What if Lee went to the West Building Order of Battle (Early 1862) Remade

No that is way D.H.Hill's forces came in. They with the 10,000 to 20,000 men in NC and SC will defend the coast.
The point I'm trying to make is that the numbers are really lopsided.

Livermore's estimate of total Confederate mobilization, including militias and measured in Present (not PFD or Effectives) was 425,000 all told in April:



Army of Northern Virginia: 110,000

Longstreet’s I Corps

Smith’s II Corps

Stuart’s Cavalry Division

Western Virginia

Jackson’s Division: 8,397 (ex- Army of the Northwest)

Ewell’s Division: 8,500 (Detached from Army of Northern Virginia)

Heth’s Brigade: 3,000 (Lewisburg, VA)

Eastern Virginia

Huger’s Corps: 15,143 (Norfolk, VA)

Western Theatre

Army of the Mississippi: 93,883

Polk’s I Corps: (ex- Army of Central Kentucky, one Division of AoCK was the ex Army of Kanawha)

Bragg’s II Corps: (ex- Army of Mobile and Army of Pensacola)

Hardee’s III Corps:

Breckinridge’s Reserves (3 Brigades)

3 Brigades of Cavalry


Smith’s Corps (Army of Eastern Tennessee): 16,199

Army of the West: 34,045 (Missouri State Guard (Militia) and McCulloch’s Division)

Pillow’s Brigade: 3,847 (Fort Pillow, TN)

Trans-Mississippi Theatre

Pike’s Division: 9,565 (Indian Territory)

Sibley’s Brigade: 3,700 (“Army of New Mexico” – retreating into Texas)

Total: 306,279

State Forces, Garrisons and Militia

North Carolina: 26,433

South Carolina: 27,000 (est. based on splitting SC and GA returns pro rata)

Georgia: 13,000

Missouri and Arkansas: 28,000 (Jan 62)

Middle and East Florida: 4,393

Trans-Mississippi District: 20,000

Mississippi: ?

Louisiana: ?

Alabama: ?

Total: 118,826

Grand Total: 425,105



Your numbers don't include anyone in the Trans-Mississippi District, by the way, which sort of cancels out any benefit from Missouri.

To get 325,000 men in the Western Theatre, even AP, then the total strength of North Carolina plus South Carolina plus the field army in Northern Virginia and the defenders of Norfolk - and anyone in the Valley - has to total only about 100,000 AP.

This, frankly, is not enough. Either you can't get states like NC and SC to give up all their militia (and so the AoNV is functionally a division or so) or you can but the result is that Raleigh, Norfolk and Charleston are so poorly defended that a single division can snap them up.
 
Jackson’s Division: 8,397 (ex- Army of the Northwest)

Ewell’s Division: 8,500 (Detached from Army of Northern Virginia)

Heth’s Brigade: 3,000 (Lewisburg, VA)

Eastern Virginia

After the bulk of Loring's Army of Northwestern Virginia was pulled into Jackson's force to make Jackson's division, a small remnant was left:

Army of Northwestern Virginia (aka “Army of Allegheny”)

BG Edward “Allegheny” Johnson

Location: Fort Edward Johnson, Shenandoah Mountain, near Staunton, Va
  • Major George Jackson’s Virginia Cavalry Squadron (to be part of 14th​ Va Cav)
1st​ Brigade

Col. Zephaniah T. Connor
  • 12th​ Georgia
  • 25th​ Virginia (absorbed 9th​ Va Bn in December ’61)
  • 31st​ Virginia
  • Rice’s Battery (Va New Market Artillery, aka 8th​ Starr artillery)
2nd​ Brigade

Col. William C. Scott
  • 44th​ Virginia
  • 52nd​ Virginia
  • 58th​ Virginia
  • Anderson’s Battery (Va Botetourt Artillery)
Notes: This is the rump of Loring’s old “Army of Northwestern Virginia”, being the 2nd​ brigade of that army split into two. The 1st​ brigade under French was reassigned to Fredericksburg and by the Peninsula campaign was under S.R. Anderson with its’ organisation intact. The 3rd​ and 4th​ brigades were reassigned in February to Jackson, and became the 2nd​ and 3rd​ brigades of Jackson’s division. It cooperated with Jackson in the 1862 Valley campaigns, and in May these two brigades were merged into Ewell’s division. See: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2001.05.0274:chapter=1.11

There were three groups of forces in WVa, the other two being (in early March '62):

