What if...Gettysburg/Vicksburg

rallyround

Cadet
Joined
Feb 20, 2005
Location
Illinois
Well! I might as well start off this new topic!
Here goes...
I have never been able to believe that Gettysburg was the turning point of the Civil War. I believe that it was the fall of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863, that really indicated a turning point. William T. Sherman once wrote to his brother: "Whatever nation gets control of the Ohio, Mississippi, and Missouri Rivers will control the continent." I believe he had it right. Once Vicksburg fell, the Confederacy gave up the Mississippi to the Union. That was a dangerous blow that cut already shrinking supply lines to the Confederacy. I believe that Gettysburg is considered the turning point by many because it was lost by the Confederacy the day before Vicksburg fell. If Gettysburg had never been fought, would that be when Vicksburg would be considered the turning point? What if Vicksburg had fallen a month before the battle at Gettysburg? Would the "turning point" be looked at differently then?
 
Personally, I hate what-if's because I believe that if you change one thing, the domino effect takes over and all things are changed ad infinitum. I do, however, understand and respect how much fun they can be for many.

Anyway Aimee's question isn't quite a what-if in the category of what if General Whoman had turned his CCXXIVII Corp right instead of left at the cross roads and for me at least easier to address. Besides it is a fun question. Thanks Aimee.

I think that two things assured Gettysburg's central position in the CW, Lincoln's appearance in November and Lee admiration. When you read contemporary evaluations, you come away knowing for a certainty that both governments in 1863 recognized the immense value of VB's loss. But emotionally GB, located in the East, had the bigger bang in the popular press of the day and impacted the morale of both home fronts more acutely.

However if VB had fallen a month sooner, the chances of GB happening are almost nonexistent. Part of Lee's GB campaign strategy was to win big in the East to divert Grant's attention East. He believed a win at GB would force Grant to send troops from the west thereby relieving the siege on VB. It was a longshot, but in Lee's mind worth the risk. However, if VB fell first, Lee would have been under enormous pressure to go west and shore up the western armies and also to conserve his resources in the East.

With the two happening in tandem, July 4th, 1863 become the turning point of the war. But of course, GB's proximity to the two White Houses, the NY press, and because of Lee's participation and ultimately because of Lincoln's great Address, GB became in the minds of most the pivotal event in the CW and the one remembered by almost every American. In addition, Sickles' commitment to making GB the first CW national monument along with Chamberlain's voluminous postwar writings assured that GB would emerge as a focus for studying the CW.

Today I think most historians, even those with an Eastern focus, grudgingly admit VB had greater military value and was a mortal hammer blow to the South's ability to feed its armies, get foreign recognition and respect, and to achieve ultimate victory.
 
I think it is hard to really pinpoint a turning point at all. I believe it was just a matter of time due to the limited manpower and resources of the Confederacy. The losses at Gettysburg and Vicksburg only hastened the inevitable. If the outcome of either would have been different it only would have prolonged things. But I feel Vicksburg had more of an effect on the outcome than Gettysburg did. Do you really think that there was a clear winner at Gettysburg. I guess the Federals were victorious because they could replace the men they had lost, where as Lee could not. Maybe if Meade would have counter attacked after Picketts charge, it would have made for a more decisive victory. What do you think would have happened if Lee had not ordered the charge, but followed Longstreet's suggestions, or simply held fast. Up until that point were not the casualties higher against the Federals?


Traveller
 
Rick: You may be right when you say, "just a matter of time due to the limited manpower and resources of the Confederacy." Yet I question this hindsight conclusion when you look at the events through a contemporary lens.

As we all know limited manpower and resources do not always translate to defeat. There are too many examples disputing it i.e. the Revolution, Vietnam.

In 1861, the South believed completely that their chances were equal or better than the North. After all they had a cohesive goal and the advantage of interior lines as well as some of the best trained West Point officers and state militias in the country.

With the exception of predictions by Lee and Sherman, few realized the enormity of the hurricane they were steering into. The South believed they could win and a couple of times nearly achieved it. In the first two years, their certainty was confirmed on the battlefield.

IMHO, had it not been for Lincoln's equal determination and commitment to preserving the Union, the South would have won in the first year or two. Lincoln, however, stood fast, weathering battlefield, political, and home front storms by bending, avoiding, fortifying and navigating in the prevailing winds. He kept the Union afloat long enough for Grant to emerge and the South to mortally bleed.

I just think that to dismiss the war as a foregone conclusion overlooks the trials of the time. The Union army after all had something to do with it as did Lincoln, Grant and the Yankee home front.
 
