What if Hood had caught Schofield at Spring Hill?

JSylvester

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Chapter 1: The Battle of Spring Hill

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On November 29, 1864, General John Bell Hood Hood sent Major General Benjamin F. Cheatham's and Lieutenant General Alexander P. Stewart's corps on a flanking march north across the Duck River to Davis's Ford east of Columbia, while the two divisions of Lieutenant General Stephen D. Lee's corps and most of the army's artillery remained on the south bank to deceive Major General John M. Schofield into believing that a general assault was planned against Columbia. Hood, riding near the head of the column with Cheatham's corps, plans to interpose his army between Schofield and Major General George Thomas, hoping to defeat Schofield during the Federals retreat north from Columbia. Stewart's corps followed Cheatham, and they were trailed by Major General Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's division (Lee's corps). The rest of Lee's corps remained south of Columbia, making a demonstration against Schofield's men north of the Duck River.

Cavalry skirmishes between Brigadier General James H. Wilson's Union cavalry and Lieutenant General Nathan B. Forrest's Confederate troopers continued throughout the day as the Confederates advanced. Forrest's broad turning movement with 4,000 troops pushed Wilson back north from Hurt's Corner, preventing Union cavalry from interfering with Hood's infantry advance. At 10 a.m. on November 29, Forrest ordered his men to turn west toward Spring Hill. Wilson sent several messages to Schofield warning him of Hood's advance, but it was not until dawn on November 29, that Schofield believed the reports, understood the deception represented by Lee, and realized the situation he was in. He sent Major General David S. Stanley north with Brigadier General Nathan Kimball's IV Corps division, the rest of Brigadier General George D. Wagner's division, and the bulk of the Federal artillery reserve. Their mission was initially to protect the trains, but also to hold the crossroads at Spring Hill to allow the entire army to withdraw safely to Franklin.

Forrest's horsemen approached Spring Hill at about 11:30 a.m. and ran into the IV Corps pickets. Stanley moved north quickly and formed positions with Wagner's division protecting Spring Hill village and the huge supply trains on three sides. Forrest received a message from Hood to hold the position at all costs until the infantry arrived. Major General Patrick R. Cleburne's division from Cheatham's corps arrived mid-afternoon on Forrest's left. Forrest's men moved north to cover the line.

Back in Columbia, Schofield was convinced by about 3:00 p.m. that the Confederates would not attack him here, and by 3:30 p.m. he joined two brigades of Brigadier General Thomas H. Ruger's division on the march to Spring Hill. He ordered his remaining forces to stay until dark, then join him on the march north. As soon as Schofield left, Stephen D. Lee coincidentally launched an attack on the Union position, although he had great difficulty deploying floating bridges across the river. By the time the bulk of his two divisions were able to cross, the senior Union commander left behind at Columbia, Brigadier General Jacob D. Cox, began to withdraw.

Major General Patrick R. Cleburne's 3,000 men began an echelon attack against Bradley's brigade at about 4 p.m. While Cheatham expected Cleburne to move north on Spring Hill, Hood's intention was to use this formation to make a turning movement toward the turnpike and turn left to intercept Schofield's incoming units, but apparently he had not observed the location of the Union positions south of the town. The echelon formation was therefore less effective against Bradley's position on their right and in front, allowing only Lowrey's brigade to engage them at first. Govan's and Lowrey's attack overwhelmed Bradley and his men fled in disarray. Cleburne's two brigades drove them off vigorously, and they were stopped short of the turnpike only by heavy fire from the IV Corps artillery, placed earlier by Stanley on a hill north of the creek.

By this time, Cheatham's division under Major General John C. Brown (Cheatham's division before he took command of the corps) had crossed Rutherford Creek and was being set up by Cheatham on Cleburne`s right. Earlier in the afternoon, Hood sent Stewart's corps behind Rutherford Creek and ordered them to move north from Spring Hill and cut off the Federal column. At around 6:15 p.m. Stewart arrived on Brown`s right flank and deployed his corps in a right angle across the Columbia Pike.