Army of Southwestern Virginia (aka “Army of the New River”)

BG Henry Heth

Location: Lewisburg, Va
  • 22nd​ Virginia (1st​ Regiment, Wise Legion)
  • 45th​ Virginia
  • 23rd​ Virginia Battalion (Finney’s – from the militia of Smyth, Mercer and Tazewell counties, 5 coys)
  • 26th​ Virginia Battalion (Edgar’s – from the part of the 59th​ Virginia Regiment which was not captured at Roanoke Island. On paper they are still a detachment of the 59th​ Va at this time)
  • Lowry’s Battery (The Wise Legion Artillery) – 2 guns
Notes: This is the rump of Wise’s force. Floyd’s force largely went to the Army of Central Kentucky. The other two regiments of the Wise Legion ended up at Fort Donelson (captured, exchanged on 9th April at returned to this force), and at Fredericksburg (hence to AP Hill’s division). Two more batteries are in the process of being raised and will fight at Lewisburg (23rd​ May 1862).

Army of Eastern Kentucky

BG Humphrey Marshall

Location: Pound Gap, Va/Ky border
  • 5th​ Kentucky (14 coys)
  • 29th​ Virginia
  • 54th​ Virginia
  • 21st​ Virginia Battalion (formed from the militia of Lee, Scott, Wise and Buchanan counties, Va. Later merged with the 29th​ Va Bn to form the 64th​ Va Mounted Infantry Regiment)
  • Jeffress’ Battery (Virginia Nottoway Artillery) – 6 guns (only 2 with horses)
  • 1st​ Battalion, Kentucky Mounted Rifles
  • Stratton’s and Witcher’s Coys, Virginia Mounted Rifles (later Coys A & B, 34th​ Va Mounted Rifles)
  • Shawnan’s Kentucky Cavalry Coy (later Coy A, 1st​ Kentucky Cavalry)
Notes: Will be attacked on 16th​ March and driven out of Pound Gap. See http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2001.05.0057:chapter=9
 
I am using PFD or Effectives with state militias and a higher mobilization.

The Western Theatre is also the Trans-Mississippi Theatre.

The Western Theatre is the states of KY, AL, GA, FL, LA, MS, TN, MO, AR, TX, West Virginia and parts of Virginia and South Carolina.

(Army of the Mississippi) Army of Central Kentucky: Gen Albert S. Johnston (117,500+10,000 Militia in LA)
2nd in Command: Gen Robert E. Lee (The extra men from the east or new KY regiments for the defence of Kentucky.)

1st Army Corps: LtG Leonidas Polk (24,350) (TN units)
Second Army Corps: LtG Braxton Bragg (42,450+10,000 Militia in LA) (LA, MS and AL units
Third Army Corps: LtG Edmund K. Smith (28,300) (Will get a 3rd Division from new KY Regiments) (AR, TN, AL and MS units)
Reserve Army Corps: MG Simon B. Buckner, Sr. (15,400) (5 Brigades) (NC, SC and KY units)
Cavalry: BG John S. Marmaduke; Col Nathan B. Forrest (7,000)

Army of East Tennessee and Western Virginia: LtG Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson (50,000) (Most of the army of the Valley and new units from TN, KY, GA, FL, AL and West Virginia.

Army of Eastern Kentucky: MG George H. Thomas (14,000) (GA and new KY Units)

Army of Northwestern Virginia: BG Humphrey Marshall (15,000) (VA units) (To invade West Virginia)

(Invasion of MO) Army of the West: LtG William J. Hardee (60,000-70,000) (Most union MO troops will join the CSA) 34,045 (Missouri State Guard (Militia) and McCulloch’s Division or more with Sibley’s Brigade: 3,700, Pike’s Division: 9,565 in the Indian Territory and 14,000 to 20,000 from Missouri and Arkansas)

Department of Texas and Arkansas: BG Paul O. Hébert (15,000) (Texas and the 8,000 from Arkansas and Missouri)

Department of Alabama and Florida: MG Samuel Jones (12,900)

Department of Mississippi: MG Mansfield Lovell (12,550) (Parts of the army of the valley)

Department of Georgia: MG Daniel H. Hill (6,000-10,000) (3,000 go to the east or to SC and NC)

The 20,000 from Trans-Mississippi District will be put in one of the new departments.

NC and SC have about 56,000-60,000 men. (More men from SC)

Virginia has about 100,000 men.
 
