeated that often enough.

Let's say you have 65 troops pinned down in a house by 3,000 attackers. After killing 190 attackers and wounding over 300 more, the defenders finally surrender on the exhaustion of their ammunition.

Presumably the commander of the defenders was a failure, because he didn't find an alternative and win?

No he is a failure because he got his command into a situation where success was unlikely or impossible.
 
Everyone should calm down a bit. I will say though the burden of proof is on the people attacking McClellan. If you want to degrade the reputation of the former General in Chief of the Union Army you better have some evidence and alternatives to present, otherwise its just slander. I expect the same when people are attacking Grant or Sherman. If they fail to adequately back up claims, it normally means the person just doesn't like said general based on personal feelings regardless of evidence.
 
There is always something better than failure and I could not give a #$%@ what you think of my opinions

But you've repeatedly refused to cite what that option would be. This is my contention - you're willing to say there were alternatives, you're willing to directly state that my list of options is not exhaustive, but the closest you have thus far provided is to resign.

No, even good generals can experience failure. Mac was no Lee.
So how would we tell if McClellan was "no Lee"? In their tactical clashes McClellan comes off somewhat the better, they directly engaged in two campaigns (during which Lee failed in his campaign objective for the Seven Days, to destroy the Army of the Potomac, and failed in his campaign objective for the Maryland Campaign because McClellan drove him out of Maryland) and McClellan succeeds at Yorktown and in WV (and in Maryland).

No he is a failure because he got his command into a situation where success was unlikely or impossible.

Interesting. Does your opinion differ if he's been ordered to do it so as to fulfil an objective?
 
Saphroneth,
You obviously have no real agenda other than***Edited by Chellers****** Mac. Feel free to do so without me since you have no interest in contradictory opinions.
Dan
 
In the military only success matters.

Yet you seem to have a strange definition of success. Clearly McClellan was very successful, but you dismiss his successes because they were not easy, nor as complete as you'd like.

Chronologically:

West Virginia: McClellan builds an army and rapidly invades Western Virginia, destroying a small rebel army and gaining most of the future state for the Union.

Washington: McClellan inherits the nightmare of an enemy army at the gates of the capital. He secures the capital and drives them back from overlooking it.

Peninsula: McClellan gains Yorktown, which gives the Union control of the York and James Rivers and leads to the destruction of the Virginia. He closely pursues Johnston doing much damage, and defeats his counterattack. As he's closing for the kill a whole other force caves in his supply lines and he moves to a new supply line. He has total freedom of action on the river, and is advancing on Richmond again (without the promised reinforcements) when ordered to retreat by Halleck.

2nd Bull Run and aftermath: McClellan is incredibly fast in getting reinforcements to Pope, who given the timescale should not have expected either 3rd or 5th Corps. He manages to blunt Lee's pursuit of Pope with 2nd and 6th Corps and saved both Washington and Pope's Army.

Maryland: McClellan rapidly assembles an army, marches out to aggressively confront Lee and beats he fairly decisively. He attempts to pursue across the Potomac but is repulsed and then is denied permission to turn Lee's right via Harper's Ferry.

Loudoun Valley: A superb movement that splits the rebel army in two, with Halleck relieving McClellan on the eve of victory to save his skin regarding his (Halleck's) mismanagement of Pope.

These were all successes. You may argue that you'd have preferred them to be greater successes, but that does not change their nature as successes.
 
He certainly did quite a lot that was great. However, you seem to have moved the goalposts for McClellan. Rosecrans gets credit for Stones River, but McClellan not for Seven Pines for example. Clear case of the application of a double standard.

Rosecrans gets and deserves credit for Stones River because it was an unqualified success which lead to the Tullahoma Campaign which delivered Middle Tenneesee. Seven Pines was a stalemate that delivered Robert E. Lee and defeat.

Not even broadly comparable.
 
Rosecrans gets and deserves credit for Stones River because it was an unqualified success which lead to the Tullahoma Campaign which delivered Middle Tenneesee. Seven Pines was a stalemate that delivered Robert E. Lee and defeat.

Not even broadly comparable.

Indeed, for whilst Stones River was a success, Tullahoma is six months later and there is not much happening in those six months. Two months after that Rosecrans will be rolled up like a wet towel and lose his command. I wonder why you adopt a double standard and hold Gaines Mill against McClellan, but not Chickamauga against Rosecrans...
 
Indeed, for whilst Stones River was a success, Tullahoma is six months later and there is not much happening in those six months. Two months after that Rosecrans will be rolled up like a wet towel and lose his command. I wonder why you adopt a double standard and hold Gaines Mill against McClellan, but not Chickamauga against Rosecrans...
Agreed. McClellan was not in direct command on the field at Gaines Mill. Rosecrans was at Chickamauga and among the first to flee.
 
Indeed, for whilst Stones River was a success, Tullahoma is six months later and there is not much happening in those six months. Two months after that Rosecrans will be rolled up like a wet towel and lose his command. I wonder why you adopt a double standard and hold Gaines Mill against McClellan, but not Chickamauga against Rosecrans...

I didn't mention Chickamauga or Gaines Mill there, as you should be aware. But yeah, Chickamauga was a failure and I haven't said otherwise.

I was comparing campaigns and battles, specifically the Peninsula and Antietam to Tullahoma and Stones River. The latter two are indisputable strategic and tactical victories, the former two are the opposite.

The point is, when compared to his peers McClellan is found wanting.
 
Agreed. McClellan was not in direct command on the field at Gaines Mill.
He was in direct command, but not on the field - he was on the southern side of the Chickahominy and in contact by electric telegraph. Action was taking place on both sides of the Chickahominy.

The point is, when compared to his peers McClellan is found wanting.
Do you have an alternative course of action for McClellan before and during Mechanicsville/Gaines Mill? Please give one...
 
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