As darkness fell, Wagner`s lone division of 4,500 men was blocked to the north by Stewart`s 9,500 strong corps, while Brown`s 4,400-men-division threatened the right flank. Along Columbia Pike to the south were Cleburne`s still 4,200-strong division, Major General William B. Bate`s 2,500 troops and Johnson`s 3,100 men. Forrest sent Brigadier General Abraham Buford`s and James R. Chalmers` divisions, another 4,300 troopers, northwest to Carter`s Creek Pike to cover Stewart`s right flank.

When the remainder of Schofield`s nearly 30,000-man army arrived at Spring Hill around midnight of 29th November, the commander realized that a onward march to Franklin was impossible due to Stewart`s blockade. The dispatch of Wilson`s troopers to a parallel road led to the discovery that it had also been blocked.

With a concentrated night attack out of the question, Schofield attempted a makeshift regroup in the darkness. The remaining two divisions of IV Corps under Brigadier General Nathan Kimball and Thomas J. Wood extended Wagner`s lines opposite Stewart, Brown, and Cleburne to the west and south, with Wilson`s 5,600 cavalrymen deploying to Stanley`s left opposing Forrest. The Second Division of XXIII Corps under Ruger deployed along Columbia Pike opposite Bate and Johnson, while the Third Division, commanded by Brigadier General James W. Reilly was to secure the rear against Lee`s approaching 6,000 infantrymen from Major General Carter Stevenson`s and Henry D. Clayton`s divisions.

Daybreak on November 30, 1864, fully revealed the precarious position of Northerners. Hood`s 38,500 Confederates had them surrounded on three sides and possessed superior numbers. Schofield made a half-hearted attempt to reopen Columbia Pike toward Franklin with an attack by Wagner, but was easily repulsed by Major General Edward C. Walthall`s division from Stewart`s Corps. In turn, Hood gave the order to build up pressure in the rear through Clayton and Stevenson. With Clayton`s lines already visibly overlapping those of Reilly, it was only a matter of time before the entire Northern formation would collapse domino-like. At 10:30 a.m., Schofield dispatched a rider with a white flag to Hood`s lines. Only an hour later, after brief negotiations, the Army of the Ohio surrendered unconditionally. With one stroke of the hand, the Union Army`s forces in Tennessee had been more than halved.​
 
It is fair to say that without Schofield’s backstabbing letters Grant would not have been as anxious. I have noticed that in this scenario the presence of a squadron of Mississippi Flotilla heavy gunboats & the tinclads that guaranteed that Hood could not cross the Cumberland. Likewise, a corps had been transferred from Saint Louis. The L&NRR was open.

The Neosho opened Thomas’ attack. I have yet to find a personal account of one of Hood’s red legs who were on the receiving end of this he 128 pound grapeshot. That must have been hair raising.
In any event, the loss(or diversion) of Schofield's force would probably be the standard by which Thomas would how soon he would consider it feasible for his offensive.

The war was entering its final phase, and I do not think Lincoln or Grant would be in any mood to countenance any perceived faltering or faintheartedness.
 
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In any event, the loss(or diversion) of Schofield's force would probably be the standard by which Thomas would how soon he would consider it feasible for his offensive.

The war was entering its final phase, and I do not think Lincoln or Grant would be in any mood to countenance any perceived faltering or faintheartedness.
Sure, the loss of Schofield's force would have an effect. But that was never going to happen. There were very few US forces that surrendered or were captured. Wilder's force surrendered in Kentucky early in the war. And I believe Thomas Jackson captured the US garrison at Harper's Ferry. But that wasn't going to happen in December 1864.
 
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Sure, the loss of Schofield's force would have an effect. But that was never going to happen. There were very few US forces that surrendered or were captured. Wilder's force surrendered in Kentucky early in the war. And I believe Thomas Jackson captured the US garrison at Harper's Ferry. But that wasn't going to happen in December 1864.
When Hood arrived at Spring Hill, union infantry was already dug in & manning the works. As you say, these were veterans, many armed with repeaters. At every engagement they had defeated the gray backs. For good reason they believed that would prevail no matter what. As Napoleon said, the moral is to the material as ten is to one.
 