I did not mean to say I had written the South off from the beginning, but to win the war I think they would have had to do it quickly. I feel by the time 1863 had arrived it was clear that the North would not give in, especially with Lincoln in charge. I suppose it is easy for us to look back and to speculate, but at the time I dont know if the South really knew the enormous power that the North had over them. Once Grant arrived the war just became a matter of who had the most men to fight and to die.
 
Noted author Shelby Foote feels "the North fought that War with one hand behind it's back, if there were more Southern victories {a lot more} they would have brought out the other hand....." This is a very realistic comment coming from a Southerners point of view.The industrial might and seemingly endless supply of manpower put this "war of attrition" in the North's favor; I do agree with Traveller that in order for the South to be victorious it would have had to win it in the first two or three years.Once the Emancipation Proclamation was issued the political ramifications sealed the South's doom.
 
Marc, I tend to agree with you and Rick on the idea the South had very little time to win. I feel it had to win by at least 1862 before the North began to wear her down.

That is the trouble with viewing history from up here in the future. Things are set and in their place.

Myself, I think the North could have lost due to low morale or other factors. In my opinion, the US lost the Vietnam war at home, not on the battlefield. If political restrictions had been lifted, it may have had a different outcome.

The same with the Civil War. If the South had launched some early punches up North, it might have made all the difference.

But our history is set, dates, places and names all in their places. But it is fun to speculate just a bit, don't you think?

Unionblue
 
I agree with Neil.

The south could have won if the north had waffled in its determination, but it didn't. Despite a lot of noise from know-nothings and Copperheads and riots in NYC, the north was on the whole committed to Union and willing to fling its superior resources at keeping the country together.

In the beginning only a few recognized this. Sherman was one. He summarized it perfectly.

"You mistake, too, the people of the North. They are a peaceable people, but an earnest people and will fight too, and they are not going to let this country be destroyed without a mighty effort to save it. . . and in all history no nation of mere agriculturists ever made successful war against a nation of mechanics . . .

The North can make a steam engine, locomotive or railway car; hardly a yard of cloth or a pair of shoes can you make. You are rushing into war with one of the most powerful, ingeniously mechanical and determined people on earth-right at your doors. You are bound to fail. Only in spirit and determination are you prepared for war. In all else you are totally unprepared, with a bad cause to start with.

At first you will make headway, but as your limited resources begin to fail, and shut out from the markets of Europe by blockade as you will be, your cause will begin to wane . . . if your people would but stop and think, they must see that in the end you will surely fail."


Sherman's prophecy. December 1860


(Message edited by tulip on October 22, 2002)
 
Connie, excellent post! Thank you for sharing Sherman's prophecy of 1860 with us. I had never seen it in such a complete manner.

Amazing that he could see such a future and that he could cling to it, even when he became depressed and 'mad' early in the war. What was that comment, that Sherman was "gone in the head" or some such?

Unionblue
 
One of the reasons you seldom see complete quotes is because it is trendy today for published historians to clip them down to bite size. It is one of the reasons the old writers are often more fun. The Sherman prediction I quoted came from <u>Sherman, Fighting Prophet</u> 1932 by Lloyd Lewis.

Murat Halstad the owner of the Cincinnati Commercial was at odds with Sherman and published the "insane" accusation on December 11, 1861. It was passed to him by two journalists -- Henry Villard who heard it from Sam Wilkerson. It had been campfire gossip in which Wilkerson called Cump "crazy." The venacular became a diagnosis in the editorial.

"The painful intelligence reaches us, in such form that we are not at liberty to disclose it, that Gen. William T. Sherman, late commander of the Department of the Cumberland, is insane. It appears that at the time while commanding in Kentucky, stark mad. We learn that he at one time telegraphed to the War Department three times in one day for permission to evacuate Kentucky and retreat into Indiana. . . The harsh criticisms that have been lavished on this gentleman, provoked by his strange conduct, will now give way to feelings of deepest sympathy for him in this great calamity. It seems providential that the country has not to mourn the loss of an army through the loss of mind of a general into whose hands was committed the vast responsibility of the command of Kentucky."

Old Brains, General Halleck stood by his old friend and immediately telegraphed Ellen Sherman. "Tell the General I will make a Yankee trade with him. I will take all that is said against him if he will take all that is said against me. I am certain to make 50% profit by the exchange."

Halstead was pressured into printing a retraction on December 13, but few noticed. Damage had been done and in several ways it backfired against Halstead and the reporters. After the war both Wilkerson and Villard denied any participation in the accusation, although there is a case to be made that it was actually written by Villard.

The truth is that at the time Sherman was probably suffering from depression which is always temporary. Those near him reported he was troubled, nervous, obssessed, and at times a bit deranged. Course, the outcome of Halstead's ridiculous editorial scourge was to turn Sherman's distrust of the press into outright hatred ending in the notorious Thomas Knox trial for treason.