Then your numbers are basically impossible. You're claiming about 480,000 Confederate PFD, which equates roughly to 650,000-700,000 AP - which, and I mean this literally, is peak Union army strength. This is an army size the Union struggled to maintain.
a higher mobilization of 100,000 men. I am not using PFD or Effectives.
 
a higher mobilization of 100,000 men. I am not using PFD or Effectives.
Er...

I am using PFD or Effectives with state militias and a higher mobilization.
I think you might need to sort that one out with yourself.


Just one of the problems with a higher mobilization is the provision of small arms. This was a big enough issue for the Union, let alone the Confederacy, and this is why when you are considering this WI (which is fundamentally a question of resource allocation) you should probably stick to what was historically raised; if in order to make the what-if work you need a massively higher mobilization of troops for the CSA, then the higher mobilization is the main component of the what-if.
 
Er...
I think you might need to sort that one out with yourself.
Just one of the problems with a higher mobilization is the provision of small arms. This was a big enough issue for the Union, let alone the Confederacy, and this is why when you are considering this WI (which is fundamentally a question of resource allocation) you should probably stick to what was historically raised; if in order to make the what-if work you need a massively higher mobilization of troops for the CSA, then the higher mobilization is the main component of the what-if.

But with most union regiments of MO and KY join the CSA it would help deal with the small arms problem.

Do you think the CSA could win in the west??
 
But with most union regiments of MO and KY join the CSA it would help deal with the small arms problem.
Not really. The only actual arms stockpile the CSA gains is Saint Louis arsenal, which had about ~33,000 small arms - it's not nothing, but 26,000 of them were old flintlocks altered to percussion and as such were several decades old.


Do you think the CSA could win in the west??
It could certainly win some more signal victories (Shiloh could have been a pretty spectacular victory), possibly even by transferring troops from the East, but not by transferring any of Johnston's main field army - the cost is too great as you'd lose the East.
 
What do you think I should change??
Well, now.


Step one is going to be to ask yourself if what you're trying to do is a "what if", or a "how to". Are you trying to create a situation where the Confederacy wins in the West (a "how to"), or are you asking what the knock on effects are if something changes (a "what if").

Step two is going to be to stick as far as possible to units that actually existed, as this is "safer" for avoiding errors.

Step three is going to be to consider how the changes that you make are going to affect what happens. For example, how far down can you strip the CS forces in the East? It depends on the situation that paticular force is in - you can strip down most of the coast as far as it got in July 1862 safely, for example, but you can't strip down Johnston's army much because it's about to face a serious attempt at capturing Richmond and you pretty much can't touch Jackson's army or Richmond falls.
 
The other problem with Lee going west is simply seniority. Literally one field general in the Confederacy is senior to Lee, and it's Albert Sidney Johnson; I suppose you could have Lee and ASJ swap, but if you want Confederate success you kind of want Shiloh to go off properly.

Perhaps you could have Lee show up prior to Shiloh having moved most of the historical "June and July reinforcements" that historically went to the armies at Richmond, and have that as a tradeoff for Beauregard remaining down at New Orleans; that might allow New Orleans to avoid being taken, actually increase the bulk of the attack at Shiloh, and have Lee be the one who handles arranging the attack at Shiloh (and thus avoid the column-of-lines, using line-of-columns instead). Get ASJ shot as historically, have the attack go better because of more troops and the more flexible attack approach, and ASJ is a dead hero while Lee is a live hero and they've both crushed Grant's army against a swamp before fending off Buell's army.

Much better situation for the CSA than historical in the West, and if things go "on schedule" in the East then those troops Lee borrowed won't be needed back until the period of the Seven Days.
 
So here's the result of that on Shiloh, counting by regiments.

First off, I'm going to assume that Bragg's force is left down in Louisiana; possibly Bragg himself comes north to become CoS for the Army of Tennessee and Beauregard goes down there, so as to get Beauregard out of Virginia. This means New Orleans is well defended, so that's one significant change.
This is a loss to the CSA forces at Shiloh of:

24 numbered regiments
1 named regiment
2 battalions (Orleans Guard and Confederate Guards Response)
1 cavalry battalion
5 batteries
So call it about 26 regiments infantry, half a cavalry regiment, and 5 artillery batteries.