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When Hood arrived at Spring Hill, union infantry was already dug in & manning the works. As you say, these were veterans, many armed with repeaters. At every engagement they had defeated the gray backs. For good reason they believed that would prevail no matter what. As Napoleon said, the moral is to the material as ten is to one.
Those were the guys that conducted the surprise crossing of the Chattahoochee River, including the naked attack. They were the western equivalent of Wright's VI corp. The Confederate soldiers preferred not to fight those divisions. The results at Franklin demonstrate the wisdom of that preference.
 
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In fact, Hood had caught Schofield, but let him escape . To me, the question is what would have happened if Hood had attacked Schofield while his force was strung out on its line of retreat trying to escape i.e., it appears Schofield had no intention of fighting at Spring Hill and if he was attacked it would have been on his line of march and not in position, i.e., Schofield would seem to be prepared for a fighting retreat, not a defensive fight from prepared positions.


offensive
 
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In fact, Hood had caught Schofield, but let him escape . To me, the question is what would have happened if Hood had attacked Schofield while his force was strung out on its line of retreat trying to escape i.e., it appears Schofield had no intention of fighting at Spring Hill and if he was attacked it would have been on his line of march and not in position, i.e., Schofield would seem to be prepared for a fighting retreat, not a defensive fight from prepared positions.


offensive
From Schofield’s point of view, all Hood’s attack at Franklin accompanied was to delay his arrival in Nashville. He was tasked with protecting the convoy of wagons, not fighting Hood’s army. Thomas was withdrawing garrisons from all over Middle Tennessee & concentrating them at Nashville.
 
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From Schofield’s point of view, all Hood’s attack at Franklin accompanied was to delay his arrival in Nashville. He was tasked with protecting the convoy of wagons, not fighting Hood’s army. Thomas was withdrawing garrisons from all over Middle Tennessee & concentrating them at Nashville.
All very true, but the question, implied, I believe, in the OP is what becomes of Thomas'(Sherman's) plans if there was disaster at Spring Hill and The Battle of Franklin never happened ?
 
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All very true, but the question, implied, I believe, in the OP is what becomes of Thomas'(Sherman's) plans if there was disaster at Spring Hill and The Battle of Franklin never happened ?
Nashville was one of the most fortified places on earth. There were ample supplies on hand, witness the ads in the Nashville Daily Union Banner for the circus performances three times daily & the grand opening of an ice cream parlor. Hood could not flank Nashville by crossing the Cumberland. Even if he managed a bridgehead against the opposition of the gunboats, there was nothing to eat in Kentucky & no way to establish a supply line.

Hood’s announced intention was to take Nashville & use it as a base for an advance into Virginia to join Lee. Setting that delusion aside, the reality of winter in Middle Tennessee & Kentucky is exemplified by the ice storm that struck Hood’s besieging army standing in open trenches. If you have never been exposed to one of our ice storms, it might begger the imagination. Every branch & twig is encased in ice 1/8” & more thick. As Both Hood & Thomas discovered during Hood’s retreat, maneuvering during January killed horses by the thousands.

No matter what happened at Spring Hill, Hood‘s dream of greeting a grateful RE Lee outside Richmond as soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia & Army of Tennessee mingled in mutual delight was farcical. Tragically, a lot of men had to die in the attempt to make it a reality.
 
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Nashville was one of the most fortified places on earth. There were ample supplies on hand, witness the ads in the Nashville Daily Union Banner for the circus performances three times daily & the grand opening of an ice cream parlor. Hood could not flank Nashville by crossing the Cumberland. Even if he managed a bridgehead against the opposition of the gunboats, there was nothing to eat in Kentucky & no way to establish a supply line.

Hood’s announced intention was to take Nashville & use it as a base for an advance into Virginia to join Lee. Setting that delusion aside, the reality of winter in Middle Tennessee & Kentucky is exemplified by the ice storm that struck Hood’s besieging army standing in open trenches. If you have never been exposed to one of our ice storms, it might begger the imagination. Every branch & twig is encased in ice 1/8” & more thick. As Both Hood & Thomas discovered during Hood’s retreat, maneuvering during January killed horses by the thousands.