The event also served as a bonding force with Grant who underwent his own burning at the media stake after Donelson and Shiloh. It is interesting that while the press experiences brought the two generals together, each reacted differently. Grant never tried to gag the press instead turned several journalists -- Cadwallader, Richardson, Young and Charles Dana into unofficial members of his staff while Sherman became the most ardent and vocal critic of the press in the military establishment.

[Sherman Fighting Prophet, pg 202-203]
[Blue &amp; Gray in Black &amp; White pgs 240 and 244]
 
If Vicksburg, fell a month before, I have my doubts, that Gettysburg, would have happened. The reasons, for Lee's invasion, of the north, would have been voided.

Gunsmoke
 
Charles
1 reason! Not all the reasons.
Moving to Pennsylvania had several objectives.
1. Drawing the AoP out of Virginia to allow the farmers a respite from
all the armies tramping back and forth, and hopefully allowing time
for a decent harvest.
2. To carry the war into the North and hopefully weaken Northern resolve for the war.
3. To use Maryland and Pennsylvania farms to supply his own needs.
4. To meet Hooker's army and destroy it piecemeal, on ground of his own choosing. Thereby winning that Great Battle that would Win the war for the South.
5. Lee was a Virginian, and nothing but. From that I sometimes think he cared not 1 iota for anything not Virginian, and the planning of the campaign was started to prevent Davis from sending Longstreet, or anyone else for that matter, to the West.
Chuck in Il.
 
I was aware of the above reasons, for Lee taking his army north. There was enough anti-war sentiment, in Washington, that even a small victory, on northern soil, might would have caused a vote, that would have stopped the war. But, when we throw in the "what if" of Vicksburg falling before, the battle of Gettysburg, we start a whole different chain of events. With the fall of Vicksburg first, the fighting spirit, of the north, would have rose, to a very high level. A small victory,or even large one, by Lee, in the north, wouldn't have caused enough votes to change, to stop the war. More than likely, with the fall of Vicksburg happening first, to stop the war, Lee would have had to destroy the AOP, and then, he may have had to go after Grant.
 
Sherman's prophesy is really interesting. Rather prophetic.
I know this is leaving the CW, but, maybe the Japanese should have read Sherman's prophesy in 1941. It applies equally well.
 
Jack, a very profound observation on your part and I agree completely. Americans are a tricky bunch and are very hard to "read" when it comes to their response when it comes to war.

When I was in Military Intelligence, I had occasion to read translated Russian Military manuals on American tactics. In the preface of the one manual I read it said, "Never trust Americans to go by their own military manuals on fighting a war. They are just too unpredictable!"

Unionblue
 
I think the Japanese did know. Admiral Yamamoto opposed the attack and the war. His response to the success of the attack on Pearl Harbor was "I fear all we have done is awakened a sleeping giant and have instilled in him a terrible resolve"

Admiral Yamamoto also predicted that his country would essentially have the run of the Pacific for about six months after they attacked Pearl Harbor, but then they would ultimately suffer defeat...
YMOS
tommy
 
Yamamoto, who had spent time in the US, did feel that war with the US would be a mistake. He said he could run wild in the Pacific for 6 months (he did), but then we would build up our military machine and beat H*&amp;^ out of them (we did).
Yamamoto was in the minority. The Japanese high command was sure we would get discouraged and negotiate a peace treaty. They did not understand how angry and determined we would become, after Pearl Harbor.
 
Charles,
I still don't think Vicks. falling 1 month earlier, would have made much difference in northern thought.
Lee needed, and strived for, a great victory, whether Vicks. was lost early June or July, or not at all. And I think, the Vicks surrender and the defeat of Lee at the same time actually had a greater effect on the burst of sprirt, that each would create separately.
So you have Lee winning his Penns. campaign, then heading his army west to defeat Grant. How does he hold his hard fought ground and move enought troops west to have any effect against Grant?
And what votes are you talking about. The presidental election was not until '64, so <u>who</u> was going to 'vote' to end the war. Certainly not Lincoln. Not at this stage of the War.
Chuck in Il.
 
Charles, this I think was the great flaw in Confederate strategy (and the Union's too, early in the war).

There was no overall command, no unified goal. Lee looked out for the East and the other Reb generals had to look out for the West as best they could.

The fall of Vicksburg one month early would have had no effect, I think, on Lee sending any troops to the West or would have delayed his march to Gettysburg. I think the mindset of Lee and Davis was already set in stone and that was keep Lee in front of Richmond.

Now, if somehow, Grant had botched Vicksburg and been cut off behind rebel lines and defeated in front of Vicksburg, my, my, how things might have changed!

Unionblue
 
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