What do you believe was Meade’s best strategy in winning the battle of Gettysburg?

NDR5thNY

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I believe sending Buford’s Cavalry with the Spencer Rifles , followed by Reynold’s with the iron brigade on July 1st with the Sharpe’s rifles provided superior firepower were it was most needed . General Oates of the 15th Alabama wrote Joshua Chamberlain in 1888. General Oates wrote the the Second US Sharpshooters with their Sharpe rifles were Instrumental in holding his forces from capturing Little Round Top. General Oates believed taking Little Round Top would have won the battle.
I am interested in hearing your opinions.
 
Hi and welcome to CWT from PA! I think that the most fortuitous thing Meade did, in agreement with you, was place Reynolds in command of the part of the army between him and Lee. This allowed the I Corps to hold the line at the Seminary long enough on day one to keep the high ground south of the town.
 
I believe that there are a sequence of decisive decisions that were made by Meade at Gettysburg that resulted in his vistory.

But it all starts with GGM believing in his officers early on that Gettysburg was "good ground" to fight a battle. The ink was barely dry on his Pipe Creek Circular when he committed to fight at Gettysburg. That decision started the sequence of events/decisions that resulted in his victory. Much of his army was south of Gettysburg and Pipe Creek was close enough for enacting his Pipe Creek Circular. But he didn't enact it and the rest is history.
 
Gettysburg was a meeting engagement. That meant that individual units arrived at times & positions that were a happenstance, not the result of a plan. There was no strategic decision made by Meade that affected the battle in any way until after Lee was defeated & began his retreat. The Battle of Gettysburg did not end until Lee's army was safely across the Potomac.

Tactically, Meade's tepid pursuit of Lee's retreat was one of the greatest mistakes of the war. Sheridan's relentless pressure on Lee's flank at a later date is a template for what should have been done. Allowing Lee to cross the Potomac with what was left of the Army of Northern Virginia was a strategic error of the first order. Lincoln recognized that & expressed his disappointment eloquently.

Lee's army had no ammunition & no food. He was pinned against the uncrossable Potomac. A vigorous advance by the AoP would have put Lee into an impossible tactical position. As it was, desertions, straggling & abandoned wounded was the equilivent of a corps. Kilpatrick's cavalry was gobbling up his wagons filled with wounded in large numbers. Meade, a hard hitter as a corps commander, had the means & opportunity to deliver a fatal blow to Lee's army. As it was, the habitual creaks & groans of the AoP corps command was incapable of mounting a vigorous pursuit. It was Meade's job to kick them into motion, but that did not & could not have happened.

Why didn't Meade do what any Western general would have done & drive Lee's army into the Potomac? Military historians credit the habitual command paralysis legacy of George McClellan to explain the AoP's habitual inability to take advantage of opportunities. It is as good an an answer as any. Grant never gave a thought to what the opponent was going to do, he concentrated on what he was going to do to them. Under McClellan, the army had been inculcated with exactly the opposite philosophy. It is unreasonable to expect Meade to undo that damage in the few days he was in command before Lee retreated.

The Battle of the Wilderness provides an insight into what Meade could have accomplished at Gettysburg. By moving south, keeping the pressure up, & taking the initiative away from Lee, at the Wilderness Grant negated whatever advantage Lee might have gained. That was strategic thinking driving tactical actions. At Gettysburg it was Meade's lack of strategic understanding that prevented his army from striking a fatal blow against the AoNV.
 
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From the little that I have read, I have concluded that General Meade's best strategy was the execution of the strategic plan contained in the order elevating him to command. Washington and Baltimore were covered, the Army of Northern Virginia was engaged. When the campaign was over, that plan and its execution had resulted in the strengthening the of United States and the weakening of the rebellious states.
 
What are you talking about?
None of Bufors men had Spencer rifles.
None of the iron brigade had sharps rifles.
Thank you for pointing this out. I had read quotes from General Stackpole’s Buford’s New Tactics which mentioned Spenser’s. I was mistaken that the Iron Brigade had Sharpes . Thank you again for the information.
 
Tactically, Meade's tepid pursuit of Lee's retreat was one of the greatest mistakes of the war.
Tepid pursuit?

There are only four ways to move in a pursuit after Gettysburg, given the fact the army can't march over a mountain range without using a pass.