Secondly, Lee comes west starting in Jan-Feb 1862 with a force stripped from the southeastern coastline, consisting of

From Georgia
Lawton's Brigade (6 regiments)
From North Carolina
Ripley's brigade (4 regiments, 1 battery)
Ransom's brigade (6 regiments)
Daniel's brigade (3 regiments)
Walker's brigade (4.6 regiments, 1 company cavalry)
Branch's brigade (5 regiments, 2 batteries)
Dept. of NC artillery (4 batteries)
Dept. of NC cavalry (4 companies cavalry)
From South Carolina
Gregg's brigade (5 regiments, 1 battery)

Total 33.5 regiments infantry, 8 batteries, plus about half a cavalry regiment


Plus units not formed into brigades:

2nd, 20th, 30th NC
4th, 53rd GA
44th AL
14th, 56th VA
2nd SC Rifles
1st LA

Which is another 10 regiments.

Total net increase 17.5 regiments, 3 batteries, which puts the number of infantry regiments up to about 94-95. Combine this with line-of-columns structure and you've got real scope for a victory at Shiloh.
 
I respect what your trying to Invision. I think @Saphroneth has some valid points regarding numbers, etc. I actually like "what if" scenarios. But for me it's hard to discard the facts of the war and what happened in the east. I know there's lot of "what if the south won Gettysburg" or "what if Jackson was never killed at Chancellorsville". There's too many scenarios for me to discard facts, but that's just how my brain works. But again, I respect your thread.
 
I respect what your trying to Invision. I think @Saphroneth has some valid points regarding numbers, etc. I actually like "what if" scenarios. But for me it's hard to discard the facts of the war and what happened in the east. I know there's lot of "what if the south won Gettysburg" or "what if Jackson was never killed at Chancellorsville". There's too many scenarios for me to discard facts, but that's just how my brain works.
Part of the idea behind the above concept is that I focus basically everything on getting a really good Shiloh. I'm more or less assuming that things in the East go as they did historically until May, and the reason for that is that historically speaking none of the units (or indeed commander, Lee) who I strip out was involved much in the events of the Peninsula until after Yorktown had been abandoned; meanwhile Jackson is still doing his thing in the Valley and while I have stripped down the defences on the coast it's to a level which was historically sufficient in May-July.

Once there's been a good Shiloh then the offensive potential of the Union in the West has been pretty severly harmed (Grant's army has been badly mauled if not destroyed) and - theoretically at least - you can send the troops Lee brought with him back east over the course of May and June to keep things on schedule, or you can send them all in one big lump in May and smash McClellan in a turbocharged Seven Pines.
 
Part of the idea behind the above concept is that I focus basically everything on getting a really good Shiloh. I'm more or less assuming that things in the East go as they did historically until May, and the reason for that is that historically speaking none of the units (or indeed commander, Lee) who I strip out was involved much in the events of the Peninsula until after Yorktown had been abandoned; meanwhile Jackson is still doing his thing in the Valley and while I have stripped down the defences on the coast it's to a level which was historically sufficient in May-July.

Once there's been a good Shiloh then the offensive potential of the Union in the West has been pretty severly harmed (Grant's army has been badly mauled if not destroyed) and - theoretically at least - you can send the troops Lee brought with him back east over the course of May and June to keep things on schedule, or you can send them all in one big lump in May and smash McClellan in a turbocharged Seven Pines.
Also @John Wolf Smith
One factor we appear to be forgetting is that the Union Navy played a major role in the war in the West not the least at the battle of Shiloh.
Yes the Confederacy produced armoured riverine war craft but not enough and not enough with reliable engined.
Also the Union Navy was racially intergrated with approximately twenty five percent of it's sailor's being African American possibly even including one of Jefferson Davis's sons.
War is complex but it's fair to say the victo has major advantages over the looser.
Fighting an enemy that can not produce much of it's own military equipment, enslave or oppress forty percent of it's population and has serious political divisions in the sixty percent of it's population of European descent is has a steep hill to climb.
Leftyhunter
 
One factor we appear to be forgetting is that the Union Navy played a major role in the war in the West not the least at the battle of Shiloh.
Not really. ASJ's original concept of operations for Shiloh involved a right wheel and getting the Union soldiers away from the river; there's only so much a gunboat flotilla can do to affect a land battle.

Though Confederate defences being intact around New Orleans does give much more of a possibility for the Confederates to gain riverine control...
 
Not really. ASJ's original concept of operations for Shiloh involved a right wheel and getting the Union soldiers away from the river; there's only so much a gunboat flotilla can do to affect a land battle.