No matter what happened at Spring Hill, Hood‘s dream of greeting a grateful RE Lee outside Richmond as soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia & Army of Tennessee mingled in mutual delight was farcical. Tragically, a lot of men had to die in the attempt to make it a reality.
Again, very true as far as I know, except the real intent of Hood, trying to invest and take Nashville with the AoT seems unlikely.

Sherman won his argument for his March to the Sea plan from Grant and Lincoln only on the assurance that Thomas with the forces he would leave behind would be sufficient to meet any danger from the AoT(whoever was in command). Disaster at Spring Hill and Thomas holed up at Nashville for an indefinite time, leaves the confederate heartland open to Hood from the Gulf to the Ohio. I doubt such a situation could be allowed by Lincoln or Grant. to continue for very long

In any case though, even allowing Nashville and a Union Army to be besieged by a confederate army was not something that Grant could accept lightly. In the face of an unbroken AoP, Grant might be forced, however reluctantly, to do more than just replace Thomas.
 
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Again, very true as far as I know, except the real intent of Hood, trying to invest and take Nashville with the AoT seems unlikely.

Sherman won his argument for his March to the Sea plan from Grant and Lincoln only on the assurance that Thomas with the forces he would leave behind would be sufficient to meet any danger from the AoT(whoever was in command). Disaster at Spring Hill and Thomas holed up at Nashville for an indefinite time, leaves the confederate heartland open to Hood from the Gulf to the Ohio. I doubt such a situation could be allowed by Lincoln or Grant. to continue for very long

In any case though, even allowing Nashville and a Union Army to be besieged by a confederate army was not something that Grant could accept lightly. In the face of an unbroken AoP, Grant might be forced, however reluctantly, to do more than just replace Thomas.
Hood’s plan to invest & take Nashville is fully, exhaustively documented. His plan included reinforcements coming across the Mississippi from Arkansas & a citizen’s revolt as integral elements of the operation. I don’t blame you for thinking that taking Nashville was preposterous, as has so often been said, the difference between history & fiction is that fiction has to make sense.

I don’t follow the logic to of your statement. Hood did besiege Nashville…Uncharacteristically Grant did get the hibbie-jibbies… Thomas did beat the snot out of Hood… the alternative was Hood’s 20,000 strong army stranded in the cold & damp withering away until spring?
 
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I don’t follow the logic to of your statement. Hood did besiege Nashville…Uncharacteristically Grant did get the hibbie-jibbies… Thomas did beat the snot out of Hood… the alternative was Hood’s 20,000 strong army stranded in the cold & damp withering away until spring?

Hood didn't besiege Nashville; he confronted it but didn't invest it.
 
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Hood’s plan to invest & take Nashville is fully, exhaustively documented. His plan included reinforcements coming across the Mississippi from Arkansas & a citizen’s revolt as integral elements of the operation. I don’t blame you for thinking that taking Nashville was preposterous, as has so often been said, the difference between history & fiction is that fiction has to make sense.

I don’t follow the logic to of your statement. Hood did besiege Nashville…Uncharacteristically Grant did get the hibbie-jibbies… Thomas did beat the snot out of Hood… the alternative was Hood’s 20,000 strong army stranded in the cold & damp withering away until spring?
Assuming Hood was serious about besieging Nashville, the loss of Schofield's force and the AoT unbroken would have been a significant.
benefit to his plan.

Without Schofield and Hood's Army intact, Nashville besieged by a Confederate Army with Grant and Sherman on the East Coast might look different in Washington and the Press if Thomas was unable to respond quickly. The situation would certainly not look any the less threatening to Grant that it did in real life, especially if Thomas could not counterattack any sooner than he did and I would think seem even more so if the counterattack were delayed, which IMO would almost certainly happen with the proposed loss of Schofield's force.

I am not suggesting the North loses the West or the War, merely the loss of Schofield would almost of necessity delay his counterattack with unknown consequences in Washington and Press and of course Grant's sudden attack of nerves.
 
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