Option one is to go north and west, into the Cumberland Valley, and try and overhaul Lee on Lee's right side. This gives Lee a clear run at Washington.
Option two is to follow Lee over the same mountain passes. This is easily blocked by Lee leaving a rearguard and has no prospect of getting in front of Lee.
Option three is to go south and then cut west, to try and overhaul Lee on Lee's left side. This is the route Meade historically took, and his corps moved very fast - some of them made about thirty miles a day - so I don't think you can reasonably characterize it as "tepid". The problem is simply that it's a much longer route, about twice as long.
Option four is to go south across the Potomac entirely, and then cut in west into the Shenandoah. This still means marching a longer route than Lee, and it again means uncovering Washington.


Since your post also mentions
Why didn't Meade do what any Western general would have done & drive Lee's army into the Potomac?
I'd like to ask of the examples you have of a Western general doing this sort of thing. Note that I do not consider Vicksburg to count because at Vicksburg the enemy commander was backed against an uncrossable river and then forced to surrender by siege.
 
I believe sending Buford’s Cavalry with the Spencer Rifles , followed by Reynold’s with the iron brigade on July 1st with the Sharpe’s rifles provided superior firepower were it was most needed . General Oates of the 15th Alabama wrote Joshua Chamberlain in 1888. General Oates wrote the the Second US Sharpshooters with their Sharpe rifles were Instrumental in holding his forces from capturing Little Round Top. General Oates believed taking Little Round Top would have won the battle.
I am interested in hearing your opinions.
These are all tactical considerations (others have already pointed out the errors, so I won't), not strategic. The Union Army stayed between Lee and the cities of Washington and Baltimore, which was Hooker's doing as much as Meade's. It has also been pointed out that Gettysburg was a "meeting engagement." These are the hardest of all engagements because the situation is continuously fluid and it's difficult to force the enemy to your will. There were several "turning points," many on the first day, where the situation could have swung in Lee's favor and there would have been little Meade could do about it. In the end, he fought a great defensive battle. Meade made an excellent defensive position, the "fish hook line," work in his favor. He maintained an interior position with superior numbers of men and materiel. He also listened seriously to the opinions of his subordinate commanders. Despite having a reputation for a thundering temper, he displayed calm control and leadership. I think he was partly lucky, but he played his hand well, and, let's remember, he was the first commander to defeat Lee in a major engagement.
 
Tepid pursuit?

There are only four ways to move in a pursuit after Gettysburg, given the fact the army can't march over a mountain range without using a pass.

Option one is to go north and west, into the Cumberland Valley, and try and overhaul Lee on Lee's right side. This gives Lee a clear run at Washington.
Option two is to follow Lee over the same mountain passes. This is easily blocked by Lee leaving a rearguard and has no prospect of getting in front of Lee.
Option three is to go south and then cut west, to try and overhaul Lee on Lee's left side. This is the route Meade historically took, and his corps moved very fast - some of them made about thirty miles a day - so I don't think you can reasonably characterize it as "tepid". The problem is simply that it's a much longer route, about twice as long.
Option four is to go south across the Potomac entirely, and then cut in west into the Shenandoah. This still means marching a longer route than Lee, and it again means uncovering Washington.


Since your post also mentions

I'd like to ask of the examples you have of a Western general doing this sort of thing. Note that I do not consider Vicksburg to count because at Vicksburg the enemy commander was backed against an uncrossable river and then forced to surrender by siege.
No thanks. I don't do straw men.
 
These are all tactical considerations (others have already pointed out the errors, so I won't), not strategic. The Union Army stayed between Lee and the cities of Washington and Baltimore, which was Hooker's doing as much as Meade's. It has also been pointed out that Gettysburg was a "meeting engagement." These are the hardest of all engagements because the situation is continuously fluid and it's difficult to force the enemy to your will. There were several "turning points," many on the first day, where the situation could have swung in Lee's favor and there would have been little Meade could do about it. In the end, he fought a great defensive battle. Meade made an excellent defensive position, the "fish hook line," work in his favor. He maintained an interior position with superior numbers of men and materiel. He also listened seriously to the opinions of his subordinate commanders. Despite having a reputation for a thundering temper, he displayed calm control and leadership. I think he was partly lucky, but he played his hand well, and, let's remember, he was the first commander to defeat Lee in a major engagement.
Your posting is perceptive. Meade saw the battlefield for the first time at dawn on the third day of the battle. The dye had been cast, he literally had no time to make major changes in the army's dispositions.
 