Though Confederate defences being intact around New Orleans does give much more of a possibility for the Confederates to gain riverine control...
ASJ had a good plan until he got killed then his plan went downhill from there. The USN played a critical role in the Union's ability to dominate the West. Many Union victories in the West depended on the USN.
The US tried to build a strong brown water Navy buy it came off short. A major reason is lack of manpower and the inability to build reliable simple to maintain engines. Of coursing building such an engine is not simple.
Leftyhunter
 
ASJ had a good plan until he got killed then his plan went downhill from there.
To be honest he had a good plan until Beauregard messed up some of the details in implementing it. I've mentioned the big one before (though another one was over-weakening 3rd Corps) but to clarify, Beauregard implemented a column-of-lines. This means each corps is deployed in a line and the successive lines are successive corps, which makes it much harder for a corps commander to exercise control as their line is not compact. This matters in an offensive fight.
Using a line-of-columns instead would mean that each corps had responsibility for a sector of the line.

The US tried to build a strong brown water Navy buy it came off short. A major reason is lack of manpower and the inability to build reliable simple to maintain engines. Of coursing building such an engine is not simple.
As you say, the US' brown water navy was not all it could be; nor was that of the CS. With the number of ironclads the CSA nearly got finished historically around Louisiana they could at least make a bit more of a go of it.
 
To be honest he had a good plan until Beauregard messed up some of the details in implementing it. I've mentioned the big one before (though another one was over-weakening 3rd Corps) but to clarify, Beauregard implemented a column-of-lines. This means each corps is deployed in a line and the successive lines are successive corps, which makes it much harder for a corps commander to exercise control as their line is not compact. This matters in an offensive fight.
Using a line-of-columns instead would mean that each corps had responsibility for a sector of the line.


As you say, the US' brown water navy was not all it could be; nor was that of the CS. With the number of ironclads the CSA nearly got finished historically around Louisiana they could at least make a bit more of a go of it.
My original point was for the Confederacy to do better in the West it would of needed a substantial brown water Navy requiring a factory that can make high quality reliable engined a bride to far for the Confederacy.
Leftyhunter
 
Wow, this is a really interesting thread that I just happened to stumble upon. It is an interesting discussion, and one I could definitely weigh in on. It reminds me of years ago, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, I used to run, manage, and take part in a large online Civil War strategy game (originally began as a PBEM, play by email). The game was essentially a simulation of the Civil War, with players on both sides filling all military positions, etc. The game was based on very accurate, hard data (such as economic capabilities, number of troops raised, etc) while also as the game progressed taking into account things that would affect all the different possible scenarios, many like some of the things mentioned above. But as we played more complete versions of the game, (there were 12 runs total to completion, sometimes one game would take 7-8 months), certain things also became apparent that no matter what happened on the battlefield there would still be the same outcome. (incase your curious, US won 7 of the games, CS won 5). And whether it was Kentucky actually leaving the Union and joining the Confederacy sometime in late 1861, or to the Confederate New Mexico campaign ultimately being successful in its goal, with Sibley crossing over the Yuma, taking firm control of the proposed state of "Southern California," and giving the Confederacy a Pacific port and a nation that stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific, or to the other possibilities that could have potentially happened realistically. I also over time have done lots of research and compiling data, for my own pleasure, for historical societies, and many other purposes, all the while pondering out and daydreaming many different alternate versions of the Civil War in my own head. It can all be very interesting (given your basing this on good data, figures, and situations, I.e. not accounting for South suddenly being industrial giant, or suddenly possessing a powerful navy, etc).

But as I was saying, no matter how things turn, such as in the old runs of the game, no matter what happened it seemed the Mississippi River always fell to the Union sooner or later, even if Confederate successes in a Tennessee/Kentucky campaign helped keep the action and armies somewhere in Kentucky, the two pronged advance of Union armies, one from Kentucky could be stalled, but one down the river from Missouri/Cairo area backed by the navy would eventually have success. If Confederates were holding back a Union advance in Kentucky, but Union forces gained way down, thru Cairo, thru Columbus, to Memphis or even beyond, eventually Confederate troops in the Kentucky area would either have to send troops south in attempt to stop the advance, or withdraw back into Tennessee entirely to avoid the threat to their rear. Plus, the Union advance on the Mississippi River was from both ends, very early on, from the mouth of the river to New Orleans and Baton Rouge and up.

The numbers debate is also interesting. To sum it up, you got what you got, each state could only raise so much, so putting more in one area just takes away from another.
 
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