I believe sending Buford’s Cavalry with the Spencer Rifles , followed by Reynold’s with the iron brigade on July 1st with the Sharpe’s rifles provided superior firepower were it was most needed . General Oates of the 15th Alabama wrote Joshua Chamberlain in 1888. General Oates wrote the the Second US Sharpshooters with their Sharpe rifles were Instrumental in holding his forces from capturing Little Round Top. General Oates believed taking Little Round Top would have won the battle.
I am interested in hearing your opinions.
At Hoover's Gap, Wilder's Brigade armed with Spencers is an example of what would have happened if Buford had confronted Heath with repeaters.
 
No thanks. I don't do straw men.
Under what interpretation is that a straw man?

You said

"
Why didn't Meade do what any Western general would have done & drive Lee's army into the Potomac?
"

I asked for an example of a Western general doing this sort of thing. The only exception is Vicksburg, but since you said any Western general I can ask you for an example of, say, Rosecrans doing this (as Rosecrans was a Western general). Or Sherman, or Thomas.

The alternative is that you're saying "any Western general" would have driven Lee's army into the Potomac, but that you have literally no actual examples of that sort of thing to base your reasoning on.


I suppose I could rephrase and ask why you think "any Western general" would have done that. It's easy enough to come up with examples where a Western general fought his opponent and then his opponent pulled back.
 
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Strategy... I think his best order was to remain where he was. His position at Gettysburg on the 3rd day was possibly a better defensive position than Lee had at Fredericksburg. I believe Meade also had drawn a line of battle approximately 12 miles away, where he was originally preparing to fight. But based on his marvelous defensive location, he remained, and changed the course of history.
 
The defender usually extracted a higher toll from an attacker, so his best policy was a fighting withdrawal, trading space for time to allow his numerically superior army (including the Sixth Corps) to concentrate. In addition, to maximize the effectiveness of his superior artillery arm, he needed to overlook large swaths of open ground. He accomplished both objectives at Gettysburg, so he need not change much.

However, the thing that nearly undid the Union army on several occasions was his overreaction to Lee's moves, shifting troops out of one sector to another to meet the latest threat, which only endangered the newly denuded portions of his line. That stemmed from ceding the initiative to Lee. So Meade should launch two or three bold but limited forays/probes (on both flanks and near the town) to throw Lee off balance and keep him guessing. These probes would likely prove unsuccessful, but it would buy more time for Meade, and time was on his side as mobilizing Federal militia forces increasingly threatened Lee's supply lines.
 
Under what interpretation is that a straw man?

You said

"
Why didn't Meade do what any Western general would have done & drive Lee's army into the Potomac?
"

I asked for an example of a Western general doing this sort of thing. The only exception is Vicksburg, but since you said any Western general I can ask you for an example of, say, Rosecrans doing this (as Rosecrans was a Western general). Or Sherman, or Thomas.

The alternative is that you're saying "any Western general" would have driven Lee's army into the Potomac, but that you have literally no actual examples of that sort of thing to base your reasoning on.


I suppose I could rephrase and ask why you think "any Western general" would have done that. It's easy enough to come up with examples where a Western general fought his opponent and then his opponent pulled back.
Yes, it is.
 
Yes, it is.
That's not how this (where "this" is reasoned debate) works.

You made a statement with which I happen to disagree. I've asked you to provide the evidence that leads you to make the statement.
That's not a straw man.

A straw man is when someone constructs a simplified and erroneous version of someone's argument, and then attacks that. I've not done so, unless that is you don't believe that "any Western general" would have "drive[n] Lee's army into the Potomac".

Indeed, it wouldn't even be a straw man if I asked for an example of Buell doing it, because Buell was a Western general and you said "any" Western general, but I've been charitable enough to restrict myself to the more famously successful ones when I mention specific ones; you of course can bring up any example, except for Vicksburg as noted.
 
I think he was partly lucky, but he played his hand well, and, let's remember, he was the first commander to defeat Lee in a major engagement.
I'm actually sort of interested in following up on this point, because I'd like to know what definition is using for "defeat" here. There are several possible interpretations but I'd like to hear yours.
 
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